互动机制：广义委托代理问题透视

IF 1 4区经济学 Q3 ECONOMICS

Journal of Mathematical Economics Pub Date : 2024-07-19 DOI:10.1016/j.jmateco.2024.103023

Françoise Forges , Frédéric Koessler , Andrés Salamanca

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引用次数: 0

摘要

迈尔森（Myerson，1982 年）将一般委托-代理问题形式化，其中代理拥有私人信息并选择行动。他的贡献以单个委托人情况下的启示原则版本最为著名，但他也引入了一个相互作用的委托人模型。我们通过研究公司博弈的完全贝叶斯均衡结果，将后者向前推进了一步，在这个博弈中，每个委托人都向他的代理人提出了一个机制。我们证明，在我们的框架中，启示原则的几个版本都成立，而且在某些条件下，迈尔森（Myerson，1982 年）定义的每个委托人均衡都是公司博弈的完美贝叶斯均衡结果。

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Interacting mechanisms: A perspective on generalized principal–agent problems

Myerson (1982) formalizes general principal–agent problems, in which agents have private information and choose actions. His contribution is best known for a version of the revelation principle in the case of a single principal but he also introduces a model of interacting principals. We push the latter forward by studying the perfect Bayesian equilibrium outcomes of the corporations’ game in which every principal proposes a mechanism to his agents. We show that several versions of the revelation principle hold in our framework and that, under certain conditions, every principals’ equilibrium, as defined in Myerson (1982), is a perfect Bayesian equilibrium outcome of the corporations’ game.

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来源期刊

Journal of Mathematical Economics 管理科学-数学跨学科应用

CiteScore

1.70

自引率

7.70%

发文量

审稿时长

12.5 weeks

期刊介绍： The primary objective of the Journal is to provide a forum for work in economic theory which expresses economic ideas using formal mathematical reasoning. For work to add to this primary objective, it is not sufficient that the mathematical reasoning be new and correct. The work must have real economic content. The economic ideas must be interesting and important. These ideas may pertain to any field of economics or any school of economic thought.