Mathematical Social Sciences最新文献

Multimarket contact, cartel and product quality 多市场联系，卡特尔和产品质量

IF 0.7 4区经济学

Mathematical Social Sciences Pub Date : 2025-09-26 DOI: 10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2025.102467

Neelanjan Sen , Uday Bhanu Sinha

引用次数: 0

Delegation and strategic altruism: A theoretical approach 授权与战略利他主义：一种理论途径

IF 0.7 4区经济学

Mathematical Social Sciences Pub Date : 2025-09-25 DOI: 10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2025.102465

Luciano Méndez-Naya

引用次数: 0

Rational bubbles in portfolios with fundamental value 具有基本价值的投资组合中的理性泡沫

IF 0.7 4区经济学

Mathematical Social Sciences Pub Date : 2025-09-22 DOI: 10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2025.102464

Lise Clain-Chamosset-Yvrard , Xavier Raurich , Thomas Seegmuller

引用次数: 0

Connectedness in weighted consensus division of graphical cakes between two agents 两个agent间图形饼加权共识划分的连通性

IF 0.7 4区经济学

Mathematical Social Sciences Pub Date : 2025-09-17 DOI: 10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2025.102463

Josef Hanke , Ana Rita Pires

{"title":"Connectedness in weighted consensus division of graphical cakes between two agents","authors":"Josef Hanke , Ana Rita Pires","doi":"10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2025.102463","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2025.102463","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>Austin’s moving knife procedure was originally introduced to find a consensus division of an interval/circular cake between two agents, each of whom believes that they receive exactly half of the cake.</div><div>We generalise this in two ways: we consider cakes modelled by graphs, and let the two agents have unequal, arbitrary entitlements. In this setting, we seek a weighted consensus division – one where each agent believes they received exactly the share they are entitled to – which also minimises the number of connected components that each agent receives.</div><div>First, we review the weighted consensus division of a circular cake, which gives exactly one connected piece to each agent. Next, by judiciously mapping a circle to a graph, we produce a weighted consensus division of a star graph cake that gives at most two connected pieces to each agent — and show that this bound on the number of connected pieces is tight. For a tree, each agent receives at most <span><math><mrow><mi>h</mi><mo>+</mo><mn>1</mn></mrow></math></span> connected pieces, where <span><math><mi>h</mi></math></span> is the minimal height of the tree. For a connected graphical cake, each agent receives <span><math><mrow><mi>r</mi><mo>+</mo><mn>2</mn></mrow></math></span> connected pieces, where <span><math><mi>r</mi></math></span> is the radius of the graph. Finally, for a graphical cake with <span><math><mi>s</mi></math></span> connected components, the division involves at most <span><math><mrow><mi>s</mi><mo>+</mo><mn>2</mn><mi>r</mi><mo>+</mo><mn>4</mn></mrow></math></span> connected pieces, where <span><math><mi>r</mi></math></span> is the maximum radius among all connected components.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":51118,"journal":{"name":"Mathematical Social Sciences","volume":"138 ","pages":"Article 102463"},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2025-09-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145107064","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Simplex subtraction to estimate unanimity violations in sequential majority voting 单纯形减法估计顺序多数表决中一致意见的违反

IF 0.7 4区经济学

Mathematical Social Sciences Pub Date : 2025-09-16 DOI: 10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2025.102462

Christian Klamler

引用次数: 0

Limited attention and models of choice: A behavioral equivalence 有限注意力和选择模型：行为等价

IF 0.7 4区经济学

Mathematical Social Sciences Pub Date : 2025-08-28 DOI: 10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2025.102461

Davide Carpentiere, Angelo Enrico Petralia

引用次数: 0

The dynamics of bargaining power in a principal-agent model 委托代理模型中议价能力的动态

IF 0.7 4区经济学

Mathematical Social Sciences Pub Date : 2025-08-09 DOI: 10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2025.102452

Sonia Di Giannatale , Itza Tlaloc Quetzalcoatl Curiel-Cabral , Genaro Basulto

{"title":"The dynamics of bargaining power in a principal-agent model","authors":"Sonia Di Giannatale , Itza Tlaloc Quetzalcoatl Curiel-Cabral , Genaro Basulto","doi":"10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2025.102452","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2025.102452","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>This article develops a dynamic principal–agent model that integrates bargaining power as an evolving state variable, governed by a bargaining drift coefficient that links its trajectory to firm performance and agent compensation. The model examines how initial bargaining power shapes salary trajectories and how bargaining drift influences its adaptation over time in response to performance outcomes. By modeling these dynamics, the study highlights the role of incentives in driving the evolution of bargaining power, emphasizing the long-term impact of initial conditions on compensation structures. A key contribution is the formulation of an empirical equation that connects agent compensation and performance with bargaining drift, offering a framework for real-world validation. Beyond CEO pay, the framework extends to other performance-based environments, such as sports and academia, where shifting power relationships shape long-term contracts. By introducing a computational algorithm for multiobjective optimization, the study enhances the practical implementation of bargaining power dynamics, offering valuable insights for both theoretical modeling and governance applications.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":51118,"journal":{"name":"Mathematical Social Sciences","volume":"138 ","pages":"Article 102452"},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2025-08-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145005422","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Same-sex marriage, the great equalizer 同性婚姻，伟大的均衡器

IF 0.7 4区经济学

Mathematical Social Sciences Pub Date : 2025-08-08 DOI: 10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2025.102448

Alexei Parakhonyak , Sergey V. Popov

引用次数: 0

A new value for cooperative games on intersection-closed systems 交闭系统上合作对策的一个新值

IF 0.7 4区经济学

Mathematical Social Sciences Pub Date : 2025-08-08 DOI: 10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2025.102450

Martin Černý

{"title":"A new value for cooperative games on intersection-closed systems","authors":"Martin Černý","doi":"10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2025.102450","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2025.102450","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>In the model of cooperative games with restricted cooperation, certain coalitions are infeasible, meaning they cannot form, which directly influences payoff allocation. We consider a scenario where coalitions are no longer categorized as feasible or infeasible, but rather as known or unknown. In this setting, coalitions with unknown values are still feasible, but their values remain unknown in the allocation process. Classical allocation methods for games with restricted cooperation, such as the R-value, become unsuitable for such scenarios.</div><div>We introduce a new allocation rule called the <em>uniform-dividend value</em> (UD-value), designed specifically for cooperative games where some coalition values remain unknown (so-called <em>incomplete cooperative games</em>). The UD-value allocates payoffs by evenly distributing the total surplus within each group of <em>indistinguishable</em> coalitions. We demonstrate that for <em>intersection-closed</em> set systems, the UD-value is uniquely determined and can also be viewed as the expected Shapley value computed over all totally positive (i.e., nonnegative-surplus) extensions of the incomplete cooperative game. We compare the UD-value to two existing allocation rules for intersection-closed games: the R-value, defined as the Shapley value of a game that sets surplus of absent coalition values to zero, and the IC-value, tailored specifically for intersection-closed systems. Specifically, we provide axiomatic characterizations of the UD-value motivated by characterizations of the IC-value and discuss further properties such as fairness and balanced contributions.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":51118,"journal":{"name":"Mathematical Social Sciences","volume":"138 ","pages":"Article 102450"},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2025-08-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145005418","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Conformism and name dynamics: A cliometric study of ancient Greek names 符合性与名称动力学：古希腊名称的地理计量学研究

IF 0.7 4区经济学

Mathematical Social Sciences Pub Date : 2025-08-05 DOI: 10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2025.102451

Laurent Gauthier

引用次数: 0