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Cooperation and balance in signed networks: A model of multiplex formation 签名网络中的合作与平衡：一个多元形成的模型
IF 0.5 4区 经济学
Mathematical Social Sciences Pub Date : 2025-07-01 DOI: 10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2025.102430
Rajendra P. Kundu, Siddhi Gyan Pandey
{"title":"Cooperation and balance in signed networks: A model of multiplex formation","authors":"Rajendra P. Kundu,&nbsp;Siddhi Gyan Pandey","doi":"10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2025.102430","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2025.102430","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>We propose a game theoretic model for multiplexity in signed networks through strategic interactions amongst <span><math><mi>n</mi></math></span> players who are linked to each other in an existing signed network of friendships and enmities <span><math><mi>g</mi></math></span>, which shape the incentive structure faced by players in their pairwise interactions with each other. These interactions take the form of simultaneous move cooperation games of complete information, wherein network effects create incentives to cooperate due to the presence of common friends as well common enemies. The set of pure strategy Nash equilibria in the strategic interactions between players <span><math><mi>i</mi></math></span> and <span><math><mi>j</mi></math></span> determine the nature of the tie between them in <span><math><mrow><mi>G</mi><mrow><mo>(</mo><mi>g</mi><mo>)</mo></mrow></mrow></math></span>, which is the new layer of the signed multiplex. We investigate how properties of structural balance in the existing signed social network <span><math><mi>g</mi></math></span> influence balance in the new signed network <span><math><mrow><mi>G</mi><mrow><mo>(</mo><mi>g</mi><mo>)</mo></mrow></mrow></math></span>, identifying conditions on the existing network that yield a structurally balanced new layer of the multiplex.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":51118,"journal":{"name":"Mathematical Social Sciences","volume":"136 ","pages":"Article 102430"},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2025-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144517767","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Jump bidding in the war of attrition 在消耗战中跳投
IF 0.5 4区 经济学
Mathematical Social Sciences Pub Date : 2025-07-01 DOI: 10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2025.102432
Wei Bi , Huiyun Ding
{"title":"Jump bidding in the war of attrition","authors":"Wei Bi ,&nbsp;Huiyun Ding","doi":"10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2025.102432","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2025.102432","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>This paper studies jump bidding in a war of attrition, where a bidder makes a costly preemptive commitment to deter opponents. We identify a Double-Edged Sword Effect: while jump bidding increases early-stage costs for the jump bidder, it enhances her ability to deter high-valuation opponents in later stages. The bidder jump bids when she believes that her opponent is likely to have a high valuation and not quit soon, such as when the valuation distribution is convex or bounded away from zero. Although jump bidding may result in inefficient allocation, it reduces total attrition costs and can improve overall welfare ex ante.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":51118,"journal":{"name":"Mathematical Social Sciences","volume":"136 ","pages":"Article 102432"},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2025-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144562796","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Deposit insurance in a sequential-service constrained environment 顺序服务受限环境中的存款保险
IF 0.5 4区 经济学
Mathematical Social Sciences Pub Date : 2025-07-01 DOI: 10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2025.102434
Fernando Barros Jr. , Samuel Cruz , Bruno R. Delalibera , Diego Silva
{"title":"Deposit insurance in a sequential-service constrained environment","authors":"Fernando Barros Jr. ,&nbsp;Samuel Cruz ,&nbsp;Bruno R. Delalibera ,&nbsp;Diego Silva","doi":"10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2025.102434","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2025.102434","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>We study the effect of a deposit insurance scheme (DIS) in an economy with multiple isolated banks. Participant banks fund the scheme, which follows a pre-determined insurance payment scheme. An external player transfers insurance benefits to all banks where depositors are running. The total insurance payment depends on resources collected by the external authority and the number of eligible queues to receive the insurance benefit. We discuss the effect of DIS on the optimal payment contract. More specifically, we analyze the existence of bank-run equilibria and whether the optimal payment contract is incentive-compatible. We find that DIS prevents bank-run equilibria at the same time that it may expose the environment to contagion. We also see that the insurance policy relaxes the truth-telling condition for general parameters.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":51118,"journal":{"name":"Mathematical Social Sciences","volume":"136 ","pages":"Article 102434"},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2025-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144557396","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Cost structures and innovation incentives 成本结构与创新激励
IF 0.5 4区 经济学
Mathematical Social Sciences Pub Date : 2025-07-01 DOI: 10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2025.102436
Suryaprakash Mishra
{"title":"Cost structures and innovation incentives","authors":"Suryaprakash Mishra","doi":"10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2025.102436","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2025.102436","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>In a Cournot oligopoly set up with constant marginal cost and linear demand, innovation is rewarding, i.e., profit enhancing. We show that the same may not be true when marginal costs are increasing. In contrast to the standard results, we show the possibilities of conditional innovation/technological retrogression (henceforth retrogression) by firms: when the number firms <span><math><mrow><mi>n</mi><mo>=</mo><mn>1</mn></mrow></math></span> or 2 innovation is undertaken by firms unconditionally and with certainty while for <span><math><mrow><mi>n</mi><mo>&gt;</mo><mn>3</mn></mrow></math></span> there exists an innovation–neutral technology line dividing the regions of innovation and retrogression. We bring forth the unconventional but interesting relationship between the intensity of competition and welfare – <span><math><mrow><mo>∀</mo><mi>n</mi><mo>&gt;</mo><mn>3</mn></mrow></math></span> competition decreases welfare and thus leads to Pareto deterioration while the lack thereof enhances welfare and results in Pareto improvement. We suggest ‘monitored competition’ as in restricted entry to encourage innovation, as a potential policy instrument.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":51118,"journal":{"name":"Mathematical Social Sciences","volume":"136 ","pages":"Article 102436"},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2025-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144571170","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
A stricter canon: General Luce models for arbitrary menu sets 更严格的标准：用于任意菜单集的通用Luce模型
IF 0.5 4区 经济学
Mathematical Social Sciences Pub Date : 2025-06-18 DOI: 10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2025.102431
José A. Rodrigues-Neto , Matthew Ryan , James Taylor
{"title":"A stricter canon: General Luce models for arbitrary menu sets","authors":"José A. Rodrigues-Neto ,&nbsp;Matthew Ryan ,&nbsp;James Taylor","doi":"10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2025.102431","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2025.102431","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>Alós-Ferrer and Mihm (2025, Corollary 1) recently provided a characterisation the classical Luce model (Luce, 1959) when choices are observed for an arbitrarily restricted collection of menus, as is typical in experimental settings or when working with field data. They also characterise the general Luce model (<em>ibid.</em>, Theorem 1), which allows choice probabilities to be zero, for the same setting. The latter characterisation involves a single axiom – the <em>general product rule (GPR)</em>. An important special case of the general Luce model is obtained when the mapping from menus to the support of choice probabilities can be rationalised by a weak order. Cerreia-Vioglio et al. (2021) show that this special case is characterised by Luce’s (1959) <em>choice axiom</em>, provided choice is observed for all possible (finite) menus. The choice axiom is thus a fundamental “canon of probabilistic rationality”. We show that a natural – and surprisingly simple – strengthening of the GPR characterises the model of Cerreia-Vioglio et al. (2021) when the menu set is arbitrarily restricted. Our axiom implies the choice axiom, and is therefore a “stricter canon”.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":51118,"journal":{"name":"Mathematical Social Sciences","volume":"136 ","pages":"Article 102431"},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2025-06-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144366077","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
The rates of learning with public and private signals 公共信号和私人信号的学习率
IF 0.5 4区 经济学
Mathematical Social Sciences Pub Date : 2025-06-18 DOI: 10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2025.102433
Dengwei Qi
{"title":"The rates of learning with public and private signals","authors":"Dengwei Qi","doi":"10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2025.102433","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2025.102433","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>This paper presents a dynamic market-based learning model, in which agents trade a risky asset repeatedly while observing public and private endogenous signals about market prices and demands. We explicitly characterize the changes in precisions of agents’ beliefs about the market, and demonstrate that complete learning is achieved in the limit. Moreover, we show that the asymptotic learning rates of both public and private signals attain the highest possible rate in the model, which is linear, thereby establishing the asymptotic learning efficiency. Factors that influence the learning speed and asymptotic rates are also identified. We also prove that the asymptotic learning efficiency applies to other learning situations.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":51118,"journal":{"name":"Mathematical Social Sciences","volume":"136 ","pages":"Article 102433"},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2025-06-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144313440","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Aggregating incomplete rankings 汇总不完全排名
IF 0.5 4区 经济学
Mathematical Social Sciences Pub Date : 2025-06-11 DOI: 10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2025.102423
Yasunori Okumura
{"title":"Aggregating incomplete rankings","authors":"Yasunori Okumura","doi":"10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2025.102423","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2025.102423","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>This study considers a method for deriving a ranking of alternatives by aggregating the rankings submitted by multiple individuals, each of whom need not evaluate all of the alternatives. We call the collection of subsets of alternatives that individuals can evaluate an evaluability profile. For a given evaluability profile, we define an aggregating ranking function whose inputs are the rankings provided by individuals on the alternatives that they evaluate. We investigate the properties of such functions, focusing on modified versions of the properties originally introduced by Arrow and his followers. Whether there exists an aggregating ranking function that satisfies a given combination of the properties depends on the evaluability profile. Accordingly, we identify the necessary and sufficient conditions on evaluability profiles to ensure the existence of functions that satisfy four different combinations of the properties. Finally, we discuss whether these properties are satisfied in a real-world scenario.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":51118,"journal":{"name":"Mathematical Social Sciences","volume":"136 ","pages":"Article 102423"},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2025-06-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144279188","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Existence of Berge equilibrium in finite games 有限对策中Berge均衡的存在性
IF 0.5 4区 经济学
Mathematical Social Sciences Pub Date : 2025-05-21 DOI: 10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2025.102419
Hans Haller
{"title":"Existence of Berge equilibrium in finite games","authors":"Hans Haller","doi":"10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2025.102419","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2025.102419","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>This investigation is focused primarily on the existence of Berge equilibrium in finite games. A secondary concern is the comparison of Berge equilibrium existence and Nash equilibrium existence.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":51118,"journal":{"name":"Mathematical Social Sciences","volume":"136 ","pages":"Article 102419"},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2025-05-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144195735","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Dynamics of ideal efforts and consensus in a multi-layer network game 多层网络博弈中理想努力与共识的动态
IF 0.5 4区 经济学
Mathematical Social Sciences Pub Date : 2025-05-01 DOI: 10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2025.102421
Ana Mauleon , Mariam Nanumyan , Vincent Vannetelbosch
{"title":"Dynamics of ideal efforts and consensus in a multi-layer network game","authors":"Ana Mauleon ,&nbsp;Mariam Nanumyan ,&nbsp;Vincent Vannetelbosch","doi":"10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2025.102421","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2025.102421","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>We study a network game on a fixed multi-layer network of two types of relationships. The social interactions in the first layer carry a pressure to conform with the social norm within the layer. The second layer provides additional strategic complementarities from players’ interaction. Players are endowed with personal ideal efforts and are heterogeneous in their ideal efforts and productivity. Each player repeatedly chooses her effort level in the network game and updates her ideal effort based on the new effort choice. Each player suffers disutility when her effort differs from her neighbors’ efforts or is inconsistent with her ideal effort. We find the pure Nash equilibrium of the game in each period and provide conditions for the convergence of efforts and ideals to a steady state. Furthermore, we find that the sensitivity to cognitive dissonance and the taste for conformity have opposing effects on the speed of convergence to a consensus and the steady state.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":51118,"journal":{"name":"Mathematical Social Sciences","volume":"135 ","pages":"Article 102421"},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2025-05-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144138619","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Condorcet efficiency: Weighted Bucklin vs. weighted scoring and Borda 孔多塞效率：加权巴克林vs加权得分和博尔达
IF 0.5 4区 经济学
Mathematical Social Sciences Pub Date : 2025-05-01 DOI: 10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2025.102420
D. Marc Kilgour , Jean-Charles Grégoire , Angèle M. Foley
{"title":"Condorcet efficiency: Weighted Bucklin vs. weighted scoring and Borda","authors":"D. Marc Kilgour ,&nbsp;Jean-Charles Grégoire ,&nbsp;Angèle M. Foley","doi":"10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2025.102420","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2025.102420","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>We ask how good Bucklin-related procedures can be at identifying Condorcet winners in ranked-ballot, single-winner elections. Bucklin procedures can have a wide range of weighting vectors and thresholds; one, for example, applies Borda weights, analogous to the Borda Count in weighted scoring elections. Using simulation, we estimate the maximum Condorcet efficiency of both weighted Bucklin and weighted scoring elections as the number of voters becomes very large; these measures depend of course on the underlying distribution of ballots. For the impartial anonymous culture distribution, weighted Bucklin exhibits higher Condorcet efficiency than weighted scoring when there are 3 candidates, but is not as good when there are 4 candidates, and about equal when there are 5 or 6. We also compare them under the impartial culture distribution (equally good), and under a one-dimensional spatial model (weighted Bucklin is usually better, sometimes much better).</div></div>","PeriodicalId":51118,"journal":{"name":"Mathematical Social Sciences","volume":"135 ","pages":"Article 102420"},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2025-05-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144166751","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
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