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Self-consistency for multi-valued solutions and reasonable outcomes 多值解的自洽性和合理结果
IF 0.7 4区 经济学
Journal of Mathematical Economics Pub Date : 2025-08-26 DOI: 10.1016/j.jmateco.2025.103171
Pedro Calleja , Francesc Llerena , Peter Sudhölter
{"title":"Self-consistency for multi-valued solutions and reasonable outcomes","authors":"Pedro Calleja ,&nbsp;Francesc Llerena ,&nbsp;Peter Sudhölter","doi":"10.1016/j.jmateco.2025.103171","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jmateco.2025.103171","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>We explore the compatibility of <em>uniform self-consistency</em> and <em>ordinary self-consistency</em>, two extensions for handling multi-valued solutions within the consistency principle introduced by Hart and Mas-Colell (1989), with basic properties, such as <em>reasonableness</em>, which establishes bounds for payoffs based on the marginality principle. Our analysis focuses on convex games and balanced games through the study of almost positive games, a subset of convex games that plays a crucial role in the vector lattice structure of games. Further, we provide new axiomatic foundations of the core incorporating these consistency properties.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":50145,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Mathematical Economics","volume":"120 ","pages":"Article 103171"},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2025-08-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144911987","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Decomposability and the social comparison trap 分解性和社会比较陷阱
IF 0.7 4区 经济学
Journal of Mathematical Economics Pub Date : 2025-08-22 DOI: 10.1016/j.jmateco.2025.103169
Zhiwei Cui , Xueheng Li , Boyu Zhang
{"title":"Decomposability and the social comparison trap","authors":"Zhiwei Cui ,&nbsp;Xueheng Li ,&nbsp;Boyu Zhang","doi":"10.1016/j.jmateco.2025.103169","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jmateco.2025.103169","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>We propose a unified and tractable model for social comparison preferences that nests competitive motives and imperfect inequality aversion as special cases. We identify a key property called decomposability and show that players are strategically independent in decomposable games under social comparison preferences, yielding a generically unique solution in every decomposable game. The class of decomposable games is broad, including every 2 × 2 symmetric game as well as multi-player, multi-strategy games such as the minimum effort game, public goods game, and tragedy of the commons. Using this characterization, we show that social comparison often results in undesirable outcomes, sometimes worse than any outcome that would arise if all players were material payoff maximizers.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":50145,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Mathematical Economics","volume":"120 ","pages":"Article 103169"},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2025-08-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144908718","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Entrant-optimal learning in a contest game 竞赛游戏中的参赛者最优学习
IF 0.7 4区 经济学
Journal of Mathematical Economics Pub Date : 2025-08-11 DOI: 10.1016/j.jmateco.2025.103157
Zeng Lian , Shuo Xu , Jie Zheng
{"title":"Entrant-optimal learning in a contest game","authors":"Zeng Lian ,&nbsp;Shuo Xu ,&nbsp;Jie Zheng","doi":"10.1016/j.jmateco.2025.103157","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jmateco.2025.103157","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>We consider a private value single-prize asymmetric information Tullock contest between an incumbent and an entrant. The incumbent’s prize value is common knowledge, whereas the entrant is uncertain about her value and strategically acquires information to learn about it before the contest. Inspired by Roesler and Szentes (2017), we study how the entrant’s endogenous learning influences strategic contest effort choices. The entrant faces a tradeoff between more uncertainty about her value and less intense competition. If the entrant’s value is ex ante weakly lower than the incumbent’s value, full learning is the optimal strategy. However, if the entrant’s value is ex ante the higher one, no learning can be more advantageous than full learning.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":50145,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Mathematical Economics","volume":"120 ","pages":"Article 103157"},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2025-08-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144863178","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Conditional hypothesis testing systems 条件假设检验系统
IF 0.7 4区 经济学
Journal of Mathematical Economics Pub Date : 2025-07-30 DOI: 10.1016/j.jmateco.2025.103156
Xiao Luo , Xuewen Qian
{"title":"Conditional hypothesis testing systems","authors":"Xiao Luo ,&nbsp;Xuewen Qian","doi":"10.1016/j.jmateco.2025.103156","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jmateco.2025.103156","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>We introduce the notion of a Conditional Hypothesis Testing System (CHTS) that specifies the concrete mode of non-Bayesian reactions to unexpected news in a conditional world. We show that Ortoleva’s (2012) Hypothesis Testing Model (HTM) has an alternative CHTS representation, and thus Ortoleva’s axioms also characterize CHTS. We demonstrate the concept of CHTS can be used to derive the conditional-probability-system expected utility model of Myerson (1986a). In addition, we formulate and show that the CHTS updating rule is order independent—i.e., the order of receiving uncontradictory information never influences the final posterior under the updating rule in all conditioning events. Our study sheds light on the (coherent) dynamic structure of HTM in all conditional worlds.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":50145,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Mathematical Economics","volume":"120 ","pages":"Article 103156"},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2025-07-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144830492","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Permutation-invariant social welfare orders are anonymous 排列不变的社会福利秩序是匿名的
IF 0.7 4区 经济学
Journal of Mathematical Economics Pub Date : 2025-07-26 DOI: 10.1016/j.jmateco.2025.103153
Jeremy Goodman
{"title":"Permutation-invariant social welfare orders are anonymous","authors":"Jeremy Goodman","doi":"10.1016/j.jmateco.2025.103153","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jmateco.2025.103153","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>We consider two widely discussed impartiality criteria for social welfare relations: Permutation Invariance, which says that every permutation of the population induces an automorphism of the relation, and Anonymity, which says that every permutation of the population induces a permutation that maps every social welfare distribution to one that is equally good. We show that these criteria are equivalent for social welfare orders (i.e., complete social welfare relations). The new result is that Permutation Invariance entails Anonymity for infinite populations. This is not a curiosity, as there are principled reasons (to do with upholding Pareto criteria) that have led many authors to reject Anonymity in favor of Permutation Invariance specifically in the case of infinite populations. A corollary of the present result is that such approaches are incompatible with the use of social welfare orders.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":50145,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Mathematical Economics","volume":"120 ","pages":"Article 103153"},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2025-07-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144780761","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Unknottedness of graphs of pairwise stable networks & network dynamics 两两稳定网络图的解结性&网络动力学
IF 1 4区 经济学
Journal of Mathematical Economics Pub Date : 2025-07-14 DOI: 10.1016/j.jmateco.2025.103155
Julien Fixary
{"title":"Unknottedness of graphs of pairwise stable networks & network dynamics","authors":"Julien Fixary","doi":"10.1016/j.jmateco.2025.103155","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jmateco.2025.103155","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>We extend Bich–Fixary’s topological structure theorem about graphs of pairwise stable networks. Specifically, we show that certain graphs of pairwise stable networks are not only homeomorphic to their underlying space of societies but are, in fact, ambient isotopic to a trivial copy of this space. This result aligns with Demichelis–Germano’s unknottedness theorem and Predtetchinski’s unknottedness theorem. Furthermore, we introduce the notion of network dynamics which refers to families of vector fields on the set of weighted networks whose zeros correspond to pairwise stable networks. We leverage our version of the unknottedness theorem to demonstrate that most network dynamics can be continuously connected to one another without introducing additional zeros. Finally, we show that this result has a significant consequence on the indices of these network dynamics at any pairwise stable network — a concept that we connect to genericity using Bich–Fixary’s oddness theorem.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":50145,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Mathematical Economics","volume":"120 ","pages":"Article 103155"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2025-07-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144680770","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Monotonicity in Ultimatum Bargaining 最后通牒议价中的单调性
IF 1 4区 经济学
Journal of Mathematical Economics Pub Date : 2025-07-13 DOI: 10.1016/j.jmateco.2025.103154
Jack Robles
{"title":"Monotonicity in Ultimatum Bargaining","authors":"Jack Robles","doi":"10.1016/j.jmateco.2025.103154","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jmateco.2025.103154","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>We study ultimatum bargaining games with asymmetric information regarding disagreement payoffs. Results from Mensch (2020a) are used to find conditions under which a monotonic Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium exists in these games. A standard single crossing assumption implies the existence when the action space is discrete. Stronger assumptions are required when continuum demands are allowed.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":50145,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Mathematical Economics","volume":"120 ","pages":"Article 103154"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2025-07-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144655237","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Overconfidence and moral hazard without commitment 没有承诺的过度自信和道德风险
IF 1 4区 经济学
Journal of Mathematical Economics Pub Date : 2025-07-01 DOI: 10.1016/j.jmateco.2025.103145
Leonidas Enrique de la Rosa, Nikolaj Niebuhr Lambertsen
{"title":"Overconfidence and moral hazard without commitment","authors":"Leonidas Enrique de la Rosa,&nbsp;Nikolaj Niebuhr Lambertsen","doi":"10.1016/j.jmateco.2025.103145","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jmateco.2025.103145","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>We examine the implications of overconfidence in a moral hazard setting with limited commitment. Limited commitment is costly because the principal will always renegotiate to the optimal risk-sharing contract after the agent chooses his effort level. This means that no effort level above the minimum can be implemented in pure strategies when the principal and the agent have homogeneous beliefs. With overconfidence, the optimal risk-sharing contract provides payments that increase in outcome to exploit the agent’s overconfidence. The agent anticipates the exploitative contract and willingly chooses higher than minimum effort in equilibrium. Providing the agent rent can increase the slope of the optimal risk-sharing contract and, therefore, expand the set of implementable effort levels. In a mixed-strategy equilibrium, overconfidence simultaneously decreases the risk in the second-best contract and increases the risk in the optimal risk-sharing contract, increasing the probability of high effort in equilibrium.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":50145,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Mathematical Economics","volume":"119 ","pages":"Article 103145"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2025-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144534984","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Revealed preference axioms for endogenous consideration set formation 揭示了内生考虑集形成的偏好公理
IF 1 4区 经济学
Journal of Mathematical Economics Pub Date : 2025-06-30 DOI: 10.1016/j.jmateco.2025.103152
Edward Honda , Lintao Ye
{"title":"Revealed preference axioms for endogenous consideration set formation","authors":"Edward Honda ,&nbsp;Lintao Ye","doi":"10.1016/j.jmateco.2025.103152","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jmateco.2025.103152","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>We consider a setting in which the consideration sets being formed by a decision maker are observable. We analyze the necessary and sufficient conditions under which the observed sets are consistent with endogenous consideration set formation. In particular, we rationalize the consideration sets as being optimally formed by a decision maker who faces costly attention and is forced to choose a subset of alternatives to pay attention to. We show that axioms similar to those from revealed preference theory allow us to do this. The most general model is characterized by a condition resembling the Strong Axiom applied on a domain of sets rather than individual alternatives. Since the idea of observable consideration sets seems realistic in a random choice framework in which we can interpret zero probability of being chosen as the alternative being omitted from the consideration set, we apply our result to this setting using the Logit model. This results in a representation theorem for a generalized version of the Logit model.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":50145,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Mathematical Economics","volume":"119 ","pages":"Article 103152"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2025-06-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144534985","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Discriminatory Search Deterrence 歧视性搜索威慑
IF 1 4区 经济学
Journal of Mathematical Economics Pub Date : 2025-06-26 DOI: 10.1016/j.jmateco.2025.103151
Hien Pham
{"title":"Discriminatory Search Deterrence","authors":"Hien Pham","doi":"10.1016/j.jmateco.2025.103151","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jmateco.2025.103151","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>If consumers can either costly acquire product information or make their purchase decision merely based on the information provided by the seller, how should the seller design her pricing and information policies? When the consumers’ search cost is publicly observed, it has been well-established that the seller’s optimal information provision fully deters the consumer from engaging in information acquisition. We show that this is, however, not necessarily true with privately observed search cost. Moreover, when consumers’ search cost is either relatively high or zero, we characterize the seller’s optimal menu of prices and information policies featuring discriminatory search deterrence levels.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":50145,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Mathematical Economics","volume":"119 ","pages":"Article 103151"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2025-06-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144511058","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
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