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Characterizing the feasible payoff set of OLG repeated games OLG重复博弈可行收益集的表征
IF 1 4区 经济学
Journal of Mathematical Economics Pub Date : 2025-02-01 DOI: 10.1016/j.jmateco.2024.103082
Daehyun Kim , Chihiro Morooka
{"title":"Characterizing the feasible payoff set of OLG repeated games","authors":"Daehyun Kim ,&nbsp;Chihiro Morooka","doi":"10.1016/j.jmateco.2024.103082","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jmateco.2024.103082","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>We study the set of (stationary) feasible payoffs of overlapping generation repeated games that can be achieved by action sequences in which every generation of players plays the same sequence of action profiles. First, we completely characterize the set of feasible payoffs given any fixed discount factor of players and the length of interaction. This allows us to obtain the feasible payoff set in closed form. Second, we provide novel comparative statics of the feasible payoff set with respect to the discount factor and the length of interaction. Interestingly, the feasible payoff set becomes <em>smaller</em> as players’ discount factor becomes larger. Additionally, we identify a necessary and sufficient condition for this monotonicity to be strict.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":50145,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Mathematical Economics","volume":"116 ","pages":"Article 103082"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2025-02-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143144444","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
How confidence heterogeneity shapes effort and performance in tournaments and contests 信心异质性如何影响比赛和比赛中的努力和表现
IF 1 4区 经济学
Journal of Mathematical Economics Pub Date : 2025-02-01 DOI: 10.1016/j.jmateco.2024.103069
Luís Santos-Pinto , Petros G. Sekeris
{"title":"How confidence heterogeneity shapes effort and performance in tournaments and contests","authors":"Luís Santos-Pinto ,&nbsp;Petros G. Sekeris","doi":"10.1016/j.jmateco.2024.103069","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jmateco.2024.103069","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>This paper studies how heterogeneity in confidence biases affects players’ relative effort provision in tournaments and contests. We uncover a non-monotonic effect of confidence on equilibrium relative efforts and winning probabilities. A player with either a low or a high confidence exerts less effort than his rival at equilibrium. However, for intermediate confidence levels, the player exerts more effort than his rival.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":50145,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Mathematical Economics","volume":"116 ","pages":"Article 103069"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2025-02-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143144960","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Quality and price in scoring auctions 在得分拍卖的质量和价格
IF 1 4区 经济学
Journal of Mathematical Economics Pub Date : 2025-02-01 DOI: 10.1016/j.jmateco.2024.103083
Yu Awaya , Naoki Fujiwara , Marton Szabo
{"title":"Quality and price in scoring auctions","authors":"Yu Awaya ,&nbsp;Naoki Fujiwara ,&nbsp;Marton Szabo","doi":"10.1016/j.jmateco.2024.103083","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jmateco.2024.103083","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>Currently, many governments utilize scoring auctions, a format in which bidders submit both price and quality proposals. The objective is to secure high-quality procurement, even if it results in a higher price. In this paper, we theoretically confirm this trade-off. We compare scoring auctions to traditional auction formats, where the auctioneer first optimally selects the quality, followed by bidders submitting price bids. Our primary result identifies the conditions under which scoring auctions lead to higher quality, albeit at an increased price.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":50145,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Mathematical Economics","volume":"116 ","pages":"Article 103083"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2025-02-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143144446","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Signaling in dynamic contests with heterogeneous rivals 与异质对手动态竞争中的信号
IF 1 4区 经济学
Journal of Mathematical Economics Pub Date : 2025-02-01 DOI: 10.1016/j.jmateco.2024.103080
Jorge Catepillán , Nicolás Figueroa , Jorge Lemus
{"title":"Signaling in dynamic contests with heterogeneous rivals","authors":"Jorge Catepillán ,&nbsp;Nicolás Figueroa ,&nbsp;Jorge Lemus","doi":"10.1016/j.jmateco.2024.103080","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jmateco.2024.103080","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>We study signaling in dynamic contests where a privately informed challenger faces multiple rivals. When the challenger can choose between simultaneous and sequential contests, the optimal choice hinges on the degree of player heterogeneity. This is because the strength of future opponents affects the incentive to signal, whereas the strength of current opponents affects the extent and cost of signaling. We show that against homogeneous rivals, the challenger may prefer to reveal information through sequential contests. However, against heterogeneous opponents, the challenger prefers simultaneous contests to avoid information revelation. Additionally, in sequential contests with heterogeneous rivals, we characterize the equilibrium choice of rivals’ <em>order</em> (e.g., weak first and strong second) and show that only pooling and partial-pooling equilibria emerge.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":50145,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Mathematical Economics","volume":"116 ","pages":"Article 103080"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2025-02-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143144447","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Costly learning under ambiguity 模糊性下的昂贵学习
IF 1 4区 经济学
Journal of Mathematical Economics Pub Date : 2025-02-01 DOI: 10.1016/j.jmateco.2024.103079
Kemal Ozbek
{"title":"Costly learning under ambiguity","authors":"Kemal Ozbek","doi":"10.1016/j.jmateco.2024.103079","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jmateco.2024.103079","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>In this paper, we propose a general model of information acquisition, Costly Bayesian Learning (CBL). Using menu choice framework, we provide an axiomatic characterization of the model, identify its parameters, apply a comparative statics, as well as study special cases of the model. Unlike many prominent models of information acquisition (e.g., the Rational Inattention model), a CBL agent can exhibit uncertainty averse behavior and prefer late resolution of uncertainty.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":50145,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Mathematical Economics","volume":"116 ","pages":"Article 103079"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2025-02-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143129762","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Factor substitution and economic growth in a Romer-type model with monopolistic competition 垄断竞争下romer模型中的要素替代与经济增长
IF 1 4区 经济学
Journal of Mathematical Economics Pub Date : 2025-01-27 DOI: 10.1016/j.jmateco.2025.103086
Manuel A. Gómez
{"title":"Factor substitution and economic growth in a Romer-type model with monopolistic competition","authors":"Manuel A. Gómez","doi":"10.1016/j.jmateco.2025.103086","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jmateco.2025.103086","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>This paper studies the relationship between the elasticity of factor substitution (EOS) and steady-state values in a simplified Romer-type model with an expanding variety of products. Final goods production uses a nested CES technology, allowing substitution both among intermediate goods and between a composite intermediate good and labor. Consumption is a fixed fraction of output, and the cost of new intermediate production is constant and exogenous. The existence of an interior steady state requires an EOS between labor and the composite intermediate good above one, and an EOS among intermediates that exceeds the output–consumption ratio. Under these conditions, for a developing economy with an increasing variety of products, a higher EOS between labor and the intermediate composite good results in lower per capita output. This finding contrasts with results from infinite-horizon growth models, where a higher capital–labor EOS tends to boost per capita income (or the long-run growth rate) if baseline capital per capita is below its steady-state level. If the EOS between labor and the intermediate composite good is below unity and income per capita converges asymptotically to a constant as the number of intermediates continues to grow without bound, the usual positive relationship between the EOS and income per capita reappears.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":50145,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Mathematical Economics","volume":"117 ","pages":"Article 103086"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2025-01-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143136179","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Nash oligarchies 纳什寡头政治
IF 1 4区 经济学
Journal of Mathematical Economics Pub Date : 2025-01-27 DOI: 10.1016/j.jmateco.2025.103093
Shiran Rachmilevitch
{"title":"Nash oligarchies","authors":"Shiran Rachmilevitch","doi":"10.1016/j.jmateco.2025.103093","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jmateco.2025.103093","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>A bargaining solution is a <em>Nash oligarchy</em> if there exists a set of players <span><math><mi>O</mi></math></span>, the oligarchy, such that in every bargaining problem every player outside <span><math><mi>O</mi></math></span> is allocated his disagreement payoff, and the oligarchs share the surplus according to the <span><math><mrow><mo>|</mo><mi>O</mi><mo>|</mo></mrow></math></span>-person Nash solution. The Nash bargaining solution corresponds to the case where <span><math><mi>O</mi></math></span> contains all players, and dictatorial solutions correspond to singleton <span><math><mi>O</mi></math></span>s. I show that a solution satisfies three standard axioms together with a condition that balances utilitarianism and egalitarianism if and only if it is a Nash oligarchy. Strengthening the condition implies that the oligarchy contains at most two players. Strengthening it further implies a dictatorship.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":50145,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Mathematical Economics","volume":"117 ","pages":"Article 103093"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2025-01-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143136180","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Decision making under time pressure 在时间压力下做出决策
IF 1 4区 经济学
Journal of Mathematical Economics Pub Date : 2025-01-12 DOI: 10.1016/j.jmateco.2025.103084
Mengke Wang
{"title":"Decision making under time pressure","authors":"Mengke Wang","doi":"10.1016/j.jmateco.2025.103084","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jmateco.2025.103084","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>This paper studies individual decision making when deadlines are random. It establishes the relationship between a decision maker’s preference over timed choice problems and her set of feasible information acquisition paths. The decision maker’s preference over random deadlines satisfies the vNM independence axiom if her optimal way to acquire information depends only on the menu. Moreover, the decision maker’s distaste for contingent planning, a time-consuming activity, becomes weaker as she is allowed more time. Up to normalization, the decision maker’s utility function, prior belief and feasibility set of information paths can be identified from her preference over timed choice problems.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":50145,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Mathematical Economics","volume":"117 ","pages":"Article 103084"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2025-01-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143136181","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Cooperative games with diversity constraints 具有多样性约束的合作游戏
IF 1 4区 经济学
Journal of Mathematical Economics Pub Date : 2024-11-26 DOI: 10.1016/j.jmateco.2024.103077
Sylvain Béal , Marc Deschamps , Mostapha Diss , Rodrigue Tido Takeng
{"title":"Cooperative games with diversity constraints","authors":"Sylvain Béal ,&nbsp;Marc Deschamps ,&nbsp;Mostapha Diss ,&nbsp;Rodrigue Tido Takeng","doi":"10.1016/j.jmateco.2024.103077","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jmateco.2024.103077","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>A cooperative game with diversity constraints is given by a cooperative game, a coalition structure which partitions the set of players into communities, and a vector of integers specifying, for each community, the minimal number of its members that a coalition must possess to be considered as diverse. We provide axioms for a value on the class of such cooperative games with diversity constraints. Some combinations of axioms characterize two values inspired by the Shapley value (Shapley, 1953) and the Owen value (Owen, 1977) for games with a coalition structure. More specifically, the Diversity Owen value is characterized as the Owen value of the diversity-restricted game with a coalition structure, where the diversity-restricted game assigns a null worth to a coalition if it does not meet the diversity requirements or its original worth otherwise. Similarly, the Diversity Shapley value is characterized as the Shapley value of the diversity-restricted game (without coalition structure). Some of our axiomatic characterizations can be adapted to the class of simple games by replacing the Additivity axiom by the Transfer axiom (Dubey, 1975).</div></div>","PeriodicalId":50145,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Mathematical Economics","volume":"116 ","pages":"Article 103077"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2024-11-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142748217","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Intergenerational redistribution with endogenous constraints to household debt 家庭债务内生约束的代际再分配
IF 1 4区 经济学
Journal of Mathematical Economics Pub Date : 2024-11-16 DOI: 10.1016/j.jmateco.2024.103068
Ilya Eryzhenskiy
{"title":"Intergenerational redistribution with endogenous constraints to household debt","authors":"Ilya Eryzhenskiy","doi":"10.1016/j.jmateco.2024.103068","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jmateco.2024.103068","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>I study decentralization of optimal allocations in an endowment overlapping-generations economy where young agents face endogenous borrowing constraints. Lenders constrain credit because of limited commitment of borrowers: those can declare bankruptcy and only lose their ability to make savings for retirement in the future. The social planner can use lump-sum transfers and government debt in order to decentralize optimal allocations of consumption goods. I show that policies using government debt decentralize a larger set of optimal allocations, as opposed to balanced-budget policies with the same number of instruments per period. In addition, government debt always rules out equilibria where the private credit market does not operate and can rule out equilibrium steady states with binding borrowing constraints. The results are explained by incentives for saving and debt repayment under limited commitment, so they do not hold under common specifications of exogenous debt constraints.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":50145,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Mathematical Economics","volume":"116 ","pages":"Article 103068"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2024-11-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142748216","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
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