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Selling to a manager and a budget-constrained agent 向经理和预算有限的代理商销售产品
IF 1 4区 经济学
Journal of Mathematical Economics Pub Date : 2024-10-04 DOI: 10.1016/j.jmateco.2024.103062
{"title":"Selling to a manager and a budget-constrained agent","authors":"","doi":"10.1016/j.jmateco.2024.103062","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jmateco.2024.103062","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>We analyze a model of selling a single object to a manager-agent pair who want to acquire the object for a firm. The manager and the agent have different assessments of the object’s value to the firm. The agent is budget-constrained while the manager is not. The agent participates in the mechanism, but she can (strategically) approach the manager for decision-making. We derive the revenue-maximizing mechanism in a two-dimensional type space (values of the agent and the manager). We show that below a threshold budget, a mechanism involving two posted prices and three outcomes (one of which involves randomization) is the optimal mechanism for the seller. Otherwise, a single posted price mechanism is optimal.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":50145,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Mathematical Economics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2024-10-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142424334","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Equitable, neutral, and efficient voting rules 公平、中立和高效的表决规则
IF 1 4区 经济学
Journal of Mathematical Economics Pub Date : 2024-09-28 DOI: 10.1016/j.jmateco.2024.103061
{"title":"Equitable, neutral, and efficient voting rules","authors":"","doi":"10.1016/j.jmateco.2024.103061","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jmateco.2024.103061","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>In the context of voting, Moulin (1980) establishes that anonymity, neutrality, and efficiency are often incompatible unless one accepts indecision (i.e. ties). We show that versions of this incompatibility continue to hold for a natural weakening of anonymity proposed by Bartholdi et al. (2021) called <em>equity</em>. As equity is a relatively weak fairness requirement, the tension between fairness and efficiency in voting is deeper than previously established.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":50145,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Mathematical Economics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2024-09-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142424333","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Accessibility of Pareto optima 帕累托最优值的可达性
IF 1 4区 经济学
Journal of Mathematical Economics Pub Date : 2024-09-21 DOI: 10.1016/j.jmateco.2024.103059
{"title":"Accessibility of Pareto optima","authors":"","doi":"10.1016/j.jmateco.2024.103059","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jmateco.2024.103059","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>Non-tâtonnement processes and planning procedures have been defined in different economic contexts, as dynamic processes to reach efficient allocations, with or without price adjustment, satisfying the property that, along the process, the utility of every agent is non-decreasing and transactions can occur, thus making a clear distinction with the study of tâtonnement processes whose goal is to reach competitive equilibria with transactions occurring only at equilibrium.</div><div>In this paper, we provide sufficient conditions guaranteeing that every Pareto optimum which is preferred or indifferent to some given initial situation by every agent is accessible by a monotone efficient dynamic process. The framework considered is general enough to encompass the accessibility of Pareto optima by a non-tâtonnement barter process in an exchange economy, the neutrality of the MDP procedure in an economy with public goods, and other types of planning procedures.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":50145,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Mathematical Economics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2024-09-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142442205","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Effects of wariness on economic growth in overlapping generations models 世代重叠模型中戒备心理对经济增长的影响
IF 1 4区 经济学
Journal of Mathematical Economics Pub Date : 2024-09-19 DOI: 10.1016/j.jmateco.2024.103060
{"title":"Effects of wariness on economic growth in overlapping generations models","authors":"","doi":"10.1016/j.jmateco.2024.103060","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jmateco.2024.103060","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>We introduce the notion of wariness, defined as a concern for the lowest lifetime utility, in overlapping generations models and explore its effects on economic growth. In an exogenous growth model, under standard assumptions, we prove that the capital stock converges to a steady state. We then explore conditions under which this steady state is increasing (or decreasing) in the wariness level. We also provide a necessary and sufficient condition for the dynamic efficiency of the intertemporal equilibrium. In endogenous growth models (à la Romer (1986) or à la Barro (1990)), we show that the growth rate of capital stock per capita in the economy with wariness is lower (higher, respectively) than that in the economy without wariness if and only if the capital return is high (low, respectively).</div></div>","PeriodicalId":50145,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Mathematical Economics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2024-09-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142319514","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Equilibria in abstract economies with a continuum of agents with discontinuous and non-ordered preferences 具有不连续和无序偏好的连续代理的抽象经济中的均衡点
IF 1 4区 经济学
Journal of Mathematical Economics Pub Date : 2024-09-02 DOI: 10.1016/j.jmateco.2024.103049
{"title":"Equilibria in abstract economies with a continuum of agents with discontinuous and non-ordered preferences","authors":"","doi":"10.1016/j.jmateco.2024.103049","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jmateco.2024.103049","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>This paper focus on the problem of the existence of an equilibrium in abstract economies and exchange economies. Spanning over the literature we have managed to extend and generalize some previous results. In particular, we generalize the main theorem of Yannelis (1987) on the existence of an equilibrium in an abstract economy with a continuum of agents, by allowing for discontinuous preferences. As a corollary of this result, we extend the finite agent Cournot–Nash equilibrium existence theorems with discontinuous preferences (e.g., Reny, 1999; Bareli and Meneghel, 2013; He and Yannelis, 2016; among others), to a continuum of agents. We also obtain an existence theorem for an abstract economy which allows for a convexifying effect on aggregation and nonconvex strategy and constraint sets. Furthermore, our new main theorem is used to prove the existence of a Walrasian equilibrium with a continuum of agents with discontinuous, non-ordered, interdependent and price-dependent preferences and thus extending the results of Aumman (1966) and Schmeidler (1969).</p></div>","PeriodicalId":50145,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Mathematical Economics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2024-09-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142136780","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Belief aggregation, updating and dynamic collective choice 信念聚合、更新和动态集体选择
IF 1 4区 经济学
Journal of Mathematical Economics Pub Date : 2024-08-30 DOI: 10.1016/j.jmateco.2024.103050
{"title":"Belief aggregation, updating and dynamic collective choice","authors":"","doi":"10.1016/j.jmateco.2024.103050","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jmateco.2024.103050","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>This paper decision-theoretically investigates the belief aggregation method which allows consistently updating the aggregate belief.</p><p>After confirming that the Pareto axiom and dynamic consistency require the decision power of an individual to evolve proportionally to how much his/her prior has been successful, we propose a weaker Pareto axiom that applies only to one-step-ahead uncertainties and puts no restriction on how the decision powers should evolve.</p><p>We show in the binary tree domain that taking the median belief satisfies the proposed axiom, even full ex-ante efficiency under a single-crossing condition and that dynamic voting implements it.</p><p>Finally, we investigate the role of ambiguity aversion.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":50145,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Mathematical Economics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2024-08-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0304406824001101/pdfft?md5=d20c2ed3297386bb0b50f228d2988aee&pid=1-s2.0-S0304406824001101-main.pdf","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142121904","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Fair and efficient allocations when preferences are single-dipped 偏好单一时的公平高效分配
IF 1 4区 经济学
Journal of Mathematical Economics Pub Date : 2024-08-26 DOI: 10.1016/j.jmateco.2024.103048
{"title":"Fair and efficient allocations when preferences are single-dipped","authors":"","doi":"10.1016/j.jmateco.2024.103048","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jmateco.2024.103048","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>One unit of an infinitely divisible and non-disposable commodity has to be allocated among a group of agents with single-dipped preferences. We combine Pareto optimality with equal treatment of equals, the equal division lower bound, the equal division core, envy-freeness, and group envy-freeness. For each of these fairness requirements, we provide a necessary and sufficient condition for compatibility with Pareto optimality and we characterize all corresponding allocations for each preference profile.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":50145,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Mathematical Economics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2024-08-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0304406824001083/pdfft?md5=7b1573863842cac7b10fbcacfdbc43be&pid=1-s2.0-S0304406824001083-main.pdf","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142121905","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Signaling under double-crossing preferences: The case of discrete types 双重交叉偏好下的信号传递：离散类型的情况
IF 1 4区 经济学
Journal of Mathematical Economics Pub Date : 2024-08-22 DOI: 10.1016/j.jmateco.2024.103046
{"title":"Signaling under double-crossing preferences: The case of discrete types","authors":"","doi":"10.1016/j.jmateco.2024.103046","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jmateco.2024.103046","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>The class of double-crossing preferences, where signaling is cheaper for higher types than for lower types at low signaling levels and the opposite is true at high signaling levels, underlines the phenomenon of countersignaling, with intermediate types choosing higher actions than higher and lower types. We provide an algorithm to systematically construct an equilibrium and thus establish equilibrium existence for this general class of preferences with an arbitrary discrete-type distribution. Our analysis sheds light on the connection between discrete-type and continuous-type models and clarifies robust predictions of signaling under double-crossing preferences.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":50145,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Mathematical Economics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2024-08-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S030440682400106X/pdfft?md5=e637f538ddfe1d002f4c77d97bcfcf8b&pid=1-s2.0-S030440682400106X-main.pdf","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142083510","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Bureaucracy in quest of feasibility 追求可行性的官僚主义
IF 1 4区 经济学
Journal of Mathematical Economics Pub Date : 2024-08-15 DOI: 10.1016/j.jmateco.2024.103047
{"title":"Bureaucracy in quest of feasibility","authors":"","doi":"10.1016/j.jmateco.2024.103047","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jmateco.2024.103047","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>A bureaucracy has to determine the values of many decision variables while satisfying a set of constraints. The bureaucracy is not assumed to have any objective function beyond achieving a feasible solution, which can be viewed as “satisficing” à la Simon (1955). We assume that the variables are integer-valued and the constraints are linear. We show that simple and (arguably) natural versions of the problem are already NP-Hard. We therefore look at decentralized decisions, where each office controls but one decision variable and can determine its value as a function of its past values. However, an attempt to consult more than a single past case can lead to Condorcet-style consistency problems. We prove an Arrovian result, showing that, under certain conditions, feasibility is guaranteed only if all offices mimic their decisions in the same past case. This result can be viewed as explaining a status quo bias.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":50145,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Mathematical Economics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2024-08-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142049048","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Robust α-maxmin representations 稳健的α-最大最小表示法
IF 1 4区 经济学
Journal of Mathematical Economics Pub Date : 2024-08-10 DOI: 10.1016/j.jmateco.2024.103045
{"title":"Robust α-maxmin representations","authors":"","doi":"10.1016/j.jmateco.2024.103045","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jmateco.2024.103045","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>The class of <span><math><mi>α</mi></math></span>-maxmin representations of an agent’s preferences is meant to achieve a separation between the ambiguity he perceives and his attitude toward this perceived ambiguity. Yet the same preferences may admit a multiplicity of <span><math><mi>α</mi></math></span>-maxmin representations that contradict each other. We say that an <span><math><mi>α</mi></math></span>-maxmin representation is robust when no other <span><math><mi>α</mi></math></span>-maxmin representation exists for the same preferences. We obtain a full characterization of robustness for maxmin representation. In the case of general <span><math><mi>α</mi></math></span>-maxmin representations, we obtain sufficient conditions for both robustness and non-robustness. This contributes to better identification of the <span><math><mi>α</mi></math></span>-maxmin representations that admit a robust interpretation in terms of perceived ambiguity and ambiguity attitudes.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":50145,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Mathematical Economics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2024-08-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141984954","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
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