Mathematical Social Sciences最新文献_第2页

Limited attention and models of choice: A behavioral equivalence 有限注意力和选择模型：行为等价

IF 0.7 4区经济学

Mathematical Social Sciences Pub Date : 2025-08-28 DOI: 10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2025.102461

Davide Carpentiere, Angelo Enrico Petralia

引用次数: 0

The dynamics of bargaining power in a principal-agent model 委托代理模型中议价能力的动态

IF 0.7 4区经济学

Mathematical Social Sciences Pub Date : 2025-08-09 DOI: 10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2025.102452

Sonia Di Giannatale , Itza Tlaloc Quetzalcoatl Curiel-Cabral , Genaro Basulto

{"title":"The dynamics of bargaining power in a principal-agent model","authors":"Sonia Di Giannatale , Itza Tlaloc Quetzalcoatl Curiel-Cabral , Genaro Basulto","doi":"10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2025.102452","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2025.102452","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>This article develops a dynamic principal–agent model that integrates bargaining power as an evolving state variable, governed by a bargaining drift coefficient that links its trajectory to firm performance and agent compensation. The model examines how initial bargaining power shapes salary trajectories and how bargaining drift influences its adaptation over time in response to performance outcomes. By modeling these dynamics, the study highlights the role of incentives in driving the evolution of bargaining power, emphasizing the long-term impact of initial conditions on compensation structures. A key contribution is the formulation of an empirical equation that connects agent compensation and performance with bargaining drift, offering a framework for real-world validation. Beyond CEO pay, the framework extends to other performance-based environments, such as sports and academia, where shifting power relationships shape long-term contracts. By introducing a computational algorithm for multiobjective optimization, the study enhances the practical implementation of bargaining power dynamics, offering valuable insights for both theoretical modeling and governance applications.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":51118,"journal":{"name":"Mathematical Social Sciences","volume":"138 ","pages":"Article 102452"},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2025-08-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145005422","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Same-sex marriage, the great equalizer 同性婚姻，伟大的均衡器

IF 0.7 4区经济学

Mathematical Social Sciences Pub Date : 2025-08-08 DOI: 10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2025.102448

Alexei Parakhonyak , Sergey V. Popov

引用次数: 0

A new value for cooperative games on intersection-closed systems 交闭系统上合作对策的一个新值

IF 0.7 4区经济学

Mathematical Social Sciences Pub Date : 2025-08-08 DOI: 10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2025.102450

Martin Černý

{"title":"A new value for cooperative games on intersection-closed systems","authors":"Martin Černý","doi":"10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2025.102450","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2025.102450","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>In the model of cooperative games with restricted cooperation, certain coalitions are infeasible, meaning they cannot form, which directly influences payoff allocation. We consider a scenario where coalitions are no longer categorized as feasible or infeasible, but rather as known or unknown. In this setting, coalitions with unknown values are still feasible, but their values remain unknown in the allocation process. Classical allocation methods for games with restricted cooperation, such as the R-value, become unsuitable for such scenarios.</div><div>We introduce a new allocation rule called the <em>uniform-dividend value</em> (UD-value), designed specifically for cooperative games where some coalition values remain unknown (so-called <em>incomplete cooperative games</em>). The UD-value allocates payoffs by evenly distributing the total surplus within each group of <em>indistinguishable</em> coalitions. We demonstrate that for <em>intersection-closed</em> set systems, the UD-value is uniquely determined and can also be viewed as the expected Shapley value computed over all totally positive (i.e., nonnegative-surplus) extensions of the incomplete cooperative game. We compare the UD-value to two existing allocation rules for intersection-closed games: the R-value, defined as the Shapley value of a game that sets surplus of absent coalition values to zero, and the IC-value, tailored specifically for intersection-closed systems. Specifically, we provide axiomatic characterizations of the UD-value motivated by characterizations of the IC-value and discuss further properties such as fairness and balanced contributions.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":51118,"journal":{"name":"Mathematical Social Sciences","volume":"138 ","pages":"Article 102450"},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2025-08-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145005418","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Conformism and name dynamics: A cliometric study of ancient Greek names 符合性与名称动力学：古希腊名称的地理计量学研究

IF 0.7 4区经济学

Mathematical Social Sciences Pub Date : 2025-08-05 DOI: 10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2025.102451

Laurent Gauthier

引用次数: 0

A look back at the core of games in characteristic function form: Some new axiomatization results 回顾特征函数形式下的游戏核心：一些新的公理化结果

IF 0.7 4区经济学

Mathematical Social Sciences Pub Date : 2025-07-29 DOI: 10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2025.102447

Anindya Bhattacharya

引用次数: 0

Envy-freeness and maximum Nash welfare for mixed divisible and indivisible goods 可分与不可分混合商品的无嫉妒性与最大纳什福利

IF 0.7 4区经济学

Mathematical Social Sciences Pub Date : 2025-07-29 DOI: 10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2025.102449

Koichi Nishimura , Hanna Sumita

{"title":"Envy-freeness and maximum Nash welfare for mixed divisible and indivisible goods","authors":"Koichi Nishimura , Hanna Sumita","doi":"10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2025.102449","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2025.102449","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>We study fair allocation of resources consisting of both divisible and indivisible goods to agents with additive valuations. When only divisible or indivisible goods exist, it is known that an allocation that achieves the maximum Nash welfare (MNW) satisfies the classic fairness notions based on envy. Moreover, the literature shows the structures and characterizations of MNW allocations when valuations are binary and linear (i.e., divisible goods are homogeneous). In this paper, we show that when all agents’ valuations are binary linear, an MNW allocation for mixed goods satisfies the envy-freeness up to any good for mixed goods (EFXM). This notion is stronger than an existing one called envy-freeness for mixed goods (EFM), and our result generalizes the existing results for the case when only divisible or indivisible goods exist. When all agents’ valuations are binary over indivisible goods and identical over divisible goods (e.g., the divisible good is money), we extend the known characterization of an MNW allocation for indivisible goods to mixed goods, and also show that an MNW allocation satisfies EFXM. For the general additive valuations, we also provide a formal proof that an MNW allocation satisfies a weaker notion than EFM.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":51118,"journal":{"name":"Mathematical Social Sciences","volume":"138 ","pages":"Article 102449"},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2025-07-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145010801","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

The use of symmetry for models with variable-size variables 对具有可变大小变量的模型使用对称性

IF 0.7 4区经济学

Mathematical Social Sciences Pub Date : 2025-07-13 DOI: 10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2025.102437

Takeshi Fukasawa

{"title":"The use of symmetry for models with variable-size variables","authors":"Takeshi Fukasawa","doi":"10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2025.102437","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2025.102437","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>This paper presents a universal representation of symmetric (permutation-invariant) functions with multidimensional variable-size variables. These representations help justify approximation methods that aggregate information from each variable using moments. It further discusses how these findings provide insights into game-theoretic applications, including two-step policy function estimation, Moment-based Markov Equilibrium (MME), and aggregative games.</div><div>Regarding policy function estimation, under certain conditions, estimating a common policy function as a function of a firm’s own state and the sum of polynomial terms (moments) of competitors’ states is justified, regardless of the number of firms in a market, provided a sufficient number of moments are included. For MME, this study demonstrates that MME is equivalent to Markov Perfect Equilibrium if the number of moments reaches a certain level and regularity conditions are satisfied.</div><div>Regarding aggregative games, the paper establishes that any game satisfying symmetry and continuity conditions in payoff functions can be represented as a multidimensional generalized aggregative game. This extends previous research on generalized (fully) aggregative games by introducing multidimensional aggregates.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":51118,"journal":{"name":"Mathematical Social Sciences","volume":"138 ","pages":"Article 102437"},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2025-07-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145005420","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

A nonatomic game involving incomplete information and general ambiguity attitudes 一种包含不完全信息和一般模棱两可态度的非原子博弈

IF 0.7 4区经济学

Mathematical Social Sciences Pub Date : 2025-07-11 DOI: 10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2025.102435

Jian Yang

引用次数: 0

Cooperation and balance in signed networks: A model of multiplex formation 签名网络中的合作与平衡：一个多元形成的模型

IF 0.5 4区经济学

Mathematical Social Sciences Pub Date : 2025-07-01 DOI: 10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2025.102430

Rajendra P. Kundu, Siddhi Gyan Pandey

{"title":"Cooperation and balance in signed networks: A model of multiplex formation","authors":"Rajendra P. Kundu, Siddhi Gyan Pandey","doi":"10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2025.102430","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2025.102430","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>We propose a game theoretic model for multiplexity in signed networks through strategic interactions amongst <span><math><mi>n</mi></math></span> players who are linked to each other in an existing signed network of friendships and enmities <span><math><mi>g</mi></math></span>, which shape the incentive structure faced by players in their pairwise interactions with each other. These interactions take the form of simultaneous move cooperation games of complete information, wherein network effects create incentives to cooperate due to the presence of common friends as well common enemies. The set of pure strategy Nash equilibria in the strategic interactions between players <span><math><mi>i</mi></math></span> and <span><math><mi>j</mi></math></span> determine the nature of the tie between them in <span><math><mrow><mi>G</mi><mrow><mo>(</mo><mi>g</mi><mo>)</mo></mrow></mrow></math></span>, which is the new layer of the signed multiplex. We investigate how properties of structural balance in the existing signed social network <span><math><mi>g</mi></math></span> influence balance in the new signed network <span><math><mrow><mi>G</mi><mrow><mo>(</mo><mi>g</mi><mo>)</mo></mrow></mrow></math></span>, identifying conditions on the existing network that yield a structurally balanced new layer of the multiplex.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":51118,"journal":{"name":"Mathematical Social Sciences","volume":"136 ","pages":"Article 102430"},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2025-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144517767","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0