{"title":"The reciprocity set","authors":"Roland Pongou , Jean-Baptiste Tondji","doi":"10.1016/j.jmateco.2024.102980","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2024.102980","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>We consider the problem of designing procedures that guarantee policy stability, efficiency, and inclusiveness. For this purpose, we introduce a sequential protocol that embeds clauses granting agents the right to oppose actions not in their interest, retract actions that face opposition, and punish harmful actions. Our analysis shows that coalitional farsighted behaviors under this procedure lead to reciprocal actions. We then introduce a solution concept–<em>the reciprocity set</em>–to predict stable outcomes for effectivity function games. We find that under some conditions, the reciprocity set (1) is always non-empty; (2) only selects efficient outcomes; (3) strategically protects minority outcomes; and (4) is compatible with classical notions of fairness and Rawlsian justice in distributive problems.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":50145,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Mathematical Economics","volume":"112 ","pages":"Article 102980"},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2024-04-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140533718","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"A simple model of two-stage choice","authors":"Dan Qin","doi":"10.1016/j.jmateco.2024.102979","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2024.102979","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>This article studies a simple choice model in which two menu-dependent preferences jointly determine behavior. By relaxing multiple assumptions of rational choice theory, our model accounts for many choice anomalies. Nevertheless, we show that the model still possesses empirical content by characterizing it with squeezing conditions directly generalized from standard contraction and expansion conditions. Due to its generality, our model can serve as an umbrella under which three lines of nonstandard choice procedures can be organized: maximization of menu-dependent preference, preference maximization over part of the menu, and the rational shortlisting method. Our model is more than an organizational device because the two preferences can be interpreted as “simple and heuristic” and “complex and deliberate” decision-making methods with multiple selves who are divided into coalitions.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":50145,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Mathematical Economics","volume":"112 ","pages":"Article 102979"},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2024-03-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140345032","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Francesco De Sinopoli , Leo Ferraris , Claudia Meroni
{"title":"Poisson Search","authors":"Francesco De Sinopoli , Leo Ferraris , Claudia Meroni","doi":"10.1016/j.jmateco.2024.102981","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2024.102981","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>We present a model of the job market where the number of workers and companies is uncertain, representing the job search activity as a Poisson game. We allow for heterogeneity of workers and companies and show that in equilibrium more productive types choose higher terms of trade. The Poisson search model gives rise to multiple, possibly inefficient equilibria.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":50145,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Mathematical Economics","volume":"112 ","pages":"Article 102981"},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2024-03-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0304406824000430/pdfft?md5=d82263b469b4c33d229e776144930bed&pid=1-s2.0-S0304406824000430-main.pdf","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140341583","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Sign properties and axiomatizations of the weighted division values","authors":"Wenzhong Li , Genjiu Xu , René van den Brink","doi":"10.1016/j.jmateco.2024.102969","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jmateco.2024.102969","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>In this paper, we study axiomatic foundations of the class of weighted division values. Firstly, while keeping efficiency, additivity and the nullifying player property from the original axiomatization of the equal division value, we consider relaxations of symmetry in line with Casajus (2019) to characterize the class of (positively) weighted division values. Secondly, we show that the class of weighted division values can also be characterized by replacing linearity in three axiomatizations of Béal et al. (2016) with additivity. Finally, we show how strengthening an axiom regarding null, non-negative, respectively nullified players in these three axiomatizations, provides three axiomatizations of the class of positively weighted division values.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":50145,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Mathematical Economics","volume":"112 ","pages":"Article 102969"},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2024-03-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140150609","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Francesco Carli , Teresa Lloyd-Braga , Leonor Modesto
{"title":"Imperfect competition in the banking sector and economic instability","authors":"Francesco Carli , Teresa Lloyd-Braga , Leonor Modesto","doi":"10.1016/j.jmateco.2024.102968","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jmateco.2024.102968","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>We study the impact of competition in the banking sector on the emergence of endogenous cycles driven by self-fulling volatile expectations. We consider an OLG model with two sectors and two household types: workers, who consume and work when young and save through bank deposits; and entrepreneurs, who seek bank loans to finance current consumption and to invest in a productive technology that transforms the consumption good into capital. When old, entrepreneurs rent this capital to firms, who produce the consumption good using capital and labor. All markets are perfectly competitive, except the loans market where banks compete <em>à la</em> Cournot under free entry and exit.</p><p>In the absence of externalities in the capital producing technology, more competition in the banking sector promotes the emergence of local indeterminacy and sunspots fluctuations. In contrast, under constant social returns to scale in the capital producing technology, bank market power alone triggers the emergence of local indeterminacy. With increasing social returns to scale, both market power and externalities facilitate the emergence of local indeterminacy. Additionally, when banks have market power, steady state multiplicity may emerge, opening the way to global indeterminacy and fluctuations.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":50145,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Mathematical Economics","volume":"112 ","pages":"Article 102968"},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2024-03-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0304406824000302/pdfft?md5=f24ecc23ad8e7d9855cbd5a757d5d431&pid=1-s2.0-S0304406824000302-main.pdf","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140156856","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Non-vetoed matching with status quo","authors":"Mustafa Oǧuz Afacan","doi":"10.1016/j.jmateco.2024.102965","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2024.102965","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>We consider a matching market where there is an initial matching a priori. Both sides of the market can veto the new matching whenever they would rather keep their initial assignment. We propose a stability notion, called “conditional stability”. Our first mechanism—“Non-Vetoed Deferred Acceptance” (<span><math><mrow><mi>N</mi><mi>D</mi><mi>A</mi></mrow></math></span>)—is non-vetoed, conditionally stable, and strategy-proof. These three properties are incompatible with (two-sided) conditional constrained efficiency; hence <span><math><mrow><mi>N</mi><mi>D</mi><mi>A</mi></mrow></math></span> is not conditionally constrained efficient. However, no mechanism that is non-vetoed, conditionally stable, and strategy-proof improves on <span><math><mrow><mi>N</mi><mi>D</mi><mi>A</mi></mrow></math></span>. Lastly, we propose a non-vetoed, conditionally stable, and conditionally constrained efficient mechanism.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":50145,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Mathematical Economics","volume":"111 ","pages":"Article 102965"},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2024-03-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140030336","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Fifty years of mathematical growth theory: Classical topics and new trends","authors":"Emmanuelle Augeraud-Veron , Raouf Boucekkine , Fausto Gozzi , Alain Venditti , Benteng Zou","doi":"10.1016/j.jmateco.2024.102966","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2024.102966","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>We present an overview of selected contributions of the <em>Journal of Mathematical Economics</em>’ authors to growth theory in the last half century. We start with the classical optimal growth theory within a benchmark multisector model and outline the successive developments in the analysis of this model, including the turnpike theory. Different refinements of the benchmark are considered along the way. We then survey the abundant literature on endogenous fluctuations in two-sector models. We conclude with two strong trends in the recent growth literature: <em>green</em> growth and infinite-dimensional growth models.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":50145,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Mathematical Economics","volume":"111 ","pages":"Article 102966"},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2024-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140015291","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Housing markets since Shapley and Scarf","authors":"Mustafa Oğuz Afacan , Gaoji Hu , Jiangtao Li","doi":"10.1016/j.jmateco.2024.102967","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2024.102967","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>Shapley and Scarf (1974) appeared in the first issue of the Journal of Mathematical Economics, and is one of the journal’s most impactful publications. As we approach the remarkable milestone of the journal’s 50th anniversary (1974–2024), this article serves as a commemorative exploration of Shapley and Scarf (1974) and the extensive body of literature that follows it.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":50145,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Mathematical Economics","volume":"111 ","pages":"Article 102967"},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2024-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140024141","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"On constrained generalized games with action sets in non-locally-convex and non-Hausdorff topological vector spaces","authors":"M. Ali Khan , Richard P. McLean , Metin Uyanik","doi":"10.1016/j.jmateco.2024.102964","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2024.102964","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>This paper presents results on the existence of an equilibrium in the context of a typology consisting of qualitative, generalized and constrained generalized normal form games with the following features: (i) a set of players of arbitrary cardinality, (ii) action sets that may be non-compact subsets of a non-Hausdorff and non-locally convex space, (iii) individual preferences satisfying a weakened continuity postulate with origins in the literature on discontinuous strategic-form games. It reports four theorems and seven corollaries, and thereby brings together lines of work in game theory, Walrasian general equilibrium theory and applied mathematics in a synthetic overview that revolves around Browder’s fixed point theorem.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":50145,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Mathematical Economics","volume":"111 ","pages":"Article 102964"},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2024-02-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140015290","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Opinions and vaccination during an epidemic","authors":"Josselin Thuilliez , Nouhoum Touré","doi":"10.1016/j.jmateco.2024.102962","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jmateco.2024.102962","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>High levels of vaccine hesitancy remain poorly understood during an epidemic. Using high-frequency data in France at departmental level and exploiting the Covid-19 vaccination campaign calendar, we observe that vaccination among the elderly influences vaccination among young adults. We then propose a simple epidemiological economic model with two partially vaccinated demographic groups – the young and the elderly – and two opinions on vaccination - “vaxxers” and “antivaxxers”. The utility to get vaccinated for the young depends on the vaccination behavior of the elderly, their opinion of the vaccine and the epidemic environment. Our results suggest that mutual interactions between individuals’ vaccination opinions and infection prevalence may lead to the emergence of oscillations and disease traps. The vaccination behavior of the elderly can be harnessed to promote vaccination.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":50145,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Mathematical Economics","volume":"111 ","pages":"Article 102962"},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2024-02-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0304406824000247/pdfft?md5=238aee683e581085386ce0be4b5a0dde&pid=1-s2.0-S0304406824000247-main.pdf","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139951271","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}