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Asset bubble and growth: Elastic labor supply with fiscal policy 资产泡沫与增长:财政政策下的弹性劳动力供给
IF 1.3 4区 经济学
Journal of Mathematical Economics Pub Date : 2023-11-23 DOI: 10.1016/j.jmateco.2023.102930
Kathia Bahloul Zekkari
{"title":"Asset bubble and growth: Elastic labor supply with fiscal policy","authors":"Kathia Bahloul Zekkari","doi":"10.1016/j.jmateco.2023.102930","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2023.102930","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p><span>This paper examines the interaction between asset bubbles and endogenous growth. Using an overlapping generations model with elastic labor supply and fiscal policy, we demonstrate that the inefficiency of the equilibrium without bubble, in conjunction with specific fiscal policy criteria, guarantees the existence of a bubble. This inefficiency is due to the sub-optimality of labor supply. Furthermore, we establish a positive impact of asset bubbles on economic growth. These bubbles prompt an increase in the </span>interest rate, encouraging households to increase their labor supply. This surge in labor supply, in turn, heightens the marginal productivity of capital stock, culminating in an increase in the growth rate. Additionally, we find that, provided certain fiscal parameters are met, asset bubbles are welfare-enhancing.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":50145,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Mathematical Economics","volume":"110 ","pages":"Article 102930"},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2023-11-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"138448282","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Stable and weakly additive cost sharing in shortest path problems 最短路径问题的稳定和弱可加性代价分担
IF 1.3 4区 经济学
Journal of Mathematical Economics Pub Date : 2023-11-17 DOI: 10.1016/j.jmateco.2023.102921
Eric Bahel , María Gómez-Rúa , Juan Vidal-Puga
{"title":"Stable and weakly additive cost sharing in shortest path problems","authors":"Eric Bahel ,&nbsp;María Gómez-Rúa ,&nbsp;Juan Vidal-Puga","doi":"10.1016/j.jmateco.2023.102921","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2023.102921","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>In a shortest path problem, agents seek to ship their respective demands; and the cost on a given arc is linear in the flow. Previous works have proposed cost allocations falling in the core of the associated cooperative game. The present work combines core selection with weak versions of the additivity axiom, which allows to characterize a new family of rules. The demander rule charges each demander the cost of their shortest path, and the supplier rule charges the cost of the second-cheapest path while splitting the excess payment equally between access suppliers. With three or more agents, the demander rule is characterized by core selection and a specific version of cost additivity. Convex combinations of the demander rule and the supplier rule are axiomatized using core selection, a second version of cost additivity, and two additional axioms that ensure the fair compensation of intermediaries. With three or more agents, the demander rule is characterized by core selection and a specific version of cost additivity. Finally, convex combinations of the demander rule and the supplier rule are axiomatized using core selection, a second version of cost additivity, and two additional fairness properties.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":50145,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Mathematical Economics","volume":"110 ","pages":"Article 102921"},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2023-11-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0304406823001143/pdfft?md5=a8d86103f9830a5fead7c76e089d7dc0&pid=1-s2.0-S0304406823001143-main.pdf","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"138397004","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
A menu dependent Luce model with a numeraire 带有数字的菜单依赖的Luce模型
IF 1.3 4区 经济学
Journal of Mathematical Economics Pub Date : 2023-11-14 DOI: 10.1016/j.jmateco.2023.102920
John Rehbeck
{"title":"A menu dependent Luce model with a numeraire","authors":"John Rehbeck","doi":"10.1016/j.jmateco.2023.102920","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2023.102920","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>This paper proposes and characterizes a simple extension to the Luce rule when the value of each alternative can be enhanced or diminished by a non-negative menu dependent parameter that can be thought of as a measure of menu complexity. The characterization follows from two properties that hinge on the default option: monotone consistency and strong independent log-odds. We make no restriction on the domain of menus so that we may not see choice probabilities from every menu. For these models, we show it is possible to describe choice overload where the default option is chosen more often as menu size increases. It is also shown how this model relates to the class of perturbed utility models.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":50145,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Mathematical Economics","volume":"110 ","pages":"Article 102920"},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2023-11-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"134663271","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Cautious belief and iterated admissibility 谨慎的信念和反复的可采性
IF 1.3 4区 经济学
Journal of Mathematical Economics Pub Date : 2023-11-10 DOI: 10.1016/j.jmateco.2023.102918
Emiliano Catonini , Nicodemo De Vito
{"title":"Cautious belief and iterated admissibility","authors":"Emiliano Catonini ,&nbsp;Nicodemo De Vito","doi":"10.1016/j.jmateco.2023.102918","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jmateco.2023.102918","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p><span>We define notions of cautiousness and cautious belief to provide epistemic conditions for iterated admissibility in finite games. We show that iterated admissibility characterizes the behavioral implications of “cautious rationality and common cautious belief in cautious rationality” in a terminal lexicographic type structure. For arbitrary type structures, the behavioral implications of these epistemic assumptions are characterized by the solution concept of self-admissible set (</span><span>Brandenburger et al., 2008</span>). We also show that analogous results hold under alternative epistemic assumptions, in particular if cautiousness is “transparent” to the players.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":50145,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Mathematical Economics","volume":"110 ","pages":"Article 102918"},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2023-11-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135615035","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 5
Cost allocation in energy distribution networks 配电网的成本分配
IF 1.3 4区 经济学
Journal of Mathematical Economics Pub Date : 2023-11-09 DOI: 10.1016/j.jmateco.2023.102919
David Lowing
{"title":"Cost allocation in energy distribution networks","authors":"David Lowing","doi":"10.1016/j.jmateco.2023.102919","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2023.102919","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>This paper presents a cost allocation problem arising from energy distribution and proposes cost allocation rules that depend on the distribution network and consumer demands. To determine relevant rules, we adopt a normative approach and compare two principles: (i) the connection principle and (ii) the uniformity principle. The Connection rule is proposed in accordance with (i), while the Uniform rule is developed in line with (ii). However, (i) and (ii) are incompatible. To make a trade-off between them, we propose a family of Mixed rules. Each rule is axiomatically characterized. Then, we demonstrate that the Connection rule coincides with the multi-choice Shapley value of a specific multi-choice game derived from the original problem. Moreover, the Connection rule is in the Core of this game. Similarly, we show that the Uniform rule and the Mixed rules coincide with other solution concepts from multi-choice games.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":50145,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Mathematical Economics","volume":"110 ","pages":"Article 102919"},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2023-11-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"92051309","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
On a class of strategy-proof social choice correspondences with single-peaked utility functions 关于一类具有单峰效用函数的策略证明社会选择对应关系
IF 1.3 4区 经济学
Journal of Mathematical Economics Pub Date : 2023-11-04 DOI: 10.1016/j.jmateco.2023.102912
Chinmay Ingalagavi , Soumyarup Sadhukhan
{"title":"On a class of strategy-proof social choice correspondences with single-peaked utility functions","authors":"Chinmay Ingalagavi ,&nbsp;Soumyarup Sadhukhan","doi":"10.1016/j.jmateco.2023.102912","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2023.102912","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>We consider the problem of constructing strategy-proof rules that choose sets of alternatives based on the preferences of voters, modelled as Social Choice Correspondences (SCCs) in the literature. We focus on two domain restrictions inspired by Barberà et al. (2001) in the context of single-peaked utility functions. We find that for the narrower domain, the set of tops-only, unanimous, and strategy-proof SCCs coincides with the class of unions of two min–max rules (Moulin, 1980). For the broader domain, the set of SCCs coincides with the class of unions of two ‘adjacent’ min–max rules, meaning the corresponding parameters for the two rules must be either the same or consecutive alternatives.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":50145,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Mathematical Economics","volume":"109 ","pages":"Article 102912"},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2023-11-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"72249481","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Correlated play in weakest-link and best-shot group contests 在最弱的环节和最好的投篮小组比赛中相互关联
IF 1.3 4区 经济学
Journal of Mathematical Economics Pub Date : 2023-11-04 DOI: 10.1016/j.jmateco.2023.102917
Stefano Barbieri , Iryna Topolyan
{"title":"Correlated play in weakest-link and best-shot group contests","authors":"Stefano Barbieri ,&nbsp;Iryna Topolyan","doi":"10.1016/j.jmateco.2023.102917","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2023.102917","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>We explore public randomization (Harris et al., 1995) in group contests and introduce group public randomization equilibria (GPRE). We consider group all-pay auctions with weakest-link and best-shot impact functions. While best-shot contests without public randomization are known for their multiplicity of equilibria, introducing public randomization results in a unique GPRE in which only one of the strongest players in each group is active. However, in the weakest-link case, the well-known multiplicity of equilibria becomes even more pronounced with public randomization. Despite this multiplicity, a refinement that selects GPRE immune to coalitional deviations reduces the gamut of GPRE to a unique equilibrium group-effort distribution, which, for identical groups composed of identical agents, features the highest expected total effort among all equilibria of the full information game without correlation devices. The (weak) increase in expected efforts due to correlated strategies is also observed in the best-shot case.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":50145,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Mathematical Economics","volume":"110 ","pages":"Article 102917"},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2023-11-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"92051302","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
An α-MaxMin utility representation for close and distant future preferences with temporal biases 具有时间偏差的近期和远期偏好的α-MaxMin效用表示
IF 1.3 4区 经济学
Journal of Mathematical Economics Pub Date : 2023-10-31 DOI: 10.1016/j.jmateco.2023.102916
Jean-Pierre Drugeon , Thai Ha-Huy
{"title":"An α-MaxMin utility representation for close and distant future preferences with temporal biases","authors":"Jean-Pierre Drugeon ,&nbsp;Thai Ha-Huy","doi":"10.1016/j.jmateco.2023.102916","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2023.102916","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>This paper provides a framework for understanding preferences over utility streams across different time periods. We analyze preferences for the close future, for the distant future, and a synthesis of both, establishing a representation involving weights over time periods. Examining scenarios where two utility streams cannot be robustly compared to each other, we introduce notions in which one has more “potential” to be preferred over another, which lead to MaxMin, MaxMax, and <span><math><mi>α</mi></math></span><span>-MaxMin representations. Finally, we consider temporal bias in the form of violations of stationarity. For close future preferences, we obtain a generalization of quasi-hyperbolic discounting. For distant future preferences, we obtain Banach limits and discuss the relationship with exponential discounting.</span></p></div>","PeriodicalId":50145,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Mathematical Economics","volume":"109 ","pages":"Article 102916"},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2023-10-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"91959837","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
The Sure-Thing Principle 确定原则
IF 1.3 4区 经济学
Journal of Mathematical Economics Pub Date : 2023-10-31 DOI: 10.1016/j.jmateco.2023.102915
Jean Baccelli , Lorenz Hartmann
{"title":"The Sure-Thing Principle","authors":"Jean Baccelli ,&nbsp;Lorenz Hartmann","doi":"10.1016/j.jmateco.2023.102915","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2023.102915","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>The Sure-Thing Principle famously appears in Savage’s axiomatization of Subjective Expected Utility. Yet Savage introduces it only as an informal, overarching dominance condition motivating his separability postulate P2 and his state-independence postulate P3. Once these axioms are introduced, by and large, he does not discuss the principle any more. In this note, we pick up the analysis of the Sure-Thing Principle where Savage left it. In particular, we show that each of P2 and P3 is equivalent to a dominance condition; that they strengthen in different directions a common, basic dominance axiom; and that they can be explicitly combined in a unified dominance condition that is a candidate formal statement for the Sure-Thing Principle. Based on elementary proofs, our results shed light on some of the most fundamental properties of rational choice under uncertainty. In particular they imply, as corollaries, potential simplifications for Savage’s and the Anscombe-Aumann axiomatizations of Subjective Expected Utility. Most surprisingly perhaps, they reveal that in Savage’s axiomatization, P3 can be weakened to a natural strengthening of so-called Obvious Dominance.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":50145,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Mathematical Economics","volume":"109 ","pages":"Article 102915"},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2023-10-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0304406823001088/pdfft?md5=553741f4c2e07c71bc882d9bcf66edd0&pid=1-s2.0-S0304406823001088-main.pdf","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"92136329","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
A multidimensional, nonconvex model of optimal growth 最优增长的多维非凸模型
IF 1.3 4区 经济学
Journal of Mathematical Economics Pub Date : 2023-10-31 DOI: 10.1016/j.jmateco.2023.102914
Stefano Bosi, Thai Ha-Huy
{"title":"A multidimensional, nonconvex model of optimal growth","authors":"Stefano Bosi,&nbsp;Thai Ha-Huy","doi":"10.1016/j.jmateco.2023.102914","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2023.102914","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p><span>In this article, we consider a multidimensional economy where the standard supermodularity property fails. We generalize the notion of net gain of investment, introduced by Kamihigashi and Roy (2007) and applied to one-sector growth models, to the case of multiple capital stocks. We prove the convergence to the set of steady states without relying on the monotonicity of optimal path. Our approach differs from the standard </span>dynamic programming based on convexity or supermodularity. We find that preferences are key to shape the economy in the long run.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":50145,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Mathematical Economics","volume":"109 ","pages":"Article 102914"},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2023-10-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"72249482","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
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