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Impossibility results in the probabilistic assignment problem with stochastic same-sidedness and minimal invariance 具有随机同侧最小不变性的概率分配问题的不可能性结果
IF 0.7 4区 经济学
Journal of Mathematical Economics Pub Date : 2025-09-30 DOI: 10.1016/j.jmateco.2025.103183
Kiyong Yun
{"title":"Impossibility results in the probabilistic assignment problem with stochastic same-sidedness and minimal invariance","authors":"Kiyong Yun","doi":"10.1016/j.jmateco.2025.103183","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jmateco.2025.103183","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>Bogomolnaia and Moulin (2001) demonstrate the impossibility of designing a rule that simultaneously satisfies <em>stochastic dominance efficiency</em>, <em>equal treatment of equals</em>, and <em>stochastic dominance strategy-proofness</em> in the context of the probabilistic assignment problem with indivisible objects. Despite attempts to relax these conditions by introducing concepts like <em>upper contour strategy-proofness</em> or <em>robust ex-post efficiency</em>, the impossibility results remain. Recently, Bandhu et al. (2024) introduced the concept of <em>stochastic same-sidedness</em> in the random voting model. This condition stipulates that if an agent modifies their preference by swapping two consecutively ranked objects, then (1) the sum of probabilities assigned to objects strictly higher than the swapped pair should remain unchanged, and (2) the sum of probabilities assigned to the swapped pair should also remain constant. We first show that the impossibility persists even when <em>stochastic dominance strategy-proofness</em> is weakened to <em>stochastic same-sidedness</em>. We then decompose <em>stochastic same-sidedness</em> into three minimal invariance axioms and use these to establish further impossibility results.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":50145,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Mathematical Economics","volume":"121 ","pages":"Article 103183"},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2025-09-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145221459","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Preference for mixture and local ambiguity reduction in nonconvex preferences 混合偏好和非凸偏好中的局部模糊减少
IF 0.7 4区 经济学
Journal of Mathematical Economics Pub Date : 2025-09-24 DOI: 10.1016/j.jmateco.2025.103182
Youngsoo Heo
{"title":"Preference for mixture and local ambiguity reduction in nonconvex preferences","authors":"Youngsoo Heo","doi":"10.1016/j.jmateco.2025.103182","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jmateco.2025.103182","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>Ambiguity aversion is often modeled as a preference for mixing different alternatives, but such behavior may not be global, emerging only when the mixture sufficiently reduces ambiguity. This paper provides a utility function characterization that accommodates various patterns of mixture preferences by introducing a novel concept called the <em>core bound</em>. A preference for a specific mixture is characterized by the nonemptiness of the core bound, which indicates substantial overall ambiguity but relatively limited ambiguity for that mixture. Several notable special cases of the main theorem include nonconvex preferences as well as the Maxmin Expected Utility preference. Additionally, core bounds are useful in identifying relative ambiguity aversion between two different preference relations.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":50145,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Mathematical Economics","volume":"121 ","pages":"Article 103182"},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2025-09-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145159265","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Prudence and higher-order risk attitudes in the rank-dependent utility model 等级依赖实用新型的审慎性和高阶风险态度
IF 0.7 4区 经济学
Journal of Mathematical Economics Pub Date : 2025-09-23 DOI: 10.1016/j.jmateco.2025.103181
Ruodu Wang, Qinyu Wu
{"title":"Prudence and higher-order risk attitudes in the rank-dependent utility model","authors":"Ruodu Wang,&nbsp;Qinyu Wu","doi":"10.1016/j.jmateco.2025.103181","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jmateco.2025.103181","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>We obtain a full characterization of consistency with respect to higher-order stochastic dominance within the rank-dependent utility model. Different from the results in the literature, we do not assume any condition on the utility functions and the probability weighting functions, such as differentiability or continuity. It turns out that the level of generality that we offer leads to models that do not have a continuous probability weighting function and yet they satisfy prudence. In particular, the corresponding probability weighting function can only have a jump at 1, and must be linear on <span><math><mrow><mo>[</mo><mn>0</mn><mo>,</mo><mn>1</mn><mo>)</mo></mrow></math></span>.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":50145,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Mathematical Economics","volume":"121 ","pages":"Article 103181"},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2025-09-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145159264","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Obvious representations 明显的表示
IF 0.7 4区 经济学
Journal of Mathematical Economics Pub Date : 2025-09-11 DOI: 10.1016/j.jmateco.2025.103172
Lorenz Hartmann , Jean Baccelli
{"title":"Obvious representations","authors":"Lorenz Hartmann ,&nbsp;Jean Baccelli","doi":"10.1016/j.jmateco.2025.103172","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jmateco.2025.103172","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>Under standard assumptions, the respect of obvious dominance characterizes the existence of what we call <em>obvious representations</em>. We show that various conditions imposed directly on these representations pin down general monotonic, invariant bi-separable, general Choquet, convex Choquet, neo-additive Choquet, and subjective expected utility preferences. Among other insights, the alternative axiomatizations which we thus provide facilitate comparisons between models, as well as the identification of their parameters. Co-minimal and co-maximal acts — a natural generalization of co-monotonic acts, the relevance of which is further confirmed by our results — play a significant role in our analysis. Our results further testify of the fundamental importance of obvious dominance, and they offer a proof of concept that obvious representations constitute a fruitful format for axiomatic investigations.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":50145,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Mathematical Economics","volume":"121 ","pages":"Article 103172"},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2025-09-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145097423","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Ekici’s reclaim-proof allocations revisited 重新审视了Ekici的防回收拨款
IF 0.7 4区 经济学
Journal of Mathematical Economics Pub Date : 2025-09-10 DOI: 10.1016/j.jmateco.2025.103170
Qianfeng Tang , Zhan Zhu
{"title":"Ekici’s reclaim-proof allocations revisited","authors":"Qianfeng Tang ,&nbsp;Zhan Zhu","doi":"10.1016/j.jmateco.2025.103170","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jmateco.2025.103170","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>We revisit the concept of reclaim-proof allocations proposed by <span><span>Ekici (2013)</span></span> for house allocation problems with existing tenants. As a concept of core, the definition of reclaim-proof allocations assumes that when a coalition blocks an allocation, an agent in the coalition is allowed to bring her allocated object into the coalition, even when it is privately owned by an outsider. We propose a new notion of core called the effectual core by restoring the feasibility of coalitional blocking in Ekici’s definition. Our main result shows that the effectual core, while by definition weaker than reclaim-proofness, is actually equivalent to it. Together with Ekici’s results, it is then immediate that an allocation is in the effectual core if and only if it is produced by the <em>You request my house-I get your turn</em> (YRMH-IGYT) mechanism (<span><span>Abdulkadiroğlu and Sönmez, 1999</span></span>) and if and only if it is a competitive allocation.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":50145,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Mathematical Economics","volume":"121 ","pages":"Article 103170"},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2025-09-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145097422","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
A Single Relation Theory of Welfarist Social Evaluation 福利主义社会评价的单一关系理论
IF 0.7 4区 经济学
Journal of Mathematical Economics Pub Date : 2025-08-30 DOI: 10.1016/j.jmateco.2025.103168
Robert Raschka
{"title":"A Single Relation Theory of Welfarist Social Evaluation","authors":"Robert Raschka","doi":"10.1016/j.jmateco.2025.103168","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jmateco.2025.103168","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>The paper develops a systematic relational theory of social welfare evaluation. It is formulated in terms of a single difference relation capturing basic well-being comparisons between social alternatives. A new Fundamental Equity condition deals with trade-offs between individuals. It provides a unified rationale for different two-person conditions and identifies deep connections between seemingly distinct approaches to social evaluation. Dependent on the extent of interpersonal comparability, Strong Pareto and Fundamental Equity characterize Simple Majority Relation, Leximin, Utilitarianism, a level-based Borda Relation, and a new class of Equitable Welfarist Relations. They yield a general impossibility given weak incomparability. The analysis covers social evaluation under uncertainty, variable populations, and preference foundations of well-being comparisons. The relational theory is more general and more unified than the prevalent theory of Social Welfare Functionals. It does not use contestable inter-profile conditions and invariance requirements.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":50145,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Mathematical Economics","volume":"121 ","pages":"Article 103168"},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2025-08-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145011303","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Self-consistency for multi-valued solutions and reasonable outcomes 多值解的自洽性和合理结果
IF 0.7 4区 经济学
Journal of Mathematical Economics Pub Date : 2025-08-26 DOI: 10.1016/j.jmateco.2025.103171
Pedro Calleja , Francesc Llerena , Peter Sudhölter
{"title":"Self-consistency for multi-valued solutions and reasonable outcomes","authors":"Pedro Calleja ,&nbsp;Francesc Llerena ,&nbsp;Peter Sudhölter","doi":"10.1016/j.jmateco.2025.103171","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jmateco.2025.103171","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>We explore the compatibility of <em>uniform self-consistency</em> and <em>ordinary self-consistency</em>, two extensions for handling multi-valued solutions within the consistency principle introduced by Hart and Mas-Colell (1989), with basic properties, such as <em>reasonableness</em>, which establishes bounds for payoffs based on the marginality principle. Our analysis focuses on convex games and balanced games through the study of almost positive games, a subset of convex games that plays a crucial role in the vector lattice structure of games. Further, we provide new axiomatic foundations of the core incorporating these consistency properties.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":50145,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Mathematical Economics","volume":"120 ","pages":"Article 103171"},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2025-08-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144911987","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Decomposability and the social comparison trap 分解性和社会比较陷阱
IF 0.7 4区 经济学
Journal of Mathematical Economics Pub Date : 2025-08-22 DOI: 10.1016/j.jmateco.2025.103169
Zhiwei Cui , Xueheng Li , Boyu Zhang
{"title":"Decomposability and the social comparison trap","authors":"Zhiwei Cui ,&nbsp;Xueheng Li ,&nbsp;Boyu Zhang","doi":"10.1016/j.jmateco.2025.103169","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jmateco.2025.103169","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>We propose a unified and tractable model for social comparison preferences that nests competitive motives and imperfect inequality aversion as special cases. We identify a key property called decomposability and show that players are strategically independent in decomposable games under social comparison preferences, yielding a generically unique solution in every decomposable game. The class of decomposable games is broad, including every 2 × 2 symmetric game as well as multi-player, multi-strategy games such as the minimum effort game, public goods game, and tragedy of the commons. Using this characterization, we show that social comparison often results in undesirable outcomes, sometimes worse than any outcome that would arise if all players were material payoff maximizers.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":50145,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Mathematical Economics","volume":"120 ","pages":"Article 103169"},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2025-08-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144908718","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Entrant-optimal learning in a contest game 竞赛游戏中的参赛者最优学习
IF 0.7 4区 经济学
Journal of Mathematical Economics Pub Date : 2025-08-11 DOI: 10.1016/j.jmateco.2025.103157
Zeng Lian , Shuo Xu , Jie Zheng
{"title":"Entrant-optimal learning in a contest game","authors":"Zeng Lian ,&nbsp;Shuo Xu ,&nbsp;Jie Zheng","doi":"10.1016/j.jmateco.2025.103157","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jmateco.2025.103157","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>We consider a private value single-prize asymmetric information Tullock contest between an incumbent and an entrant. The incumbent’s prize value is common knowledge, whereas the entrant is uncertain about her value and strategically acquires information to learn about it before the contest. Inspired by Roesler and Szentes (2017), we study how the entrant’s endogenous learning influences strategic contest effort choices. The entrant faces a tradeoff between more uncertainty about her value and less intense competition. If the entrant’s value is ex ante weakly lower than the incumbent’s value, full learning is the optimal strategy. However, if the entrant’s value is ex ante the higher one, no learning can be more advantageous than full learning.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":50145,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Mathematical Economics","volume":"120 ","pages":"Article 103157"},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2025-08-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144863178","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Conditional hypothesis testing systems 条件假设检验系统
IF 0.7 4区 经济学
Journal of Mathematical Economics Pub Date : 2025-07-30 DOI: 10.1016/j.jmateco.2025.103156
Xiao Luo , Xuewen Qian
{"title":"Conditional hypothesis testing systems","authors":"Xiao Luo ,&nbsp;Xuewen Qian","doi":"10.1016/j.jmateco.2025.103156","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jmateco.2025.103156","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>We introduce the notion of a Conditional Hypothesis Testing System (CHTS) that specifies the concrete mode of non-Bayesian reactions to unexpected news in a conditional world. We show that Ortoleva’s (2012) Hypothesis Testing Model (HTM) has an alternative CHTS representation, and thus Ortoleva’s axioms also characterize CHTS. We demonstrate the concept of CHTS can be used to derive the conditional-probability-system expected utility model of Myerson (1986a). In addition, we formulate and show that the CHTS updating rule is order independent—i.e., the order of receiving uncontradictory information never influences the final posterior under the updating rule in all conditioning events. Our study sheds light on the (coherent) dynamic structure of HTM in all conditional worlds.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":50145,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Mathematical Economics","volume":"120 ","pages":"Article 103156"},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2025-07-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144830492","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
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