Cognitive Psychology最新文献

{"title":"Repeated rock, paper, scissors play reveals limits in adaptive sequential behavior","authors":"Erik Brockbank ,&nbsp;Edward Vul","doi":"10.1016/j.cogpsych.2024.101654","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cogpsych.2024.101654","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>How do people adapt to others in adversarial settings? Prior work has shown that people often violate rational models of adversarial decision-making in repeated interactions. In particular, in <em>mixed strategy equilibrium (MSE)</em> games, where optimal action selection entails choosing moves randomly, people often do not play randomly, but instead try to <em>outwit</em> their opponents. However, little is known about the adaptive reasoning that underlies these deviations from random behavior. Here, we examine strategic decision-making across repeated rounds of rock, paper, scissors, a well-known MSE game. In experiment 1, participants were paired with bot opponents that exhibited distinct stable move patterns, allowing us to identify the bounds of the complexity of opponent behavior that people can detect and adapt to. In experiment 2, bot opponents instead exploited stable patterns in the human participants’ moves, providing a symmetrical bound on the complexity of patterns people can revise in their own behavior. Across both experiments, people exhibited a robust and flexible attention to <em>transition patterns</em> from one move to the next, exploiting these patterns in opponents and modifying them strategically in their own moves. However, their adaptive reasoning showed strong limitations with respect to more sophisticated patterns. Together, results provide a precise and consistent account of the surprisingly limited scope of people’s adaptive decision-making in this setting.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":50669,"journal":{"name":"Cognitive Psychology","volume":"151 ","pages":"Article 101654"},"PeriodicalIF":2.6,"publicationDate":"2024-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140641101","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"The fusion point of temporal binding: Promises and perils of multisensory accounts","authors":"Annika L. Klaffehn ,&nbsp;Oliver Herbort ,&nbsp;Roland Pfister","doi":"10.1016/j.cogpsych.2024.101662","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cogpsych.2024.101662","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>Performing an action to initiate a consequence in the environment triggers the perceptual illusion of temporal binding. This phenomenon entails that actions and following effects are perceived to occur closer in time than they do outside the action-effect relationship. Here we ask whether temporal binding can be explained in terms of multisensory integration, by assuming either multisensory fusion or partial integration of the two events. We gathered two datasets featuring a wide range of action-effect delays as a key factor influencing integration. We then tested the fit of a computational model for multisensory integration, the statistically optimal cue integration (SOCI) model. Indeed, qualitative aspects of the data on a group-level followed the principles of a multisensory account. By contrast, quantitative evidence from a comprehensive model evaluation indicated that temporal binding cannot be reduced to multisensory integration. Rather, multisensory integration should be seen as one of several component processes underlying temporal binding on an individual level.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":50669,"journal":{"name":"Cognitive Psychology","volume":"151 ","pages":"Article 101662"},"PeriodicalIF":2.6,"publicationDate":"2024-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0010028524000331/pdfft?md5=618f770b916a33a013d847542c6483a0&pid=1-s2.0-S0010028524000331-main.pdf","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141072828","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"The structure and development of explore-exploit decision making","authors":"Madeline B. Harms ,&nbsp;Yuyan Xu ,&nbsp;C. Shawn Green ,&nbsp;Kristina Woodard ,&nbsp;Robert Wilson ,&nbsp;Seth D. Pollak","doi":"10.1016/j.cogpsych.2024.101650","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cogpsych.2024.101650","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>A critical component of human learning reflects the balance people must achieve between focusing on the utility of what they know versus openness to what they have yet to experience. How individuals decide whether to explore new options versus exploit known options has garnered growing interest in recent years. Yet, the component processes underlying decisions to explore and whether these processes change across development remain poorly understood. By contrasting a variety of tasks that measure exploration in slightly different ways, we found that decisions about whether to explore reflect (a) random exploration that is not explicitly goal-directed and (b) directed exploration to purposefully reduce uncertainty. While these components similarly characterized the decision-making of both youth and adults, younger participants made decisions that were less strategic, but more exploratory and flexible, than those of adults. These findings are discussed in terms of how people adapt to and learn from changing environments over time.<!--> <!-->Data has been made available in the Open Science Foundation platform (<span>osf.io</span><svg><path></path></svg>).</p></div>","PeriodicalId":50669,"journal":{"name":"Cognitive Psychology","volume":"150 ","pages":"Article 101650"},"PeriodicalIF":2.6,"publicationDate":"2024-05-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140069658","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Optimizing competence in the service of collaboration","authors":"Yang Xiang ,&nbsp;Natalia Vélez ,&nbsp;Samuel J. Gershman","doi":"10.1016/j.cogpsych.2024.101653","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cogpsych.2024.101653","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>In order to efficiently divide labor with others, it is important to understand what our collaborators can do (i.e., their <em>competence</em>). However, competence is not static—people get better at particular jobs the more often they perform them. This plasticity of competence creates a challenge for collaboration: For example, is it better to assign tasks to whoever is most competent now, or to the person who can be trained most efficiently “on-the-job”? We conducted four experiments (<span><math><mrow><mi>N</mi><mo>=</mo><mn>396</mn></mrow></math></span>) that examine how people make decisions about whom to train (Experiments 1 and 3) and whom to recruit (Experiments 2 and 4) to a collaborative task, based on the simulated collaborators’ starting expertise, the training opportunities available, and the goal of the task. We found that participants’ decisions were best captured by a <em>planning</em> model that attempts to maximize the returns from collaboration while minimizing the costs of hiring and training individual collaborators. This planning model outperformed alternative models that based these decisions on the agents’ current competence, or on how much agents stood to improve in a single training step, without considering whether this training would enable agents to succeed at the task in the long run. Our findings suggest that people do not recruit and train collaborators based solely on their current competence, nor solely on the opportunities for their collaborators to improve. Instead, people use an intuitive theory of competence to balance the costs of hiring and training others against the benefits to the collaboration.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":50669,"journal":{"name":"Cognitive Psychology","volume":"150 ","pages":"Article 101653"},"PeriodicalIF":2.6,"publicationDate":"2024-05-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140145334","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Anaphoric distance dependencies in visual narrative structure and processing","authors":"Neil Cohn ,&nbsp;Lincy van Middelaar ,&nbsp;Tom Foulsham ,&nbsp;Joost Schilperoord","doi":"10.1016/j.cogpsych.2024.101639","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.cogpsych.2024.101639","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>Linguistic syntax has often been claimed as uniquely complex due to features like anaphoric relations and distance dependencies. However, visual narratives of sequential images, like those in comics, have been argued to use sequencing mechanisms analogous to those in language. These narrative structures include “refiner” panels that “zoom in” on the contents of another panel. Similar to anaphora in language, refiners indexically connect inexplicit referential information in one unit (refiner, pronoun) to a more informative “antecedent” elsewhere in the discourse. Also like in language, refiners can follow their antecedents (anaphoric) or precede them (cataphoric), along with having either proximal or distant connections. We here explore the constraints on visual narrative refiners created by modulating these features of order and distance. Experiment 1 examined participants’ preferences for where refiners are placed in a sequence using a force-choice test, which revealed that refiners are preferred to follow their antecedents and have proximal distances from them. Experiment 2 then showed that distance dependencies lead to slower self-paced viewing times. Finally, measurements of event-related brain potentials (ERPs) in Experiment 3 revealed that these patterns evoke similar brain responses as referential dependencies in language (i.e., N400, LAN, Nref). Across all three studies, the constraints and (neuro)cognitive responses to refiners parallel those shown to anaphora in language, suggesting domain-general constraints on the sequencing of referential dependencies.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":50669,"journal":{"name":"Cognitive Psychology","volume":"149 ","pages":"Article 101639"},"PeriodicalIF":2.6,"publicationDate":"2024-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0010028524000100/pdfft?md5=37108173ad11ab4758f7cba1e9ab8a72&pid=1-s2.0-S0010028524000100-main.pdf","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139662962","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Retrieving effectively from source memory: Evidence for differentiation and local matching processes","authors":"Sinem Aytaç ,&nbsp;Aslı Kılıç ,&nbsp;Amy H. Criss ,&nbsp;David Kellen","doi":"10.1016/j.cogpsych.2023.101617","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cogpsych.2023.101617","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>The ability to distinguish between different explanations of human memory abilities continues to be the subject of many ongoing theoretical debates. These debates attempt to account for a growing corpus of empirical phenomena in item-memory judgments, which include the <em>list strength effect</em>, the <em>strength-based mirror effect,</em> and <em>output interference</em>. One of the main theoretical contenders is the Retrieving Effectively from Memory (REM) model. We show that REM, in its current form, has difficulties in accounting for source-memory judgments – a situation that calls for its revision. We propose an extended REM model that assumes a local-matching process for source judgments alongside source differentiation. We report a first evaluation of this model’s predictions using three experiments in which we manipulated the relative source-memory strength of different lists of items. Analogous to item-memory judgments, we observed a null list strength effect and a strength-based mirror effect in the case of source memory. In a second evaluation, which relied on a novel experiment alongside two previously published datasets, we evaluated the model’s predictions regarding the manifestation of output interference in item and lack of it in source memory judgments. Our results showed output interference severely affecting the accuracy of item-memory judgments but having a null or negligible impact when it comes to source-memory judgments. Altogether, these results support REM’s core notion of differentiation (for both item and source information) as well as the concept of local matching proposed by the present extension.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":50669,"journal":{"name":"Cognitive Psychology","volume":"149 ","pages":"Article 101617"},"PeriodicalIF":2.6,"publicationDate":"2024-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139107703","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"No position-specific interference from prior lists in cued recognition: A challenge for position coding (and other) theories of serial memory","authors":"Gordon D. Logan ,&nbsp;Gregory E. Cox ,&nbsp;Simon D. Lilburn ,&nbsp;Jana E. Ulrich","doi":"10.1016/j.cogpsych.2024.101641","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cogpsych.2024.101641","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>Position-specific intrusions of items from prior lists are rare but important phenomena that distinguish broad classes of theory in serial memory. They are uniquely predicted by position coding theories, which assume items on all lists are associated with the same set of codes representing their positions. Activating a position code activates items associated with it in current and prior lists in proportion to their distance from the activated position. Thus, prior list intrusions are most likely to come from the coded position. Alternative “item dependent” theories based on associations between items and contexts built from items have difficulty accounting for the position specificity of prior list intrusions. We tested the position coding account with a position-cued recognition task designed to produce prior list interference. Cuing a position should activate a position code, which should activate items in nearby positions in the current and prior lists. We presented lures from the prior list to test for position-specific activation in response time and error rate; lures from nearby positions should interfere more. We found no evidence for such interference in 10 experiments, falsifying the position coding prediction. We ran two serial recall experiments with the same materials and found position-specific prior list intrusions. These results challenge all theories of serial memory: Position coding theories can explain the prior list intrusions in serial recall and but not the absence of prior list interference in cued recognition. Item dependent theories can explain the absence of prior list interference in cued recognition but cannot explain the occurrence of prior list intrusions in serial recall.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":50669,"journal":{"name":"Cognitive Psychology","volume":"149 ","pages":"Article 101641"},"PeriodicalIF":2.6,"publicationDate":"2024-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0010028524000124/pdfft?md5=361705f3c0a5c3c3397cf4b41b1dd031&pid=1-s2.0-S0010028524000124-main.pdf","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139907421","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"A unified account of simple and response-selective inhibition","authors":"Quentin F. Gronau ,&nbsp;Mark R. Hinder ,&nbsp;Sauro E. Salomoni ,&nbsp;Dora Matzke ,&nbsp;Andrew Heathcote","doi":"10.1016/j.cogpsych.2023.101628","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cogpsych.2023.101628","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p><span>Response inhibition is a key attribute of human executive control. Standard stop-signal tasks require countermanding a single response; the speed at which that response can be inhibited indexes the efficacy of the inhibitory control networks. However, more complex stopping tasks, where one or more components of a multi-component action are cancelled (i.e., response-selective stopping) cannot be explained by the independent-race model appropriate for the simple task (Logan and Cowan 1984). Healthy human participants (</span><span><math><mrow><mi>n</mi><mo>=</mo><mn>28</mn></mrow></math></span>; 10 male; 19–40 years) completed a response-selective stopping task where a ‘go’ stimulus required simultaneous (bimanual) button presses in response to left and right pointing green arrows. On a subset of trials (30%) one, or both, arrows turned red (constituting the stop signal) requiring that only the button-press(es) associated with red arrows be cancelled. Electromyographic recordings from both index fingers (first dorsal interosseous) permitted the assessment of both voluntary motor responses that resulted in overt button presses, and activity that was cancelled prior to an overt response (i.e., partial, or covert, responses). We propose a simultaneously inhibit and start (SIS) model that extends the independent race model and provides a highly accurate account of response-selective stopping data. Together with fine-grained EMG analysis, our model-based analysis offers converging evidence that the selective-stop signal simultaneously triggers a process that stops the bimanual response and triggers a new unimanual response corresponding to the green arrow. Our results require a reconceptualisation of response-selective stopping and offer a tractable framework for assessing such tasks in healthy and patient populations.</p><p><strong>Significance Statement</strong></p><p>Response inhibition is a key attribute of human executive control, frequently investigated using the stop-signal task. After initiating a motor response to a go signal, a stop signal occasionally appears at a delay, requiring cancellation of the response. This has been conceptualised as a ‘race’ between the go and stop processes, with the successful (or failed) cancellation determined by which process wins the race. Here we provide a novel computational model for a complex variation of the stop-signal task, where only one component of a multicomponent action needs to be cancelled. We provide compelling muscle activation data that support our model, providing a robust and plausible framework for studying these complex inhibition tasks in both healthy and pathological cohorts.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":50669,"journal":{"name":"Cognitive Psychology","volume":"149 ","pages":"Article 101628"},"PeriodicalIF":2.6,"publicationDate":"2024-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139399489","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Dual-process modeling of sequential decision making in the balloon analogue risk task","authors":"Ran Zhou ,&nbsp;Mark A. Pitt","doi":"10.1016/j.cogpsych.2023.101629","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cogpsych.2023.101629","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p><span><span>People are often faced with repeated risky decisions that involve uncertainty. In sequential risk-taking tasks, like the Balloon Analogue Risk Task (BART), the underlying decision process is not yet fully understood. Dual-process theory proposes that human cognition involves two main families of processes, often referred to as System 1 (fast and automatic) and System 2 (slow and conscious). We cross models of the BART with different architectures of the two systems to yield a pool of computational dual-process models that are evaluated on multiple performance measures (e.g., parameter </span>identifiability, model recovery, and predictive accuracy). Results show that the best-performing model configuration assumes the two systems are competitively connected, an evaluation process based on the Scaled Target Learning model of the BART, and an assessment rate that incorporates sensitivity to the trial number, pumping opportunity, and bias to engage in System 1. Findings also shed light on how modeling choices and response times in a dual-process framework can benefit our understanding of sequential risk-taking </span>behavior.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":50669,"journal":{"name":"Cognitive Psychology","volume":"149 ","pages":"Article 101629"},"PeriodicalIF":2.6,"publicationDate":"2024-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139419308","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"What’s in a sample? Epistemic uncertainty and metacognitive awareness in risk taking","authors":"Sebastian Olschewski ,&nbsp;Benjamin Scheibehenne","doi":"10.1016/j.cogpsych.2024.101642","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cogpsych.2024.101642","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>In a fundamentally uncertain world, sound information processing is a prerequisite for effective behavior. Given that information processing is subject to inevitable cognitive imprecision, decision makers should adapt to this imprecision and to the resulting epistemic uncertainty when taking risks. We tested this metacognitive ability in two experiments in which participants estimated the expected value of different number distributions from sequential samples and then bet on their own estimation accuracy. Results show that estimates were imprecise, and this imprecision increased with higher distributional standard deviations. Importantly, participants adapted their risk-taking behavior to this imprecision and hence deviated from the predictions of Bayesian models of uncertainty that assume perfect integration of information. To explain these results, we developed a computational model that combines Bayesian updating with a metacognitive awareness of cognitive imprecision in the integration of information. Modeling results were robust to the inclusion of an empirical measure of participants’ perceived variability. In sum, we show that cognitive imprecision is crucial to understanding risk taking in decisions from experience. The results further demonstrate the importance of metacognitive awareness as a cognitive building block for adaptive behavior under (partial) uncertainty.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":50669,"journal":{"name":"Cognitive Psychology","volume":"149 ","pages":"Article 101642"},"PeriodicalIF":2.6,"publicationDate":"2024-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0010028524000136/pdfft?md5=944b561cc48bb314c003ee766d3d38cd&pid=1-s2.0-S0010028524000136-main.pdf","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139941835","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}