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The disclosure decision game: Subsidies and incentives for R&D activity 披露决策游戏：研发活动的补贴和激励
IF 0.6 4区 经济学
Mathematical Social Sciences Pub Date : 2023-09-01 DOI: 10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2023.06.002
Domenico Buccella , Luciano Fanti , Luca Gori
{"title":"The disclosure decision game: Subsidies and incentives for R&D activity","authors":"Domenico Buccella ,&nbsp;Luciano Fanti ,&nbsp;Luca Gori","doi":"10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2023.06.002","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2023.06.002","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>This article presents a three-stage non-cooperative disclosure decision game (DDG), in which R&amp;D-investing firms choose whether to disclose R&amp;D-related information to the rival in a Cournot-like environment. Though firms have no (private) incentive to disclose information unilaterally on their cost-reducing R&amp;D activity to prevent a rival from engaging in free appropriation, this work reveals opportunity for the government to design an optimal policy aimed at incentivising R&amp;D disclosure. Following this welfare-improving path, sharing R&amp;D-related information becomes a Pareto-efficient Nash equilibrium strategy. These findings suggest that using public subsidies to R&amp;D disclosure can lead to a win-win result, eliminating the unpleasant non-disclosing outcome from a societal perspective.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":51118,"journal":{"name":"Mathematical Social Sciences","volume":"125 ","pages":"Pages 11-26"},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2023-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"50190946","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 1
Implementing optimal scholarship assignments via backward induction 通过逆向归纳法实现最佳奖学金分配
IF 0.6 4区 经济学
Mathematical Social Sciences Pub Date : 2023-09-01 DOI: 10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2023.06.001
Pablo Amorós
{"title":"Implementing optimal scholarship assignments via backward induction","authors":"Pablo Amorós","doi":"10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2023.06.001","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2023.06.001","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>A group of students who have applied for scholarships must be ranked. The committee responsible for determining this ranking consists of the students’ advisors. While impartial towards other students, the advisors are biased towards favoring their students. This paper examines the implementation of the deserving ranking via backward induction. Some of the best-known sequential mechanisms utilized in the real world are ineffective. We present two simple and natural sequential mechanisms that prove to be effective. The first mechanism is suitable for when there are precisely three students, and the second is for four or more students.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":51118,"journal":{"name":"Mathematical Social Sciences","volume":"125 ","pages":"Pages 1-10"},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2023-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"50190973","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Effects of development aid (grants and loans) on the economic dynamics of the recipient country 发展援助（赠款和贷款）对受援国经济动态的影响
IF 0.6 4区 经济学
Mathematical Social Sciences Pub Date : 2023-09-01 DOI: 10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2023.06.003
Cuong Le Van , Ngoc-Sang Pham , Thi Kim Cuong Pham
{"title":"Effects of development aid (grants and loans) on the economic dynamics of the recipient country","authors":"Cuong Le Van ,&nbsp;Ngoc-Sang Pham ,&nbsp;Thi Kim Cuong Pham","doi":"10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2023.06.003","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2023.06.003","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>This paper investigates the nexus between foreign aid (in both forms: grant and loan), poverty trap, and economic development in a recipient country by using a Solow model<span> with two new ingredients: a development loan and a fixed cost in the production process. The presence of this fixed cost generates a poverty trap. We show that foreign aid may help the country to escape from the poverty trap and converge to a stable steady state in the long run, but only if (i) the country’s characteristics, such as saving rate, initial capital, governance quality, and productivity are good enough, (ii) the fixed cost is relatively low, and (iii) the loan rule is generous enough. We also show that our model with foreign aid has room for endogenous cycles, unlike the standard Solow model.</span></p></div>","PeriodicalId":51118,"journal":{"name":"Mathematical Social Sciences","volume":"125 ","pages":"Pages 101-112"},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2023-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"50190947","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Experiments versus distributions of posteriors 实验与后验分布
IF 0.6 4区 经济学
Mathematical Social Sciences Pub Date : 2023-09-01 DOI: 10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2023.07.003
Stefan Terstiege , Cédric Wasser
{"title":"Experiments versus distributions of posteriors","authors":"Stefan Terstiege ,&nbsp;Cédric Wasser","doi":"10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2023.07.003","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2023.07.003","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>A fundamental result in Bayesian persuasion and information design states that a distribution of posterior beliefs can be induced by an experiment if and only if the posterior beliefs average to the prior belief. We present a general version of this result that applies to infinite state and signal spaces.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":51118,"journal":{"name":"Mathematical Social Sciences","volume":"125 ","pages":"Pages 58-60"},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2023-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"50191277","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Proportional resource allocation in dynamic n-player Blotto games 动态n层Blotto对策中的比例资源分配
IF 0.6 4区 经济学
Mathematical Social Sciences Pub Date : 2023-09-01 DOI: 10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2023.07.002
Nejat Anbarci , Kutay Cingiz , Mehmet S. Ismail
{"title":"Proportional resource allocation in dynamic n-player Blotto games","authors":"Nejat Anbarci ,&nbsp;Kutay Cingiz ,&nbsp;Mehmet S. Ismail","doi":"10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2023.07.002","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2023.07.002","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>In this note, we introduce a general model of dynamic <span><math><mi>n</mi></math></span>-player multi-battle Blotto contests in which asymmetric resources and non-homogeneous battlefield prizes are possible. Each player’s probability of winning the prize in a battlefield is governed by a ratio-form contest success function and players’ resource allocation on that battlefield. We show that there exists a pure subgame perfect equilibrium in which players allocate their resources in proportion to the battlefield prizes for every history. We also give a sufficient condition that if there are two players and the contest success function is of Tullock type, then the subgame perfect equilibrium is unique.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":51118,"journal":{"name":"Mathematical Social Sciences","volume":"125 ","pages":"Pages 94-100"},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2023-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"50190948","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
When is frugality optimal? 什么时候节俭是最佳的？
IF 0.6 4区 经济学
Mathematical Social Sciences Pub Date : 2023-09-01 DOI: 10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2023.07.006
Bertrand Crettez , Naila Hayek , Georges Zaccour
{"title":"When is frugality optimal?","authors":"Bertrand Crettez ,&nbsp;Naila Hayek ,&nbsp;Georges Zaccour","doi":"10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2023.07.006","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2023.07.006","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>We consider an optimal growth model in which the decision maker<span> chooses the consumption path that maximizes her utility over a finite planning horizon. At each instant of time, she can opt for a regular product that pollutes the environment, or a non-polluting frugal product, which procures, however, lower utility. Depending on the parameter values, different optimal paths can materialize, including some where a frugal lifestyle is on the rise, and others where polluting persists during the planning horizon.</span></p></div>","PeriodicalId":51118,"journal":{"name":"Mathematical Social Sciences","volume":"125 ","pages":"Pages 65-75"},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2023-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"50191275","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Implementing optimal scholarship assignments via backward induction 通过逆向归纳法实现最佳奖学金分配
IF 0.6 4区 经济学
Mathematical Social Sciences Pub Date : 2023-09-01 DOI: 10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2023.06.001
Pablo Amorós
{"title":"Implementing optimal scholarship assignments via backward induction","authors":"Pablo Amorós","doi":"10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2023.06.001","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2023.06.001","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":51118,"journal":{"name":"Mathematical Social Sciences","volume":"125 1","pages":"1-10"},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2023-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"55181156","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Remarks on solidarity in bankruptcy problems when agents merge or split 论代理人合并或分立时破产问题的团结
IF 0.6 4区 经济学
Mathematical Social Sciences Pub Date : 2023-09-01 DOI: 10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2023.07.004
Pedro Calleja , Francesc Llerena , Peter Sudhölter
{"title":"Remarks on solidarity in bankruptcy problems when agents merge or split","authors":"Pedro Calleja ,&nbsp;Francesc Llerena ,&nbsp;Peter Sudhölter","doi":"10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2023.07.004","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2023.07.004","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p><span>In this note, we investigate the relationship between non-manipulability via merging (splitting) and strong non-manipulability via merging (splitting). Our analysis reveals that while these two non-manipulability axioms are generally not equivalent, they do coincide when the principle of solidarity is satisfied. This principle is fulfilled by a wide range of bankruptcy rules, including </span>parametric rules.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":51118,"journal":{"name":"Mathematical Social Sciences","volume":"125 ","pages":"Pages 61-64"},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2023-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"50191276","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
A classification of peak-pit maximal Condorcet domains 峰坑极大Condorcet域的一个分类
IF 0.6 4区 经济学
Mathematical Social Sciences Pub Date : 2023-09-01 DOI: 10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2023.06.004
Guanhao Li
{"title":"A classification of peak-pit maximal Condorcet domains","authors":"Guanhao Li","doi":"10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2023.06.004","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2023.06.004","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>In this paper, we introduce a weaker notion of separability for set-systems and demonstrate that the class of maximal weakly separated systems precisely corresponds to the class of peak-pit maximal Condorcet domains. Additionally, we present a generalisation of arrangements of pseudolines and establish that the sets of chamber sets from them coincide with maximal weakly separated systems, enabling the construction of all peak-pit maximal Condorcet domains. Furthermore, we reveal that peak-pit maximal Condorcet domains coincide with connected maximal Condorcet domains.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":51118,"journal":{"name":"Mathematical Social Sciences","volume":"125 ","pages":"Pages 42-57"},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2023-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"50191278","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 3
Positively correlated choice 正相关选择
IF 0.6 4区 经济学
Mathematical Social Sciences Pub Date : 2023-08-20 DOI: 10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2023.08.001
Guy Barokas
{"title":"Positively correlated choice","authors":"Guy Barokas","doi":"10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2023.08.001","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2023.08.001","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>We provide an axiomatic foundation for a choice model with two periods between which preferences are updated, but the second period choices are positively correlated with past choices in a manner that is unrelated to the agent’s preferences. Specifically, in our model, the agent chooses alternative <span><math><mi>x</mi></math></span> over alternative <span><math><mi>y</mi></math></span> in contrast to his past choice if and only if the difference between the utility of <span><math><mi>x</mi></math></span> and that of <span><math><mi>y</mi></math></span><span> is higher than some fixed cost. While restrictive in its nature, this representation captures several related but distinctive phenomena: a taste for consistency, cognitive dissonance, the escalation of commitment, passive choice, and habit formation. We also provide a representation that allows for a more general form of cost and the revealed preference implications of our models. Finally, we connect our representation to the theories of imperfect discrimination.</span></p></div>","PeriodicalId":51118,"journal":{"name":"Mathematical Social Sciences","volume":"127 ","pages":"Pages 62-71"},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2023-08-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44669064","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
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