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The economic and policy consequences of carbon emissions
IF 1 4区 经济学
Journal of Mathematical Economics Pub Date : 2025-02-28 DOI: 10.1016/j.jmateco.2025.103103
Weizhen Meng , Tuyue Chen , Jinqiang Yang
{"title":"The economic and policy consequences of carbon emissions","authors":"Weizhen Meng ,&nbsp;Tuyue Chen ,&nbsp;Jinqiang Yang","doi":"10.1016/j.jmateco.2025.103103","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jmateco.2025.103103","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>Carbon emissions are increasingly being recognized as a threat to economic well-being. This paper incorporates the carbon cycle into a general equilibrium model to study the asset pricing implications of the interaction between carbon emissions and mitigation policies. Our findings suggest that the accumulation of carbon stocks stimulates mitigation spending, reduces consumption, harms welfare, lowers the risk-free rate, and elevates the risk premium. Furthermore, we propose a framework for policy analysis that includes calculating the social cost of carbon (SCC) and the willingness to pay (WTP). Additionally, results show the complex impacts of carbon dynamics on the risk-free rate. Specifically, higher carbon decay rates and the economic damage caused by carbon increase the risk-free rate, while carbon volatility risk lowers it. Moreover, convex damage functions can reverse the trend of the risk-free rate, causing it to rise with carbon stock.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":50145,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Mathematical Economics","volume":"117 ","pages":"Article 103103"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2025-02-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143526768","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
A globally convergent alternating one-track auction for gross substitutes and complements
IF 1 4区 经济学
Journal of Mathematical Economics Pub Date : 2025-02-28 DOI: 10.1016/j.jmateco.2025.103102
Siqi Song , Chi Zhang
{"title":"A globally convergent alternating one-track auction for gross substitutes and complements","authors":"Siqi Song ,&nbsp;Chi Zhang","doi":"10.1016/j.jmateco.2025.103102","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jmateco.2025.103102","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>We propose a new globally convergent dynamic auction for selling multiple indivisible items. There are two finite and disjoint sets of items. Items in each set can be heterogeneous but are substitutes, and items across the two sets are complements. Each bidder may demand several items. In each round of the auction, every bidder reports his demand of items at the current prices and the auctioneer responds by either increasing prices or exclusively decreasing prices. We show that the auction converges globally to a Walrasian equilibrium.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":50145,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Mathematical Economics","volume":"118 ","pages":"Article 103102"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2025-02-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143552330","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Economic growth with brown or green capital
IF 1 4区 经济学
Journal of Mathematical Economics Pub Date : 2025-02-28 DOI: 10.1016/j.jmateco.2025.103101
Stefano Bosi , Cuong Le Van , Giang Phung
{"title":"Economic growth with brown or green capital","authors":"Stefano Bosi ,&nbsp;Cuong Le Van ,&nbsp;Giang Phung","doi":"10.1016/j.jmateco.2025.103101","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jmateco.2025.103101","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>We study a discrete-time growth model where capital affects the productivity of other firms and can therefore be “brown” or “green”. Brown inputs, decreasing productivity, are a negative externality, while green inputs, whether human or natural, increasing productivity, are a positive externality. We prove the existence of self-consistent externalities before the existence of a competitive equilibrium, and the occurrence of two-period cycles through bifurcation analysis. In particular, externalities lead to cycles: when negative, under dominant income effects; when positive, under dominant substitution effects.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":50145,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Mathematical Economics","volume":"117 ","pages":"Article 103101"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2025-02-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143528973","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Restricted dominant unanimity and social discounting
IF 1 4区 经济学
Journal of Mathematical Economics Pub Date : 2025-02-14 DOI: 10.1016/j.jmateco.2025.103100
Bach Dong-Xuan , Xiangyu Qu
{"title":"Restricted dominant unanimity and social discounting","authors":"Bach Dong-Xuan ,&nbsp;Xiangyu Qu","doi":"10.1016/j.jmateco.2025.103100","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jmateco.2025.103100","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>This paper addresses the intricate challenge of establishing social discount rates across far-reaching generations, particularly in the face of divergent social viewpoints. We introduce several principles related to <em>Dominant Unanimity</em>, which enable non-dictatorial social discounting, and we characterize different ranges of social discount factors based on individual one-period discount factors. Our findings suggest that societies adhering to these principles exhibit varying degrees of patience and different ranges of social discounting. This approach provides theoretical pathways to enhance the consideration of distant future welfare, particularly in the context of long-term economic activities and policies.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":50145,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Mathematical Economics","volume":"117 ","pages":"Article 103100"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2025-02-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143422512","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Pareto efficiency and financial fairness under limited expected loss constraint
IF 1 4区 经济学
Journal of Mathematical Economics Pub Date : 2025-02-10 DOI: 10.1016/j.jmateco.2025.103096
Tak Wa Ng, Thai Nguyen
{"title":"Pareto efficiency and financial fairness under limited expected loss constraint","authors":"Tak Wa Ng,&nbsp;Thai Nguyen","doi":"10.1016/j.jmateco.2025.103096","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jmateco.2025.103096","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>This paper investigates the Pareto efficiency and financial fairness in a collective asset allocation under a limited expected loss (LEL) constraint. By studying a constrained collective optimization problem, we characterize a constrained version of Pareto optimality, named LEL-Pareto optimality, within the admissible class of sharing rules. We propose a novel sharing rule, referred to as the LEL sharing rule, as an alternative to widely used proportional sharing rules. We rigorously demonstrate that every LEL sharing rule is LEL-Pareto-optimal and vice versa, thereby establishing a novel Borch-like criterion in a risk-constrained setting. Under the financial fairness condition, we derive a unique LEL sharing rule through a fixed-point iteration scheme by solving a highly non-linear system of Lagrange multipliers related to LEL-constrained optimization for collective utility and the financial fairness condition. Under mild conditions, we achieve global convergence and establish the existence of a unique fixed point of the iterative algorithm. Our numerical analysis affirms the theoretical findings and underscores the positive influence of the LEL constraint among prevalent proportional sharing rules, emphasizing the importance of risk control in practical scenarios.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":50145,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Mathematical Economics","volume":"117 ","pages":"Article 103096"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2025-02-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143394519","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Axiomatic and strategic justifications of the connected equal splitting rule in the reordering problem
IF 1 4区 经济学
Journal of Mathematical Economics Pub Date : 2025-02-08 DOI: 10.1016/j.jmateco.2025.103095
Min-Hung Tsay , Chun-Hsien Yeh , Youngsub Chun
{"title":"Axiomatic and strategic justifications of the connected equal splitting rule in the reordering problem","authors":"Min-Hung Tsay ,&nbsp;Chun-Hsien Yeh ,&nbsp;Youngsub Chun","doi":"10.1016/j.jmateco.2025.103095","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jmateco.2025.103095","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>We consider the “reordering problem”, in which agents need to be reordered from an initial queue to be served in a facility which handles only one agent at a time. Agents differ in their unit waiting costs and the amounts of service time needed to process their jobs. We adopt both axiomatic and strategic approaches to study the connected equal splitting rule. This rule selects an efficient reordering of the initial queue and allocates the cost savings obtained after reordering the positions of any two agents equally among themselves and all agents initially positioned between them. We introduce the property of <em>balanced reduction of agents</em>, which requires that the effect of one agent dropping out of the reordering process on the net utility of another agent should be equal for any two agents when no two agents are allowed to exchange their positions in the initial queue without permission from all the agents between them. As we show, the connected equal splitting rule is the only rule that satisfies <em>efficiency</em>, <em>budget balance</em>, <em>Pareto indifference</em>, and <em>balanced reduction of agents</em>. Furthermore, we introduce an extensive-form game with finite rounds exploiting <em>balanced reduction of agents</em> to strategically implement the rule in a subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":50145,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Mathematical Economics","volume":"117 ","pages":"Article 103095"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2025-02-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143422511","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Equilibrium convergence in large games
IF 1 4区 经济学
Journal of Mathematical Economics Pub Date : 2025-02-07 DOI: 10.1016/j.jmateco.2025.103097
Enxian Chen , Bin Wu , Hanping Xu
{"title":"Equilibrium convergence in large games","authors":"Enxian Chen ,&nbsp;Bin Wu ,&nbsp;Hanping Xu","doi":"10.1016/j.jmateco.2025.103097","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jmateco.2025.103097","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>This paper presents a general closed graph property for (randomized strategy) Nash equilibrium correspondence in large games. In particular, we show that for any large game with a convergent sequence of finite-player games, the limit of any convergent sequence of Nash equilibria of the corresponding finite-player games can be induced by a Nash equilibrium of the large game. Such a result goes beyond earlier results on the closed graph property for pure strategy Nash equilibrium correspondence in large games in multiple aspects. An application on equilibrium selection in large games is also presented.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":50145,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Mathematical Economics","volume":"117 ","pages":"Article 103097"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2025-02-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143387425","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
On progressive tax systems with heterogeneous preferences
IF 1 4区 经济学
Journal of Mathematical Economics Pub Date : 2025-02-06 DOI: 10.1016/j.jmateco.2025.103098
Oriol Carbonell-Nicolau
{"title":"On progressive tax systems with heterogeneous preferences","authors":"Oriol Carbonell-Nicolau","doi":"10.1016/j.jmateco.2025.103098","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jmateco.2025.103098","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>The properties of progressive income tax systems vis-à-vis standard measures of inequality and polarization have been studied elsewhere, both for economies with exogenous and endogenous income. In the case of endogenous income, preferences are assumed to be identical across consumers. This paper relaxes the preference homogeneity assumption. Using the relative Lorenz inequality order and the relative Foster–Wolfson bipolarization order, we show that income tax systems reduce both inequality and polarization — no matter what the economy’s initial conditions are — only if they are progressive. Furthermore, we identify specific conditions related to heterogeneous consumer preferences under which progressive tax systems effectively mitigate inequality and polarization.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":50145,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Mathematical Economics","volume":"117 ","pages":"Article 103098"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2025-02-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143394520","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Why do migrants stay unexpectedly? Misperceptions and implications for integration
IF 1 4区 经济学
Journal of Mathematical Economics Pub Date : 2025-02-05 DOI: 10.1016/j.jmateco.2025.103099
Marc Kaufmann , Joël Machado , Bertrand Verheyden
{"title":"Why do migrants stay unexpectedly? Misperceptions and implications for integration","authors":"Marc Kaufmann ,&nbsp;Joël Machado ,&nbsp;Bertrand Verheyden","doi":"10.1016/j.jmateco.2025.103099","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jmateco.2025.103099","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>Empirical evidence suggests that the majority of immigrants who initially planned a temporary stay end up staying permanently in the host country. Since beliefs about the duration of stay are a strong determinant of integration, many long-term migrants may end up less than optimally integrated. We theoretically model migrants with potential misperceptions about their future utility and wage prospects in the host country relative to their country of origin. We describe conditions under which these misperceptions generate, and conditions on observables that identify, unexpected staying. These conditions involve pessimism about the endogenous long-term wage for which migrants are indifferent between staying and leaving: either they overestimate the probability of earning less than this indifference wage, or they underestimate their utility in the destination country when earning this wage. Using the German Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP), we find that higher levels of pessimism about utility and wages at arrival are associated with staying in the long-term in Germany despite having initially predicted a temporary stay.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":50145,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Mathematical Economics","volume":"117 ","pages":"Article 103099"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2025-02-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143379330","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Cycle conditions for “Luce rationality”
IF 1 4区 经济学
Journal of Mathematical Economics Pub Date : 2025-02-01 DOI: 10.1016/j.jmateco.2025.103094
José A. Rodrigues-Neto , Matthew Ryan , James Taylor
{"title":"Cycle conditions for “Luce rationality”","authors":"José A. Rodrigues-Neto ,&nbsp;Matthew Ryan ,&nbsp;James Taylor","doi":"10.1016/j.jmateco.2025.103094","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jmateco.2025.103094","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>We extend and refine conditions for “Luce rationality” (i.e., the existence of a Luce – or logit – model) in the context of stochastic choice. When choice probabilities satisfy <em>positivity</em>, the <em>cyclical independence (CI)</em> condition of Ahumada and Ülkü (2018) and Echenique and Saito (2019) is necessary and sufficient for Luce rationality, even if choice is only observed for a restricted set of menus. We adapt results from the <em>cycles approach</em> (Rodrigues-Neto, 2009) to the common prior problem Harsanyi (1967–1968) to refine the CI condition, by reducing the number of cycle equations that need to be checked. A general algorithm is provided to identify a minimal sufficient set of equations. Three cases are discussed in detail: (i) when choice is only observed from binary menus, (ii) when all menus contain a common default; and (iii) when all menus contain an element from a common binary default set. Investigation of case (i) leads to a refinement of the famous product rule.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":50145,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Mathematical Economics","volume":"117 ","pages":"Article 103094"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2025-02-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143349149","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
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