Cognitive Psychology最新文献

{"title":"Two pathways in vocabulary development: Large-scale differences in noun and verb semantic structure","authors":"Justin B. Kueser ,&nbsp;Sabrina Horvath ,&nbsp;Arielle Borovsky","doi":"10.1016/j.cogpsych.2023.101574","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.cogpsych.2023.101574","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>In adults, nouns and verbs have varied and multilevel semantic interrelationships. In children, evidence suggests that nouns and verbs also have semantic interrelationships, though the timing of the emergence of these relationships and their precise impact on later noun and verb learning are not clear. In this work, we ask whether noun and verb semantic knowledge in 16–30-month-old children tend to be semantically isolated from one another or semantically interacting from the onset of vocabulary development. Early word learning patterns were quantified using network science. We measured the semantic network structure for nouns and verbs in 3,804 16–30-month-old children at several levels of granularity using a large, open dataset of vocabulary checklist data. In a cross-sectional approach in Experiment 1, early nouns and verbs exhibited stronger network relationships with other nouns and verbs than expected across multiple network levels. Using a longitudinal approach in Experiment 2, we examined patterns of normative vocabulary development over time. Initial noun and verb learning was supported by strong semantic connections to other nouns, whereas later-learned words exhibited strong connections to verbs. Overall, these two experiments suggest that nouns and verbs demonstrate early semantic interactions and that these interactions impact later word learning. Early verb and noun learning is affected by the emergence of noun and verb semantic networks during early lexical development.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":50669,"journal":{"name":"Cognitive Psychology","volume":"143 ","pages":"Article 101574"},"PeriodicalIF":2.6,"publicationDate":"2023-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"9962333","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Analogical inferences mediated by relational categories","authors":"Ricardo A. Minervino ,&nbsp;Adrián Margni ,&nbsp;Máximo Trench","doi":"10.1016/j.cogpsych.2023.101561","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.cogpsych.2023.101561","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>The standard approach posits that analogical inferences are generated by copying unmapped base relations, substituting mapped target entities for source entities, and generating slots for base entities that have not found a correspondence in the target. In the present study we argue that this mechanism does not adequately explain the generation of inferences mediated by relational categories. Experiment 1 revealed that for analogies in which the gist of the information to be transferred is better captured by relational categories than by explicit relations, inferences are more concerned with reinstantiating the base relational category than with ensuring that the relation of the inference resembles that of the base. Experiment 2 replicated this finding with analogies between situations maintaining a higher degree of semantic and contextual distance. The following experiments addressed whether there are further restrictions that guide a more fine-grained selection of exemplars. Experiment 3 revealed that when no relevant differences exist between compared situations, the exemplars included in analogical inferences tend to match the base exemplars along salient dimensions of the relational category to which both exemplars belong. In turn, Experiment 4 replicated this finding with analogies between situations maintaining some degree of semantic and contextual distance. The study adds to a growing literature recognizing the role of categorization in analogical reasoning. The challenges posed by the present results to the traditional view of analogical inference are discussed, as well as the prospects of the categorial mechanism for explaining other types of analogies not included in the present study.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":50669,"journal":{"name":"Cognitive Psychology","volume":"142 ","pages":"Article 101561"},"PeriodicalIF":2.6,"publicationDate":"2023-05-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"9854417","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Information acquisition and decision strategies in intertemporal choice","authors":"Lisheng He ,&nbsp;Daniel Wall ,&nbsp;Crystal Reeck ,&nbsp;Sudeep Bhatia","doi":"10.1016/j.cogpsych.2023.101562","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.cogpsych.2023.101562","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>Intertemporal decision models describe choices between outcomes with different delays. While these models mainly focus on predicting choices, they make implicit assumptions about how people acquire and process information. A link between information processing and choice model predictions is necessary for a complete mechanistic account of decision making. We establish this link by fitting 18 intertemporal choice models to experimental datasets with both choice and information acquisition data. First, we show that choice models have highly correlated fits: people that behave according to one model also behave according to other models that make similar information processing assumptions. Second, we develop and fit an attention model to information acquisition data. Critically, the attention model parameters predict which type of intertemporal choice models best describes a participant’s choices. Overall, our results relate attentional processes to models of intertemporal choice, providing a stepping stone towards a complete mechanistic account of intertemporal decision making.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":50669,"journal":{"name":"Cognitive Psychology","volume":"142 ","pages":"Article 101562"},"PeriodicalIF":2.6,"publicationDate":"2023-05-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"9487694","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Relational and lexical similarity in analogical reasoning and recognition memory: Behavioral evidence and computational evaluation","authors":"Nicholas Ichien ,&nbsp;Katherine L. Alfred ,&nbsp;Sophia Baia ,&nbsp;David J.M. Kraemer ,&nbsp;Keith J. Holyoak ,&nbsp;Silvia A. Bunge ,&nbsp;Hongjing Lu","doi":"10.1016/j.cogpsych.2023.101550","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.cogpsych.2023.101550","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>We examined the role of different types of similarity in both analogical reasoning and recognition memory. On recognition tasks, people more often falsely report having seen a recombined word pair (e.g., <em>flower: garden</em>) if it instantiates the same semantic relation (e.g., <em>is a part of</em>) as a studied word pair (e.g., <em>house: town</em>). This phenomenon, termed <em>relational luring</em>, has been interpreted as evidence that explicit relation representations—known to play a central role in analogical reasoning—also impact episodic memory. We replicate and extend previous studies, showing that relation-based false alarms in recognition memory occur after participants encode word pairs either by making relatedness judgments about individual words presented sequentially, or by evaluating analogies between pairs of word pairs. To test alternative explanations of relational luring, we implemented an established model of recognition memory, the Generalized Context Model (GCM). Within this basic framework, we compared representations of word pairs based on similarities derived either from explicit relations or from lexical semantics (i.e., individual word meanings). In two experiments on recognition memory, best-fitting values of GCM parameters enabled <em>both</em> similarity models (even the model based solely on lexical semantics) to predict relational luring with comparable accuracy. However, the model based on explicit relations proved more robust to parameter variations than that based on lexical similarity. We found this same pattern of modeling results when applying GCM to an independent set of data reported by <span>Popov, Hristova, and Anders (2017)</span>. In accord with previous work, we also found that explicit relation representations are necessary for modeling analogical reasoning. Our findings support the possibility that explicit relations, which are central to analogical reasoning, also play an important role in episodic memory.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":50669,"journal":{"name":"Cognitive Psychology","volume":"141 ","pages":"Article 101550"},"PeriodicalIF":2.6,"publicationDate":"2023-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"9484031","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"The spatiotemporal gradient of intrusion errors in continuous outcome source memory: Source retrieval is affected by both guessing and intrusions","authors":"Jason Zhou,&nbsp;Adam F. Osth,&nbsp;Philip L. Smith","doi":"10.1016/j.cogpsych.2023.101552","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.cogpsych.2023.101552","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>Previous research has characterized source retrieval as a thresholded process, which fails on a proportion of trials and leads to guessing, as opposed to a continuous process, in which response precision varies across trials but is never zero. The thresholded view of source retrieval is largely based on the observation of heavy tailed distributions of response errors, thought to reflect a large proportion of “memoryless” trials. In this study, we investigate whether these errors might instead reflect systematic intrusions from other list items which can mimic source guessing. Using the circular diffusion model of decision making, which accounts for both response errors and RTs we found that intrusions account for some, but not all, errors in a continuous-report source memory task. We found that intrusion errors were more likely to come from items studied in nearby locations and times, and were well-described by a spatiotemporal gradient model, but not from semantically or perceptually similar cues. Our findings support a thresholded view of source retrieval but suggest that previous work has overestimated the proportion of guesses which have been conflated with intrusions.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":50669,"journal":{"name":"Cognitive Psychology","volume":"141 ","pages":"Article 101552"},"PeriodicalIF":2.6,"publicationDate":"2023-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"9487641","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Probability and intentional action","authors":"Spencer R. Ericson ,&nbsp;Stephanie Denison ,&nbsp;John Turri ,&nbsp;Ori Friedman","doi":"10.1016/j.cogpsych.2023.101551","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.cogpsych.2023.101551","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>How does probability affect attributions of intentionality? In five experiments (total N = 1410), we provide evidence for a probability raising account holding that people are more likely to see the outcome of an agent’s action as intentional if the agent does something to increase the odds of that outcome. Experiment 1 found that high probability without probability raising does not suffice for strong attributions of intentionality. Participants were more likely to conclude a girl intentionally obtained a desired gumball from a single gumball machine when it offered favorable odds for getting that kind of gumball compared with when it offered poor odds, but their attributions of intentionality were lukewarm. Experiments 2 and 3 then found stronger attributions of intentionality when the girl raised her probability of success by choosing to use machines offering favorable odds over machines offering poor odds. Finally, Experiments 4 and 5 examined whether these effects of probability raising might reduce to consideration of agents’ beliefs and expectations. We found that although these mental states do matter, probability raising matters too—people attribute intentional actions to agents who increase their odds of success, rather than to agents who merely become convinced that success is likely. We discuss the implications of these findings for claims that control and skill contribute to attributions of intentional action.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":50669,"journal":{"name":"Cognitive Psychology","volume":"141 ","pages":"Article 101551"},"PeriodicalIF":2.6,"publicationDate":"2023-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"9536974","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Contextuality and context-sensitivity in probabilistic models of cognition","authors":"P.D. Bruza,&nbsp;L. Fell,&nbsp;P. Hoyte,&nbsp;S. Dehdashti,&nbsp;A. Obeid,&nbsp;A. Gibson,&nbsp;C. Moreira","doi":"10.1016/j.cogpsych.2022.101529","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.cogpsych.2022.101529","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>The context-sensitivity of cognition has been demonstrated across a wide range of cognitive functions such as perception, memory, judgement and decision making. A related term, ‘contextuality’, has appeared from the field of quantum cognition, with mounting empirical evidence demonstrating that cognitive phenomena are sometimes contextual. Contextuality is a subtle notion that influences how we must view the properties of the cognitive phenomenon being studied. This article addresses the questions: What does it mean for a cognitive phenomenon to be contextual? What are the implications of contextuality for probabilistic models of cognition? How does contextuality differ from context-sensitivity? Starting from George Boole’s “conditions of possible experience”, we argue that a probabilistic model of a cognitive phenomenon is necessarily subject to an assumption of realism. By this we mean that the phenomenon being studied is assumed to have cognitive properties with a definite value independent of observation. In contrast, quantum cognition holds that a cognitive property maybe indeterminate, i.e., its properties do not have well established values prior to observation. We argue that indeterminacy is sufficient for incompatibility between cognitive properties. In turn, incompatibility is necessary for their contextuality. The significance of this argument for cognitive psychology is the following:if a cognitive phenomenon is found to be contextual, then there is reason to believe it may be indeterminate. We illustrate by means of two crowdsourced experiments how context-sensitivity and contextuality of cognitive properties in the form of facial trait judgements can be characterized from empirical data. Finally, we conceptually and formally contrast contextuality with context-sensitivity. We propose that both involve a form of context dependence, with causality being the differentiating factor: the context dependence in context-sensitivity has a causal basis, whereas the context dependence in contextuality is acausal. The resulting implications for probabilistic models of cognition are discussed.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":50669,"journal":{"name":"Cognitive Psychology","volume":"140 ","pages":"Article 101529"},"PeriodicalIF":2.6,"publicationDate":"2023-02-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"9482222","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Evidence for abstract representations in children but not capuchin monkeys","authors":"Elisa Felsche ,&nbsp;Patience Stevens ,&nbsp;Christoph J. Völter ,&nbsp;Daphna Buchsbaum ,&nbsp;Amanda M. Seed","doi":"10.1016/j.cogpsych.2022.101530","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.cogpsych.2022.101530","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>The use of abstract higher-level knowledge (also called overhypotheses) allows humans to learn quickly from sparse data and make predictions in new situations. Previous research has suggested that humans may be the only species capable of abstract knowledge formation, but this remains controversial. There is also mixed evidence for when this ability emerges over human development. <span>Kemp et al. (2007)</span> proposed a computational model of how overhypotheses could be learned from sparse examples. We provide the first direct test of this model: an ecologically valid paradigm for testing two species, capuchin monkeys (<em>Sapajus</em> spp.) and 4- to 5-year-old human children. We presented participants with sampled evidence from different containers which suggested that all containers held items of uniform type (type condition) or of uniform size (size condition). Subsequently, we presented two new test containers and an example item from each: a small, high-valued item and a large but low-valued item. Participants could then choose from which test container they would like to receive the next sample – the optimal choice was the container that yielded a large item in the size condition or a high-valued item in the type condition. We compared performance to a priori predictions made by models with and without the capacity to learn overhypotheses. Children's choices were consistent with the model predictions and thus suggest an ability for abstract knowledge formation in the preschool years, whereas monkeys performed at chance level.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":50669,"journal":{"name":"Cognitive Psychology","volume":"140 ","pages":"Article 101530"},"PeriodicalIF":2.6,"publicationDate":"2023-02-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"9836153","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"The perceived dilution of causal strength","authors":"Simon Stephan ,&nbsp;Neele Engelmann ,&nbsp;Michael R. Waldmann","doi":"10.1016/j.cogpsych.2022.101540","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.cogpsych.2022.101540","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>Dependency theories of causal reasoning, such as causal Bayes net accounts, postulate that the strengths of individual causal links are independent of the causal structure in which they are embedded; they are inferred from dependency information, such as statistical regularities. We propose a psychological account that postulates that reasoners’ concept of causality is richer. It predicts a systematic influence of causal structure knowledge on causal strength intuitions. Our view incorporates the notion held by dispositional theories that causes produce effects in virtue of an underlying causal capacity. Going beyond existing normative dispositional theories, however, we argue that reasoners’ concept of causality involves the idea that continuous causes spread their capacity across their different causal pathways, analogous to fluids running through pipe systems. Such a representation leads to the prediction of a structure-dependent <em>dilution</em> of causal strength: the more links are served by a cause, the weaker individual links are expected to be. A series of experiments corroborate the theory. For continuous causes with continuous effects, but not in causal structures with genuinely binary variables that can only be present or absent, reasoners tend to think that link strength decreases with the number of links served by a cause. The effect reflects a default notion reasoners have about causality, but it is moderated by assumptions about the amount of causal capacity causes are assumed to possess, and by mechanism knowledge about how a cause generates its effect(s). We discuss the theoretical and empirical implications of our findings.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":50669,"journal":{"name":"Cognitive Psychology","volume":"140 ","pages":"Article 101540"},"PeriodicalIF":2.6,"publicationDate":"2023-02-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"9474902","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"The role of task-relevant and task-irrelevant information in congruency sequence effects: Applying the diffusion model for conflict tasks","authors":"Valentin Koob ,&nbsp;Ian Mackenzie ,&nbsp;Rolf Ulrich ,&nbsp;Hartmut Leuthold ,&nbsp;Markus Janczyk","doi":"10.1016/j.cogpsych.2022.101528","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.cogpsych.2022.101528","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>In conflict tasks, such as the Simon, Eriksen flanker, or Stroop task, the congruency effect is often reduced after an incongruent compared to a congruent trial: the congruency sequence effect (CSE). It was suggested that the CSE may reflect increased processing of task-relevant information and/or suppression of task-irrelevant information after experiencing an incongruent relative to a congruent trial. In the present study, we contribute to this discussion by applying the Diffusion Model for Conflict tasks (DMC) framework in the context of CSEs to flanker and Simon tasks. We argue that DMC independently models the task-relevant and task-irrelevant information and thus is a first good candidate for disentangling their unique contributions. As a first approach, we fitted DMC conjointly or separately to previously congruent or incongruent trials, using four empirical flanker and two Simon data sets. For the flanker task, we fitted the classical DMC version. For the Simon task, we fitted a generalized DMC version which allows the task-irrelevant information to undershoot when swinging back to zero. After considering the model fits, we present a second approach, where we implemented a cognitive control mechanism to simulate the influence of increased processing of task-relevant information or increased suppression of task-irrelevant information. Both approaches demonstrate that the suppression of task-irrelevant information is essential to create the typical CSE pattern. Increased processing of task-relevant information, however, could rarely describe the CSE accurately.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":50669,"journal":{"name":"Cognitive Psychology","volume":"140 ","pages":"Article 101528"},"PeriodicalIF":2.6,"publicationDate":"2023-02-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"9482238","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}