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Belief aggregation, updating and dynamic collective choice 信念聚合、更新和动态集体选择
IF 1 4区 经济学
Journal of Mathematical Economics Pub Date : 2024-08-30 DOI: 10.1016/j.jmateco.2024.103050
Takashi Hayashi
{"title":"Belief aggregation, updating and dynamic collective choice","authors":"Takashi Hayashi","doi":"10.1016/j.jmateco.2024.103050","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jmateco.2024.103050","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>This paper decision-theoretically investigates the belief aggregation method which allows consistently updating the aggregate belief.</p><p>After confirming that the Pareto axiom and dynamic consistency require the decision power of an individual to evolve proportionally to how much his/her prior has been successful, we propose a weaker Pareto axiom that applies only to one-step-ahead uncertainties and puts no restriction on how the decision powers should evolve.</p><p>We show in the binary tree domain that taking the median belief satisfies the proposed axiom, even full ex-ante efficiency under a single-crossing condition and that dynamic voting implements it.</p><p>Finally, we investigate the role of ambiguity aversion.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":50145,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Mathematical Economics","volume":"115 ","pages":"Article 103050"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2024-08-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0304406824001101/pdfft?md5=d20c2ed3297386bb0b50f228d2988aee&pid=1-s2.0-S0304406824001101-main.pdf","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142121904","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Fair and efficient allocations when preferences are single-dipped 偏好单一时的公平高效分配
IF 1 4区 经济学
Journal of Mathematical Economics Pub Date : 2024-08-26 DOI: 10.1016/j.jmateco.2024.103048
Bas Dietzenbacher , Yuki Tamura
{"title":"Fair and efficient allocations when preferences are single-dipped","authors":"Bas Dietzenbacher ,&nbsp;Yuki Tamura","doi":"10.1016/j.jmateco.2024.103048","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jmateco.2024.103048","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>One unit of an infinitely divisible and non-disposable commodity has to be allocated among a group of agents with single-dipped preferences. We combine Pareto optimality with equal treatment of equals, the equal division lower bound, the equal division core, envy-freeness, and group envy-freeness. For each of these fairness requirements, we provide a necessary and sufficient condition for compatibility with Pareto optimality and we characterize all corresponding allocations for each preference profile.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":50145,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Mathematical Economics","volume":"115 ","pages":"Article 103048"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2024-08-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0304406824001083/pdfft?md5=7b1573863842cac7b10fbcacfdbc43be&pid=1-s2.0-S0304406824001083-main.pdf","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142121905","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Signaling under double-crossing preferences: The case of discrete types 双重交叉偏好下的信号传递：离散类型的情况
IF 1 4区 经济学
Journal of Mathematical Economics Pub Date : 2024-08-22 DOI: 10.1016/j.jmateco.2024.103046
Chia-Hui Chen , Junichiro Ishida , Wing Suen
{"title":"Signaling under double-crossing preferences: The case of discrete types","authors":"Chia-Hui Chen ,&nbsp;Junichiro Ishida ,&nbsp;Wing Suen","doi":"10.1016/j.jmateco.2024.103046","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jmateco.2024.103046","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>The class of double-crossing preferences, where signaling is cheaper for higher types than for lower types at low signaling levels and the opposite is true at high signaling levels, underlines the phenomenon of countersignaling, with intermediate types choosing higher actions than higher and lower types. We provide an algorithm to systematically construct an equilibrium and thus establish equilibrium existence for this general class of preferences with an arbitrary discrete-type distribution. Our analysis sheds light on the connection between discrete-type and continuous-type models and clarifies robust predictions of signaling under double-crossing preferences.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":50145,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Mathematical Economics","volume":"114 ","pages":"Article 103046"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2024-08-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S030440682400106X/pdfft?md5=e637f538ddfe1d002f4c77d97bcfcf8b&pid=1-s2.0-S030440682400106X-main.pdf","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142083510","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Bureaucracy in quest of feasibility 追求可行性的官僚主义
IF 1 4区 经济学
Journal of Mathematical Economics Pub Date : 2024-08-15 DOI: 10.1016/j.jmateco.2024.103047
Hervé Crès , Itzhak Gilboa , Nicolas Vieille
{"title":"Bureaucracy in quest of feasibility","authors":"Hervé Crès ,&nbsp;Itzhak Gilboa ,&nbsp;Nicolas Vieille","doi":"10.1016/j.jmateco.2024.103047","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jmateco.2024.103047","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>A bureaucracy has to determine the values of many decision variables while satisfying a set of constraints. The bureaucracy is not assumed to have any objective function beyond achieving a feasible solution, which can be viewed as “satisficing” à la Simon (1955). We assume that the variables are integer-valued and the constraints are linear. We show that simple and (arguably) natural versions of the problem are already NP-Hard. We therefore look at decentralized decisions, where each office controls but one decision variable and can determine its value as a function of its past values. However, an attempt to consult more than a single past case can lead to Condorcet-style consistency problems. We prove an Arrovian result, showing that, under certain conditions, feasibility is guaranteed only if all offices mimic their decisions in the same past case. This result can be viewed as explaining a status quo bias.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":50145,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Mathematical Economics","volume":"114 ","pages":"Article 103047"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2024-08-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142049048","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Robust α-maxmin representations 稳健的α-最大最小表示法
IF 1 4区 经济学
Journal of Mathematical Economics Pub Date : 2024-08-10 DOI: 10.1016/j.jmateco.2024.103045
Alain Chateauneuf , Xiangyu Qu , Caroline Ventura , Vassili Vergopoulos
{"title":"Robust α-maxmin representations","authors":"Alain Chateauneuf ,&nbsp;Xiangyu Qu ,&nbsp;Caroline Ventura ,&nbsp;Vassili Vergopoulos","doi":"10.1016/j.jmateco.2024.103045","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jmateco.2024.103045","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>The class of <span><math><mi>α</mi></math></span>-maxmin representations of an agent’s preferences is meant to achieve a separation between the ambiguity he perceives and his attitude toward this perceived ambiguity. Yet the same preferences may admit a multiplicity of <span><math><mi>α</mi></math></span>-maxmin representations that contradict each other. We say that an <span><math><mi>α</mi></math></span>-maxmin representation is robust when no other <span><math><mi>α</mi></math></span>-maxmin representation exists for the same preferences. We obtain a full characterization of robustness for maxmin representation. In the case of general <span><math><mi>α</mi></math></span>-maxmin representations, we obtain sufficient conditions for both robustness and non-robustness. This contributes to better identification of the <span><math><mi>α</mi></math></span>-maxmin representations that admit a robust interpretation in terms of perceived ambiguity and ambiguity attitudes.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":50145,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Mathematical Economics","volume":"114 ","pages":"Article 103045"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2024-08-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141984954","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
“Subjectivity and correlation in randomized strategies”: Back to the roots "随机策略中的主观性和相关性"：回归本源
IF 1 4区 经济学
Journal of Mathematical Economics Pub Date : 2024-08-06 DOI: 10.1016/j.jmateco.2024.103044
Françoise Forges , Indrajit Ray
{"title":"“Subjectivity and correlation in randomized strategies”: Back to the roots","authors":"Françoise Forges ,&nbsp;Indrajit Ray","doi":"10.1016/j.jmateco.2024.103044","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jmateco.2024.103044","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>The very first paper published in the <em>Journal of Mathematical Economics</em>, “Subjectivity and correlation in randomized strategies”, by Aumann, proposes a new approach to strategic form games by taking account of an extraneous space of states of the world, on which every player has a subjective probability distribution and private information. We review some of Aumann’s results as well as some properties and extensions of the best known by-product of his seminal paper, the “correlated equilibrium”.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":50145,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Mathematical Economics","volume":"114 ","pages":"Article 103044"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2024-08-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0304406824001046/pdfft?md5=28b5b51d86c1ca1a905eae7f0312bcb2&pid=1-s2.0-S0304406824001046-main.pdf","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141979731","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Equilibrium analysis in majority-based coalitional bargaining games 基于多数的联合讨价还价博弈中的均衡分析
IF 1 4区 经济学
Journal of Mathematical Economics Pub Date : 2024-07-30 DOI: 10.1016/j.jmateco.2024.103043
Guangjing Yang , Hao Sun
{"title":"Equilibrium analysis in majority-based coalitional bargaining games","authors":"Guangjing Yang ,&nbsp;Hao Sun","doi":"10.1016/j.jmateco.2024.103043","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jmateco.2024.103043","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>This paper introduces majority rule into coalitional bargaining games, adapting traditional models that rely on unanimous consent to more accurately mirror decision-making processes in real-world scenarios. We introduce a majority-based coalitional bargaining game (MBCBG), wherein coalitions pass proposals via majority votes. Our analysis of the stationary subgame perfect equilibrium (SSPE) not only establishes the necessary and sufficient conditions for SSPE strategy profiles but also confirms the existence of no-delay SSPEs in MBCBGs. We further delve into symmetric MBCBGs, delineating conditions that ensure equitable outcomes for homogeneous players. Furthermore, we provide a necessary and sufficient condition for the formation of the grand coalition under SSPEs. Additionally, we briefly explore how asymmetries in coalition values, proposal probabilities, and voting weights may influence both the dynamics of coalition formation and the expected equilibrium payoffs.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":50145,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Mathematical Economics","volume":"114 ","pages":"Article 103043"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2024-07-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141929891","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
The role of information in auctions 信息在拍卖中的作用
IF 1 4区 经济学
Journal of Mathematical Economics Pub Date : 2024-07-25 DOI: 10.1016/j.jmateco.2024.103027
Alp E. Atakan , Mehmet Ekmekci
{"title":"The role of information in auctions","authors":"Alp E. Atakan ,&nbsp;Mehmet Ekmekci","doi":"10.1016/j.jmateco.2024.103027","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jmateco.2024.103027","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>This review discusses the seminal contributions of Engelbrecht-Wiggans et al. (1983) Milgrom and Weber (1982a) to the literature that studies the role of information in auctions. We describe the results in these papers and present several extensions. Much of the earlier literature on auctions takes the information environment as exogenous. The extensions that we present will demonstrate how the insights of Engelbrecht-Wiggans et al. (1983) and Milgrom and Weber (1982a) apply to the more recent literature on flexible information acquisition in auctions where the information structure is endogenously determined in equilibrium.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":50145,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Mathematical Economics","volume":"114 ","pages":"Article 103027"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2024-07-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0304406824000879/pdfft?md5=52f2a8ccb0dae0ab12f5ca1df6959fd1&pid=1-s2.0-S0304406824000879-main.pdf","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141851788","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
An even tighter bound for the Shapley–Folkman–Starr theorem 沙普利-福克曼-斯塔尔定理的更严格约束
IF 1 4区 经济学
Journal of Mathematical Economics Pub Date : 2024-07-24 DOI: 10.1016/j.jmateco.2024.103028
Haoyu Wu , Ao Tang
{"title":"An even tighter bound for the Shapley–Folkman–Starr theorem","authors":"Haoyu Wu ,&nbsp;Ao Tang","doi":"10.1016/j.jmateco.2024.103028","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jmateco.2024.103028","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>Based on a previous refined Shapley–Folkman lemma, we derive a tighter error bound for the Shapley–Folkman–Starr theorem and apply the result to the course allocation problem.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":50145,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Mathematical Economics","volume":"114 ","pages":"Article 103028"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2024-07-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141842185","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
The on-line transfer rule for queueing with arrivals 有到达者排队的在线转移规则
IF 1 4区 经济学
Journal of Mathematical Economics Pub Date : 2024-07-20 DOI: 10.1016/j.jmateco.2024.103026
Changyong Han , Youngsub Chun , Manipushpak Mitra , Suresh Mutuswami
{"title":"The on-line transfer rule for queueing with arrivals","authors":"Changyong Han ,&nbsp;Youngsub Chun ,&nbsp;Manipushpak Mitra ,&nbsp;Suresh Mutuswami","doi":"10.1016/j.jmateco.2024.103026","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jmateco.2024.103026","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>We consider the queueing problem with arrivals, or the arrival queueing problem, where agents arrive at different (time) slots to process their jobs in a service facility and each job requires the same amount of processing time which is normalized to one. Each agent has one job to process and the facility can process only one job at each slot. We introduce a rule for the arrival queueing problem, which we call the <em>on-line transfer rule,</em> by adapting the minimal transfer rule of the static queueing problem (Maniquet, 2003) but incorporating the time span which each agent observes. We provide axiomatic characterizations of the on-line transfer rule by imposing the axioms of <em>efficiency, Pareto indifference, equal treatment of equals, independence of larger costs,</em> and <em>consistency from later-arrived-later-served agents</em>. We also introduce and characterize an alternative rule for the arrival queueing problem which adapts the maximal transfer rule of the static queueing problem (Chun, 2006a).</p></div>","PeriodicalId":50145,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Mathematical Economics","volume":"114 ","pages":"Article 103026"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2024-07-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141847702","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
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