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Information-based discrimination 以信息为基础的歧视
IF 0.5 4区 经济学
Mathematical Social Sciences Pub Date : 2025-03-01 Epub Date: 2025-01-08 DOI: 10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2025.01.001
Naomi M. Utgoff
{"title":"Information-based discrimination","authors":"Naomi M. Utgoff","doi":"10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2025.01.001","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2025.01.001","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>The distribution of a single college’s incoming freshman cohort by high school of origin differs from the population distribution of high school seniors (Bernhard, 2013), a fact typically attributed to taste-based or statistical discrimination. This paper models a third explanation which I call <em>information-based discrimination</em>: information asymmetries between a college and high schools incentivize the formation of a relationship between the college and one <em>ex ante</em> randomly selected high school, resulting in <em>de facto</em> discriminatory admissions even in the absence of taste-based and statistical discrimination. I construct an admissions game between one college and <span><math><mi>N</mi></math></span> identical in expectation high schools. The game features a perfect Bayesian equilibrium in which the <em>ex ante</em> randomly chosen high school provides truthful information to the college in exchange for future favorable admission treatment. When agents are sufficiently patient, this relationship between the college and the initially randomly chosen high school is sustained in equilibrium. This equilibrium increases overall admissions efficiency relative to but does not Pareto improve on a dominant strategy implementable alternative: the welfare gains accrue entirely to the college and high school in the relationship while harming students from all other high schools.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":51118,"journal":{"name":"Mathematical Social Sciences","volume":"134 ","pages":"Pages 20-30"},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2025-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143175365","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Evolutionary implementation with partially effective institutions 部分有效制度下的渐进式实施
IF 0.5 4区 经济学
Mathematical Social Sciences Pub Date : 2025-03-01 Epub Date: 2025-01-03 DOI: 10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2024.12.004
Ratul Lahkar
{"title":"Evolutionary implementation with partially effective institutions","authors":"Ratul Lahkar","doi":"10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2024.12.004","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2024.12.004","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>We consider large population models of a public goods game and a tragedy of the commons. A planner applies externality pricing in these models. However, institutions in society are only partially effective. Hence, the externality price does not compel agents to internalize externalities fully. The resulting externality-adjusted game with partially effective institutions is a potential game. Evolutionary dynamics converge to its Nash equilibrium. More effective institutions bring this Nash equilibrium closer to the original Pareto efficient state. We trace the effectiveness of institutions to a primeval Tullock contest over natural resources in society. The society’s institutional structure arises from the contest’s Nash equilibrium. The institutional structure is more inclusive if natural resources in the contest are less appropriable. Institutions are then also more effective in implementing externality pricing.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":51118,"journal":{"name":"Mathematical Social Sciences","volume":"134 ","pages":"Pages 1-13"},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2025-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143175364","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Cooperative games with types, outside options, and the egalitarian value 具有类型、外部选择和平等价值的合作游戏
IF 0.5 4区 经济学
Mathematical Social Sciences Pub Date : 2025-03-01 Epub Date: 2025-01-22 DOI: 10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2025.01.003
Florian Navarro
{"title":"Cooperative games with types, outside options, and the egalitarian value","authors":"Florian Navarro","doi":"10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2025.01.003","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2025.01.003","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>This article introduces a new axiom of sub-game order preservation for TU-games as well as a model of cooperative games with types. The axiom, alongside efficiency, characterizes the egalitarian value. The model addresses situations where players of different types are needed. Each player has a specific type and coalitions are feasible only if it contains at most one player of each type. We use the new characterization of the egalitarian value for TU-games to obtain the following result in our class of problems: the egalitarian value is the only sharing rule that ensures that each player of the most productive group is better off joining this most productive group. We characterize the egalitarian value without fairness requirement and show that, for this new class of problems, egalitarianism can provide some form of incentives towards optimal cooperation.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":51118,"journal":{"name":"Mathematical Social Sciences","volume":"134 ","pages":"Pages 42-49"},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2025-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143175368","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Upper semicontinuous utilities for all upper semicontinuous total preorders 所有上半连续总预订量的上半连续效用
IF 0.5 4区 经济学
Mathematical Social Sciences Pub Date : 2025-03-01 Epub Date: 2025-01-15 DOI: 10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2025.01.002
Gianni Bosi, Gabriele Sbaiz
{"title":"Upper semicontinuous utilities for all upper semicontinuous total preorders","authors":"Gianni Bosi,&nbsp;Gabriele Sbaiz","doi":"10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2025.01.002","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2025.01.002","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>Let <span><math><mi>X</mi></math></span> be an arbitrary nonempty set. Then a topology <span><math><mi>t</mi></math></span> on <span><math><mi>X</mi></math></span> is said to be <em>completely useful</em> (or <em>upper useful</em>) if every upper semicontinuous <em>total</em> preorder <span><math><mo>≾</mo></math></span> on the topological space <span><math><mrow><mo>(</mo><mi>X</mi><mo>,</mo><mi>t</mi><mo>)</mo></mrow></math></span> can be represented by an upper semicontinuous real-valued order-preserving function (i.e., utility function). In this paper the structures of completely useful topologies on <span><math><mi>X</mi></math></span> will be deeply studied and clarified. In particular, completely useful topologies will be characterized through the new notions of super-short and strongly separable topologies. Further, the incorporation of the <em>Souslin Hypothesis</em> and the relevance of these characterizations in mathematical utility theory will be discussed. Finally, various interrelations between the concepts of complete usefulness and other topological concepts that are of interest not only in mathematical utility theory are analyzed.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":51118,"journal":{"name":"Mathematical Social Sciences","volume":"134 ","pages":"Pages 31-41"},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2025-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143175367","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
A measurement of population ageing: From the perspective of thickness of the labor force 人口老龄化的测度：基于劳动力厚度的视角
IF 0.5 4区 经济学
Mathematical Social Sciences Pub Date : 2025-03-01 Epub Date: 2025-01-31 DOI: 10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2025.01.004
Yoko Kawada , Yuta Nakamura , Noriaki Okamoto
{"title":"A measurement of population ageing: From the perspective of thickness of the labor force","authors":"Yoko Kawada ,&nbsp;Yuta Nakamura ,&nbsp;Noriaki Okamoto","doi":"10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2025.01.004","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2025.01.004","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>We propose a new measure of population ageing, and introduce a new condition called the <em>working-age principle</em>, which is a sensitivity condition to the “thickness” of the working-age population. Then, we characterize our measure by <em>working-age principle</em> and the other standard axioms. We also applied our measure to compute the degree of ageing in China, Japan, Niue, and Singapore, highlighting its importance in capturing the thickness of the labor force.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":51118,"journal":{"name":"Mathematical Social Sciences","volume":"134 ","pages":"Pages 50-57"},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2025-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143317562","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
The morality of markets. A critique 市场的道德。批判
IF 0.5 4区 经济学
Mathematical Social Sciences Pub Date : 2025-03-01 Epub Date: 2024-12-20 DOI: 10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2024.12.003
Grégory Ponthière , Nicolas Stevens
{"title":"The morality of markets. A critique","authors":"Grégory Ponthière ,&nbsp;Nicolas Stevens","doi":"10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2024.12.003","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2024.12.003","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>Dewatripont and Tirole (2024) defend the morality of markets on the ground of an irrelevance result: the social production of moral actions is independent from competitive pressure on markets. No matter how strong competitive pressure is, markets perform well in diffusing signals about moral values and in coordinating suppliers of moral actions. In this article, we argue, on the contrary, that markets lead to a double crowding out of moral values: first, imperfect transmission of moral values on markets leads to an underproduction of moral actions despite the presence of highly ethical suppliers; second, competitive pressure on markets favors the eviction of highly ethical suppliers by less ethical suppliers. Furthermore, we highlight that this double crowding-out restricts the normative scope of the irrelevance result, and raises the question of what the division of moral labor should be between citizens, firms and States.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":51118,"journal":{"name":"Mathematical Social Sciences","volume":"134 ","pages":"Pages 14-19"},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2025-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143175366","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Bargaining theory and the copyright royalty board’s rate setting decisions for interactive streaming of music 讨价还价理论和版权版税委员会的费率设置决策的交互式流媒体音乐
IF 0.5 4区 经济学
Mathematical Social Sciences Pub Date : 2025-03-01 Epub Date: 2025-02-11 DOI: 10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2025.01.005
Elliott Hughes , Richard Watt
{"title":"Bargaining theory and the copyright royalty board’s rate setting decisions for interactive streaming of music","authors":"Elliott Hughes ,&nbsp;Richard Watt","doi":"10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2025.01.005","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2025.01.005","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>In the USA, the remuneration for songwriters whose copyrighted material is broadcast using online interactive music services is subject to a compulsory license with a rate that is regulated by the Copyright Royalty Board. On the other hand, an essentially equally necessary input to the interactive music services, namely the sound recording copyright, is freely negotiated between the parties. This sets up an interesting bargaining problem that is of interest to the regulator. The present paper sets out this problem formally, and resolves the equilibrium outcomes. The model is calibrated with the actual rates that have been set recently.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":51118,"journal":{"name":"Mathematical Social Sciences","volume":"134 ","pages":"Pages 58-65"},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2025-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143421129","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Stability and optimal double auction design for a two-sided market 双边市场的稳定性与最优双拍卖设计
IF 0.5 4区 经济学
Mathematical Social Sciences Pub Date : 2025-01-01 Epub Date: 2024-11-23 DOI: 10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2024.11.003
Aditya Vikram
{"title":"Stability and optimal double auction design for a two-sided market","authors":"Aditya Vikram","doi":"10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2024.11.003","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2024.11.003","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>We investigate the stability of internet platform trading mechanisms using the notion of ex-ante incentive compatible core defined by Forges et al. (2002) in the context of an exchange economy. A mechanism can be blocked by a single buyer and seller pair if they can find an interim incentive-compatible trading mechanism that gives them higher ex-ante expected utilities. Standard double auction mechanisms like the trade reduction mechanism and McAfee double auction mechanism may not be single-buyer–single-seller (SBSS) ex-ante stable. We characterize interim incentive-compatible, interim individually-rational, symmetric and revenue-maximizing mechanisms that are SBSS ex-ante stable using methods in Myerson and Satterthwaite (1983).</div></div>","PeriodicalId":51118,"journal":{"name":"Mathematical Social Sciences","volume":"133 ","pages":"Pages 1-12"},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2025-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142743600","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Optimal top-n policy 最优顶优先策略
IF 0.5 4区 经济学
Mathematical Social Sciences Pub Date : 2025-01-01 Epub Date: 2024-12-15 DOI: 10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2024.12.001
Isa Hafalir , Siqi Pan , Kentaro Tomoeda
{"title":"Optimal top-n policy","authors":"Isa Hafalir ,&nbsp;Siqi Pan ,&nbsp;Kentaro Tomoeda","doi":"10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2024.12.001","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2024.12.001","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>A widely adopted affirmative action policy in the university sector is the “top-<span><math><mi>n</mi></math></span>” policy, where the universities guarantee admission to students in the top <span><math><mi>n</mi></math></span> fraction of their class from every high school. The efficacy of the top-<span><math><mi>n</mi></math></span> policy in university integration has been questioned because students strategically relocate to low-achieving high schools. We show that when minorities are less likely to strategize than others, the policy can even segregate minorities from the target university, compared to the school-blind policy. A suitably chosen eligibility requirement, featuring the minimum time students must spend at a high school in order to be eligible for top-<span><math><mi>n</mi></math></span> admissions, can restore the efficacy of this policy. However, the most stringent requirement is not always optimal. The optimal requirement depends on the original distribution of students across high schools.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":51118,"journal":{"name":"Mathematical Social Sciences","volume":"133 ","pages":"Pages 34-48"},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2025-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143092906","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Condorcet domains on at most seven alternatives 孔多塞域在最多七个备选项上
IF 0.5 4区 经济学
Mathematical Social Sciences Pub Date : 2025-01-01 Epub Date: 2024-12-13 DOI: 10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2024.12.002
Dolica Akello-Egwel , Charles Leedham-Green , Alastair Litterick , Klas Markström , Søren Riis
{"title":"Condorcet domains on at most seven alternatives","authors":"Dolica Akello-Egwel ,&nbsp;Charles Leedham-Green ,&nbsp;Alastair Litterick ,&nbsp;Klas Markström ,&nbsp;Søren Riis","doi":"10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2024.12.002","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2024.12.002","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>A Condorcet domain is a collection of linear orders which avoid Condorcet’s paradox for majority voting. We have developed a new algorithm for complete enumeration of all maximal Condorcet domains and, using a supercomputer, obtained the first enumeration of all maximal Condorcet domains on <span><math><mrow><mi>n</mi><mo>≤</mo><mn>7</mn></mrow></math></span> alternatives.</div><div>We investigate properties of these domains and use this study to resolve several open questions regarding Condorcet domains, and propose several new conjectures. Following this we connect our results to other domain types used in voting theory, such a non-dictatorial and strategy-proof domains. All our data are made freely available on the web.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":51118,"journal":{"name":"Mathematical Social Sciences","volume":"133 ","pages":"Pages 23-33"},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2025-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143092905","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
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