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Cooperative games with diversity constraints 具有多样性约束的合作游戏
IF 1 4区 经济学
Journal of Mathematical Economics Pub Date : 2024-11-26 DOI: 10.1016/j.jmateco.2024.103077
Sylvain Béal , Marc Deschamps , Mostapha Diss , Rodrigue Tido Takeng
{"title":"Cooperative games with diversity constraints","authors":"Sylvain Béal ,&nbsp;Marc Deschamps ,&nbsp;Mostapha Diss ,&nbsp;Rodrigue Tido Takeng","doi":"10.1016/j.jmateco.2024.103077","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jmateco.2024.103077","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>A cooperative game with diversity constraints is given by a cooperative game, a coalition structure which partitions the set of players into communities, and a vector of integers specifying, for each community, the minimal number of its members that a coalition must possess to be considered as diverse. We provide axioms for a value on the class of such cooperative games with diversity constraints. Some combinations of axioms characterize two values inspired by the Shapley value (Shapley, 1953) and the Owen value (Owen, 1977) for games with a coalition structure. More specifically, the Diversity Owen value is characterized as the Owen value of the diversity-restricted game with a coalition structure, where the diversity-restricted game assigns a null worth to a coalition if it does not meet the diversity requirements or its original worth otherwise. Similarly, the Diversity Shapley value is characterized as the Shapley value of the diversity-restricted game (without coalition structure). Some of our axiomatic characterizations can be adapted to the class of simple games by replacing the Additivity axiom by the Transfer axiom (Dubey, 1975).</div></div>","PeriodicalId":50145,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Mathematical Economics","volume":"116 ","pages":"Article 103077"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2024-11-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142748217","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Intergenerational redistribution with endogenous constraints to household debt 家庭债务内生约束的代际再分配
IF 1 4区 经济学
Journal of Mathematical Economics Pub Date : 2024-11-16 DOI: 10.1016/j.jmateco.2024.103068
Ilya Eryzhenskiy
{"title":"Intergenerational redistribution with endogenous constraints to household debt","authors":"Ilya Eryzhenskiy","doi":"10.1016/j.jmateco.2024.103068","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jmateco.2024.103068","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>I study decentralization of optimal allocations in an endowment overlapping-generations economy where young agents face endogenous borrowing constraints. Lenders constrain credit because of limited commitment of borrowers: those can declare bankruptcy and only lose their ability to make savings for retirement in the future. The social planner can use lump-sum transfers and government debt in order to decentralize optimal allocations of consumption goods. I show that policies using government debt decentralize a larger set of optimal allocations, as opposed to balanced-budget policies with the same number of instruments per period. In addition, government debt always rules out equilibria where the private credit market does not operate and can rule out equilibrium steady states with binding borrowing constraints. The results are explained by incentives for saving and debt repayment under limited commitment, so they do not hold under common specifications of exogenous debt constraints.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":50145,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Mathematical Economics","volume":"116 ","pages":"Article 103068"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2024-11-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142748216","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
The social value of overreaction to information 对信息反应过度的社会价值
IF 1 4区 经济学
Journal of Mathematical Economics Pub Date : 2024-11-10 DOI: 10.1016/j.jmateco.2024.103067
Matteo Bizzarri , Daniele d’Arienzo
{"title":"The social value of overreaction to information","authors":"Matteo Bizzarri ,&nbsp;Daniele d’Arienzo","doi":"10.1016/j.jmateco.2024.103067","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jmateco.2024.103067","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>We study the welfare effects of overreaction to information in markets with asymmetric information as well as the impact of a simple intervention in the form of a tax or a subsidy on trade volume. A large enough level of overreaction is always welfare decreasing: in these situations, introducing a tax can improve welfare. However, a small degree of overreaction can increase welfare. This is because of the interplay of two competing externalities: an information externality, due to the informational role of prices, and a pecuniary externality, due to the allocative role of prices. Depending on the balance of these externalities, a trade volume subsidy may be optimal.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":50145,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Mathematical Economics","volume":"115 ","pages":"Article 103067"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2024-11-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142653739","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
An overlapping-generations model with data-driven equilibrium behavior 数据驱动平衡行为的重叠世代模型
IF 1 4区 经济学
Journal of Mathematical Economics Pub Date : 2024-11-08 DOI: 10.1016/j.jmateco.2024.103065
Alexander Gorokhovsky , Anna Rubinchik
{"title":"An overlapping-generations model with data-driven equilibrium behavior","authors":"Alexander Gorokhovsky ,&nbsp;Anna Rubinchik","doi":"10.1016/j.jmateco.2024.103065","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jmateco.2024.103065","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>We propose a class of overlapping generations models that can serve as a workhorse for policy analysis. Recent literature identifies several features of key observable economic variables in Europe and the U.S.: the life-cycle path of earnings is hump-shaped, while the aggregate variables — per-capita consumption and labor hours — exhibit a clear time trend. Our class generates non-monotonic life-cycle behavior of labor supply and the desired aggregate trends in all its balanced-growth equilibria (BGE). There is a finite number of these equilibria and at least one of them exists provided a single-generation consumer problem has a solution. The model has a constant-returns-to-scale production, non-trivial depreciation of capital, exogenous labor-saving growth and an arbitrary individual life-cycle productivity. The necessary restrictions imposed on preferences are consistent with those generating the aggregate trends in a representative-agent economy, while ruling out popular specifications such as Cobb–Douglas or CES. We characterize BGE with MaCurdy preferences and solve a parametrized model that yields at least two stationary equilibria with reasonable interest rates. The hump-shaped life-cycle consumption profile can be generated with an additional parameter interpreted as reflecting family structure or a desire for immediate gratification that peaks at mid-life.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":50145,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Mathematical Economics","volume":"115 ","pages":"Article 103065"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2024-11-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142653738","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Robust group strategy-proof rules in the object allocation problem with money: The role of tie-breaking rules 有资金的物品分配问题中的稳健群体策略防范规则：打破平局规则的作用
IF 1 4区 经济学
Journal of Mathematical Economics Pub Date : 2024-10-31 DOI: 10.1016/j.jmateco.2024.103066
Hiroki Shinozaki
{"title":"Robust group strategy-proof rules in the object allocation problem with money: The role of tie-breaking rules","authors":"Hiroki Shinozaki","doi":"10.1016/j.jmateco.2024.103066","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jmateco.2024.103066","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>We study the object allocation problem with money. The owner owns identical objects. Each agent receives at most one unit of the object, and has a preference that is not necessarily quasi-linear. Recently, Kivinen and Tumennasan (2021) propose a group incentive property that they call <em>robust group strategy-proofness</em>. It takes into account a coalitional manipulation with which a coalition agrees without knowing the other agents’ preferences. We propose a <em>generalized Vickrey rule with lowest priority agents</em> that is associated with a tie-breaking rule such that for each coalitional report of preferences, there is an agent (a <em>lowest priority agent</em>) who has a chance to receive the object only after all the other members of the coalition receive the object. We show that the generalized Vickrey rules with lowest priority agents are the only rules satisfying <em>robust group strategy-proofness</em>, <em>efficiency</em>, <em>individual rationality</em>, and <em>no subsidy for losers</em>. Our result highlights the importance of the tie-breaking rules for <em>robust group strategy-proofness</em>, which contrasts with <em>group strategy-proofness</em> that a generalized Vickrey rule satisfies regardless of the tie-breaking rule.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":50145,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Mathematical Economics","volume":"115 ","pages":"Article 103066"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2024-10-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142578515","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Some advances in cooperative game theory: Indivisibilities, externalities and axiomatic approach 合作博弈论的若干进展：不可分割性、外部性和公理方法
IF 1 4区 经济学
Journal of Mathematical Economics Pub Date : 2024-10-29 DOI: 10.1016/j.jmateco.2024.103064
Yukihiko Funaki , Marina Núñez
{"title":"Some advances in cooperative game theory: Indivisibilities, externalities and axiomatic approach","authors":"Yukihiko Funaki ,&nbsp;Marina Núñez","doi":"10.1016/j.jmateco.2024.103064","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jmateco.2024.103064","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>This article reviews some contributions on cooperative games where the <em>Journal of Mathematical Economics</em> has been influential, namely the games with non-transferable utility and some market games with indivisibilities. Additionally, it presents some more recent advances on two aspects of the theory of cooperative games: the introduction of externalities in the worth of the coalitions and the axiomatic characterization of solutions.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":50145,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Mathematical Economics","volume":"115 ","pages":"Article 103064"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2024-10-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142572182","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
On the axiomatization of an unawareness structure from knowing-whether operators 论从 "是否知道 "算子出发的 "不知道 "结构的公理化
IF 1 4区 经济学
Journal of Mathematical Economics Pub Date : 2024-10-16 DOI: 10.1016/j.jmateco.2024.103063
Satoshi Fukuda
{"title":"On the axiomatization of an unawareness structure from knowing-whether operators","authors":"Satoshi Fukuda","doi":"10.1016/j.jmateco.2024.103063","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jmateco.2024.103063","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>This paper shows that, on a generalized state space model of unawareness, an agent’s underlying knowledge is axiomatized from her knowing-whether operator if and only if her knowledge satisfies the Truth Axiom: whenever the agent knows an event, the event holds. The agent knows whether an event obtains if she knows it or knows its negation. Different knowledge operators lead to different knowing-whether operators if knowledge is truthful. Conversely, for any knowing-whether operator, there is a unique truthful knowledge operator that induces the given knowing-whether operator: the agent knows an event if and only if she knows whether the event holds and the event indeed holds. Qualitative or probabilistic beliefs may not be recovered from believing-whether. This paper then axiomatizes properties of knowledge and common knowledge, in terms of knowing-whether. The main contributions of the paper are as follows. First, conceptually, this paper provides a generalized-state-space model of knowledge and unawareness in which the only assumption on knowledge is the Truth Axiom. Second, practically, this paper may provide a simple way to construct a generalized-state-space model.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":50145,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Mathematical Economics","volume":"115 ","pages":"Article 103063"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2024-10-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142528380","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Selling to a manager and a budget-constrained agent 向经理和预算有限的代理商销售产品
IF 1 4区 经济学
Journal of Mathematical Economics Pub Date : 2024-10-04 DOI: 10.1016/j.jmateco.2024.103062
Debasis Mishra, Kolagani Paramahamsa
{"title":"Selling to a manager and a budget-constrained agent","authors":"Debasis Mishra,&nbsp;Kolagani Paramahamsa","doi":"10.1016/j.jmateco.2024.103062","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jmateco.2024.103062","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>We analyze a model of selling a single object to a manager-agent pair who want to acquire the object for a firm. The manager and the agent have different assessments of the object’s value to the firm. The agent is budget-constrained while the manager is not. The agent participates in the mechanism, but she can (strategically) approach the manager for decision-making. We derive the revenue-maximizing mechanism in a two-dimensional type space (values of the agent and the manager). We show that below a threshold budget, a mechanism involving two posted prices and three outcomes (one of which involves randomization) is the optimal mechanism for the seller. Otherwise, a single posted price mechanism is optimal.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":50145,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Mathematical Economics","volume":"115 ","pages":"Article 103062"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2024-10-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142424334","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Equitable, neutral, and efficient voting rules 公平、中立和高效的表决规则
IF 1 4区 经济学
Journal of Mathematical Economics Pub Date : 2024-09-28 DOI: 10.1016/j.jmateco.2024.103061
Steven Kivinen
{"title":"Equitable, neutral, and efficient voting rules","authors":"Steven Kivinen","doi":"10.1016/j.jmateco.2024.103061","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jmateco.2024.103061","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>In the context of voting, Moulin (1980) establishes that anonymity, neutrality, and efficiency are often incompatible unless one accepts indecision (i.e. ties). We show that versions of this incompatibility continue to hold for a natural weakening of anonymity proposed by Bartholdi et al. (2021) called <em>equity</em>. As equity is a relatively weak fairness requirement, the tension between fairness and efficiency in voting is deeper than previously established.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":50145,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Mathematical Economics","volume":"115 ","pages":"Article 103061"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2024-09-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142424333","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Accessibility of Pareto optima 帕累托最优值的可达性
IF 1 4区 经济学
Journal of Mathematical Economics Pub Date : 2024-09-21 DOI: 10.1016/j.jmateco.2024.103059
Bernard Cornet
{"title":"Accessibility of Pareto optima","authors":"Bernard Cornet","doi":"10.1016/j.jmateco.2024.103059","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jmateco.2024.103059","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>Non-tâtonnement processes and planning procedures have been defined in different economic contexts, as dynamic processes to reach efficient allocations, with or without price adjustment, satisfying the property that, along the process, the utility of every agent is non-decreasing and transactions can occur, thus making a clear distinction with the study of tâtonnement processes whose goal is to reach competitive equilibria with transactions occurring only at equilibrium.</div><div>In this paper, we provide sufficient conditions guaranteeing that every Pareto optimum which is preferred or indifferent to some given initial situation by every agent is accessible by a monotone efficient dynamic process. The framework considered is general enough to encompass the accessibility of Pareto optima by a non-tâtonnement barter process in an exchange economy, the neutrality of the MDP procedure in an economy with public goods, and other types of planning procedures.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":50145,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Mathematical Economics","volume":"115 ","pages":"Article 103059"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2024-09-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142442205","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
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