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Agreeing to disagree revisited 求同存异
IF 0.7 4区 经济学
Journal of Mathematical Economics Pub Date : 2026-04-01 Epub Date: 2026-02-03 DOI: 10.1016/j.jmateco.2026.103224
Shinya Sugiura
{"title":"Agreeing to disagree revisited","authors":"Shinya Sugiura","doi":"10.1016/j.jmateco.2026.103224","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jmateco.2026.103224","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>We characterize a qualitative generalization of the impossibility of agreeing to disagree. Prior work has proposed several sufficient conditions for this generalization based on variants of the sure-thing principle. Our main result shows that, under a natural modification, these conditions are not only equivalent to one another but also equivalent to the impossibility of agreeing to disagree. As an application, we establish an equivalence between the impossibility of speculative trade and the weak decomposability axiom introduced by <span><span>Grant et al. (2000)</span></span>.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":50145,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Mathematical Economics","volume":"123 ","pages":"Article 103224"},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2026-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"146190139","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
On strategy-proofness and single peakedness: A full characterization 论抗策略性和单峰性：一个完整的表征
IF 0.7 4区 经济学
Journal of Mathematical Economics Pub Date : 2026-04-01 Epub Date: 2026-01-14 DOI: 10.1016/j.jmateco.2026.103215
Makoto Hagiwara , Goro Ochiai , Hirofumi Yamamura
{"title":"On strategy-proofness and single peakedness: A full characterization","authors":"Makoto Hagiwara ,&nbsp;Goro Ochiai ,&nbsp;Hirofumi Yamamura","doi":"10.1016/j.jmateco.2026.103215","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jmateco.2026.103215","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>We investigate <em>strategy-proof</em> rules defined over the set of single-peaked preference profiles whose range may not be an interval. We define the class of “minmax rules with a family of upper-set tie-breaking rules”, and show that it is characterized by <em>strategy-proofness</em>. This class is broader than that of “disturbed minmax rules” introduced by Massó and Moreno de Barreda (2011), because, under the domain of all single-peaked preferences, the alternative selected by a <em>strategy-proof</em> rule whose range is not an interval may be affected by asymmetric single-peaked preferences over alternatives lying outside its range.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":50145,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Mathematical Economics","volume":"123 ","pages":"Article 103215"},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2026-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"146039492","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Uncertainty in discount rate and aggregation of time preferences 贴现率的不确定性与时间偏好的聚合
IF 0.7 4区 经济学
Journal of Mathematical Economics Pub Date : 2026-04-01 Epub Date: 2026-02-12 DOI: 10.1016/j.jmateco.2026.103226
Tailong Li, Wei Ma
{"title":"Uncertainty in discount rate and aggregation of time preferences","authors":"Tailong Li,&nbsp;Wei Ma","doi":"10.1016/j.jmateco.2026.103226","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jmateco.2026.103226","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>This paper assumes that the individual discount rate is not deterministic but random, and investigates how to aggregate a finite number of individual probability distributions for the discount rate. We take an ex post approach by considering the individuals’ choice behavior after their random discount rates realize. Specifically, we propose a unanimity condition that if every individual in society adopts one discount rate with a higher probability than another, then so should society. We prove that when the probability distributions are countably additive, this condition implies the linear aggregation rule. We then demonstrate by way of examples that this is not true if the probability distributions are finitely additive. Finally, we show that one alternative way to recover the linear aggregation rule is to impose strong continuity on the distributions.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":50145,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Mathematical Economics","volume":"123 ","pages":"Article 103226"},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2026-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"146190149","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
The maxmin value of repeated games with incomplete information on one side and tail-measurable payoffs 具有不完全信息和尾部可测收益的重复博弈的最大值
IF 0.7 4区 经济学
Journal of Mathematical Economics Pub Date : 2026-04-01 Epub Date: 2026-01-16 DOI: 10.1016/j.jmateco.2026.103214
Gil Bar Castellon Koltun , Ehud Lehrer , Eilon Solan
{"title":"The maxmin value of repeated games with incomplete information on one side and tail-measurable payoffs","authors":"Gil Bar Castellon Koltun ,&nbsp;Ehud Lehrer ,&nbsp;Eilon Solan","doi":"10.1016/j.jmateco.2026.103214","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jmateco.2026.103214","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>We study two-player zero-sum repeated games with incomplete information on one side, where the payoff function is tail measurable (and not necessarily the long-run average payoff). We show that the maxmin value equals the concavification of the value function of the non-revealing game. In addition, we provide an example demonstrating that, under tail-measurable payoffs, the value of the game may fail to exist.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":50145,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Mathematical Economics","volume":"123 ","pages":"Article 103214"},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2026-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145993587","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Group obvious strategy-proofness: Definition and characterization 群体明显策略抗性：定义与表征
IF 0.7 4区 经济学
Journal of Mathematical Economics Pub Date : 2026-04-01 Epub Date: 2026-01-19 DOI: 10.1016/j.jmateco.2026.103216
R. Pablo Arribillaga , Jordi Massó , Alejandro Neme
{"title":"Group obvious strategy-proofness: Definition and characterization","authors":"R. Pablo Arribillaga ,&nbsp;Jordi Massó ,&nbsp;Alejandro Neme","doi":"10.1016/j.jmateco.2026.103216","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jmateco.2026.103216","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>We introduce the concept of group obvious strategy-proofness, an extension of Li (2017)’s notion of obvious strategy-proofness, by requiring that truth-telling remains an obviously dominant strategy for any group of agents in the extensive game form implementing the social choice function. We show that this stronger condition is no more restrictive: the set of all group obviously strategy-proof social choice functions coincides with the set of all obviously strategy-proof social choice functions. Building on this equivalence result and on existing results on obvious strategy-proofness <em>via</em> extensive game forms with perfect information, we derive additional equivalences concerning the implementability of social choice functions: in this class of games, strategy-proofness, group strategy-proofness, obvious strategy-proofness, and group obvious strategy-proofness are all equivalent.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":50145,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Mathematical Economics","volume":"123 ","pages":"Article 103216"},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2026-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"146039491","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
A tractable theory of value-dependent spite in first- and second-price auctions 一价和二价拍卖中价值依赖的可处理理论
IF 0.7 4区 经济学
Journal of Mathematical Economics Pub Date : 2026-04-01 Epub Date: 2026-02-09 DOI: 10.1016/j.jmateco.2026.103227
Matthew J. Robertson
{"title":"A tractable theory of value-dependent spite in first- and second-price auctions","authors":"Matthew J. Robertson","doi":"10.1016/j.jmateco.2026.103227","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jmateco.2026.103227","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>I propose a model of value-dependent spite in first- and second-price auctions. My central innovation is that bidders are more spiteful the greater their value for the object. I show that equilibrium bids are increasing and, in contrast to models of value-independent spite, non-linear in bidders’ values. Due to how the marginal benefit of increasing one’s bid changes as one’s value increases, bids are convex in first-price auctions and concave in second-price auctions. I confirm that value-dependent spite leads to overbidding in both auction formats, and that second-price auctions yield greater expected revenue for the seller. Unlike the standard model, however, bidders with the lowest value in second-price auctions no longer submit positive bids. My modelling approach provides new, testable insights on spiteful bidding behaviour and generalises existing findings.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":50145,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Mathematical Economics","volume":"123 ","pages":"Article 103227"},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2026-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"146190138","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Sequential elimination contests with repechage 有重复排位赛的顺序淘汰比赛
IF 0.7 4区 经济学
Journal of Mathematical Economics Pub Date : 2026-02-01 Epub Date: 2025-12-02 DOI: 10.1016/j.jmateco.2025.103210
Zijia Wang
{"title":"Sequential elimination contests with repechage","authors":"Zijia Wang","doi":"10.1016/j.jmateco.2025.103210","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jmateco.2025.103210","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>We study a three-stage sequential elimination contest with repechage. In the first stage, all the contestants compete against each other, and some advance directly to the third stage while the others enter the second stage to compete for the opportunity to proceed to the third stage. The finalists in the third stage then compete against each other for the final prize. Compared to a sequential elimination contest without repechage, the contest with repechage induces a strictly higher overall contest effort as well as a higher expected total effort from the prize winner. This result helps to explain the prevalence of repechage in some real-world tournaments or competitions.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":50145,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Mathematical Economics","volume":"122 ","pages":"Article 103210"},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2026-02-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145684363","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Endogenous entry and investment in an all-pay auction 全付费拍卖的内生进入和投资
IF 0.7 4区 经济学
Journal of Mathematical Economics Pub Date : 2026-02-01 Epub Date: 2025-11-13 DOI: 10.1016/j.jmateco.2025.103203
Derek J. Clark , Tapas Kundu
{"title":"Endogenous entry and investment in an all-pay auction","authors":"Derek J. Clark ,&nbsp;Tapas Kundu","doi":"10.1016/j.jmateco.2025.103203","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jmateco.2025.103203","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>Contests are ubiquitous but do not simply arise in a vacuum. Competitors make conscious decisions before the fighting stage. This paper looks at the interplay between the decision to enter and then undertake a pre-contest investment to enhance the chance of winning the prize. We use an all-pay auction to model the contest stage; investment cost is private information and its return is stochastic. We characterize equilibrium in terms of threshold strategies on the cost parameter, both for the entry and the subsequent investment decision. We show that the stochastic nature of the investment outcome has a non-monotonic effect on players decisions in equilibrium. A contest designer can use our results to directly achieve goals related to the maximization of contest effort, entry fee revenue and investment propensity. In all cases, we demonstrate that limiting entry may be optimal.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":50145,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Mathematical Economics","volume":"122 ","pages":"Article 103203"},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2026-02-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145521188","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Equilibrium selection in aggregative games with strategic complementarities 具有战略互补的聚集博弈中的均衡选择
IF 0.7 4区 经济学
Journal of Mathematical Economics Pub Date : 2026-02-01 Epub Date: 2025-11-12 DOI: 10.1016/j.jmateco.2025.103195
Ricardo Serrano-Padial
{"title":"Equilibrium selection in aggregative games with strategic complementarities","authors":"Ricardo Serrano-Padial","doi":"10.1016/j.jmateco.2025.103195","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jmateco.2025.103195","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>We study large games played by heterogeneous agents whose payoffs depend on their type and on the aggregate action. We show that when player actions and the aggregate action are complements the global games equilibrium selection yields a unique equilibrium. We characterize the selected equilibrium as the strategy profile that maximizes average expected payoffs when players have pessimistic beliefs about the aggregate action. In particular, each agent believes to be the lowest type to contribute to the aggregate action. To obtain our result we prove that beliefs about the distribution of the aggregate action in the global game satisfy a <em>generalized Laplacian property</em>, which states that the (weighted) average belief is the uniform distribution.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":50145,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Mathematical Economics","volume":"122 ","pages":"Article 103195"},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2026-02-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145521189","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Optimal contracts under general mixed constraints: Continuity, structure, and applications 一般混合约束下的最优契约：连续性、结构和应用
IF 0.7 4区 经济学
Journal of Mathematical Economics Pub Date : 2026-02-01 Epub Date: 2025-11-28 DOI: 10.1016/j.jmateco.2025.103205
Aggey Simons Semenov
{"title":"Optimal contracts under general mixed constraints: Continuity, structure, and applications","authors":"Aggey Simons Semenov","doi":"10.1016/j.jmateco.2025.103205","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jmateco.2025.103205","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>This paper characterizes optimal contracts under adverse selection when the principal faces a general linear constraint involving both the quantity produced and the transfer paid. These constraints capture enforcement limits, budget restrictions, and minimum quality standards. Using optimal control techniques, we establish existence and continuity of the optimal quantity schedule and derive a three-region structure: under regularity conditions, the optimal contract splits the type space into at most three connected intervals (slack and binding intervals), where binding intervals generically induce endogenous bunching of quantities. Our unifying framework, along with novel analytical assumptions, provides rigorous foundations for understanding how optimal mechanisms behave under such smooth constraints and offers a toolkit for analyzing a broad class of constrained contracting problems.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":50145,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Mathematical Economics","volume":"122 ","pages":"Article 103205"},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2026-02-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145684366","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
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