Mathematical Social Sciences最新文献_第8页

Creative destruction vs destructive destruction: A Schumpeterian approach for adaptation and mitigation 创造性破坏与破坏性破坏：熊彼得的适应与缓解方法

IF 0.6 4区经济学

Mathematical Social Sciences Pub Date : 2023-12-16 DOI: 10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2023.12.002

Can Askan Mavi

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引用次数: 0

Relational utility and social norms in games 游戏中的关系效用和社会规范

IF 0.6 4区经济学

Mathematical Social Sciences Pub Date : 2023-12-09 DOI: 10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2023.12.001

Ruiyang Su , Bryce Morsky

引用次数: 0

Policy polarization, primaries, and strategic voters 政策两极化、初选和战略选民

IF 0.6 4区经济学

Mathematical Social Sciences Pub Date : 2023-12-02 DOI: 10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2023.11.002

Diego Carrasco , Shino Takayama , Yuki Tamura , Terence Yeo

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引用次数: 0

Rational Shortlist Method with refined rationales 具有精炼基本原理的合理候选名单方法

IF 0.6 4区经济学

Mathematical Social Sciences Pub Date : 2023-11-21 DOI: 10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2023.10.003

Hassan Nosratabadi

引用次数: 0

Ultimatum bargaining with envy under incomplete information 不完全信息下的最后通牒嫉妒谈判

IF 0.6 4区经济学

Mathematical Social Sciences Pub Date : 2023-11-17 DOI: 10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2023.11.001

Eric Gonzalez-Sanchez , Gino Loyola

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引用次数: 0

On the measurement of electoral volatility 关于选举波动性的测量

IF 0.6 4区经济学

Mathematical Social Sciences Pub Date : 2023-11-01 DOI: 10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2023.10.005

Sandip Sarkar , Bharatee Bhusana Dash

引用次数: 0

Robust Bayesian choice 鲁棒贝叶斯选择

IF 0.6 4区经济学

Mathematical Social Sciences Pub Date : 2023-11-01 DOI: 10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2023.10.002

Lorenzo Stanca

引用次数: 0

Maximal domains for strategy-proof pairwise exchange 防策略对偶交换的最大域

IF 0.6 4区经济学

Mathematical Social Sciences Pub Date : 2023-11-01 DOI: 10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2023.10.004

Carmelo Rodríguez-Álvarez

引用次数: 0

Subjective complexity under uncertainty 不确定性条件下的主观复杂性

IF 0.6 4区经济学

Mathematical Social Sciences Pub Date : 2023-10-16 DOI: 10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2023.10.001

Quitzé Valenzuela-Stookey

引用次数: 8

Analytic approach for models of optimal retirement with disability risk 具有残疾风险的最优退休模型的分析方法

IF 0.6 4区经济学

Mathematical Social Sciences Pub Date : 2023-10-05 DOI: 10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2023.09.007

Jiwon Chae , Bong-Gyu Jang , Seyoung Park

引用次数: 0