重新审视了Ekici的防回收拨款

IF 0.7 4区 经济学 Q3 ECONOMICS
Qianfeng Tang , Zhan Zhu
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引用次数: 0

摘要

我们重新审视了Ekici(2013)针对现有租户的房屋分配问题提出的防回收分配概念。作为核心概念,防回收分配的定义假设当联盟阻止分配时,联盟中的代理可以将其分配的对象带入联盟,即使该对象为外部私有。我们通过恢复埃基西定义中的联盟封锁的可行性,提出了一种新的核心概念——有效核心。我们的主要结果表明,有效核虽然在定义上弱于防回收性,但实际上相当于防回收性。结合Ekici的结果,当且仅当一项分配是由“你要我的房子,我轮到你”(YRMH-IGYT)机制(Abdulkadiroğlu和Sönmez, 1999)产生的,并且当且仅当它是竞争性分配时,它就立即成为有效核心。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Ekici’s reclaim-proof allocations revisited
We revisit the concept of reclaim-proof allocations proposed by Ekici (2013) for house allocation problems with existing tenants. As a concept of core, the definition of reclaim-proof allocations assumes that when a coalition blocks an allocation, an agent in the coalition is allowed to bring her allocated object into the coalition, even when it is privately owned by an outsider. We propose a new notion of core called the effectual core by restoring the feasibility of coalitional blocking in Ekici’s definition. Our main result shows that the effectual core, while by definition weaker than reclaim-proofness, is actually equivalent to it. Together with Ekici’s results, it is then immediate that an allocation is in the effectual core if and only if it is produced by the You request my house-I get your turn (YRMH-IGYT) mechanism (Abdulkadiroğlu and Sönmez, 1999) and if and only if it is a competitive allocation.
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来源期刊
Journal of Mathematical Economics
Journal of Mathematical Economics 管理科学-数学跨学科应用
CiteScore
1.70
自引率
7.70%
发文量
73
审稿时长
12.5 weeks
期刊介绍: The primary objective of the Journal is to provide a forum for work in economic theory which expresses economic ideas using formal mathematical reasoning. For work to add to this primary objective, it is not sufficient that the mathematical reasoning be new and correct. The work must have real economic content. The economic ideas must be interesting and important. These ideas may pertain to any field of economics or any school of economic thought.
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