发布求助
文献互助 智能选刊 最新文献

Journal of Mathematical Economics最新文献

筛选
英文 中文
Return expectations across the wealth distribution 整个财富分配的回报预期
IF 1 4区 经济学
Journal of Mathematical Economics Pub Date : 2025-05-06 DOI: 10.1016/j.jmateco.2025.103132
Edouard Djeutem , Shaofeng Xu
{"title":"Return expectations across the wealth distribution","authors":"Edouard Djeutem ,&nbsp;Shaofeng Xu","doi":"10.1016/j.jmateco.2025.103132","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jmateco.2025.103132","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>This paper examines how a household’s expectation of asset returns varies with wealth. In the model, households face idiosyncratic investment risks and confront Knightian uncertainty about returns on the risky asset. Their return expectations are formed out of a dynamic zero-sum game with nature. We characterize the robust consumption–investment policies using a perturbation method. The model predicts a U-shaped relationship between expected risky returns and wealth, as nature is less incentivized to distort the perceptions of both poor and rich households. We confront this prediction with U.S. survey data.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":50145,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Mathematical Economics","volume":"118 ","pages":"Article 103132"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2025-05-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143937668","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Proportionality-based fairness and strategyproofness in the facility location problem 设施选址问题中基于比例的公平性与策略证明性
IF 1 4区 经济学
Journal of Mathematical Economics Pub Date : 2025-05-05 DOI: 10.1016/j.jmateco.2025.103129
Haris Aziz , Alexander Lam , Barton E. Lee , Toby Walsh
{"title":"Proportionality-based fairness and strategyproofness in the facility location problem","authors":"Haris Aziz ,&nbsp;Alexander Lam ,&nbsp;Barton E. Lee ,&nbsp;Toby Walsh","doi":"10.1016/j.jmateco.2025.103129","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jmateco.2025.103129","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>We focus on a simple, one-dimensional collective decision problem (often referred to as the facility location problem) and explore issues of strategyproofness and proportionality-based fairness. Our focus is on the Unanimous Fair Share (UFS) axiom—a strengthening of the proportionality axiom (as in Freeman et al., 2021) We characterize the family of strategyproof and UFS mechanisms and also strategyproof and proportional mechanisms. We show that imposing strategyproofness renders the combination of proportionality and unanimity to be equivalent to UFS. Furthermore, there is a unique mechanism that satisfies strategyproofness and UFS (or, equivalently, proportionality and unanimity): the Uniform Phantom mechanism, which is studied in Freeman et al. (2021). This result strengthens known characterizations in the literature. We also provide an alternative characterization of the outcomes of the Uniform Phantom mechanism as the unique (pure) Nash equilibrium outcome for any mechanism that satisfies continuity, strict monotonicity, and UFS. Finally, we analyze the approximation guarantees, in terms of optimal social welfare, obtained by mechanisms that are strategyproof and satisfy the UFS (and proportionality) axiom. We show that the Uniform Phantom mechanism provides the best approximation of the optimal social welfare among all mechanisms that satisfy UFS (or proportionality).</div></div>","PeriodicalId":50145,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Mathematical Economics","volume":"119 ","pages":"Article 103129"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2025-05-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144106201","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Bargaining-Equilibrium equivalence Bargaining-Equilibrium等价
IF 1 4区 经济学
Journal of Mathematical Economics Pub Date : 2025-04-22 DOI: 10.1016/j.jmateco.2025.103117
Anuj Bhowmik , Sandipan Saha
{"title":"Bargaining-Equilibrium equivalence","authors":"Anuj Bhowmik ,&nbsp;Sandipan Saha","doi":"10.1016/j.jmateco.2025.103117","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jmateco.2025.103117","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>The paper tries to answer one of the more nascent questions in the literature on general equilibrium theory by investigating the equivalence between the set of club equilibrium allocations and the bargaining set for a club economy. Clubs in this framework are treated in a parallel fashion to private goods as articles of choice. Each club comprises two components: (i) the profile of the club and (ii) the club project. We define a two-step veto mechanism and introduce the bargaining set in line with Aumann et al. (1961) for such an economy. In this paper, we establish that non-club-equilibrium allocations are those against which there exists a set of agents and a price vector at which they agree to trade amongst themselves rather than consume the non-club-equilibrium allocation assigned to them and all other agents (weakly) prefer the non-club-equilibrium allocation to trading at that particular price vector. In other words, there is a Walrasian objection to any non-club equilibrium allocation. We further show that Walrasian objections are also justified, which helps us to establish our equivalence between the set of equilibrium allocations and the bargaining set for an atomless club economy.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":50145,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Mathematical Economics","volume":"118 ","pages":"Article 103117"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2025-04-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143870709","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Group dominant networks and convexity 群优势网络与凸性
IF 1 4区 经济学
Journal of Mathematical Economics Pub Date : 2025-03-28 DOI: 10.1016/j.jmateco.2025.103116
Christophe Bravard , Sudipta Sarangi , Hector Tzavellas
{"title":"Group dominant networks and convexity","authors":"Christophe Bravard ,&nbsp;Sudipta Sarangi ,&nbsp;Hector Tzavellas","doi":"10.1016/j.jmateco.2025.103116","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jmateco.2025.103116","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>We study group dominant networks under convexity alone and in combination with either strategic complementarity or substitutability. Group dominant networks consists of one group of completely connected agents and a set of isolated agents. They arise frequently in the networks’ literature, most commonly in collaborative situations. We first provide two conditions that help us select from different equilibrium group dominant networks. They allow us to provide a characterization of equilibrium networks for both strategic complementarity and substitutability cases including identifying conditions for uniqueness. Next we observe that under strategic substitutability the equilibrium set may not be a convex interval, allowing for the possibility of ‘holes’ in it. We provide conditions to eliminate these holes and show that this approach can also help to simplify the process of identifying group dominant equilibria.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":50145,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Mathematical Economics","volume":"118 ","pages":"Article 103116"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2025-03-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143738744","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
An economic theory of the Soviet system 苏联体制的经济理论
IF 1 4区 经济学
Journal of Mathematical Economics Pub Date : 2025-03-25 DOI: 10.1016/j.jmateco.2025.103115
Maxime Menuet , Antoine Parent
{"title":"An economic theory of the Soviet system","authors":"Maxime Menuet ,&nbsp;Antoine Parent","doi":"10.1016/j.jmateco.2025.103115","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jmateco.2025.103115","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>The sudden collapse of the Soviet regime is one of the most enigmatic historical events explored in the social sciences. In this paper, we propose a macrodynamic theory of the Soviet economy that provides theoretical foundations for understanding its collapse. Our model features three actors: workers (the people) who can revolt, natchalnik (the supervisor of firms) who controls a defense-industry firm, and the apparatchik (a member of the communist party and administration) who both extracts production for personal uses and acts as a central planner. We analyze the conditions for the Soviet regime’s sustainability or collapse. Our theory identifies three channels leading to the collapse: internal contradictions within the elite, conflicts between the workforce and the administrative-command structure, and corruption among the elite.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":50145,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Mathematical Economics","volume":"118 ","pages":"Article 103115"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2025-03-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143738745","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Pricing negative externalities in social networks 社交网络中的负外部性定价
IF 1 4区 经济学
Journal of Mathematical Economics Pub Date : 2025-03-17 DOI: 10.1016/j.jmateco.2025.103105
Guopeng Li , Sijie Wang , Yifan Xiong , Feng Zhu
{"title":"Pricing negative externalities in social networks","authors":"Guopeng Li ,&nbsp;Sijie Wang ,&nbsp;Yifan Xiong ,&nbsp;Feng Zhu","doi":"10.1016/j.jmateco.2025.103105","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jmateco.2025.103105","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>We explore optimal monopoly pricing in the presence of local negative externalities among agents’ consumption. A monopolist first sets personalized prices, and consumers then simultaneously determine consumption levels. When network externalities are relatively small, the complement graph of the social network plays a key role in characterizing the equilibrium. Optimal prices are uniform when the production cost is linear and proportional to agents’ Katz-Bonacich centralities in the complement network when the production cost is convex. We further connect agents’ consumption with their degrees in several typical networks. The firm’s profit and total consumption decrease with network density, although the consumption of a specific agent may not decrease accordingly. Furthermore, in the context of directed networks, the monopolist charges higher prices to agents who generate substantial externalities for others without being reciprocally influenced. We also apply our model to the case involving large network externalities, where the monopolist exclusively sells products to consumers who constitute a maximum independent set.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":50145,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Mathematical Economics","volume":"118 ","pages":"Article 103105"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2025-03-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143683355","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
A Tarski–Kantorovich theorem for correspondences 对应的一个Tarski-Kantorovich定理
IF 1 4区 经济学
Journal of Mathematical Economics Pub Date : 2025-03-08 DOI: 10.1016/j.jmateco.2025.103106
Łukasz Balbus , Wojciech Olszewski , Kevin Reffett , Łukasz Woźny
{"title":"A Tarski–Kantorovich theorem for correspondences","authors":"Łukasz Balbus ,&nbsp;Wojciech Olszewski ,&nbsp;Kevin Reffett ,&nbsp;Łukasz Woźny","doi":"10.1016/j.jmateco.2025.103106","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jmateco.2025.103106","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>For a weakly monotone (resp., strongly monotone) upper order hemicontinuous correspondence <span><math><mrow><mi>F</mi><mo>:</mo><mi>A</mi><mo>⇉</mo><mi>A</mi></mrow></math></span>, where <span><math><mi>A</mi></math></span> is a complete lattice (resp., a <span><math><mi>σ</mi></math></span>-complete lattice), we provide tight fixed-point bounds for sufficiently large iterations <span><math><mrow><msup><mrow><mi>F</mi></mrow><mrow><mi>k</mi></mrow></msup><mrow><mo>(</mo><msup><mrow><mi>a</mi></mrow><mrow><mn>0</mn></mrow></msup><mo>)</mo></mrow></mrow></math></span>, starting from any point <span><math><mrow><msup><mrow><mi>a</mi></mrow><mrow><mn>0</mn></mrow></msup><mo>∈</mo><mi>A</mi></mrow></math></span>. Our results, hence, prove a generalization of the Tarski–Kantorovich theorem. We provide an application of our results to a class of social learning models on networks.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":50145,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Mathematical Economics","volume":"118 ","pages":"Article 103106"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2025-03-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143629117","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
The economic and policy consequences of carbon emissions 碳排放的经济和政策后果
IF 1 4区 经济学
Journal of Mathematical Economics Pub Date : 2025-02-28 DOI: 10.1016/j.jmateco.2025.103103
Weizhen Meng , Tuyue Chen , Jinqiang Yang
{"title":"The economic and policy consequences of carbon emissions","authors":"Weizhen Meng ,&nbsp;Tuyue Chen ,&nbsp;Jinqiang Yang","doi":"10.1016/j.jmateco.2025.103103","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jmateco.2025.103103","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>Carbon emissions are increasingly being recognized as a threat to economic well-being. This paper incorporates the carbon cycle into a general equilibrium model to study the asset pricing implications of the interaction between carbon emissions and mitigation policies. Our findings suggest that the accumulation of carbon stocks stimulates mitigation spending, reduces consumption, harms welfare, lowers the risk-free rate, and elevates the risk premium. Furthermore, we propose a framework for policy analysis that includes calculating the social cost of carbon (SCC) and the willingness to pay (WTP). Additionally, results show the complex impacts of carbon dynamics on the risk-free rate. Specifically, higher carbon decay rates and the economic damage caused by carbon increase the risk-free rate, while carbon volatility risk lowers it. Moreover, convex damage functions can reverse the trend of the risk-free rate, causing it to rise with carbon stock.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":50145,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Mathematical Economics","volume":"117 ","pages":"Article 103103"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2025-02-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143526768","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
A globally convergent alternating one-track auction for gross substitutes and complements 对总替代品和互补品进行全球趋同的单轨交替拍卖
IF 1 4区 经济学
Journal of Mathematical Economics Pub Date : 2025-02-28 DOI: 10.1016/j.jmateco.2025.103102
Siqi Song , Chi Zhang
{"title":"A globally convergent alternating one-track auction for gross substitutes and complements","authors":"Siqi Song ,&nbsp;Chi Zhang","doi":"10.1016/j.jmateco.2025.103102","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jmateco.2025.103102","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>We propose a new globally convergent dynamic auction for selling multiple indivisible items. There are two finite and disjoint sets of items. Items in each set can be heterogeneous but are substitutes, and items across the two sets are complements. Each bidder may demand several items. In each round of the auction, every bidder reports his demand of items at the current prices and the auctioneer responds by either increasing prices or exclusively decreasing prices. We show that the auction converges globally to a Walrasian equilibrium.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":50145,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Mathematical Economics","volume":"118 ","pages":"Article 103102"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2025-02-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143552330","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Balancing inequality reduction against equality of liabilities in a taxation scheme 在税收计划中平衡减少不平等与平等负债之间的关系
IF 1 4区 经济学
Journal of Mathematical Economics Pub Date : 2025-02-28 DOI: 10.1016/j.jmateco.2025.103104
Satya R. Chakravarty , Palash Sarkar
{"title":"Balancing inequality reduction against equality of liabilities in a taxation scheme","authors":"Satya R. Chakravarty ,&nbsp;Palash Sarkar","doi":"10.1016/j.jmateco.2025.103104","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jmateco.2025.103104","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>This paper designs a taxation policy by maintaining a balance between post-tax income equality and equality of tax burdens. Analytically, the problem is formulated as a constrained optimisation problem achieving controlled trade-off between the equality in tax distribution and post-tax income equality. For the Gini and the Bonferroni indices, the optimisation problem becomes a linear programming problem (LPP). From a practical point of view, the LPP-based formulation provides a practical and effective computational tool based on an economic optimisation principle.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":50145,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Mathematical Economics","volume":"118 ","pages":"Article 103104"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2025-02-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143578305","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
首页 上一页 下一页 尾页
0
×
引用
GB/T 7714-2015
复制
MLA
复制
APA
复制
导出至
BibTeX EndNote RefMan NoteFirst NoteExpress
×
提示
您的信息不完整，为了账户安全，请先补充。
现在去补充
×
提示
您因"违规操作"
具体请查看互助需知
我知道了
×
提示
现在去查看 取消
×
提示
确定
请完成安全验证×
相关产品
×
本文献相关产品
联系我们：info@booksci.cn Book学术提供免费学术资源搜索服务，方便国内外学者检索中英文文献。致力于提供最便捷和优质的服务体验。 Copyright © 2023 布克学术 All rights reserved.
京ICP备2023020795号-1
ghs 京公网安备 11010802042870号
Book学术文献互助
Book学术文献互助群
群 号：604180095
Book学术官方微信