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Innovation through competitive experimentation 通过竞争性实验进行创新
IF 1.3 4区 经济学
Journal of Mathematical Economics Pub Date : 2024-02-05 DOI: 10.1016/j.jmateco.2024.102957
Peter Achim
{"title":"Innovation through competitive experimentation","authors":"Peter Achim","doi":"10.1016/j.jmateco.2024.102957","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jmateco.2024.102957","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>This paper studies optimal contest design for competitive experimentation. A principal wants to implement a project and seeks contributions from multiple agents that increase the value of the project. The agent’s chances of success are independent and their experimentation efforts are unobservable. To induce effort, the principal offers a mechanism that specifies rewards and a termination time which depend on the history of past contributions. I characterize the optimal contest and show that the principal limits the agents’ rent by setting inefficiently tight stopping thresholds.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":50145,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Mathematical Economics","volume":"111 ","pages":"Article 102957"},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2024-02-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0304406824000193/pdfft?md5=c07f29b730843df4134dcd956ad28abc&pid=1-s2.0-S0304406824000193-main.pdf","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139689603","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
An approximation approach to dynamic programming with unbounded returns 收益无限制的动态程序设计近似方法
IF 1.3 4区 经济学
Journal of Mathematical Economics Pub Date : 2024-02-02 DOI: 10.1016/j.jmateco.2024.102954
G. Bloise , C. Le Van , Y. Vailakis
{"title":"An approximation approach to dynamic programming with unbounded returns","authors":"G. Bloise ,&nbsp;C. Le Van ,&nbsp;Y. Vailakis","doi":"10.1016/j.jmateco.2024.102954","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jmateco.2024.102954","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>We study stochastic dynamic programming with recursive utility in settings where multiplicity of values is only attributed to unbounded returns. That is, we consider Koopmans aggregators that, when artificially restricted to be bounded, satisfy the traditional Blackwell’s discounting condition (as it certainly happens with time-additive aggregators). We argue that, when the truncation is removed, the sequence of truncated values converges to the relevant fixed point of the untruncated Bellman operator, whenever it exists, and diverges otherwise. The experiment provides a natural selection criterion, corresponding to an extension of the recursive utility from bounded to unbounded returns.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":50145,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Mathematical Economics","volume":"111 ","pages":"Article 102954"},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2024-02-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0304406824000168/pdfft?md5=25635d3242344ebd329ca6a8ee561dc0&pid=1-s2.0-S0304406824000168-main.pdf","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139677364","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
How innocuous is it to approximate globally decreasing impatience with quasi-hyperbolic discounting? 用准双曲贴现来近似地描述全球递减的不耐烦程度有多无害？
IF 1.3 4区 经济学
Journal of Mathematical Economics Pub Date : 2024-02-01 DOI: 10.1016/j.jmateco.2024.102958
Paul Calcott, Vladimir Petkov
{"title":"How innocuous is it to approximate globally decreasing impatience with quasi-hyperbolic discounting?","authors":"Paul Calcott,&nbsp;Vladimir Petkov","doi":"10.1016/j.jmateco.2024.102958","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jmateco.2024.102958","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>This paper studies the behavior of a consumer whose time preferences exhibit globally decreasing impatience. We ask how well this behavior could be approximated with quasi-hyperbolic discounting. We find that a quasi-hyperbolic approximation can reproduce the consumer’s equilibrium strategies and their local comparative statics. However, such an approximation would provide biased assessments of measures to mitigate excessive consumption. We identify a range of biases relating to investment in illiquid assets, and to corrective taxes on sin goods. The quantitative implications of these biases are evaluated in numerical examples. For plausible parameter values, the quasi-hyperbolic approximation significantly overstates the effectiveness and the welfare consequences of the responses to excessive consumption.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":50145,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Mathematical Economics","volume":"111 ","pages":"Article 102958"},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2024-02-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S030440682400020X/pdfft?md5=5241c5fd9143c6ebaf5c681526054b27&pid=1-s2.0-S030440682400020X-main.pdf","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139666336","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Transitions between equilibria in Bilingual Games under Probit Choice Probit 选择下双语博弈中均衡点之间的转换
IF 1.3 4区 经济学
Journal of Mathematical Economics Pub Date : 2024-01-29 DOI: 10.1016/j.jmateco.2024.102956
Srinivas Arigapudi
{"title":"Transitions between equilibria in Bilingual Games under Probit Choice","authors":"Srinivas Arigapudi","doi":"10.1016/j.jmateco.2024.102956","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jmateco.2024.102956","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>We study the effect of introducing a bilingual strategy on the long run equilibrium outcome in a class of two-strategy coordination games with distinct payoff- and risk-dominant equilibria under the probit choice rule. Existing results show that in the class of two-strategy games under consideration, the inefficient risk dominant equilibrium is selected in the long run under noisy best response models. We show that if the cost of the bilingual option is sufficiently low then the efficient payoff dominant equilibrium will be selected in the long run under the probit choice rule.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":50145,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Mathematical Economics","volume":"111 ","pages":"Article 102956"},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2024-01-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139584165","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Detecting profitable deviations 检测盈利偏差
IF 1.3 4区 经济学
Journal of Mathematical Economics Pub Date : 2024-01-24 DOI: 10.1016/j.jmateco.2024.102946
David M. Rahman
{"title":"Detecting profitable deviations","authors":"David M. Rahman","doi":"10.1016/j.jmateco.2024.102946","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jmateco.2024.102946","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p><span>Rochet’s Theorem characterizes implementable allocations in a mechanism design environment in terms of cyclic monotonicity, a concept from convex analysis. In this paper, I offer an alternative approach to both the proof and interpretation of this result, based on linear duality. This duality reveals a formal relationship between incentives and detection, much like that between prices and quantities. Moreover, it allows me to extend Rochet’s Theorem and present a </span>subdifferential<span> characterization of implementing payments, revenue equivalence as differentiability of a value function, as well as budget-balanced implementation in terms of attributing innocence after unilateral deviations, together with other ancillary results.</span></p></div>","PeriodicalId":50145,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Mathematical Economics","volume":"111 ","pages":"Article 102946"},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2024-01-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139560779","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Proportional clearing mechanisms in financial systems: An axiomatic approach 金融系统中的比例清算机制：公理方法
IF 1.3 4区 经济学
Journal of Mathematical Economics Pub Date : 2024-01-24 DOI: 10.1016/j.jmateco.2024.102955
Pedro Calleja , Francesc Llerena
{"title":"Proportional clearing mechanisms in financial systems: An axiomatic approach","authors":"Pedro Calleja ,&nbsp;Francesc Llerena","doi":"10.1016/j.jmateco.2024.102955","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jmateco.2024.102955","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>We address the problem of clearing mutual obligations among agents when a financial network collapses. To do so, we adopt an axiomatic approach and provide the first comprehensive characterization of the rules based on the principle of proportionality, covering the entire domain of financial systems. While a previous attempt by <span>Csóka and Herings (2021)</span> tackled this issue in a context where agents have strictly positive initial endowments, we show that their properties do not fully capture the set of proportional rules when extended to the full financial systems’ domain. To overcome this limitation, we introduce new properties that emphasize the value of equity of the firms in the network. We show that a clearing mechanism satisfies compatibility, limited liability, absolute priority, equity continuity, and non-manipulability by clones if and only if each agent receives a payment proportional to the value of their claims. This characterization holds in the framework studied by <span>Csóka and Herings (2021)</span>.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":50145,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Mathematical Economics","volume":"111 ","pages":"Article 102955"},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2024-01-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S030440682400017X/pdfft?md5=5e5d3fd9592d7c7e6aeb916d3075dc11&pid=1-s2.0-S030440682400017X-main.pdf","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139560782","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Bubble economics 泡沫经济
IF 1.3 4区 经济学
Journal of Mathematical Economics Pub Date : 2024-01-23 DOI: 10.1016/j.jmateco.2024.102944
Tomohiro Hirano , Alexis Akira Toda
{"title":"Bubble economics","authors":"Tomohiro Hirano ,&nbsp;Alexis Akira Toda","doi":"10.1016/j.jmateco.2024.102944","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jmateco.2024.102944","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>This article provides a self-contained overview of the theory of rational asset price bubbles. We cover topics from basic definitions, properties, and classical results to frontier research, with an emphasis on bubbles attached to real assets such as stocks, housing, and land. The main message is that bubbles attached to real assets are fundamentally nonstationary phenomena related to unbalanced growth. We present a bare-bones model and draw three new insights: (i) the emergence of asset price bubbles is a necessity, instead of a possibility; (ii) asset pricing implications are markedly different between balanced growth of stationary nature and unbalanced growth of nonstationary nature; and (iii) asset price bubbles occur within larger historical trends involving shifts in industrial structure driven by technological innovation, including the transition from the Malthusian economy to the modern economy.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":50145,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Mathematical Economics","volume":"111 ","pages":"Article 102944"},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2024-01-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0304406824000065/pdfft?md5=4fd03a70d7c1e0a9016716295273a557&pid=1-s2.0-S0304406824000065-main.pdf","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139560928","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Bank bailouts: Moral hazard and commitment 银行救助：道德风险与承诺
IF 1.3 4区 经济学
Journal of Mathematical Economics Pub Date : 2024-01-23 DOI: 10.1016/j.jmateco.2024.102939
Khai Zhi Sim
{"title":"Bank bailouts: Moral hazard and commitment","authors":"Khai Zhi Sim","doi":"10.1016/j.jmateco.2024.102939","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jmateco.2024.102939","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p><span>This paper investigates moral hazard from bank bailouts and its welfare implications. The traditional channel of moral hazard in existing literature arises from banks offering excessively attractive deposit contracts that lead to inefficiently large bailouts when there is a run. This paper introduces a new, second channel of moral hazard: bailouts discourage banks from offering deposit contracts that deter panic-based runs. It also identifies when the second channel is active, and decomposes the welfare losses contributed by the two channels. Whenever the second channel is active, commitment on the bailout policy alone is unable to fully eliminate the welfare loss from moral hazard. Alternative regulations such as controlling short-term </span>interest rates<span><span> offered by banks are necessary to achieve efficiency. Additionally, the second channel can cause welfare to be increasing with the probability of bank runs. The increased </span>run probability helps encourage banks to offer run-proof contracts, easing the necessary effort from the fiscal authority to intervene.</span></p></div>","PeriodicalId":50145,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Mathematical Economics","volume":"111 ","pages":"Article 102939"},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2024-01-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139561117","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Strategic disclosure with reputational concerns 战略披露与声誉问题
IF 1.3 4区 经济学
Journal of Mathematical Economics Pub Date : 2024-01-22 DOI: 10.1016/j.jmateco.2024.102945
Wenhao Zhang
{"title":"Strategic disclosure with reputational concerns","authors":"Wenhao Zhang","doi":"10.1016/j.jmateco.2024.102945","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2024.102945","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>I study a strategic disclosure model wherein an uninformed decision-maker (DM) consults an expert of uncertain types regarding the state before acting. The expert may be an honest type, who is committed to reporting the truth; or a strategic type, whose payoff increases in the DM’s action independent of the state and, thus, strategically discloses information to facilitate his agenda while also valuing a reputation for honesty. We find that if the expert fails to obtain information with positive probability, a monotone equilibrium exists that involves an interval wherein the strategic expert adopts a mixed strategy for disclosure, in contrast to a simple cutoff rule that cannot be sustained in equilibrium. The value that the strategic expert attaches to reputation serves as a commitment device to promote disclosure, as does the higher probability that the state is observed, whereas an honest expert’s greater presence may harm the strategic expert’s disclosure incentive.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":50145,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Mathematical Economics","volume":"111 ","pages":"Article 102945"},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2024-01-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139549203","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Stabilization policy and lags 稳定政策和滞后
IF 1.3 4区 经济学
Journal of Mathematical Economics Pub Date : 2024-01-15 DOI: 10.1016/j.jmateco.2024.102941
Olivier Loisel
{"title":"Stabilization policy and lags","authors":"Olivier Loisel","doi":"10.1016/j.jmateco.2024.102941","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jmateco.2024.102941","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p><span>Macroeconomic stabilization policy is notoriously subject to inside lags (which delay the reaction of policy to the state of the economy) and outside lags (which delay the effects of policy on the economy). In a broad class of dynamic rational-expectations models, I show that neither inside lags nor outside lags of any length restrict the ability of the policymaker to ensure local-equilibrium determinacy and to control the anticipation and convergence rates, under a weak condition on the model and the policymaker’s observation set. To establish this result, I invert the problem usually addressed in the literature: I start from a targeted </span>characteristic polynomial, and I derive a corresponding policy-instrument rule. For any lags, this method offers some degrees of freedom that can be exploited to design rules with additional properties; I illustrate this possibility by designing non-superinertial rules, which the literature suggests may be more robust under model uncertainty.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":50145,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Mathematical Economics","volume":"111 ","pages":"Article 102941"},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2024-01-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139469102","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
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