Monotonicity in Ultimatum Bargaining

IF 1 4区经济学 Q3 ECONOMICS

Journal of Mathematical Economics Pub Date : 2025-07-13 DOI:10.1016/j.jmateco.2025.103154

Jack Robles

引用次数: 0

Abstract

We study ultimatum bargaining games with asymmetric information regarding disagreement payoffs. Results from Mensch (2020a) are used to find conditions under which a monotonic Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium exists in these games. A standard single crossing assumption implies the existence when the action space is discrete. Stronger assumptions are required when continuum demands are allowed.

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最后通牒议价中的单调性

我们研究了不对称信息下的最后通牒议价博弈。Mensch （2020a）的结果用于寻找这些博弈中存在单调完美贝叶斯均衡的条件。一个标准的单交叉假设暗示了作用空间离散时的存在性。当允许连续需求时，需要更强的假设。

本文章由计算机程序翻译，如有差异，请以英文原文为准。

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来源期刊

Journal of Mathematical Economics 管理科学-数学跨学科应用

CiteScore

1.70

自引率

7.70%

发文量

审稿时长

12.5 weeks

期刊介绍： The primary objective of the Journal is to provide a forum for work in economic theory which expresses economic ideas using formal mathematical reasoning. For work to add to this primary objective, it is not sufficient that the mathematical reasoning be new and correct. The work must have real economic content. The economic ideas must be interesting and important. These ideas may pertain to any field of economics or any school of economic thought.