发布求助
文献互助 智能选刊 最新文献

Journal of Mathematical Economics最新文献

筛选
英文 中文
Robust α-maxmin representations 稳健的α-最大最小表示法
IF 1 4区 经济学
Journal of Mathematical Economics Pub Date : 2024-08-10 DOI: 10.1016/j.jmateco.2024.103045
Alain Chateauneuf , Xiangyu Qu , Caroline Ventura , Vassili Vergopoulos
{"title":"Robust α-maxmin representations","authors":"Alain Chateauneuf ,&nbsp;Xiangyu Qu ,&nbsp;Caroline Ventura ,&nbsp;Vassili Vergopoulos","doi":"10.1016/j.jmateco.2024.103045","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jmateco.2024.103045","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>The class of <span><math><mi>α</mi></math></span>-maxmin representations of an agent’s preferences is meant to achieve a separation between the ambiguity he perceives and his attitude toward this perceived ambiguity. Yet the same preferences may admit a multiplicity of <span><math><mi>α</mi></math></span>-maxmin representations that contradict each other. We say that an <span><math><mi>α</mi></math></span>-maxmin representation is robust when no other <span><math><mi>α</mi></math></span>-maxmin representation exists for the same preferences. We obtain a full characterization of robustness for maxmin representation. In the case of general <span><math><mi>α</mi></math></span>-maxmin representations, we obtain sufficient conditions for both robustness and non-robustness. This contributes to better identification of the <span><math><mi>α</mi></math></span>-maxmin representations that admit a robust interpretation in terms of perceived ambiguity and ambiguity attitudes.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":50145,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Mathematical Economics","volume":"114 ","pages":"Article 103045"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2024-08-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141984954","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
“Subjectivity and correlation in randomized strategies”: Back to the roots "随机策略中的主观性和相关性"：回归本源
IF 1 4区 经济学
Journal of Mathematical Economics Pub Date : 2024-08-06 DOI: 10.1016/j.jmateco.2024.103044
Françoise Forges , Indrajit Ray
{"title":"“Subjectivity and correlation in randomized strategies”: Back to the roots","authors":"Françoise Forges ,&nbsp;Indrajit Ray","doi":"10.1016/j.jmateco.2024.103044","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jmateco.2024.103044","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>The very first paper published in the <em>Journal of Mathematical Economics</em>, “Subjectivity and correlation in randomized strategies”, by Aumann, proposes a new approach to strategic form games by taking account of an extraneous space of states of the world, on which every player has a subjective probability distribution and private information. We review some of Aumann’s results as well as some properties and extensions of the best known by-product of his seminal paper, the “correlated equilibrium”.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":50145,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Mathematical Economics","volume":"114 ","pages":"Article 103044"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2024-08-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0304406824001046/pdfft?md5=28b5b51d86c1ca1a905eae7f0312bcb2&pid=1-s2.0-S0304406824001046-main.pdf","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141979731","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Equilibrium analysis in majority-based coalitional bargaining games 基于多数的联合讨价还价博弈中的均衡分析
IF 1 4区 经济学
Journal of Mathematical Economics Pub Date : 2024-07-30 DOI: 10.1016/j.jmateco.2024.103043
Guangjing Yang , Hao Sun
{"title":"Equilibrium analysis in majority-based coalitional bargaining games","authors":"Guangjing Yang ,&nbsp;Hao Sun","doi":"10.1016/j.jmateco.2024.103043","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jmateco.2024.103043","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>This paper introduces majority rule into coalitional bargaining games, adapting traditional models that rely on unanimous consent to more accurately mirror decision-making processes in real-world scenarios. We introduce a majority-based coalitional bargaining game (MBCBG), wherein coalitions pass proposals via majority votes. Our analysis of the stationary subgame perfect equilibrium (SSPE) not only establishes the necessary and sufficient conditions for SSPE strategy profiles but also confirms the existence of no-delay SSPEs in MBCBGs. We further delve into symmetric MBCBGs, delineating conditions that ensure equitable outcomes for homogeneous players. Furthermore, we provide a necessary and sufficient condition for the formation of the grand coalition under SSPEs. Additionally, we briefly explore how asymmetries in coalition values, proposal probabilities, and voting weights may influence both the dynamics of coalition formation and the expected equilibrium payoffs.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":50145,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Mathematical Economics","volume":"114 ","pages":"Article 103043"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2024-07-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141929891","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
The role of information in auctions 信息在拍卖中的作用
IF 1 4区 经济学
Journal of Mathematical Economics Pub Date : 2024-07-25 DOI: 10.1016/j.jmateco.2024.103027
Alp E. Atakan , Mehmet Ekmekci
{"title":"The role of information in auctions","authors":"Alp E. Atakan ,&nbsp;Mehmet Ekmekci","doi":"10.1016/j.jmateco.2024.103027","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jmateco.2024.103027","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>This review discusses the seminal contributions of Engelbrecht-Wiggans et al. (1983) Milgrom and Weber (1982a) to the literature that studies the role of information in auctions. We describe the results in these papers and present several extensions. Much of the earlier literature on auctions takes the information environment as exogenous. The extensions that we present will demonstrate how the insights of Engelbrecht-Wiggans et al. (1983) and Milgrom and Weber (1982a) apply to the more recent literature on flexible information acquisition in auctions where the information structure is endogenously determined in equilibrium.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":50145,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Mathematical Economics","volume":"114 ","pages":"Article 103027"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2024-07-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0304406824000879/pdfft?md5=52f2a8ccb0dae0ab12f5ca1df6959fd1&pid=1-s2.0-S0304406824000879-main.pdf","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141851788","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
An even tighter bound for the Shapley–Folkman–Starr theorem 沙普利-福克曼-斯塔尔定理的更严格约束
IF 1 4区 经济学
Journal of Mathematical Economics Pub Date : 2024-07-24 DOI: 10.1016/j.jmateco.2024.103028
Haoyu Wu , Ao Tang
{"title":"An even tighter bound for the Shapley–Folkman–Starr theorem","authors":"Haoyu Wu ,&nbsp;Ao Tang","doi":"10.1016/j.jmateco.2024.103028","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jmateco.2024.103028","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>Based on a previous refined Shapley–Folkman lemma, we derive a tighter error bound for the Shapley–Folkman–Starr theorem and apply the result to the course allocation problem.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":50145,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Mathematical Economics","volume":"114 ","pages":"Article 103028"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2024-07-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141842185","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
The on-line transfer rule for queueing with arrivals 有到达者排队的在线转移规则
IF 1 4区 经济学
Journal of Mathematical Economics Pub Date : 2024-07-20 DOI: 10.1016/j.jmateco.2024.103026
Changyong Han , Youngsub Chun , Manipushpak Mitra , Suresh Mutuswami
{"title":"The on-line transfer rule for queueing with arrivals","authors":"Changyong Han ,&nbsp;Youngsub Chun ,&nbsp;Manipushpak Mitra ,&nbsp;Suresh Mutuswami","doi":"10.1016/j.jmateco.2024.103026","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jmateco.2024.103026","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>We consider the queueing problem with arrivals, or the arrival queueing problem, where agents arrive at different (time) slots to process their jobs in a service facility and each job requires the same amount of processing time which is normalized to one. Each agent has one job to process and the facility can process only one job at each slot. We introduce a rule for the arrival queueing problem, which we call the <em>on-line transfer rule,</em> by adapting the minimal transfer rule of the static queueing problem (Maniquet, 2003) but incorporating the time span which each agent observes. We provide axiomatic characterizations of the on-line transfer rule by imposing the axioms of <em>efficiency, Pareto indifference, equal treatment of equals, independence of larger costs,</em> and <em>consistency from later-arrived-later-served agents</em>. We also introduce and characterize an alternative rule for the arrival queueing problem which adapts the maximal transfer rule of the static queueing problem (Chun, 2006a).</p></div>","PeriodicalId":50145,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Mathematical Economics","volume":"114 ","pages":"Article 103026"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2024-07-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141847702","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
A general solution to the quasi linear screening problem 准线性筛选问题的一般解决方案
IF 1 4区 经济学
Journal of Mathematical Economics Pub Date : 2024-07-20 DOI: 10.1016/j.jmateco.2024.103025
Guillaume Carlier , Xavier Dupuis , Jean-Charles Rochet , John Thanassoulis
{"title":"A general solution to the quasi linear screening problem","authors":"Guillaume Carlier ,&nbsp;Xavier Dupuis ,&nbsp;Jean-Charles Rochet ,&nbsp;John Thanassoulis","doi":"10.1016/j.jmateco.2024.103025","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jmateco.2024.103025","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>We provide an algorithm for solving multidimensional screening problems which are intractable analytically. The algorithm is a primal–dual algorithm which alternates between optimizing the primal problem of the surplus extracted by the principal and the dual problem of the optimal assignment to deliver to the agents for a given surplus. We illustrate the algorithm by solving (i) the generic monopolist price discrimination problem and (ii) an optimal tax problem covering income and savings taxes when citizens differ in multiple dimensions.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":50145,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Mathematical Economics","volume":"114 ","pages":"Article 103025"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2024-07-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142045037","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Interacting mechanisms: A perspective on generalized principal–agent problems 互动机制：广义委托代理问题透视
IF 1 4区 经济学
Journal of Mathematical Economics Pub Date : 2024-07-19 DOI: 10.1016/j.jmateco.2024.103023
Françoise Forges , Frédéric Koessler , Andrés Salamanca
{"title":"Interacting mechanisms: A perspective on generalized principal–agent problems","authors":"Françoise Forges ,&nbsp;Frédéric Koessler ,&nbsp;Andrés Salamanca","doi":"10.1016/j.jmateco.2024.103023","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jmateco.2024.103023","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>Myerson (1982) formalizes general principal–agent problems, in which agents have private information and choose actions. His contribution is best known for a version of the revelation principle in the case of a single principal but he also introduces a model of interacting principals. We push the latter forward by studying the perfect Bayesian equilibrium outcomes of the corporations’ game in which every principal proposes a mechanism to his agents. We show that several versions of the revelation principle hold in our framework and that, under certain conditions, every principals’ equilibrium, as defined in Myerson (1982), is a perfect Bayesian equilibrium outcome of the corporations’ game.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":50145,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Mathematical Economics","volume":"114 ","pages":"Article 103023"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2024-07-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0304406824000831/pdfft?md5=7a4ae7eed7a6f02b92ca89acfb39ad3f&pid=1-s2.0-S0304406824000831-main.pdf","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141842046","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
General equilibrium and dynamic inconsistency 一般均衡与动态不一致性
IF 1 4区 经济学
Journal of Mathematical Economics Pub Date : 2024-07-15 DOI: 10.1016/j.jmateco.2024.103024
Kirill Borissov , Mikhail Pakhnin , Ronald Wendner
{"title":"General equilibrium and dynamic inconsistency","authors":"Kirill Borissov ,&nbsp;Mikhail Pakhnin ,&nbsp;Ronald Wendner","doi":"10.1016/j.jmateco.2024.103024","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jmateco.2024.103024","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>We study the role of different sources of naivete in a general equilibrium version of the Ramsey model with quasi-hyperbolic discounting. When agents are aware of others’ naivete, as strongly suggested by empirical evidence, they revise consumption paths, correctly anticipating prices in a resulting sliding equilibrium (perfect foresight). When agents are unaware of others’ naivete, as is typically assumed in the theoretical literature, they revise both consumption paths and price expectations (quasi-perfect foresight). We prove the existence of sliding equilibrium under perfect foresight for the class of isoelastic utility functions. We show that generically quasi-hyperbolic discounting matters for saving behavior: sliding equilibrium under perfect foresight is observationally equivalent to some optimal path in the standard Ramsey model <em>only if</em> utility is logarithmic. By comparing sliding equilibria under different types of foresight we show that perfect foresight implies a higher saving rate, long-run capital stock and consumption level than quasi-perfect foresight.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":50145,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Mathematical Economics","volume":"114 ","pages":"Article 103024"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2024-07-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0304406824000843/pdfft?md5=c814bde0745cfe8b048bf2ec53299a1e&pid=1-s2.0-S0304406824000843-main.pdf","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141700025","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Preferences on discounting under time risk 时间风险下的贴现偏好
IF 1 4区 经济学
Journal of Mathematical Economics Pub Date : 2024-07-04 DOI: 10.1016/j.jmateco.2024.103020
Marzia De Donno , Mario Menegatti
{"title":"Preferences on discounting under time risk","authors":"Marzia De Donno ,&nbsp;Mario Menegatti","doi":"10.1016/j.jmateco.2024.103020","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jmateco.2024.103020","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>This paper examines the linkages between different aspects of a decision maker’s attitude towards risk in the presence of time risk. Our results suggest that certain combinations of aspects of preferences towards risk are incoherent, supporting the idea that preferences exhibit risk-seeking, prudent, intemperate and antimixed risk-averse discounting, at least starting from a certain time horizon. Consequently, we observe that, unlike the case of risky outcome, in the presence of risky time, a decision maker usually prefers “combining good with good” rather than “combining good with bad”. We extend our analysis considering the implications of our findings on the decision maker’s attitude towards changes in risk of different degrees and uncertainty in the variance. Lastly, applications to saving for delayed expenditures and to investments under delayed risks are provided.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":50145,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Mathematical Economics","volume":"113 ","pages":"Article 103020"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2024-07-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141586104","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
首页 上一页 下一页 尾页
0
×
引用
GB/T 7714-2015
复制
MLA
复制
APA
复制
导出至
BibTeX EndNote RefMan NoteFirst NoteExpress
×
提示
您的信息不完整，为了账户安全，请先补充。
现在去补充
×
提示
您因"违规操作"
具体请查看互助需知
我知道了
×
提示
现在去查看 取消
×
提示
确定
请完成安全验证×
相关产品
×
本文献相关产品
联系我们：info@booksci.cn Book学术提供免费学术资源搜索服务，方便国内外学者检索中英文文献。致力于提供最便捷和优质的服务体验。 Copyright © 2023 布克学术 All rights reserved.
京ICP备2023020795号-1
ghs 京公网安备 11010802042870号
Book学术文献互助
Book学术文献互助群
群 号：481959085
Book学术官方微信