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Comply-or-explain regulation and investor protection 遵守或解释法规和投资者保护
IF 5.4 1区 管理学
Journal of Accounting & Economics Pub Date : 2025-04-01 DOI: 10.1016/j.jacceco.2025.101765
Thomas Bourveau , Xingchao Gao , Rongchen Li , Frank S. Zhou
{"title":"Comply-or-explain regulation and investor protection","authors":"Thomas Bourveau ,&nbsp;Xingchao Gao ,&nbsp;Rongchen Li ,&nbsp;Frank S. Zhou","doi":"10.1016/j.jacceco.2025.101765","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jacceco.2025.101765","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>We investigate a 2012 comply-or-explain regulation implemented by China’s Shanghai Stock Exchange. The regulation requires eligible firms to pay 30% of their current-year profits as cash dividends or explain the reasons why they do not meet this requirement through a public conference call. Using firms listed on the Shenzhen Stock Exchange as a control group, our difference-in-differences estimates suggest that firms subject to the regulation decreased tunneling, irrespective of whether they complied by paying or disclosing. Further analyses suggest that the reduction in tunneling is partially attributed to enhanced regulatory monitoring over explaining firms and the constraint on excess cash of paying firms. These findings offer novel policy insights into how a flexible comply-or-explain form of regulation can mitigate agency costs between controlling and minority shareholders in a weak institutional environment.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48438,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Accounting & Economics","volume":"79 2","pages":"Article 101765"},"PeriodicalIF":5.4,"publicationDate":"2025-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143820364","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
The value of lending to bellwether firms by institutional investors 机构投资者向风向标企业提供贷款的价值
IF 5.4 1区 管理学
Journal of Accounting & Economics Pub Date : 2025-04-01 DOI: 10.1016/j.jacceco.2024.101735
Wayne R. Landsman , F. Dimas Peña-Romera , Jianxin (Donny) Zhao
{"title":"The value of lending to bellwether firms by institutional investors","authors":"Wayne R. Landsman ,&nbsp;F. Dimas Peña-Romera ,&nbsp;Jianxin (Donny) Zhao","doi":"10.1016/j.jacceco.2024.101735","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jacceco.2024.101735","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>We predict that institutional investors in loan syndicates charge bellwether firms lower loan spreads as compensation for having access to private information that can help identify trading opportunities in other firms' public market securities. Consistent with this prediction, when lending to bellwether firms, institutional investors charge a loan premium that is between 17 and 25 bps lower relative to non-bellwether firms, and earn annualized excess returns of 1.5–2.2% from trading in other firms' securities. Findings from cross-sectional analyses reveal that the reduction in loan spread is larger when the value of private information from bellwether firms is higher. Additionally, institutional lenders' excess returns are lower when lending to more transparent bellwether borrowers and when they pay a lower price—as reflected in loan spreads—in exchange for the private information, supporting the notion that the value of private information relates to institutional investors’ trading performance.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48438,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Accounting & Economics","volume":"79 2","pages":"Article 101735"},"PeriodicalIF":5.4,"publicationDate":"2025-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141910699","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Editorial Data 编辑数据
IF 5.4 1区 管理学
Journal of Accounting & Economics Pub Date : 2025-04-01 DOI: 10.1016/j.jacceco.2025.101785
{"title":"Editorial Data","authors":"","doi":"10.1016/j.jacceco.2025.101785","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jacceco.2025.101785","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":48438,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Accounting & Economics","volume":"79 2","pages":"Article 101785"},"PeriodicalIF":5.4,"publicationDate":"2025-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143820355","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Creditor protection and government procurement contracting 债权人保护和政府采购合同
IF 5.4 1区 管理学
Journal of Accounting & Economics Pub Date : 2025-04-01 DOI: 10.1016/j.jacceco.2024.101742
Xiao Liu , Zhiming Ma , Lufei Ruan
{"title":"Creditor protection and government procurement contracting","authors":"Xiao Liu ,&nbsp;Zhiming Ma ,&nbsp;Lufei Ruan","doi":"10.1016/j.jacceco.2024.101742","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jacceco.2024.101742","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>This paper examines the effect of creditor protection on the choice of government procurement contract types. We use the staggered adoption of anti-recharacterization laws (ARLs) as a quasi-natural experiment to investigate the research question. ARLs strengthen creditors’ rights to repossess collateral in bankruptcy and thus enhance creditor protection. Using a dataset of U.S. government contracts, we find a significant shift from the use of fixed-price contracts to cost-plus contracts after the adoption of ARLs. The effect is more pronounced for firms with higher default risk and stronger firm-government ties. We also find that the government is more likely to switch away or reduce the contract value for contractors affected by ARLs. Overall, our findings point to an important relation between debt contracts and government contracts.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48438,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Accounting & Economics","volume":"79 2","pages":"Article 101742"},"PeriodicalIF":5.4,"publicationDate":"2025-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143820358","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
The role of accounting information in an era of fake news 假新闻时代会计信息的作用
IF 5.4 1区 管理学
Journal of Accounting & Economics Pub Date : 2025-04-01 DOI: 10.1016/j.jacceco.2024.101764
Betty Liu , Austin Moss
{"title":"The role of accounting information in an era of fake news","authors":"Betty Liu ,&nbsp;Austin Moss","doi":"10.1016/j.jacceco.2024.101764","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jacceco.2024.101764","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>We offer empirical evidence on the role of accounting information in shaping the incentives to produce fake news. We document that fake news authors strategically (1) publish their articles near earnings announcements, leveraging the widespread market attention these events attract, and (2) within the near-announcement window, avoid publishing post-announcement when investors are less susceptible to fake news due to the disclosure of accounting information. In extending our analyses to the broader accounting information environment, we find that fake news authors are less likely to target firms with more robust accounting information and elicit lower market reactions when doing so. These results highlight both ex-ante and ex-post roles that accounting information plays in safeguarding firms from financial disinformation.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48438,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Accounting & Economics","volume":"79 2","pages":"Article 101764"},"PeriodicalIF":5.4,"publicationDate":"2025-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143820363","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
The future performance implications of Non-GAAP firms’ investments 非公认会计准则公司投资对未来业绩的影响
IF 5.4 1区 管理学
Journal of Accounting & Economics Pub Date : 2025-04-01 DOI: 10.1016/j.jacceco.2024.101760
Minkwan Ahn , Theodore E. Christensen , Ryan G. Johnson , Melissa F. Lewis-Western
{"title":"The future performance implications of Non-GAAP firms’ investments","authors":"Minkwan Ahn ,&nbsp;Theodore E. Christensen ,&nbsp;Ryan G. Johnson ,&nbsp;Melissa F. Lewis-Western","doi":"10.1016/j.jacceco.2024.101760","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jacceco.2024.101760","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>We investigate whether consistent non-GAAP reporting is associated with investment efficiency. Prior research finds a positive association between non-GAAP reporting and investment levels, concluding that it represents overinvestment. We corroborate this positive association, but additional tests are not consistent with the conclusion of inefficient overinvestment. Specifically, we explore the relation between investment and future cash flows as a proxy for the realization of investments in positive net present value projects. We find that the investments of firms that consistently report non-GAAP metrics are associated with similar or higher future cash flows than the investments of firms reporting only GAAP earnings, which is consistent with efficient investment. We observe similar associations in multiple specifications, performance horizons, and outcome variables, including future returns and earnings. Given the prevalence of non-GAAP reporting and the SEC's ongoing concern with the consequences of non-GAAP disclosure, our analyses offer timely evidence relevant to this important discussion.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48438,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Accounting & Economics","volume":"79 2","pages":"Article 101760"},"PeriodicalIF":5.4,"publicationDate":"2025-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142874777","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Foreign bank branch participation and U.S. syndicated loan contract design 外国银行分行参与和美国银团贷款合同设计
IF 5.4 1区 管理学
Journal of Accounting & Economics Pub Date : 2025-02-01 DOI: 10.1016/j.jacceco.2024.101714
Daniel G. Yang
{"title":"Foreign bank branch participation and U.S. syndicated loan contract design","authors":"Daniel G. Yang","doi":"10.1016/j.jacceco.2024.101714","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jacceco.2024.101714","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>I examine whether and how foreign bank branch participation in U.S. loan syndicates influences loan contract design. I predict that foreign bank branches’ dollar funding liquidity risk and information frictions increase renegotiation costs and affect loan contract design. I find that loan contracts with greater foreign bank branch participation include fewer flexibility-reducing covenants, such as capital expenditure and balance sheet covenants, that restrict borrowers from making positive net present value investments. I document similar results using matched sample and plausibly exogenous variation in foreign bank branch participation. Additionally, loan contracts with greater foreign bank branch participation are more likely to feature split control rights, which give banks in revolving lines of credit the exclusive right to renegotiate. In contrast, foreign bank branches are more likely to be included in covenant-lite term loans. Overall, I show that foreign bank branch participation affects U.S. syndicated loan contract design through renegotiation costs.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48438,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Accounting & Economics","volume":"79 1","pages":"Article 101714"},"PeriodicalIF":5.4,"publicationDate":"2025-02-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141692703","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Early-life experience and CEOs’ reactions to COVID-19 早年经历和首席执行官对 COVID-19 的反应
IF 5.4 1区 管理学
Journal of Accounting & Economics Pub Date : 2025-02-01 DOI: 10.1016/j.jacceco.2024.101734
Hong Ru , Endong Yang , Kunru Zou
{"title":"Early-life experience and CEOs’ reactions to COVID-19","authors":"Hong Ru ,&nbsp;Endong Yang ,&nbsp;Kunru Zou","doi":"10.1016/j.jacceco.2024.101734","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jacceco.2024.101734","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>This study investigates how CEOs' experience of natural disasters and severe disease outbreaks in their formative years influences their firms' responses to the COVID-19 pandemic in the United States. We observe that firms whose CEOs experienced disease outbreaks akin to COVID-19 early in their lives demonstrated more conservative responses to the emergence of the COVID-19 in late February 2020, notably through a substantial slowdown in capital expenditure growth. Moreover, firms led by CEOs with early-life disease experience exhibit a more negative tone in their corporate disclosures and heightened pessimism in their earnings forecasts following the COVID-19 outbreak. These effects are more pronounced for firms in industries that were hit hard by the pandemic. Our findings suggest that severe events early in life leave indelible imprints on memory, thereby impacting CEOs’ decision-making when managing similar crises in their professional careers.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48438,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Accounting & Economics","volume":"79 1","pages":"Article 101734"},"PeriodicalIF":5.4,"publicationDate":"2025-02-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142045898","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Transaction-level transparency and portfolio mimicking 交易层面的透明度和投资组合模仿
IF 5.4 1区 管理学
Journal of Accounting & Economics Pub Date : 2025-02-01 DOI: 10.1016/j.jacceco.2024.101713
Thomas C. Hagenberg
{"title":"Transaction-level transparency and portfolio mimicking","authors":"Thomas C. Hagenberg","doi":"10.1016/j.jacceco.2024.101713","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jacceco.2024.101713","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>This study examines whether an increase in the transparency of investment transactions facilitates portfolio mimicking. While there are reported benefits of transparency in enhancing regulatory monitoring and discipline, an increase in the transparency of investment transactions can also facilitate mimicking of peer firms’ investment strategies. I exploit an exogenous increase in the broad dissemination of transaction-level investment disclosures of U.S.-based insurers and find a significant increase in portfolio similarity at the individual security level. Increases in portfolio similarity are more pronounced in smaller, less sophisticated insurers mimicking their larger, more sophisticated peers. Shared asset positions and common exposures to risk can exacerbate collective risk across firms. Accordingly, I find that the detectable increases in portfolio similarity are positively associated with measures of systemic risk, especially in those smaller insurers mimicking their peers. This study adds to a nascent literature on portfolio mimicking and highlights a potential negative externality of increased transparency.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48438,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Accounting & Economics","volume":"79 1","pages":"Article 101713"},"PeriodicalIF":5.4,"publicationDate":"2025-02-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141704672","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Do signatory auditors with tax expertise facilitate or curb tax aggressiveness? 具有税务专业知识的签字审计员会促进还是抑制税收积极性？
IF 5.4 1区 管理学
Journal of Accounting & Economics Pub Date : 2025-02-01 DOI: 10.1016/j.jacceco.2024.101715
Mark DeFond , Baolei Qi , Yi Si , Jieying Zhang
{"title":"Do signatory auditors with tax expertise facilitate or curb tax aggressiveness?","authors":"Mark DeFond ,&nbsp;Baolei Qi ,&nbsp;Yi Si ,&nbsp;Jieying Zhang","doi":"10.1016/j.jacceco.2024.101715","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jacceco.2024.101715","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>Prior research concludes that tax-expert auditors facilitate tax aggressiveness. However, these studies examine auditors who also provide non-audit tax services to their clients, creating conflicting incentives. We predict that tax-expert auditors, who do not provide non-audit tax services, reduce tax aggressiveness, because tax aggressiveness imposes costs on them. We test our prediction using Chinese data, allowing us to identify Certified Tax Agents as tax-expert auditors. We find that companies are less tax aggressive when their signatory auditor is a tax-expert who does not provide non-audit tax services. Consistent with a causal relation, a decrease in tax rates, which reduces clients’ incentives to be tax aggressive, weakens the effect of tax-expertise on tax aggressiveness. Moreover, tax-expert auditors attenuate the type of tax aggressiveness that results in tax-related misstatements. Overall, by examining auditors who do not provide non-audit tax services, we find that tax-expert auditors curb tax aggressiveness, contrary to prior research.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48438,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Accounting & Economics","volume":"79 1","pages":"Article 101715"},"PeriodicalIF":5.4,"publicationDate":"2025-02-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141705561","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
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