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An economic theory of the Soviet system 苏联体制的经济理论
IF 1 4区 经济学
Journal of Mathematical Economics Pub Date : 2025-03-25 DOI: 10.1016/j.jmateco.2025.103115
Maxime Menuet , Antoine Parent
{"title":"An economic theory of the Soviet system","authors":"Maxime Menuet ,&nbsp;Antoine Parent","doi":"10.1016/j.jmateco.2025.103115","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jmateco.2025.103115","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>The sudden collapse of the Soviet regime is one of the most enigmatic historical events explored in the social sciences. In this paper, we propose a macrodynamic theory of the Soviet economy that provides theoretical foundations for understanding its collapse. Our model features three actors: workers (the people) who can revolt, natchalnik (the supervisor of firms) who controls a defense-industry firm, and the apparatchik (a member of the communist party and administration) who both extracts production for personal uses and acts as a central planner. We analyze the conditions for the Soviet regime’s sustainability or collapse. Our theory identifies three channels leading to the collapse: internal contradictions within the elite, conflicts between the workforce and the administrative-command structure, and corruption among the elite.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":50145,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Mathematical Economics","volume":"118 ","pages":"Article 103115"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2025-03-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143738745","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Pricing negative externalities in social networks 社交网络中的负外部性定价
IF 1 4区 经济学
Journal of Mathematical Economics Pub Date : 2025-03-17 DOI: 10.1016/j.jmateco.2025.103105
Guopeng Li , Sijie Wang , Yifan Xiong , Feng Zhu
{"title":"Pricing negative externalities in social networks","authors":"Guopeng Li ,&nbsp;Sijie Wang ,&nbsp;Yifan Xiong ,&nbsp;Feng Zhu","doi":"10.1016/j.jmateco.2025.103105","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jmateco.2025.103105","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>We explore optimal monopoly pricing in the presence of local negative externalities among agents’ consumption. A monopolist first sets personalized prices, and consumers then simultaneously determine consumption levels. When network externalities are relatively small, the complement graph of the social network plays a key role in characterizing the equilibrium. Optimal prices are uniform when the production cost is linear and proportional to agents’ Katz-Bonacich centralities in the complement network when the production cost is convex. We further connect agents’ consumption with their degrees in several typical networks. The firm’s profit and total consumption decrease with network density, although the consumption of a specific agent may not decrease accordingly. Furthermore, in the context of directed networks, the monopolist charges higher prices to agents who generate substantial externalities for others without being reciprocally influenced. We also apply our model to the case involving large network externalities, where the monopolist exclusively sells products to consumers who constitute a maximum independent set.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":50145,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Mathematical Economics","volume":"118 ","pages":"Article 103105"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2025-03-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143683355","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
A Tarski–Kantorovich theorem for correspondences 对应的一个Tarski-Kantorovich定理
IF 1 4区 经济学
Journal of Mathematical Economics Pub Date : 2025-03-08 DOI: 10.1016/j.jmateco.2025.103106
Łukasz Balbus , Wojciech Olszewski , Kevin Reffett , Łukasz Woźny
{"title":"A Tarski–Kantorovich theorem for correspondences","authors":"Łukasz Balbus ,&nbsp;Wojciech Olszewski ,&nbsp;Kevin Reffett ,&nbsp;Łukasz Woźny","doi":"10.1016/j.jmateco.2025.103106","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jmateco.2025.103106","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>For a weakly monotone (resp., strongly monotone) upper order hemicontinuous correspondence <span><math><mrow><mi>F</mi><mo>:</mo><mi>A</mi><mo>⇉</mo><mi>A</mi></mrow></math></span>, where <span><math><mi>A</mi></math></span> is a complete lattice (resp., a <span><math><mi>σ</mi></math></span>-complete lattice), we provide tight fixed-point bounds for sufficiently large iterations <span><math><mrow><msup><mrow><mi>F</mi></mrow><mrow><mi>k</mi></mrow></msup><mrow><mo>(</mo><msup><mrow><mi>a</mi></mrow><mrow><mn>0</mn></mrow></msup><mo>)</mo></mrow></mrow></math></span>, starting from any point <span><math><mrow><msup><mrow><mi>a</mi></mrow><mrow><mn>0</mn></mrow></msup><mo>∈</mo><mi>A</mi></mrow></math></span>. Our results, hence, prove a generalization of the Tarski–Kantorovich theorem. We provide an application of our results to a class of social learning models on networks.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":50145,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Mathematical Economics","volume":"118 ","pages":"Article 103106"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2025-03-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143629117","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
The economic and policy consequences of carbon emissions 碳排放的经济和政策后果
IF 1 4区 经济学
Journal of Mathematical Economics Pub Date : 2025-02-28 DOI: 10.1016/j.jmateco.2025.103103
Weizhen Meng , Tuyue Chen , Jinqiang Yang
{"title":"The economic and policy consequences of carbon emissions","authors":"Weizhen Meng ,&nbsp;Tuyue Chen ,&nbsp;Jinqiang Yang","doi":"10.1016/j.jmateco.2025.103103","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jmateco.2025.103103","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>Carbon emissions are increasingly being recognized as a threat to economic well-being. This paper incorporates the carbon cycle into a general equilibrium model to study the asset pricing implications of the interaction between carbon emissions and mitigation policies. Our findings suggest that the accumulation of carbon stocks stimulates mitigation spending, reduces consumption, harms welfare, lowers the risk-free rate, and elevates the risk premium. Furthermore, we propose a framework for policy analysis that includes calculating the social cost of carbon (SCC) and the willingness to pay (WTP). Additionally, results show the complex impacts of carbon dynamics on the risk-free rate. Specifically, higher carbon decay rates and the economic damage caused by carbon increase the risk-free rate, while carbon volatility risk lowers it. Moreover, convex damage functions can reverse the trend of the risk-free rate, causing it to rise with carbon stock.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":50145,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Mathematical Economics","volume":"117 ","pages":"Article 103103"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2025-02-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143526768","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
A globally convergent alternating one-track auction for gross substitutes and complements 对总替代品和互补品进行全球趋同的单轨交替拍卖
IF 1 4区 经济学
Journal of Mathematical Economics Pub Date : 2025-02-28 DOI: 10.1016/j.jmateco.2025.103102
Siqi Song , Chi Zhang
{"title":"A globally convergent alternating one-track auction for gross substitutes and complements","authors":"Siqi Song ,&nbsp;Chi Zhang","doi":"10.1016/j.jmateco.2025.103102","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jmateco.2025.103102","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>We propose a new globally convergent dynamic auction for selling multiple indivisible items. There are two finite and disjoint sets of items. Items in each set can be heterogeneous but are substitutes, and items across the two sets are complements. Each bidder may demand several items. In each round of the auction, every bidder reports his demand of items at the current prices and the auctioneer responds by either increasing prices or exclusively decreasing prices. We show that the auction converges globally to a Walrasian equilibrium.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":50145,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Mathematical Economics","volume":"118 ","pages":"Article 103102"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2025-02-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143552330","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Balancing inequality reduction against equality of liabilities in a taxation scheme 在税收计划中平衡减少不平等与平等负债之间的关系
IF 1 4区 经济学
Journal of Mathematical Economics Pub Date : 2025-02-28 DOI: 10.1016/j.jmateco.2025.103104
Satya R. Chakravarty , Palash Sarkar
{"title":"Balancing inequality reduction against equality of liabilities in a taxation scheme","authors":"Satya R. Chakravarty ,&nbsp;Palash Sarkar","doi":"10.1016/j.jmateco.2025.103104","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jmateco.2025.103104","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>This paper designs a taxation policy by maintaining a balance between post-tax income equality and equality of tax burdens. Analytically, the problem is formulated as a constrained optimisation problem achieving controlled trade-off between the equality in tax distribution and post-tax income equality. For the Gini and the Bonferroni indices, the optimisation problem becomes a linear programming problem (LPP). From a practical point of view, the LPP-based formulation provides a practical and effective computational tool based on an economic optimisation principle.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":50145,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Mathematical Economics","volume":"118 ","pages":"Article 103104"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2025-02-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143578305","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Economic growth with brown or green capital 棕色或绿色资本的经济增长
IF 1 4区 经济学
Journal of Mathematical Economics Pub Date : 2025-02-28 DOI: 10.1016/j.jmateco.2025.103101
Stefano Bosi , Cuong Le Van , Giang Phung
{"title":"Economic growth with brown or green capital","authors":"Stefano Bosi ,&nbsp;Cuong Le Van ,&nbsp;Giang Phung","doi":"10.1016/j.jmateco.2025.103101","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jmateco.2025.103101","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>We study a discrete-time growth model where capital affects the productivity of other firms and can therefore be “brown” or “green”. Brown inputs, decreasing productivity, are a negative externality, while green inputs, whether human or natural, increasing productivity, are a positive externality. We prove the existence of self-consistent externalities before the existence of a competitive equilibrium, and the occurrence of two-period cycles through bifurcation analysis. In particular, externalities lead to cycles: when negative, under dominant income effects; when positive, under dominant substitution effects.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":50145,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Mathematical Economics","volume":"117 ","pages":"Article 103101"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2025-02-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143528973","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Restricted dominant unanimity and social discounting 限制支配一致和社会折扣
IF 1 4区 经济学
Journal of Mathematical Economics Pub Date : 2025-02-14 DOI: 10.1016/j.jmateco.2025.103100
Bach Dong-Xuan , Xiangyu Qu
{"title":"Restricted dominant unanimity and social discounting","authors":"Bach Dong-Xuan ,&nbsp;Xiangyu Qu","doi":"10.1016/j.jmateco.2025.103100","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jmateco.2025.103100","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>This paper addresses the intricate challenge of establishing social discount rates across far-reaching generations, particularly in the face of divergent social viewpoints. We introduce several principles related to <em>Dominant Unanimity</em>, which enable non-dictatorial social discounting, and we characterize different ranges of social discount factors based on individual one-period discount factors. Our findings suggest that societies adhering to these principles exhibit varying degrees of patience and different ranges of social discounting. This approach provides theoretical pathways to enhance the consideration of distant future welfare, particularly in the context of long-term economic activities and policies.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":50145,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Mathematical Economics","volume":"117 ","pages":"Article 103100"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2025-02-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143422512","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Pareto efficiency and financial fairness under limited expected loss constraint 有限预期损失约束下的帕累托效率与财务公平
IF 1 4区 经济学
Journal of Mathematical Economics Pub Date : 2025-02-10 DOI: 10.1016/j.jmateco.2025.103096
Tak Wa Ng, Thai Nguyen
{"title":"Pareto efficiency and financial fairness under limited expected loss constraint","authors":"Tak Wa Ng,&nbsp;Thai Nguyen","doi":"10.1016/j.jmateco.2025.103096","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jmateco.2025.103096","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>This paper investigates the Pareto efficiency and financial fairness in a collective asset allocation under a limited expected loss (LEL) constraint. By studying a constrained collective optimization problem, we characterize a constrained version of Pareto optimality, named LEL-Pareto optimality, within the admissible class of sharing rules. We propose a novel sharing rule, referred to as the LEL sharing rule, as an alternative to widely used proportional sharing rules. We rigorously demonstrate that every LEL sharing rule is LEL-Pareto-optimal and vice versa, thereby establishing a novel Borch-like criterion in a risk-constrained setting. Under the financial fairness condition, we derive a unique LEL sharing rule through a fixed-point iteration scheme by solving a highly non-linear system of Lagrange multipliers related to LEL-constrained optimization for collective utility and the financial fairness condition. Under mild conditions, we achieve global convergence and establish the existence of a unique fixed point of the iterative algorithm. Our numerical analysis affirms the theoretical findings and underscores the positive influence of the LEL constraint among prevalent proportional sharing rules, emphasizing the importance of risk control in practical scenarios.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":50145,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Mathematical Economics","volume":"117 ","pages":"Article 103096"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2025-02-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143394519","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Axiomatic and strategic justifications of the connected equal splitting rule in the reordering problem 重排序问题中连通相等分裂规则的公理化和策略论证
IF 1 4区 经济学
Journal of Mathematical Economics Pub Date : 2025-02-08 DOI: 10.1016/j.jmateco.2025.103095
Min-Hung Tsay , Chun-Hsien Yeh , Youngsub Chun
{"title":"Axiomatic and strategic justifications of the connected equal splitting rule in the reordering problem","authors":"Min-Hung Tsay ,&nbsp;Chun-Hsien Yeh ,&nbsp;Youngsub Chun","doi":"10.1016/j.jmateco.2025.103095","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jmateco.2025.103095","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>We consider the “reordering problem”, in which agents need to be reordered from an initial queue to be served in a facility which handles only one agent at a time. Agents differ in their unit waiting costs and the amounts of service time needed to process their jobs. We adopt both axiomatic and strategic approaches to study the connected equal splitting rule. This rule selects an efficient reordering of the initial queue and allocates the cost savings obtained after reordering the positions of any two agents equally among themselves and all agents initially positioned between them. We introduce the property of <em>balanced reduction of agents</em>, which requires that the effect of one agent dropping out of the reordering process on the net utility of another agent should be equal for any two agents when no two agents are allowed to exchange their positions in the initial queue without permission from all the agents between them. As we show, the connected equal splitting rule is the only rule that satisfies <em>efficiency</em>, <em>budget balance</em>, <em>Pareto indifference</em>, and <em>balanced reduction of agents</em>. Furthermore, we introduce an extensive-form game with finite rounds exploiting <em>balanced reduction of agents</em> to strategically implement the rule in a subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":50145,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Mathematical Economics","volume":"117 ","pages":"Article 103095"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2025-02-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143422511","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
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