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Efficiency in multiple-type housing markets 多类型住房市场的效率
IF 1 4区 经济学
Journal of Mathematical Economics Pub Date : 2025-05-27 DOI: 10.1016/j.jmateco.2025.103136
Di Feng
{"title":"Efficiency in multiple-type housing markets","authors":"Di Feng","doi":"10.1016/j.jmateco.2025.103136","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jmateco.2025.103136","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>We consider multiple-type housing markets (Moulin, 1995), which extend Shapley and Scarf (1974)’s housing markets from one dimension to higher dimensions. In this model, <em>Pareto efficiency</em> is incompatible with <em>individual rationality</em> and <em>strategy-proofness</em> (Konishi et al., 2001). Therefore, we consider two weaker efficiency properties: <em>coordinatewise efficiency</em> and <em>pairwise efficiency</em>.</div><div>We show that these two properties both (i) are compatible with <em>individual rationality</em> and <em>strategy-proofness</em>, and (ii) help us to identify two specific mechanisms. Put precisely, on various preference domains, together with other well-studied properties (<em>individual rationality</em>, <em>strategy-proofness</em>, and <em>non-bossiness</em>), <em>coordinatewise efficiency</em> and <em>pairwise efficiency</em> respectively characterize two extensions of the top trading cycles mechanism (TTC): the coordinatewise TTC (cTTC) and the bundle TTC (bTTC). For multiple-type housing markets with strict preferences, our bTTC characterization constitutes the first characterization of a TTC extension.</div><div>Our proof is nonstandard and its novelty has independent methodological interest. Specifically, the absence of <em>non-bossiness</em> in the cTTC characterization and its presence in the bTTC characterization highlight both the uniqueness of our proof approach and the differences between our results and those in the existing literature.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":50145,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Mathematical Economics","volume":"119 ","pages":"Article 103136"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2025-05-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144147983","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Potentials in quadratic Cournot cross-holding games 二次古诺交叉持棋的势
IF 1 4区 经济学
Journal of Mathematical Economics Pub Date : 2025-05-22 DOI: 10.1016/j.jmateco.2025.103135
Zhigang Cao , Guopeng Li , Sixian Shen , Feng Zhu
{"title":"Potentials in quadratic Cournot cross-holding games","authors":"Zhigang Cao ,&nbsp;Guopeng Li ,&nbsp;Sixian Shen ,&nbsp;Feng Zhu","doi":"10.1016/j.jmateco.2025.103135","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jmateco.2025.103135","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>Do firms in an oligopoly market behave “as if” they were maximizing a common fictitious objective function, as in perfect competition and monopoly? The answer is yes under certain mild technical conditions (Slade, 1994). That is, in terms of Monderer and Shapley (1996), the Cournot competition is a potential game. In this paper, we ask the same question for Cournot competition with quadratic payoff functions and cross-holdings, an important variant of the oligopoly market. We find that, for various potential functions, the question can be more easily understood from the structure of the influence network, which is constructed from the cross-holding network. Roughly, we find that the Cournot competition with cross-holdings is a potential game if and only if the influence network is symmetric in certain generalized sense. Extending the model to Cournot competition with both overlapping ownership and product differentiation, we find that the previous results still hold. We also provide two applications of our results.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":50145,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Mathematical Economics","volume":"119 ","pages":"Article 103135"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2025-05-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144170260","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Fair allocation in hierarchies: A compromise between marginalism and egalitarianism 等级制度中的公平分配：边际主义与平均主义之间的妥协
IF 1 4区 经济学
Journal of Mathematical Economics Pub Date : 2025-05-16 DOI: 10.1016/j.jmateco.2025.103128
Takaaki Abe , David Lowing , Satoshi Nakada
{"title":"Fair allocation in hierarchies: A compromise between marginalism and egalitarianism","authors":"Takaaki Abe ,&nbsp;David Lowing ,&nbsp;Satoshi Nakada","doi":"10.1016/j.jmateco.2025.103128","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jmateco.2025.103128","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>This paper explores the fair allocation of economic surplus among individuals within hierarchical social structures, incorporating the seemingly conflicting principles of marginalism and egalitarianism. We formalize this situation as cooperative games with permission structures and introduce a novel class of allocation rules called <em>egalitarian permission values</em>, extending the traditional egalitarian Shapley values. Our main contribution lies in establishing an axiomatic foundation for this class of rules through a monotonicity axiom. Additionally, we provide a monotonicity-based foundation for the permission value as a special case. Our results also reveal that, in the presence of hierarchical structures, a monotonicity property alone is insufficient to justify the adoption of linear allocation rules, contrasting with the conventional findings in the literature.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":50145,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Mathematical Economics","volume":"119 ","pages":"Article 103128"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2025-05-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144106202","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Overreacting to a black box 对黑盒反应过度
IF 1 4区 经济学
Journal of Mathematical Economics Pub Date : 2025-05-10 DOI: 10.1016/j.jmateco.2025.103131
Shohei Yanagita
{"title":"Overreacting to a black box","authors":"Shohei Yanagita","doi":"10.1016/j.jmateco.2025.103131","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jmateco.2025.103131","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>We often receive recommendations whose generation process is so complex that we cannot understand it. In such cases, we cannot perform accurate Bayesian updating. Moreover, it is well-documented that when such recommendations are unexpected for us, we often overreact to them. Based on the framework established by Ke, Wu, and Zhao (2024), we characterize an updating rule expressing such a reaction. In the resulting updating rule, if the distance between the recommendation and the decision maker’s prior belief is significant enough, she perceives it as unexpected and overreacts. This rule can be seen as a generalization of the contraction rule, proposed by Ke, Wu, and Zhao (2024).</div></div>","PeriodicalId":50145,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Mathematical Economics","volume":"118 ","pages":"Article 103131"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2025-05-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143937669","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Resolute and symmetric mechanisms for two-sided matching problems 双边匹配问题的刚毅和对称机制
IF 1 4区 经济学
Journal of Mathematical Economics Pub Date : 2025-05-09 DOI: 10.1016/j.jmateco.2025.103130
Daniela Bubboloni , Michele Gori , Claudia Meo
{"title":"Resolute and symmetric mechanisms for two-sided matching problems","authors":"Daniela Bubboloni ,&nbsp;Michele Gori ,&nbsp;Claudia Meo","doi":"10.1016/j.jmateco.2025.103130","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jmateco.2025.103130","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>We focus on the one-to-one two-sided matching model with two disjoint sets of agents of equal size, where each agent in a set has preferences on the agents in the other set modeled by a linear order. A matching mechanism associates a set of matchings to each preference profile; resoluteness, that is the capability to select a unique matching, and stability are important properties for a matching mechanism. The two versions of the deferred acceptance algorithm are resolute and stable matching mechanisms but they are unfair since they strongly favor one side of the market. We introduce a property for matching mechanisms that relates to fairness; such property, called symmetry, captures different levels of fairness and generalizes existing notions. We provide several possibility and impossibility results mainly involving the most general notion of symmetry, known as gender fairness, resoluteness, stability, weak Pareto optimality and minimal optimality. In particular, we prove that: resolute, gender fair matching mechanisms exist if and only if each side of the market consists of an odd number of agents; there exists no resolute, gender fair, minimally optimal matching mechanism. Those results are obtained by employing algebraic methods based on group theory, an approach not yet explored in matching theory.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":50145,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Mathematical Economics","volume":"118 ","pages":"Article 103130"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2025-05-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143946815","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Robust personal equilibrium effects in misspecified causal models 错误指定因果模型中的稳健个人均衡效应
IF 1 4区 经济学
Journal of Mathematical Economics Pub Date : 2025-05-08 DOI: 10.1016/j.jmateco.2025.103127
Juan Carlos Carbajal , John Nachbar
{"title":"Robust personal equilibrium effects in misspecified causal models","authors":"Juan Carlos Carbajal ,&nbsp;John Nachbar","doi":"10.1016/j.jmateco.2025.103127","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jmateco.2025.103127","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>Following the work of Spiegler (2016), we use directed acyclical graphs (DAGs) to model a decision maker (DM) who is boundedly rational in the sense of having a misspecified causal model. Spiegler (2016) shows that certain misspecifications can lead to <em>personal equilibrium effects</em>: the DM calculates conditional probabilities of the relevant state variables incorrectly, and the DM’s action influences her interpretation of the data in ways that exacerbate this issue. We show that these personal equilibrium effects are <em>robust</em>, i.e., they do not depend on the details of the underlying distribution. We provide an exact characterization of when robust personal equilibrium effects arise, which is formulated in terms of structural conditional independence assertions of the DM’s misspecified DAG. Examples demonstrate how sensitive robust PE effects are to the structural details of the subjective DAG that, in most cases, are the DM’s private information. We consider detecting robust personal equilibrium effects under partial knowledge of the DM’s misspecified causal model.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":50145,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Mathematical Economics","volume":"118 ","pages":"Article 103127"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2025-05-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143941959","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Return expectations across the wealth distribution 整个财富分配的回报预期
IF 1 4区 经济学
Journal of Mathematical Economics Pub Date : 2025-05-06 DOI: 10.1016/j.jmateco.2025.103132
Edouard Djeutem , Shaofeng Xu
{"title":"Return expectations across the wealth distribution","authors":"Edouard Djeutem ,&nbsp;Shaofeng Xu","doi":"10.1016/j.jmateco.2025.103132","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jmateco.2025.103132","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>This paper examines how a household’s expectation of asset returns varies with wealth. In the model, households face idiosyncratic investment risks and confront Knightian uncertainty about returns on the risky asset. Their return expectations are formed out of a dynamic zero-sum game with nature. We characterize the robust consumption–investment policies using a perturbation method. The model predicts a U-shaped relationship between expected risky returns and wealth, as nature is less incentivized to distort the perceptions of both poor and rich households. We confront this prediction with U.S. survey data.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":50145,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Mathematical Economics","volume":"118 ","pages":"Article 103132"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2025-05-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143937668","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Proportionality-based fairness and strategyproofness in the facility location problem 设施选址问题中基于比例的公平性与策略证明性
IF 1 4区 经济学
Journal of Mathematical Economics Pub Date : 2025-05-05 DOI: 10.1016/j.jmateco.2025.103129
Haris Aziz , Alexander Lam , Barton E. Lee , Toby Walsh
{"title":"Proportionality-based fairness and strategyproofness in the facility location problem","authors":"Haris Aziz ,&nbsp;Alexander Lam ,&nbsp;Barton E. Lee ,&nbsp;Toby Walsh","doi":"10.1016/j.jmateco.2025.103129","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jmateco.2025.103129","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>We focus on a simple, one-dimensional collective decision problem (often referred to as the facility location problem) and explore issues of strategyproofness and proportionality-based fairness. Our focus is on the Unanimous Fair Share (UFS) axiom—a strengthening of the proportionality axiom (as in Freeman et al., 2021) We characterize the family of strategyproof and UFS mechanisms and also strategyproof and proportional mechanisms. We show that imposing strategyproofness renders the combination of proportionality and unanimity to be equivalent to UFS. Furthermore, there is a unique mechanism that satisfies strategyproofness and UFS (or, equivalently, proportionality and unanimity): the Uniform Phantom mechanism, which is studied in Freeman et al. (2021). This result strengthens known characterizations in the literature. We also provide an alternative characterization of the outcomes of the Uniform Phantom mechanism as the unique (pure) Nash equilibrium outcome for any mechanism that satisfies continuity, strict monotonicity, and UFS. Finally, we analyze the approximation guarantees, in terms of optimal social welfare, obtained by mechanisms that are strategyproof and satisfy the UFS (and proportionality) axiom. We show that the Uniform Phantom mechanism provides the best approximation of the optimal social welfare among all mechanisms that satisfy UFS (or proportionality).</div></div>","PeriodicalId":50145,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Mathematical Economics","volume":"119 ","pages":"Article 103129"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2025-05-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144106201","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Bargaining-Equilibrium equivalence Bargaining-Equilibrium等价
IF 1 4区 经济学
Journal of Mathematical Economics Pub Date : 2025-04-22 DOI: 10.1016/j.jmateco.2025.103117
Anuj Bhowmik , Sandipan Saha
{"title":"Bargaining-Equilibrium equivalence","authors":"Anuj Bhowmik ,&nbsp;Sandipan Saha","doi":"10.1016/j.jmateco.2025.103117","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jmateco.2025.103117","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>The paper tries to answer one of the more nascent questions in the literature on general equilibrium theory by investigating the equivalence between the set of club equilibrium allocations and the bargaining set for a club economy. Clubs in this framework are treated in a parallel fashion to private goods as articles of choice. Each club comprises two components: (i) the profile of the club and (ii) the club project. We define a two-step veto mechanism and introduce the bargaining set in line with Aumann et al. (1961) for such an economy. In this paper, we establish that non-club-equilibrium allocations are those against which there exists a set of agents and a price vector at which they agree to trade amongst themselves rather than consume the non-club-equilibrium allocation assigned to them and all other agents (weakly) prefer the non-club-equilibrium allocation to trading at that particular price vector. In other words, there is a Walrasian objection to any non-club equilibrium allocation. We further show that Walrasian objections are also justified, which helps us to establish our equivalence between the set of equilibrium allocations and the bargaining set for an atomless club economy.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":50145,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Mathematical Economics","volume":"118 ","pages":"Article 103117"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2025-04-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143870709","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Group dominant networks and convexity 群优势网络与凸性
IF 1 4区 经济学
Journal of Mathematical Economics Pub Date : 2025-03-28 DOI: 10.1016/j.jmateco.2025.103116
Christophe Bravard , Sudipta Sarangi , Hector Tzavellas
{"title":"Group dominant networks and convexity","authors":"Christophe Bravard ,&nbsp;Sudipta Sarangi ,&nbsp;Hector Tzavellas","doi":"10.1016/j.jmateco.2025.103116","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jmateco.2025.103116","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>We study group dominant networks under convexity alone and in combination with either strategic complementarity or substitutability. Group dominant networks consists of one group of completely connected agents and a set of isolated agents. They arise frequently in the networks’ literature, most commonly in collaborative situations. We first provide two conditions that help us select from different equilibrium group dominant networks. They allow us to provide a characterization of equilibrium networks for both strategic complementarity and substitutability cases including identifying conditions for uniqueness. Next we observe that under strategic substitutability the equilibrium set may not be a convex interval, allowing for the possibility of ‘holes’ in it. We provide conditions to eliminate these holes and show that this approach can also help to simplify the process of identifying group dominant equilibria.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":50145,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Mathematical Economics","volume":"118 ","pages":"Article 103116"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2025-03-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143738744","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
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