Mathematical Social Sciences最新文献_第8页

Expectations for the MPC chair and interest rate persistence 对货币政策委员会主席和利率持续性的预期

IF 0.6 4区经济学

Mathematical Social Sciences Pub Date : 2024-01-18 DOI: 10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2024.01.005

Yuta Saito

引用次数: 0

Externalities and the (pre)nucleolus in cooperative games 合作博弈中的外在性和（前）核子

IF 0.6 4区经济学

Mathematical Social Sciences Pub Date : 2024-01-13 DOI: 10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2024.01.003

Mikel Álvarez-Mozos , Lars Ehlers

引用次数: 0

Classification aggregation without unanimity 无一致意见的分类汇总

IF 0.6 4区经济学

Mathematical Social Sciences Pub Date : 2024-01-11 DOI: 10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2024.01.002

Olivier Cailloux , Matthieu Hervouin , Ali I. Ozkes , M. Remzi Sanver

{"title":"Classification aggregation without unanimity","authors":"Olivier Cailloux , Matthieu Hervouin , Ali I. Ozkes , M. Remzi Sanver","doi":"10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2024.01.002","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2024.01.002","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>A classification is a surjective mapping from a set of objects to a set of categories. A classification aggregation function aggregates every vector of classifications into a single one. We show that every citizen sovereign and independent classification aggregation function is essentially a dictatorship. This impossibility implies an earlier result of Maniquet and Mongin (2016), who show that every unanimous and independent classification aggregation function is a dictatorship. The relationship between the two impossibilities is reminiscent to the relationship between Wilson’s (1972) and Arrow’s (1951) impossibilities in preference aggregation. Moreover, while the Maniquet-Mongin impossibility rests on the existence of at least three categories, we propose an alternative proof technique that covers the case of two categories, except when the number of objects is also two. We also identify all independent and unanimous classification aggregation functions for the case of two categories and two objects.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":51118,"journal":{"name":"Mathematical Social Sciences","volume":"128 ","pages":"Pages 6-9"},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2024-01-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0165489624000088/pdfft?md5=0187f37c798bf0c6a8c9bf69de97a8da&pid=1-s2.0-S0165489624000088-main.pdf","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139422830","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Characterizations of approval ranking 批准等级的特征

IF 0.6 4区经济学

Mathematical Social Sciences Pub Date : 2024-01-11 DOI: 10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2024.01.001

Hiroyuki Komatsu

引用次数: 0

Strategy-proof allocation of objects: A characterization result 无策略的对象分配：表征结果

IF 0.6 4区经济学

Mathematical Social Sciences Pub Date : 2023-12-28 DOI: 10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2023.12.004

Tommy Andersson, Lars-Gunnar Svensson

引用次数: 0

Costly expressive voting 代价高昂的表达式投票

IF 0.6 4区经济学

Mathematical Social Sciences Pub Date : 2023-12-20 DOI: 10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2023.12.003

Arthur Fishman , Doron Klunover

引用次数: 0

Creative destruction vs destructive destruction: A Schumpeterian approach for adaptation and mitigation 创造性破坏与破坏性破坏：熊彼得的适应与缓解方法

IF 0.6 4区经济学

Mathematical Social Sciences Pub Date : 2023-12-16 DOI: 10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2023.12.002

Can Askan Mavi

{"title":"Creative destruction vs destructive destruction: A Schumpeterian approach for adaptation and mitigation","authors":"Can Askan Mavi","doi":"10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2023.12.002","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2023.12.002","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>This article aims to demonstrate how a market exposed to a catastrophic event strives to find a balance between adaptation and mitigation policies through R&D strategies. Our analysis reveals that, within our framework, there exists no trade-off between adaptation and mitigation. Rather, the critical relationship exists between adaptation and pollution because adaptation (wealth accumulation) increases the growth rate of the economy, leading to a higher flow pollution due to the scale effect. We also investigate the long-run effects of pollution taxes on growth rates and the influence of the probability of catastrophic events on these outcomes. Our findings suggest that even with a higher likelihood of catastrophe, the economy can elevate its R&D endeavors, provided that the penalty rate stemming from an abrupt event remains sufficiently high and the economy confronts a risk of a doomsday scenario. Additionally, we illustrate that pollution taxes can foster heightened long-term growth, with the positive effects being more pronounced when the probability of catastrophe is elevated, assuming an adequately substantial penalty rate. Finally, we find that pollution growth can be higher with less polluting inputs due to a scale effect, a phenomenon akin to the Jevons-type paradox.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":51118,"journal":{"name":"Mathematical Social Sciences","volume":"127 ","pages":"Pages 36-53"},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2023-12-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"138685620","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Relational utility and social norms in games 游戏中的关系效用和社会规范

IF 0.6 4区经济学

Mathematical Social Sciences Pub Date : 2023-12-09 DOI: 10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2023.12.001

Ruiyang Su , Bryce Morsky

引用次数: 0

Policy polarization, primaries, and strategic voters 政策两极化、初选和战略选民

IF 0.6 4区经济学

Mathematical Social Sciences Pub Date : 2023-12-02 DOI: 10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2023.11.002

Diego Carrasco , Shino Takayama , Yuki Tamura , Terence Yeo

{"title":"Policy polarization, primaries, and strategic voters","authors":"Diego Carrasco , Shino Takayama , Yuki Tamura , Terence Yeo","doi":"10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2023.11.002","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2023.11.002","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>We consider two-stage electoral competitions with strategic voters, investigating the effects of valence (i.e., a candidate’s personal quality) on policy polarization. In our model, two parties compete in a general election, and each party has two office-seeking candidates. Parties first hold a primary election to decide their representative, and then put forward their winning candidate to compete in the general election. Candidates are thus characterized by their promised policy and their valence. Although voters value policies differently, they value valence uniformly. We focus on a competitive regime pure strategy Nash equilibrium where the candidate with the highest valence does not necessarily win the general election. We provide the sufficient conditions under which such an equilibrium exists, as well as a novel comparative static analysis of the valence differences between candidates (or the valence advantage). Our findings demonstrate that changing the valence advantage in general and primary elections can pose differing implications for policy outcomes and policy polarization.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":51118,"journal":{"name":"Mathematical Social Sciences","volume":"127 ","pages":"Pages 19-35"},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2023-12-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0165489623000999/pdfft?md5=602fe45c6572cc23079a81fb74272246&pid=1-s2.0-S0165489623000999-main.pdf","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"138490582","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Rational Shortlist Method with refined rationales 具有精炼基本原理的合理候选名单方法

IF 0.6 4区经济学

Mathematical Social Sciences Pub Date : 2023-11-21 DOI: 10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2023.10.003

Hassan Nosratabadi

引用次数: 0