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Opinions and vaccination during an epidemic 流行病期间的意见和疫苗接种
IF 1.3 4区 经济学
Journal of Mathematical Economics Pub Date : 2024-02-23 DOI: 10.1016/j.jmateco.2024.102962
Josselin Thuilliez , Nouhoum Touré
{"title":"Opinions and vaccination during an epidemic","authors":"Josselin Thuilliez ,&nbsp;Nouhoum Touré","doi":"10.1016/j.jmateco.2024.102962","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jmateco.2024.102962","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>High levels of vaccine hesitancy remain poorly understood during an epidemic. Using high-frequency data in France at departmental level and exploiting the Covid-19 vaccination campaign calendar, we observe that vaccination among the elderly influences vaccination among young adults. We then propose a simple epidemiological economic model with two partially vaccinated demographic groups – the young and the elderly – and two opinions on vaccination - “vaxxers” and “antivaxxers”. The utility to get vaccinated for the young depends on the vaccination behavior of the elderly, their opinion of the vaccine and the epidemic environment. Our results suggest that mutual interactions between individuals’ vaccination opinions and infection prevalence may lead to the emergence of oscillations and disease traps. The vaccination behavior of the elderly can be harnessed to promote vaccination.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":50145,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Mathematical Economics","volume":"111 ","pages":"Article 102962"},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2024-02-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0304406824000247/pdfft?md5=238aee683e581085386ce0be4b5a0dde&pid=1-s2.0-S0304406824000247-main.pdf","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139951271","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Two characterizations of the dense rank 密集等级的两个特征
IF 1.3 4区 经济学
Journal of Mathematical Economics Pub Date : 2024-02-21 DOI: 10.1016/j.jmateco.2024.102963
José Luis García-Lapresta, Miguel Martínez-Panero
{"title":"Two characterizations of the dense rank","authors":"José Luis García-Lapresta,&nbsp;Miguel Martínez-Panero","doi":"10.1016/j.jmateco.2024.102963","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jmateco.2024.102963","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>In this paper, we have considered the dense rank for assigning positions to alternatives in weak orders. If we arrange the alternatives in tiers (i.e., indifference classes), the dense rank assigns position 1 to all the alternatives in the top tier, 2 to all the alternatives in the second tier, and so on. We have proposed a formal framework to analyze the dense rank when compared to other well-known position operators, such as the standard, modified and fractional ranks. As the main results, we have provided two different axiomatic characterizations which determine the dense rank by considering position invariance conditions along horizontal extensions (duplication), as well as through vertical reductions and movements (truncation, and upward or downward independency).</p></div>","PeriodicalId":50145,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Mathematical Economics","volume":"111 ","pages":"Article 102963"},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2024-02-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139918654","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Increasing returns to scale and financial fragility 规模回报增加和金融脆弱性
IF 1.3 4区 经济学
Journal of Mathematical Economics Pub Date : 2024-02-17 DOI: 10.1016/j.jmateco.2024.102961
Jiahong Gao , Robert R. Reed
{"title":"Increasing returns to scale and financial fragility","authors":"Jiahong Gao ,&nbsp;Robert R. Reed","doi":"10.1016/j.jmateco.2024.102961","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jmateco.2024.102961","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>How do liquidity creation and financial fragility depend on increasing returns to scale? We study this question in a version of the Diamond and Dybvig (1983) model with limited commitment. We show that while a higher minimum scale generally lowers welfare since it makes the investment technology more restrictive, there exhibits a non-monotonic relationship between the degree of instability and size thresholds. In particular, to reap the benefits of scale economies, the bank facing somewhat higher scale cutoffs may issue liabilities prudently where such cautious behavior ameliorates depositors’ incentive to panic. Nevertheless, a relatively large minimum scale is not always associated with lower degrees of fragility in the sense that the bank facing medium size thresholds is most vulnerable to a crisis. Such findings indicate that failing to account for scale economies in banking activity leaves a significant void in policy debates regarding the stability of the financial system.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":50145,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Mathematical Economics","volume":"111 ","pages":"Article 102961"},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2024-02-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139918549","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Stable outcomes in simple cooperative games 简单合作博弈的稳定结果
IF 1.3 4区 经济学
Journal of Mathematical Economics Pub Date : 2024-02-15 DOI: 10.1016/j.jmateco.2024.102960
Gabrielle Demange
{"title":"Stable outcomes in simple cooperative games","authors":"Gabrielle Demange","doi":"10.1016/j.jmateco.2024.102960","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2024.102960","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>In a cooperative game, coalitions are the fundamental behavioral units. Stable outcomes (in the core) are those blocked by no coalition. This paper has two objectives. First, building on the notion of intermediate preferences indexed by a median graph, I unify and extend previous results on the existence of stable outcomes in simple games. Second, I review how and when the core approach applies in more general settings and may help to predict the stable splitting of a whole group into disjoint coalitions.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":50145,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Mathematical Economics","volume":"111 ","pages":"Article 102960"},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2024-02-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139743589","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
On two mechanisms in job rotation problems 论工作轮换问题中的两种机制
IF 1.3 4区 经济学
Journal of Mathematical Economics Pub Date : 2024-02-07 DOI: 10.1016/j.jmateco.2024.102959
Yu Gu, Yongchao Zhang
{"title":"On two mechanisms in job rotation problems","authors":"Yu Gu,&nbsp;Yongchao Zhang","doi":"10.1016/j.jmateco.2024.102959","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2024.102959","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>We study a class of priority-based allocation problems, the general job rotation problems first proposed by Yu and Zhang (2020), in which each position is occupied by at most one agent, and each agent occupies at most one position. The priority structure is that at each occupied position, its occupant has the lowest priority while all other agents have equal highest priority; at other positions, all agents have equal priority. This priority structure is the “opposite” to that in house allocation with existing tenants (HET) problem proposed by Abdulkadiroğlu and Sönmez (1999). We propose two constrained efficient mechanisms: one is the <em>modified top trading cycles</em> mechanism, the other is the <em>you request my position, I get your turn</em> mechanism. Both of the two mechanisms are adapted from mechanisms in the HET model. In a special setup that there are equal numbers of agents and positions, each agent occupies exactly one position, and all positions are acceptable for all agents, these two mechanisms yield the same outcome, which is also the outcome of the <em>backward-induction top trading cycles</em> mechanism proposed by Yu and Zhang (2020). In such a setup, our two mechanisms are also weakly group strategy-proof.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":50145,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Mathematical Economics","volume":"111 ","pages":"Article 102959"},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2024-02-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139748574","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Innovation through competitive experimentation 通过竞争性实验进行创新
IF 1.3 4区 经济学
Journal of Mathematical Economics Pub Date : 2024-02-05 DOI: 10.1016/j.jmateco.2024.102957
Peter Achim
{"title":"Innovation through competitive experimentation","authors":"Peter Achim","doi":"10.1016/j.jmateco.2024.102957","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jmateco.2024.102957","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>This paper studies optimal contest design for competitive experimentation. A principal wants to implement a project and seeks contributions from multiple agents that increase the value of the project. The agent’s chances of success are independent and their experimentation efforts are unobservable. To induce effort, the principal offers a mechanism that specifies rewards and a termination time which depend on the history of past contributions. I characterize the optimal contest and show that the principal limits the agents’ rent by setting inefficiently tight stopping thresholds.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":50145,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Mathematical Economics","volume":"111 ","pages":"Article 102957"},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2024-02-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0304406824000193/pdfft?md5=c07f29b730843df4134dcd956ad28abc&pid=1-s2.0-S0304406824000193-main.pdf","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139689603","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
An approximation approach to dynamic programming with unbounded returns 收益无限制的动态程序设计近似方法
IF 1.3 4区 经济学
Journal of Mathematical Economics Pub Date : 2024-02-02 DOI: 10.1016/j.jmateco.2024.102954
G. Bloise , C. Le Van , Y. Vailakis
{"title":"An approximation approach to dynamic programming with unbounded returns","authors":"G. Bloise ,&nbsp;C. Le Van ,&nbsp;Y. Vailakis","doi":"10.1016/j.jmateco.2024.102954","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jmateco.2024.102954","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>We study stochastic dynamic programming with recursive utility in settings where multiplicity of values is only attributed to unbounded returns. That is, we consider Koopmans aggregators that, when artificially restricted to be bounded, satisfy the traditional Blackwell’s discounting condition (as it certainly happens with time-additive aggregators). We argue that, when the truncation is removed, the sequence of truncated values converges to the relevant fixed point of the untruncated Bellman operator, whenever it exists, and diverges otherwise. The experiment provides a natural selection criterion, corresponding to an extension of the recursive utility from bounded to unbounded returns.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":50145,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Mathematical Economics","volume":"111 ","pages":"Article 102954"},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2024-02-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0304406824000168/pdfft?md5=25635d3242344ebd329ca6a8ee561dc0&pid=1-s2.0-S0304406824000168-main.pdf","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139677364","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
How innocuous is it to approximate globally decreasing impatience with quasi-hyperbolic discounting? 用准双曲贴现来近似地描述全球递减的不耐烦程度有多无害？
IF 1.3 4区 经济学
Journal of Mathematical Economics Pub Date : 2024-02-01 DOI: 10.1016/j.jmateco.2024.102958
Paul Calcott, Vladimir Petkov
{"title":"How innocuous is it to approximate globally decreasing impatience with quasi-hyperbolic discounting?","authors":"Paul Calcott,&nbsp;Vladimir Petkov","doi":"10.1016/j.jmateco.2024.102958","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jmateco.2024.102958","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>This paper studies the behavior of a consumer whose time preferences exhibit globally decreasing impatience. We ask how well this behavior could be approximated with quasi-hyperbolic discounting. We find that a quasi-hyperbolic approximation can reproduce the consumer’s equilibrium strategies and their local comparative statics. However, such an approximation would provide biased assessments of measures to mitigate excessive consumption. We identify a range of biases relating to investment in illiquid assets, and to corrective taxes on sin goods. The quantitative implications of these biases are evaluated in numerical examples. For plausible parameter values, the quasi-hyperbolic approximation significantly overstates the effectiveness and the welfare consequences of the responses to excessive consumption.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":50145,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Mathematical Economics","volume":"111 ","pages":"Article 102958"},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2024-02-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S030440682400020X/pdfft?md5=5241c5fd9143c6ebaf5c681526054b27&pid=1-s2.0-S030440682400020X-main.pdf","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139666336","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Transitions between equilibria in Bilingual Games under Probit Choice Probit 选择下双语博弈中均衡点之间的转换
IF 1.3 4区 经济学
Journal of Mathematical Economics Pub Date : 2024-01-29 DOI: 10.1016/j.jmateco.2024.102956
Srinivas Arigapudi
{"title":"Transitions between equilibria in Bilingual Games under Probit Choice","authors":"Srinivas Arigapudi","doi":"10.1016/j.jmateco.2024.102956","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jmateco.2024.102956","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>We study the effect of introducing a bilingual strategy on the long run equilibrium outcome in a class of two-strategy coordination games with distinct payoff- and risk-dominant equilibria under the probit choice rule. Existing results show that in the class of two-strategy games under consideration, the inefficient risk dominant equilibrium is selected in the long run under noisy best response models. We show that if the cost of the bilingual option is sufficiently low then the efficient payoff dominant equilibrium will be selected in the long run under the probit choice rule.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":50145,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Mathematical Economics","volume":"111 ","pages":"Article 102956"},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2024-01-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139584165","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Detecting profitable deviations 检测盈利偏差
IF 1.3 4区 经济学
Journal of Mathematical Economics Pub Date : 2024-01-24 DOI: 10.1016/j.jmateco.2024.102946
David M. Rahman
{"title":"Detecting profitable deviations","authors":"David M. Rahman","doi":"10.1016/j.jmateco.2024.102946","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jmateco.2024.102946","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p><span>Rochet’s Theorem characterizes implementable allocations in a mechanism design environment in terms of cyclic monotonicity, a concept from convex analysis. In this paper, I offer an alternative approach to both the proof and interpretation of this result, based on linear duality. This duality reveals a formal relationship between incentives and detection, much like that between prices and quantities. Moreover, it allows me to extend Rochet’s Theorem and present a </span>subdifferential<span> characterization of implementing payments, revenue equivalence as differentiability of a value function, as well as budget-balanced implementation in terms of attributing innocence after unilateral deviations, together with other ancillary results.</span></p></div>","PeriodicalId":50145,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Mathematical Economics","volume":"111 ","pages":"Article 102946"},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2024-01-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139560779","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
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