Journal of Mathematical Economics最新文献_第3页

Efficient reallocation of indivisible resources: Pair-efficiency versus Pareto-efficiency 不可分割资源的有效再分配：配对效率与帕累托效率

IF 1 4区经济学

Journal of Mathematical Economics Pub Date : 2025-06-14 DOI: 10.1016/j.jmateco.2025.103149

Pinaki Mandal

{"title":"Efficient reallocation of indivisible resources: Pair-efficiency versus Pareto-efficiency","authors":"Pinaki Mandal","doi":"10.1016/j.jmateco.2025.103149","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jmateco.2025.103149","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>In the object reallocation problem, achieving Pareto-efficiency is desirable, but may be too demanding for implementation purposes. In contrast, pair-efficiency, which is the minimal efficiency requirement, is more suitable. Despite being a significant relaxation, however, pair-efficiency ensures Pareto-efficiency for any strategy-proof and individually rational rule when agents’ preferences are unrestricted.</div><div>What if agents’ preferences have specific restricted structures, such as <em>single-peakedness</em> or <em>single-dippedness</em>? We often encounter such situations in real-world scenarios. This study aims to investigate whether pair-efficiency is sufficient to ensure Pareto-efficiency in such cases.</div><div>Our main contribution in this paper is establishing the equivalence between pair-efficiency and Pareto-efficiency when dealing with single-peaked or single-dipped preference profiles. This equivalence holds without needing to assume any other properties of the rule. We further show that both the single-peaked domain and the single-dipped domain are the “maximal” domains where this equivalence holds.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":50145,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Mathematical Economics","volume":"119 ","pages":"Article 103149"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2025-06-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144322567","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Cooperative TU-games: Dominance, stable sets, and the core revisited 合作式tu游戏：优势、稳定的组合和重新审视的核心

IF 1 4区经济学

Journal of Mathematical Economics Pub Date : 2025-06-10 DOI: 10.1016/j.jmateco.2025.103137

Begoña Subiza , José-Manuel Giménez-Gómez , Josep E. Peris

引用次数: 0

Aggregation of downside risk and portfolio selection 下行风险汇总和投资组合选择

IF 1 4区经济学

Journal of Mathematical Economics Pub Date : 2025-06-02 DOI: 10.1016/j.jmateco.2025.103138

Conrad Spanaus, Jan Wenzelburger

引用次数: 0

A scalable Bayesian persuasion framework for epidemic containment on heterogeneous networks 异构网络流行病控制的可扩展贝叶斯说服框架

IF 1 4区经济学

Journal of Mathematical Economics Pub Date : 2025-05-27 DOI: 10.1016/j.jmateco.2025.103134

Shraddha Pathak , Ankur A. Kulkarni

{"title":"A scalable Bayesian persuasion framework for epidemic containment on heterogeneous networks","authors":"Shraddha Pathak , Ankur A. Kulkarni","doi":"10.1016/j.jmateco.2025.103134","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jmateco.2025.103134","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>During an epidemic, the information available to individuals in the society deeply influences their belief of the true infectiousness of the disease, and thereby the preventive measures they take to stay safe from the infection. In this paper, we develop a scalable framework for ascertaining the optimal choice of the test for determining the infectiousness of the disease whose results must be truthfully communicated to individuals for the purpose of epidemic containment. We use a networked public goods model to capture the underlying societal structure and the individuals’ incentives during an epidemic, and the Bayesian persuasion framework for modelling the choice of the test. Our first main result is a structural decomposition of the government’s objectives into two independent components – a component dependent on the utility function of individuals, and another dependent on properties of the underlying network. Since the network dependent term in this decomposition is unaffected by the testing strategies adopted by the government, this characterization simplifies the problem of finding the optimal testing methodology. We find explicit conditions, in terms of certain concavity measures, under which perfectly accurate tests, uninformative tests, tests which exaggerate the infectiousness, and ones which downplay it are optimal. Furthermore, we explicitly evaluate these optimal tests for exponential and quadratic benefit functions and study their dependence on underlying parameter values. The structural decomposition results are also helpful in studying other forms of interventions like incentive design and network design.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":50145,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Mathematical Economics","volume":"119 ","pages":"Article 103134"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2025-05-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144205172","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Efficiency in multiple-type housing markets 多类型住房市场的效率

IF 1 4区经济学

Journal of Mathematical Economics Pub Date : 2025-05-27 DOI: 10.1016/j.jmateco.2025.103136

Di Feng

{"title":"Efficiency in multiple-type housing markets","authors":"Di Feng","doi":"10.1016/j.jmateco.2025.103136","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jmateco.2025.103136","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>We consider multiple-type housing markets (Moulin, 1995), which extend Shapley and Scarf (1974)’s housing markets from one dimension to higher dimensions. In this model, <em>Pareto efficiency</em> is incompatible with <em>individual rationality</em> and <em>strategy-proofness</em> (Konishi et al., 2001). Therefore, we consider two weaker efficiency properties: <em>coordinatewise efficiency</em> and <em>pairwise efficiency</em>.</div><div>We show that these two properties both (i) are compatible with <em>individual rationality</em> and <em>strategy-proofness</em>, and (ii) help us to identify two specific mechanisms. Put precisely, on various preference domains, together with other well-studied properties (<em>individual rationality</em>, <em>strategy-proofness</em>, and <em>non-bossiness</em>), <em>coordinatewise efficiency</em> and <em>pairwise efficiency</em> respectively characterize two extensions of the top trading cycles mechanism (TTC): the coordinatewise TTC (cTTC) and the bundle TTC (bTTC). For multiple-type housing markets with strict preferences, our bTTC characterization constitutes the first characterization of a TTC extension.</div><div>Our proof is nonstandard and its novelty has independent methodological interest. Specifically, the absence of <em>non-bossiness</em> in the cTTC characterization and its presence in the bTTC characterization highlight both the uniqueness of our proof approach and the differences between our results and those in the existing literature.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":50145,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Mathematical Economics","volume":"119 ","pages":"Article 103136"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2025-05-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144147983","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Potentials in quadratic Cournot cross-holding games 二次古诺交叉持棋的势

IF 1 4区经济学

Journal of Mathematical Economics Pub Date : 2025-05-22 DOI: 10.1016/j.jmateco.2025.103135

Zhigang Cao , Guopeng Li , Sixian Shen , Feng Zhu

引用次数: 0

Fair allocation in hierarchies: A compromise between marginalism and egalitarianism 等级制度中的公平分配：边际主义与平均主义之间的妥协

IF 1 4区经济学

Journal of Mathematical Economics Pub Date : 2025-05-16 DOI: 10.1016/j.jmateco.2025.103128

Takaaki Abe , David Lowing , Satoshi Nakada

引用次数: 0

Overreacting to a black box 对黑盒反应过度

IF 1 4区经济学

Journal of Mathematical Economics Pub Date : 2025-05-10 DOI: 10.1016/j.jmateco.2025.103131

Shohei Yanagita

引用次数: 0

Resolute and symmetric mechanisms for two-sided matching problems 双边匹配问题的刚毅和对称机制

IF 1 4区经济学

Journal of Mathematical Economics Pub Date : 2025-05-09 DOI: 10.1016/j.jmateco.2025.103130

Daniela Bubboloni , Michele Gori , Claudia Meo

{"title":"Resolute and symmetric mechanisms for two-sided matching problems","authors":"Daniela Bubboloni , Michele Gori , Claudia Meo","doi":"10.1016/j.jmateco.2025.103130","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jmateco.2025.103130","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>We focus on the one-to-one two-sided matching model with two disjoint sets of agents of equal size, where each agent in a set has preferences on the agents in the other set modeled by a linear order. A matching mechanism associates a set of matchings to each preference profile; resoluteness, that is the capability to select a unique matching, and stability are important properties for a matching mechanism. The two versions of the deferred acceptance algorithm are resolute and stable matching mechanisms but they are unfair since they strongly favor one side of the market. We introduce a property for matching mechanisms that relates to fairness; such property, called symmetry, captures different levels of fairness and generalizes existing notions. We provide several possibility and impossibility results mainly involving the most general notion of symmetry, known as gender fairness, resoluteness, stability, weak Pareto optimality and minimal optimality. In particular, we prove that: resolute, gender fair matching mechanisms exist if and only if each side of the market consists of an odd number of agents; there exists no resolute, gender fair, minimally optimal matching mechanism. Those results are obtained by employing algebraic methods based on group theory, an approach not yet explored in matching theory.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":50145,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Mathematical Economics","volume":"118 ","pages":"Article 103130"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2025-05-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143946815","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Robust personal equilibrium effects in misspecified causal models 错误指定因果模型中的稳健个人均衡效应

IF 1 4区经济学

Journal of Mathematical Economics Pub Date : 2025-05-08 DOI: 10.1016/j.jmateco.2025.103127

Juan Carlos Carbajal , John Nachbar

引用次数: 0