Mathematical Social Sciences最新文献

Filters in abstract aggregation with infinite sequences of signals 无限序列信号抽象聚合中的滤波器

IF 0.7 4区经济学

Mathematical Social Sciences Pub Date : 2026-07-01 Epub Date: 2026-06-25 DOI: 10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2026.102551

Susumu Cato, Stéphane Gonzalez, Eric Rémila, Philippe Solal

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引用次数: 0

The relationship between general equilibrium models with infinitely-lived agents and overlapping generations models, and some applications 具有无限活主体的一般均衡模型与重叠代模型的关系及其应用

IF 0.7 4区经济学

Mathematical Social Sciences Pub Date : 2026-07-01 Epub Date: 2026-06-30 DOI: 10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2026.102553

Ngoc-Sang Pham

引用次数: 0

Strategic hiding and exploration in networks 网络中的战略隐藏与探索

IF 0.7 4区经济学

Mathematical Social Sciences Pub Date : 2026-07-01 Epub Date: 2026-06-27 DOI: 10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2026.102549

Francis Bloch, Bhaskar Dutta, Marcin Dziubiński

引用次数: 0

Null players, solidarity, and a generalization of the egalitarian Shapley values 零玩家，团结，以及平等主义Shapley价值观的概括

IF 0.7 4区经济学

Mathematical Social Sciences Pub Date : 2026-07-01 Epub Date: 2026-06-17 DOI: 10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2026.102548

Takumi Kongo

引用次数: 0

Nested removal of strictly dominated strategies in infinite games 无限对策中严格劣势策略的嵌套移除

IF 0.7 4区经济学

Mathematical Social Sciences Pub Date : 2026-07-01 Epub Date: 2026-06-24 DOI: 10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2026.102552

Michele Crescenzi

{"title":"Nested removal of strictly dominated strategies in infinite games","authors":"Michele Crescenzi","doi":"10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2026.102552","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2026.102552","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>We compare two procedures for the iterated removal of strictly dominated strategies. In the nested procedure, a strategy of a player is removed only if it is dominated by an unremoved strategy. The universal procedure is more comprehensive for it allows the removal of strategies that are dominated by previously removed ones. Outside the class of finite games, the two procedures may lead to different outcomes in that the universal one is always order independent while the other is not. We provide necessary and sufficient conditions for the equivalence of the two procedures. The conditions we give are based on completely bounded subsets of strategy profiles, which are variations of the bounded mechanisms from the literature on full implementation. The two elimination procedures are also shown to be equivalent in quasisupermodular games as well as in games with compact strategy spaces and upper semicontinuous payoff functions. Finally, we give an example of a game in which the nested procedure is order independent but not equivalent to the universal one, thus showing that order independence is not sufficient to guarantee the equivalence of the two elimination procedures.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":51118,"journal":{"name":"Mathematical Social Sciences","volume":"142 ","pages":"Article 102552"},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2026-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"148542136","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Information projection and selective search: Implement now or draw again 信息投射和选择性搜索：现在执行或重新绘制

IF 0.7 4区经济学

Mathematical Social Sciences Pub Date : 2026-07-01 Epub Date: 2026-06-18 DOI: 10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2026.102546

Kohei Daido, Tomoya Tajika

{"title":"Information projection and selective search: Implement now or draw again","authors":"Kohei Daido, Tomoya Tajika","doi":"10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2026.102546","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2026.102546","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>We study how interpersonal information projection bias influences a researcher’s decision to implement a current idea or to continue drawing new ones. Consistent misbeliefs, such as overconfidence or underconfidence, distort beliefs in a fixed manner. In contrast, information projection creates state-dependent beliefs: before an idea arises, the researcher is optimistic about its uniqueness, and once the idea is in hand, the researcher becomes pessimistic. This fluctuation makes implementation less attractive and makes repeated searches more appealing. Our analysis yields two key findings. First, compared to any consistent-misbelief researcher whose fixed belief falls between the optimistic and pessimistic assessments of the information projection researcher, the information projection researcher is more selective: implementing less, drawing more ideas, and quitting less frequently. Second, at sufficiently high performance thresholds, researchers who end up passing the threshold are disproportionately information projection researchers. Consequently, information projection systematically biases both individual search dynamics and the composition of such researchers.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":51118,"journal":{"name":"Mathematical Social Sciences","volume":"142 ","pages":"Article 102546"},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2026-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"148542099","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

When free-riding on contributing to an impurely shared good decreases with greater concentration of interests 当对不纯粹的共享利益的贡献随着利益的集中而减少时

IF 0.7 4区经济学

Mathematical Social Sciences Pub Date : 2026-07-01 Epub Date: 2026-06-19 DOI: 10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2026.102550

David A. Hennessy, Jian Li

引用次数: 0

Maximal elements of preorders from countable continuous multi-utilities 可数连续多实用程序的最大预购元素

IF 0.7 4区经济学

Mathematical Social Sciences Pub Date : 2026-05-01 Epub Date: 2026-05-07 DOI: 10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2026.102533

Gianni Bosi, Gabriele Sbaiz

引用次数: 0

The impact of asset bubbles on capital and employment: The roles of labor unions and capital externality 资产泡沫对资本和就业的影响：工会和资本外部性的作用

IF 0.7 4区经济学

Mathematical Social Sciences Pub Date : 2026-03-01 Epub Date: 2026-01-14 DOI: 10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2026.102505

Kathia Bahloul Zekkari

引用次数: 0

Non-emptiness of the core of mcst games with revenues 大多数游戏的核心是非空性的

IF 0.7 4区经济学

Mathematical Social Sciences Pub Date : 2026-03-01 Epub Date: 2026-01-22 DOI: 10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2026.102508

Begoña Subiza , José-Manuel Giménez-Gómez , Josep E. Peris

{"title":"Non-emptiness of the core of mcst games with revenues","authors":"Begoña Subiza , José-Manuel Giménez-Gómez , Josep E. Peris","doi":"10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2026.102508","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2026.102508","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>The minimum cost spanning tree (<span><math><mrow><mi>m</mi><mi>c</mi><mi>s</mi><mi>t</mi></mrow></math></span>) problem analyzes how to efficiently connect geographically dispersed agents to a common source. Estévez-Fernández and Reijnierse (2014) study <span><math><mrow><mi>m</mi><mi>c</mi><mi>s</mi><mi>t</mi></mrow></math></span> problems involving revenues, in which the agents benefit from being connected to the source. A key feature of their framework is that only certain coalitions, called <em>effective coalitions</em>, make sense to form. Estévez-Fernández and Reijnierse (2014) show that the core in cost–revenue <span><math><mrow><mi>m</mi><mi>c</mi><mi>s</mi><mi>t</mi></mrow></math></span> games is typically empty. In this paper, we present a necessary condition that <span><math><mrow><mi>m</mi><mi>c</mi><mi>s</mi><mi>t</mi></mrow></math></span> games with revenues need to fulfill to ensure the non-emptiness of the core: the existence of at least one agent with <em>veto power</em>, i.e., an agent whose participation is required in every effective coalition. Additionally, we extend the sufficient condition in Estévez-Fernández and Reijnierse (2014) for elementary cost <span><math><mrow><mi>m</mi><mi>c</mi><mi>s</mi><mi>t</mi></mrow></math></span> problems.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":51118,"journal":{"name":"Mathematical Social Sciences","volume":"140 ","pages":"Article 102508"},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2026-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"146038597","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0