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Rent dissipation in difference-form contests 差异形式竞赛中的租金消散
IF 0.5 4区 经济学
Mathematical Social Sciences Pub Date : 2024-12-01 Epub Date: 2024-09-05 DOI: 10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2024.09.002
Ratul Lahkar
{"title":"Rent dissipation in difference-form contests","authors":"Ratul Lahkar","doi":"10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2024.09.002","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2024.09.002","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>We consider rent-seeking contests where the impact function, which measures how much impact effort has, takes an exponential form. The resulting contest success function (CSF) is a difference-form CSF and the contest is a difference-form contest. Rent dissipation measures the rent lost due to rent-seeking. Cost functions in our difference-form contest are also exponential. We establish the equivalence between such difference-form contests and Tullock contests. We then solve finite-player symmetric difference-form contests in closed form. But if there are asymmetries, the contest cannot be solved. We, therefore, approximate an asymmetric difference-form contest with a large population contest, which can be solved. Rent dissipation in the large population contest is the ratio of the elasticity of the impact function to that of the cost function. Hence, this ratio also approximates rent dissipation in a finite-player contest.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":51118,"journal":{"name":"Mathematical Social Sciences","volume":"132 ","pages":"Pages 40-48"},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2024-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142229465","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Symmetry groups for social preference functions 社会偏好函数的对称组
IF 0.5 4区 经济学
Mathematical Social Sciences Pub Date : 2024-12-01 Epub Date: 2024-08-13 DOI: 10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2024.07.004
Daniela Bubboloni, Francesco Nardi
{"title":"Symmetry groups for social preference functions","authors":"Daniela Bubboloni,&nbsp;Francesco Nardi","doi":"10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2024.07.004","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2024.07.004","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>We introduce the anonymity group, the neutrality group and the symmetry group of a social preference function. Inspired by an unsolved problem posed by Kelly in 1991, we investigate the problem of recognizing which permutation groups may arise as anonymity, neutrality and symmetry groups of a social preference function. A complete description is provided for neutrality groups. In the case of anonymity groups, we derive a sufficient condition, which largely captures the desired class of objects. Our approach also is of relevance for the notion of representability by Boolean functions and, therefore, the results of this paper also shed some light on this field of study.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":51118,"journal":{"name":"Mathematical Social Sciences","volume":"132 ","pages":"Pages 1-14"},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2024-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0165489624000696/pdfft?md5=1a8881f9212a224d472328303d2dd0e9&pid=1-s2.0-S0165489624000696-main.pdf","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142096187","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Inequality and bipolarization-reducing mixed taxation 不平等和两极化--减少混合税收
IF 0.5 4区 经济学
Mathematical Social Sciences Pub Date : 2024-12-01 Epub Date: 2024-11-13 DOI: 10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2024.11.001
Oriol Carbonell-Nicolau
{"title":"Inequality and bipolarization-reducing mixed taxation","authors":"Oriol Carbonell-Nicolau","doi":"10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2024.11.001","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2024.11.001","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>Progressive income and commodity tax structures have been examined independently in terms of their ability to reduce income inequality and bipolarization. Rather than focusing on income and commodity taxes in isolation, this paper studies mixed tax systems, which subject both income and consumption to taxation. It provides necessary and sufficient conditions on the structure of these systems that ensure a reduction in income inequality and bipolarization for both exogenous and endogenous income scenarios. Commodity taxation is “superfluous” in the case of exogenous income, as any post-tax income distribution achievable through a mixed tax system can be replicated by income taxation alone. In contrast, when income is endogenous, there are cases where relying solely on income taxation is ineffective, while mixed tax structures have equalizing and depolarizing potential.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":51118,"journal":{"name":"Mathematical Social Sciences","volume":"132 ","pages":"Pages 128-145"},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2024-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142701105","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Very weakly dominant strategies 极弱优势战略
IF 0.5 4区 经济学
Mathematical Social Sciences Pub Date : 2024-12-01 Epub Date: 2024-09-18 DOI: 10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2024.09.005
Benjamin Bachi, Shiran Rachmilevitch
{"title":"Very weakly dominant strategies","authors":"Benjamin Bachi,&nbsp;Shiran Rachmilevitch","doi":"10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2024.09.005","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2024.09.005","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>We introduce a new solution concept for <span><math><mi>n</mi></math></span>-person strategic games — <em>very weak dominance</em> — which is weaker than ordinary weak dominance, but stronger than Nash equilibrium. One of the attractive features of this concept is that it can provide intuitive predictions to games in which weakly dominant strategies exist, but they seem unappealing.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":51118,"journal":{"name":"Mathematical Social Sciences","volume":"132 ","pages":"Pages 75-78"},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2024-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142526127","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Consistent conjectures in dynamic matching markets 动态匹配市场中的一致猜想
IF 0.5 4区 经济学
Mathematical Social Sciences Pub Date : 2024-12-01 Epub Date: 2024-11-17 DOI: 10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2024.11.002
Laura Doval , Pablo Schenone
{"title":"Consistent conjectures in dynamic matching markets","authors":"Laura Doval ,&nbsp;Pablo Schenone","doi":"10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2024.11.002","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2024.11.002","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>We provide a framework to study stability notions for two-sided dynamic matching markets in which matching is one-to-one and irreversible. The framework gives center stage to the set of matchings an agent anticipates would ensue should they remain unmatched, which we refer to as the agent’s <em>conjectures</em>. A collection of conjectures, together with a pairwise stability and individual rationality requirement given the conjectures, defines a solution concept for the economy. We identify a sufficient condition — <em>consistency</em> — for a family of conjectures to lead to a nonempty solution (cf. Hafalir, 2008). As an application, we introduce two families of consistent conjectures and their corresponding solution concepts: continuation-value-respecting dynamic stability, and the extension to dynamic markets of the solution concept in Hafalir (2008), sophisticated dynamic stability.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":51118,"journal":{"name":"Mathematical Social Sciences","volume":"132 ","pages":"Pages 114-127"},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2024-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142701104","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Some further results on random OBIC rules 关于随机 OBIC 规则的一些进一步结果
IF 0.5 4区 经济学
Mathematical Social Sciences Pub Date : 2024-10-01 Epub Date: 2024-08-16 DOI: 10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2024.08.005
Madhuparna Karmokar , Dipjyoti Majumdar , Souvik Roy
{"title":"Some further results on random OBIC rules","authors":"Madhuparna Karmokar ,&nbsp;Dipjyoti Majumdar ,&nbsp;Souvik Roy","doi":"10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2024.08.005","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2024.08.005","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>We study the structure of probabilistic voting rules that are ordinal Bayesian incentive compatible (OBIC) with respect to independently distributed prior beliefs that can be considered <em>generic</em> (Majumdar and Sen (2004)). We first identify a class of priors, such that for each prior in that class there exists a probabilistic voting rule that puts a positive probability weight on “compromise” candidates. The class of priors include generic priors. Next, we consider a class of randomized voting rules that have a “finite range”. For this class of rules, we identify an appropriate generic condition on priors such that, any rule in this class is OBIC with respect to a prior satisfying the generic condition if and only if the rule is a random dictatorship.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":51118,"journal":{"name":"Mathematical Social Sciences","volume":"131 ","pages":"Pages 102-112"},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2024-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142083493","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Shannon meets Myerson: Information extraction from a strategic sender 香农遇上迈尔森从战略发送者那里提取信息
IF 0.5 4区 经济学
Mathematical Social Sciences Pub Date : 2024-10-01 Epub Date: 2024-07-25 DOI: 10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2024.07.002
Anuj S. Vora , Ankur A. Kulkarni
{"title":"Shannon meets Myerson: Information extraction from a strategic sender","authors":"Anuj S. Vora ,&nbsp;Ankur A. Kulkarni","doi":"10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2024.07.002","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2024.07.002","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>We study a setting where a receiver must design a questionnaire to recover a sequence of symbols known to a strategic sender, whose utility may not be incentive compatible. We allow the receiver the possibility of selecting the alternatives presented in the questionnaire, and thereby linking decisions across the components of the sequence. We show that, despite the strategic sender and the noise in the channel, the receiver can recover exponentially many sequences, but also that exponentially many sequences are unrecoverable even by the best strategy. We define the growth rate of the number of recovered sequences as the information extraction capacity. A generalization of the Shannon capacity, it characterizes the optimal amount of communication resources required while communicating with a strategic sender. We derive bounds leading to an exact evaluation of the information extraction capacity in many cases. Our results form the building blocks of a novel, non-cooperative regime of communication involving a strategic sender.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":51118,"journal":{"name":"Mathematical Social Sciences","volume":"131 ","pages":"Pages 48-66"},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2024-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141961295","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Gain–loss hedging and cumulative prospect theory 损益对冲和累积前景理论
IF 0.5 4区 经济学
Mathematical Social Sciences Pub Date : 2024-10-01 Epub Date: 2024-07-25 DOI: 10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2024.07.003
Lorenzo Bastianello , Alain Chateauneuf , Bernard Cornet
{"title":"Gain–loss hedging and cumulative prospect theory","authors":"Lorenzo Bastianello ,&nbsp;Alain Chateauneuf ,&nbsp;Bernard Cornet","doi":"10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2024.07.003","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2024.07.003","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>Two acts are comonotonic if they co-vary in the same direction. The main purpose of this paper is to derive a new characterization of Cumulative Prospect Theory (CPT) through simple properties involving comonotonicity. The main novelty is a concept dubbed gain–loss hedging: mixing positive and negative acts creates hedging possibilities even when acts are comonotonic. This allows us to clarify in which sense CPT differs from Choquet expected utility. Our analysis is performed under the assumption that acts are real-valued functions. This entails a simple (piece-wise) constant marginal utility representation of CPT, which allows us to clearly separate the perception of uncertainty from the evaluation of outcomes.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":51118,"journal":{"name":"Mathematical Social Sciences","volume":"131 ","pages":"Pages 40-47"},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2024-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0165489624000684/pdfft?md5=1b553049de9d55af0f9582ce915bd357&pid=1-s2.0-S0165489624000684-main.pdf","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141954681","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Designing information to improve welfare in matching markets 设计信息，提高匹配市场的福利
IF 0.5 4区 经济学
Mathematical Social Sciences Pub Date : 2024-10-01 Epub Date: 2024-06-11 DOI: 10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2024.06.001
Sulagna Dasgupta
{"title":"Designing information to improve welfare in matching markets","authors":"Sulagna Dasgupta","doi":"10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2024.06.001","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2024.06.001","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>In matching markets, objects are allocated to agents without monetary transfers, based on agents’ preferences. However, agents may not have enough information to determine their preferences over the objects precisely. How should a benevolent planner optimally reveal information to maximize social welfare in this context? I show that when agents are symmetric and there are just two options, letting each agent know his <em>rank</em> in the realized distribution of preferences – but not his actual preferences – <em>always</em> improves social welfare over providing no information. When there are more objects, this rank-based information policy generalizes to the Object Recommendation (OR) Signal, which consists of simply recommending each agent to pick his socially-optimal choice. Under a mild regularity condition, I show that, when agents’ a priori relative preferences over the objects are “not too strong”, the OR Signal, used together with any standard ordinal mechanism, not only maximizes welfare, but achieves the unconstrained social optimum — formalizing the intuition that when people do not have strong opinions over several options, it is easy to sway them.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":51118,"journal":{"name":"Mathematical Social Sciences","volume":"131 ","pages":"Pages 5-16"},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2024-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141398833","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
The α-core in a multi-objective game with set payoffs 有固定回报的多目标博弈中的α核心
IF 0.5 4区 经济学
Mathematical Social Sciences Pub Date : 2024-10-01 Epub Date: 2024-07-20 DOI: 10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2024.07.001
Qi-Qing Song , Min Guo , Xin-Yi Chi
{"title":"The α-core in a multi-objective game with set payoffs","authors":"Qi-Qing Song ,&nbsp;Min Guo ,&nbsp;Xin-Yi Chi","doi":"10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2024.07.001","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2024.07.001","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>For the cooperative equilibria in <span><math><mi>α</mi></math></span>-core form, the balancedness and coalitionally <span><math><mrow><mi>C</mi><mo>−</mo></mrow></math></span>security of games with usual utilities are extended to the games with discontinuous set payoffs. The existence of <span><math><mrow><mi>α</mi><mo>−</mo></mrow></math></span>core for these games is established, which can deduce some typical results for normal form games. For continuous games, a quasi-concave-like set payoff is introduced. Based on the introduced set payoffs, the existence of <span><math><mrow><mi>α</mi><mo>−</mo></mrow></math></span>core is also obtained. Examples are given to verify these results. Comparison with existing results in references shows that the introduced conditions are new to guarantee the existence of <span><math><mrow><mi>α</mi><mo>−</mo></mrow></math></span>core for games with set payoffs.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":51118,"journal":{"name":"Mathematical Social Sciences","volume":"131 ","pages":"Pages 32-39"},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2024-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141845586","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
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