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Axiomatic and strategic justifications of the connected equal splitting rule in the reordering problem
IF 1 4区 经济学
Journal of Mathematical Economics Pub Date : 2025-02-08 DOI: 10.1016/j.jmateco.2025.103095
Min-Hung Tsay , Chun-Hsien Yeh , Youngsub Chun
{"title":"Axiomatic and strategic justifications of the connected equal splitting rule in the reordering problem","authors":"Min-Hung Tsay ,&nbsp;Chun-Hsien Yeh ,&nbsp;Youngsub Chun","doi":"10.1016/j.jmateco.2025.103095","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jmateco.2025.103095","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>We consider the “reordering problem”, in which agents need to be reordered from an initial queue to be served in a facility which handles only one agent at a time. Agents differ in their unit waiting costs and the amounts of service time needed to process their jobs. We adopt both axiomatic and strategic approaches to study the connected equal splitting rule. This rule selects an efficient reordering of the initial queue and allocates the cost savings obtained after reordering the positions of any two agents equally among themselves and all agents initially positioned between them. We introduce the property of <em>balanced reduction of agents</em>, which requires that the effect of one agent dropping out of the reordering process on the net utility of another agent should be equal for any two agents when no two agents are allowed to exchange their positions in the initial queue without permission from all the agents between them. As we show, the connected equal splitting rule is the only rule that satisfies <em>efficiency</em>, <em>budget balance</em>, <em>Pareto indifference</em>, and <em>balanced reduction of agents</em>. Furthermore, we introduce an extensive-form game with finite rounds exploiting <em>balanced reduction of agents</em> to strategically implement the rule in a subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":50145,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Mathematical Economics","volume":"117 ","pages":"Article 103095"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2025-02-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143422511","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Equilibrium convergence in large games
IF 1 4区 经济学
Journal of Mathematical Economics Pub Date : 2025-02-07 DOI: 10.1016/j.jmateco.2025.103097
Enxian Chen , Bin Wu , Hanping Xu
{"title":"Equilibrium convergence in large games","authors":"Enxian Chen ,&nbsp;Bin Wu ,&nbsp;Hanping Xu","doi":"10.1016/j.jmateco.2025.103097","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jmateco.2025.103097","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>This paper presents a general closed graph property for (randomized strategy) Nash equilibrium correspondence in large games. In particular, we show that for any large game with a convergent sequence of finite-player games, the limit of any convergent sequence of Nash equilibria of the corresponding finite-player games can be induced by a Nash equilibrium of the large game. Such a result goes beyond earlier results on the closed graph property for pure strategy Nash equilibrium correspondence in large games in multiple aspects. An application on equilibrium selection in large games is also presented.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":50145,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Mathematical Economics","volume":"117 ","pages":"Article 103097"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2025-02-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143387425","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
On progressive tax systems with heterogeneous preferences
IF 1 4区 经济学
Journal of Mathematical Economics Pub Date : 2025-02-06 DOI: 10.1016/j.jmateco.2025.103098
Oriol Carbonell-Nicolau
{"title":"On progressive tax systems with heterogeneous preferences","authors":"Oriol Carbonell-Nicolau","doi":"10.1016/j.jmateco.2025.103098","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jmateco.2025.103098","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>The properties of progressive income tax systems vis-à-vis standard measures of inequality and polarization have been studied elsewhere, both for economies with exogenous and endogenous income. In the case of endogenous income, preferences are assumed to be identical across consumers. This paper relaxes the preference homogeneity assumption. Using the relative Lorenz inequality order and the relative Foster–Wolfson bipolarization order, we show that income tax systems reduce both inequality and polarization — no matter what the economy’s initial conditions are — only if they are progressive. Furthermore, we identify specific conditions related to heterogeneous consumer preferences under which progressive tax systems effectively mitigate inequality and polarization.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":50145,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Mathematical Economics","volume":"117 ","pages":"Article 103098"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2025-02-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143394520","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Why do migrants stay unexpectedly? Misperceptions and implications for integration
IF 1 4区 经济学
Journal of Mathematical Economics Pub Date : 2025-02-05 DOI: 10.1016/j.jmateco.2025.103099
Marc Kaufmann , Joël Machado , Bertrand Verheyden
{"title":"Why do migrants stay unexpectedly? Misperceptions and implications for integration","authors":"Marc Kaufmann ,&nbsp;Joël Machado ,&nbsp;Bertrand Verheyden","doi":"10.1016/j.jmateco.2025.103099","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jmateco.2025.103099","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>Empirical evidence suggests that the majority of immigrants who initially planned a temporary stay end up staying permanently in the host country. Since beliefs about the duration of stay are a strong determinant of integration, many long-term migrants may end up less than optimally integrated. We theoretically model migrants with potential misperceptions about their future utility and wage prospects in the host country relative to their country of origin. We describe conditions under which these misperceptions generate, and conditions on observables that identify, unexpected staying. These conditions involve pessimism about the endogenous long-term wage for which migrants are indifferent between staying and leaving: either they overestimate the probability of earning less than this indifference wage, or they underestimate their utility in the destination country when earning this wage. Using the German Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP), we find that higher levels of pessimism about utility and wages at arrival are associated with staying in the long-term in Germany despite having initially predicted a temporary stay.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":50145,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Mathematical Economics","volume":"117 ","pages":"Article 103099"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2025-02-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143379330","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Cycle conditions for “Luce rationality”
IF 1 4区 经济学
Journal of Mathematical Economics Pub Date : 2025-02-01 DOI: 10.1016/j.jmateco.2025.103094
José A. Rodrigues-Neto , Matthew Ryan , James Taylor
{"title":"Cycle conditions for “Luce rationality”","authors":"José A. Rodrigues-Neto ,&nbsp;Matthew Ryan ,&nbsp;James Taylor","doi":"10.1016/j.jmateco.2025.103094","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jmateco.2025.103094","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>We extend and refine conditions for “Luce rationality” (i.e., the existence of a Luce – or logit – model) in the context of stochastic choice. When choice probabilities satisfy <em>positivity</em>, the <em>cyclical independence (CI)</em> condition of Ahumada and Ülkü (2018) and Echenique and Saito (2019) is necessary and sufficient for Luce rationality, even if choice is only observed for a restricted set of menus. We adapt results from the <em>cycles approach</em> (Rodrigues-Neto, 2009) to the common prior problem Harsanyi (1967–1968) to refine the CI condition, by reducing the number of cycle equations that need to be checked. A general algorithm is provided to identify a minimal sufficient set of equations. Three cases are discussed in detail: (i) when choice is only observed from binary menus, (ii) when all menus contain a common default; and (iii) when all menus contain an element from a common binary default set. Investigation of case (i) leads to a refinement of the famous product rule.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":50145,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Mathematical Economics","volume":"117 ","pages":"Article 103094"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2025-02-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143349149","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
How to build and solve continuous-time heterogeneous agents models in asset pricing? The martingale approach and the finite difference method
IF 1 4区 经济学
Journal of Mathematical Economics Pub Date : 2025-02-01 DOI: 10.1016/j.jmateco.2024.103078
Hamilton Galindo Gil
{"title":"How to build and solve continuous-time heterogeneous agents models in asset pricing? The martingale approach and the finite difference method","authors":"Hamilton Galindo Gil","doi":"10.1016/j.jmateco.2024.103078","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jmateco.2024.103078","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>This paper serves as a tutorial, offering a step-by-step guide for building and numerically solving a preference-heterogeneous agent model in asset pricing. Using a three-stage framework, we clarify the modeling and solution process through a detailed example. Within this framework, we demonstrate how to apply the finite difference method with implicit and upwind schemes to solve the partial differential equation for stock prices, thereby deriving the optimal portfolio, equilibrium asset prices, and their volatility. Additionally, we explore other contexts where this numerical method can be applied, including models with preference heterogeneity using dynamic programming, external habits, and incomplete markets with income heterogeneity and recursive utility. We also address practical considerations in its implementation. This paper does not cover models that incorporate both aggregate and idiosyncratic risks.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":50145,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Mathematical Economics","volume":"116 ","pages":"Article 103078"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2025-02-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143144445","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
A partial-state space model of unawareness
IF 1 4区 经济学
Journal of Mathematical Economics Pub Date : 2025-02-01 DOI: 10.1016/j.jmateco.2024.103081
Wesley H. Holliday
{"title":"A partial-state space model of unawareness","authors":"Wesley H. Holliday","doi":"10.1016/j.jmateco.2024.103081","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jmateco.2024.103081","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>We propose a model of unawareness that remains close to the paradigm of Aumann’s (1999a) model for knowledge: just as Aumann uses a correspondence on a state space to define an agent’s knowledge operator on events, we use a correspondence on a state space to define an agent’s awareness operator on events. This is made possible by three ideas. First, like the model of Heifetz, Meier, and Schipper (2006), ours is based on a space of partial specifications of the world, partially ordered by a relation of further specification or refinement, and the idea that agents may be aware of some coarser-grained specifications while unaware of some finer-grained specifications; however, our model is based on a different implementation of this idea, related to forcing in set theory. Second, we depart from a tradition in the literature, initiated by Modica and Rustichini (1994) and adopted by Heifetz et al. and Li (2009), of taking awareness to be definable in terms of knowledge. Third, we show that the negative conclusion of a well-known impossibility theorem concerning unawareness due to Dekel, Lipman, and Rustichini (1998) can be escaped by a slight weakening of a key axiom. Together these points demonstrate that a correspondence on a partial-state space is sufficient to model unawareness of events. Indeed, we prove a representation theorem showing that any abstract Boolean algebra equipped with awareness, knowledge, and belief operators satisfying some plausible axioms is representable as the algebra of events arising from a partial-state space with awareness, knowledge, and belief correspondences.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":50145,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Mathematical Economics","volume":"116 ","pages":"Article 103081"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2025-02-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143144448","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Characterizing the feasible payoff set of OLG repeated games
IF 1 4区 经济学
Journal of Mathematical Economics Pub Date : 2025-02-01 DOI: 10.1016/j.jmateco.2024.103082
Daehyun Kim , Chihiro Morooka
{"title":"Characterizing the feasible payoff set of OLG repeated games","authors":"Daehyun Kim ,&nbsp;Chihiro Morooka","doi":"10.1016/j.jmateco.2024.103082","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jmateco.2024.103082","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>We study the set of (stationary) feasible payoffs of overlapping generation repeated games that can be achieved by action sequences in which every generation of players plays the same sequence of action profiles. First, we completely characterize the set of feasible payoffs given any fixed discount factor of players and the length of interaction. This allows us to obtain the feasible payoff set in closed form. Second, we provide novel comparative statics of the feasible payoff set with respect to the discount factor and the length of interaction. Interestingly, the feasible payoff set becomes <em>smaller</em> as players’ discount factor becomes larger. Additionally, we identify a necessary and sufficient condition for this monotonicity to be strict.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":50145,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Mathematical Economics","volume":"116 ","pages":"Article 103082"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2025-02-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143144444","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Quality and price in scoring auctions
IF 1 4区 经济学
Journal of Mathematical Economics Pub Date : 2025-02-01 DOI: 10.1016/j.jmateco.2024.103083
Yu Awaya , Naoki Fujiwara , Marton Szabo
{"title":"Quality and price in scoring auctions","authors":"Yu Awaya ,&nbsp;Naoki Fujiwara ,&nbsp;Marton Szabo","doi":"10.1016/j.jmateco.2024.103083","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jmateco.2024.103083","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>Currently, many governments utilize scoring auctions, a format in which bidders submit both price and quality proposals. The objective is to secure high-quality procurement, even if it results in a higher price. In this paper, we theoretically confirm this trade-off. We compare scoring auctions to traditional auction formats, where the auctioneer first optimally selects the quality, followed by bidders submitting price bids. Our primary result identifies the conditions under which scoring auctions lead to higher quality, albeit at an increased price.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":50145,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Mathematical Economics","volume":"116 ","pages":"Article 103083"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2025-02-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143144446","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
How confidence heterogeneity shapes effort and performance in tournaments and contests
IF 1 4区 经济学
Journal of Mathematical Economics Pub Date : 2025-02-01 DOI: 10.1016/j.jmateco.2024.103069
Luís Santos-Pinto , Petros G. Sekeris
{"title":"How confidence heterogeneity shapes effort and performance in tournaments and contests","authors":"Luís Santos-Pinto ,&nbsp;Petros G. Sekeris","doi":"10.1016/j.jmateco.2024.103069","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jmateco.2024.103069","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>This paper studies how heterogeneity in confidence biases affects players’ relative effort provision in tournaments and contests. We uncover a non-monotonic effect of confidence on equilibrium relative efforts and winning probabilities. A player with either a low or a high confidence exerts less effort than his rival at equilibrium. However, for intermediate confidence levels, the player exerts more effort than his rival.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":50145,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Mathematical Economics","volume":"116 ","pages":"Article 103069"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2025-02-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143144960","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
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