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Rank-and-file accounting employee compensation and financial reporting quality 普通会计员工薪酬与财务报告质量
IF 5.4 1区 管理学
Journal of Accounting & Economics Pub Date : 2024-08-01 DOI: 10.1016/j.jacceco.2024.101672
{"title":"Rank-and-file accounting employee compensation and financial reporting quality","authors":"","doi":"10.1016/j.jacceco.2024.101672","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jacceco.2024.101672","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p><span>We use a proprietary database with detailed, employee-specific compensation contract information for rank-and-file corporate accountants who are directly involved in the financial reporting process to assess their influence on their firms' financial reporting quality. Theory predicts that paying above-market wages can both attract employees with more </span>human capital and subsequently encourage better performance. Consistent with audit committees structuring accountants' compensation to mitigate financial misreporting that might otherwise occur, we find that firms with relatively well-paid accountants tend to issue higher-quality financial reports. Moreover, this relationship is more pronounced when firms’ senior executives have stronger contractual incentives to misreport and when the audit committee is more independent from management.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":48438,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Accounting & Economics","volume":"78 1","pages":"Article 101672"},"PeriodicalIF":5.4,"publicationDate":"2024-08-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139379622","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Labor supply and M&A in the audit market 审计市场的劳动力供应与并购
IF 5.4 1区 管理学
Journal of Accounting & Economics Pub Date : 2024-08-01 DOI: 10.1016/j.jacceco.2024.101700
{"title":"Labor supply and M&A in the audit market","authors":"","doi":"10.1016/j.jacceco.2024.101700","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jacceco.2024.101700","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>Using labor supply shocks from the 150-Hour Rule, I find that a reduction in the labor supply of accountants increases audit firms' mergers and acquisitions (M&amp;A) and the audit market concentration. These M&amp;A deals connect audit firms serving clients in the same states and lead to greater industry specialization of the merging firms. Although both small and large auditors generally engage in labor supply–driven M&amp;A deals, large audit firms’ engagement in M&amp;A is restricted to markets with a tight supply of accounting labor. Attenuations of the labor supply restrictions tend to limit the heightened M&amp;A activities and mitigate the rise in the audit-market concentration from the 150-Hour Rule. I conclude that labor supply reductions affect the boundaries of audit firms, potentially changing the structure of the entire audit market.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":48438,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Accounting & Economics","volume":"78 1","pages":"Article 101700"},"PeriodicalIF":5.4,"publicationDate":"2024-08-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0165410124000302/pdfft?md5=8a00009650808f673d26ea17173049df&pid=1-s2.0-S0165410124000302-main.pdf","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140791967","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Competence vs. Independence: Auditors' connections with members of their clients’ business community 胜任与独立：审计师与客户企业界成员的联系*
IF 5.4 1区 管理学
Journal of Accounting & Economics Pub Date : 2024-08-01 DOI: 10.1016/j.jacceco.2024.101702
{"title":"Competence vs. Independence: Auditors' connections with members of their clients’ business community","authors":"","doi":"10.1016/j.jacceco.2024.101702","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jacceco.2024.101702","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>Prior research finds that auditors' social connections with their clients harms audit quality. We examine auditors' social connections with members of their clients' business community, a setting in which auditors' connections may improve audit quality. While social ties within a client's business community should improve auditor competency, they also threaten auditor independence. We test the effects of auditors' network connections on audit quality using data from China, where data on social connections and individual auditors are available. Auditors' business connections should be particularly beneficial in a relational economy like China, where clients heavily rely on social networks for contracting. We find that auditors with strong local business and government connections deliver higher quality audits as evidenced by fewer financial irregularities among their clients. Our findings are consistent with the improved competency that arises from auditors' business connections outweighing the potential costs of impaired auditor independence.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":48438,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Accounting & Economics","volume":"78 1","pages":"Article 101702"},"PeriodicalIF":5.4,"publicationDate":"2024-08-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0165410124000326/pdfft?md5=02b1e000e47144f088cf19e426e105eb&pid=1-s2.0-S0165410124000326-main.pdf","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141028678","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Standing on the shoulders of giants: Financial reporting comparability and knowledge accumulation 站在巨人的肩膀上：财务报告可比性与知识积累
IF 5.4 1区 管理学
Journal of Accounting & Economics Pub Date : 2024-08-01 DOI: 10.1016/j.jacceco.2024.101685
{"title":"Standing on the shoulders of giants: Financial reporting comparability and knowledge accumulation","authors":"","doi":"10.1016/j.jacceco.2024.101685","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jacceco.2024.101685","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>This study examines whether and how financial statement comparability facilitates the dissemination of innovative knowledge between firms and stimulates the creation of new knowledge. Using cross-patent citations to track interfirm knowledge transfers, we find that comparability increases firms' incentives to learn from peers and create new patents that cite their peers' existing patents. The investigation into the mechanism reveals that comparability improves firms’ ability to estimate the monetary value of peer knowledge and predict their own financial benefits from knowledge acquisition. The impact of comparability is more pronounced when peer knowledge is more publicly accessible or of higher monetary value. Consequently, the acquired knowledge fosters follow-on innovation, enabling firms to produce more patents with greater economic significance. Evidence from two quasi-natural experiments suggests that our findings are plausibly causal. Overall, our study highlights the important role of accounting comparability in facilitating knowledge dissemination.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":48438,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Accounting & Economics","volume":"78 1","pages":"Article 101685"},"PeriodicalIF":5.4,"publicationDate":"2024-08-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0165410124000156/pdfft?md5=99a7946448ad59de98a36bf985ee8640&pid=1-s2.0-S0165410124000156-main.pdf","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139916416","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Community membership and reciprocity in lending: Evidence from informal markets 社区成员资格与借贷互惠：非正规市场的证据
IF 5.4 1区 管理学
Journal of Accounting & Economics Pub Date : 2024-08-01 DOI: 10.1016/j.jacceco.2024.101697
{"title":"Community membership and reciprocity in lending: Evidence from informal markets","authors":"","doi":"10.1016/j.jacceco.2024.101697","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jacceco.2024.101697","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>We study credit access in informal economies where market institutions, such as financial reporting systems, auditing, and courts, are nonexistent or function poorly. Using the setting of a large bazaar in India, we find that community membership plays a vital role in access to credit. Wholesalers are more likely to provide credit and offer greater amounts of credit to within-community retailers, and are more lenient when these retailers are delinquent. Furthermore, wholesalers who lent preferentially to their community retailers pre-COVID are more likely to receive help from their community following the COVID-19–related income shock, particularly from same-community landlords and suppliers. Also, wholesalers with low endowments, those with greater within-community information flow about them, and those facing income shocks are more likely to provide preferential credit to their community retailers. Our findings are consistent with an indirect reciprocity mechanism explaining within-community credit flows.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":48438,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Accounting & Economics","volume":"78 1","pages":"Article 101697"},"PeriodicalIF":5.4,"publicationDate":"2024-08-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140953765","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
EDITORIAL DATA 编辑日期
IF 5.4 1区 管理学
Journal of Accounting & Economics Pub Date : 2024-08-01 DOI: 10.1016/j.jacceco.2024.101712
{"title":"EDITORIAL DATA","authors":"","doi":"10.1016/j.jacceco.2024.101712","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jacceco.2024.101712","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":48438,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Accounting & Economics","volume":"78 1","pages":"Article 101712"},"PeriodicalIF":5.4,"publicationDate":"2024-08-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0165410124000429/pdfft?md5=64d474481f35bd81e773536d4b5bc654&pid=1-s2.0-S0165410124000429-main.pdf","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141712871","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Mandatory financial information disclosure and credit ratings 强制性财务信息披露和信用评级
IF 5.4 1区 管理学
Journal of Accounting & Economics Pub Date : 2024-08-01 DOI: 10.1016/j.jacceco.2024.101676
{"title":"Mandatory financial information disclosure and credit ratings","authors":"","doi":"10.1016/j.jacceco.2024.101676","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jacceco.2024.101676","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>When firms are forced to publicly disclose financial information, credit rating agencies are generally expected to improve their risk assessments. Theory predicts such an information quality effect but also suggests an adverse reputational concerns effect since credit analysts may become increasingly concerned about alleged rating failures. We empirically examine these predictions using a large-scale quasi-natural experiment in Germany, where a new compliance regime required firms to disclose annual financial statements publicly. Consistent with the reputational concerns hypothesis, we find an average increase in credit rating downgrades that is entirely driven by changes in the discretionary assessments of credit analysts rather than changes in firm fundamentals. Following public disclosure regulations, analysts tend to give positive private information less weight in their risk assessments while assigning greater weight to negative public information. A final set of results indicates that professional credit providers recognize that the resulting downgrades are not warranted.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":48438,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Accounting & Economics","volume":"78 1","pages":"Article 101676"},"PeriodicalIF":5.4,"publicationDate":"2024-08-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0165410124000065/pdfft?md5=075117dcbf6abef7b3d8627d5016d047&pid=1-s2.0-S0165410124000065-main.pdf","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139897067","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Distinguishing between recurring and nonrecurring components of earnings using unobserved components modeling 利用非观测变量模型区分收益的经常性和非经常性组成部分
IF 5.4 1区 管理学
Journal of Accounting & Economics Pub Date : 2024-08-01 DOI: 10.1016/j.jacceco.2024.101687
{"title":"Distinguishing between recurring and nonrecurring components of earnings using unobserved components modeling","authors":"","doi":"10.1016/j.jacceco.2024.101687","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jacceco.2024.101687","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>Distinguishing between recurring and nonrecurring components of earnings is a critical task in financial analysis and valuation. Academics and quantitative investors often rely on measures of recurring and nonrecurring components derived from standardized financial databases. We use unobserved components modeling and the Kalman smoother to obtain efficient ex-post estimates of the recurring and nonrecurring components of annual earnings. We then show that popular measures are significantly misspecified and that investors appear to anticipate a significant portion of the misspecification. Finally, we identify certain misclassified items that drive misspecification and provide algorithms to improve their ex-ante classification.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":48438,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Accounting & Economics","volume":"78 1","pages":"Article 101687"},"PeriodicalIF":5.4,"publicationDate":"2024-08-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140406022","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Litigation risk and strategic M&A valuations 诉讼风险与战略性并购估值
IF 5.4 1区 管理学
Journal of Accounting & Economics Pub Date : 2024-08-01 DOI: 10.1016/j.jacceco.2024.101671
{"title":"Litigation risk and strategic M&A valuations","authors":"","doi":"10.1016/j.jacceco.2024.101671","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jacceco.2024.101671","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p><span>We study the role of litigation risk in M&amp;A valuations. Specifically, we hypothesize that litigation risk leads to strategic valuations in fairness opinions (FOs) obtained in M&amp;A transactions. Employing a regulatory shock to merger litigation risk and focusing on the most common valuation techniques – peer firm comparables and </span>DCF analysis – we find that target-sought FOs exhibit lower valuations when litigation risk is high. The effect is concentrated in deals with greater agency conflicts between target management and outside shareholders. Furthermore, downward-biased valuations reduce appraisal litigation but are also associated with lower premiums. In contrast to prior work suggesting that target-sought FOs are used to negotiate a higher takeover price, our findings imply that they are used, at least in part, to mitigate litigation risk and facilitate successful deal completion. Our findings are relevant to academics, practitioners, and regulators interested in M&amp;A price formation, and highlight the role litigation plays therein.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":48438,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Accounting & Economics","volume":"78 1","pages":"Article 101671"},"PeriodicalIF":5.4,"publicationDate":"2024-08-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139431743","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Employee responses to CEO activism 员工对首席执行官行动主义的反应
IF 5.4 1区 管理学
Journal of Accounting & Economics Pub Date : 2024-08-01 DOI: 10.1016/j.jacceco.2024.101701
{"title":"Employee responses to CEO activism","authors":"","doi":"10.1016/j.jacceco.2024.101701","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jacceco.2024.101701","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>We examine employee responses to CEO activism, the increasingly common practice of CEOs taking public stances on socio-political issues. CEO activism may bolster employees' identification with their organizations and strengthen shared beliefs among employees. Alternatively, CEO activism may alienate employees if CEO stances contrast with employees' ideologies. We find that employee satisfaction is higher when CEOs engage in activism that is aligned with employees’ ideologies. Furthermore, firms with CEO activism experience a net inflow of productive, ideologically-aligned inventors, which contributes to increased firm-level innovation. The improvements in employee satisfaction and innovation constitute an important channel that connects aligned CEO activism to increased firm value.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":48438,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Accounting & Economics","volume":"78 1","pages":"Article 101701"},"PeriodicalIF":5.4,"publicationDate":"2024-08-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140949762","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
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