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Tax and tariff planning through transfer prices: The role of the head office and business unit 通过转让价格进行税收和关税规划：总部和业务部门的作用
IF 5.9 1区 管理学
Journal of Accounting & Economics Pub Date : 2023-04-01 DOI: 10.1016/j.jacceco.2022.101568
Saskia Kohlhase , Jacco L. Wielhouwer
{"title":"Tax and tariff planning through transfer prices: The role of the head office and business unit","authors":"Saskia Kohlhase ,&nbsp;Jacco L. Wielhouwer","doi":"10.1016/j.jacceco.2022.101568","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jacceco.2022.101568","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>We study the roles of the head office (HO) and the business units (BUs) of a multinational corporation (MNC) in reducing income tax and tariff payments through internal transfer prices in international trades. Using confidential transfer price data of a large MNC, we analyze how the different elements of internal transfer prices set by the HO and BUs vary differently from external prices with income tax rates, tariff rates, and the tradeoff between the two. Absent severe agency conflicts, we find that the BUs contribute more to tax planning than the HO, despite that explicit incentives to do so are not included in the compensation schemes. The roles of the HO and BUs vary with product market competition, the risk of conflicts with tax and customs authorities, and agency problems within the firm. Moreover, we provide evidence of strategic trade cost allocations among BUs to reduce income taxes.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":48438,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Accounting & Economics","volume":"75 2","pages":"Article 101568"},"PeriodicalIF":5.9,"publicationDate":"2023-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49827061","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 6
Remote tax authority 远程税务机关
IF 5.9 1区 管理学
Journal of Accounting & Economics Pub Date : 2023-04-01 DOI: 10.1016/j.jacceco.2022.101570
Andrew Belnap, Anthony Welsch, Braden Williams
{"title":"Remote tax authority","authors":"Andrew Belnap,&nbsp;Anthony Welsch,&nbsp;Braden Williams","doi":"10.1016/j.jacceco.2022.101570","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jacceco.2022.101570","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p><span>Tax enforcement and compliance are critical features of any tax system. One way that prior studies examine these topics is by measuring taxpayer responses to different types of letters from a tax authority. We extend this research by focusing on ‘remote firms’ – firms with no physical presence in the tax authority's jurisdiction – and examining sales tax compliance. Specifically, we partner with the Texas Comptroller's office to conduct a randomized field experiment that examines whether and why firms comply with remote tax authority. Using a sample of remote firms with a recent history of late filing, we find that tax authority correspondence increases the average reported sales </span>tax base by 105 percent and tax payments by $3,711, although the effects are short-lived. Our evidence suggests that the effect is driven by increased salience of firms' tax obligations. Our study offers key insights given the growth in cross-border transactions and remote taxation.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":48438,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Accounting & Economics","volume":"75 2","pages":"Article 101570"},"PeriodicalIF":5.9,"publicationDate":"2023-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49827062","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
The economic consequences of GASB financial statement disclosure GASB财务报表披露的经济后果
IF 5.9 1区 管理学
Journal of Accounting & Economics Pub Date : 2023-04-01 DOI: 10.1016/j.jacceco.2022.101555
Michael Dambra , Omri Even-Tov , James P. Naughton
{"title":"The economic consequences of GASB financial statement disclosure","authors":"Michael Dambra ,&nbsp;Omri Even-Tov ,&nbsp;James P. Naughton","doi":"10.1016/j.jacceco.2022.101555","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jacceco.2022.101555","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>We examine whether Governmental Accounting Standards Board (GASB) financial statement disclosure alters local governments' economic decision-making. To do so, we exploit a recent GASB standard that eliminated differences in the disclosure requirements for county governments' pension obligations. The standard, GASB 68, had no effect on pension economics or the annual budget—it affected only whether and how information was presented on GASB financial statements. Using a broad hand-collected dataset, we document that counties that did not disclose information about their pension obligations before GASB 68 reduced public welfare expenditures, employment, and salary expenses relative to those that had disclosed such information. We conduct extensive field research and employ several cross-sectional analyses to conclude that the effects we document are in part driven by increased awareness of the financial costs of pension obligations by newly disclosing counties.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":48438,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Accounting & Economics","volume":"75 2","pages":"Article 101555"},"PeriodicalIF":5.9,"publicationDate":"2023-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49811976","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Do Managers learn from institutional investors through direct interactions? 管理者是否通过直接互动向机构投资者学习？
IF 5.9 1区 管理学
Journal of Accounting & Economics Pub Date : 2023-04-01 DOI: 10.1016/j.jacceco.2022.101554
Rachel Xi Zhang
{"title":"Do Managers learn from institutional investors through direct interactions?","authors":"Rachel Xi Zhang","doi":"10.1016/j.jacceco.2022.101554","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jacceco.2022.101554","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>I examine whether corporate managers learn from institutional investors through direct interactions at investor conferences. I find that managers seek more direct interactions with institutional investors at conferences when they have a greater need for information about their firm's product markets and supply chains. This relation is stronger when managers expect investors to be knowledgeable. I also show that the information acquired from conference interactions is reflected in subsequent manager decisions. First, direct interactions help managers to extract information embedded in stock prices and later use it to make investments. Second, within the same firm and month, managers' personal stock trades immediately after attending a conference earn higher abnormal returns, consistent with direct interactions expanding their private information set. Overall, these findings suggest that managers can acquire decision-relevant information from direct interactions with institutional investors of their firm.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":48438,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Accounting & Economics","volume":"75 2","pages":"Article 101554"},"PeriodicalIF":5.9,"publicationDate":"2023-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49811977","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Political euphoria and corporate disclosures: An investigation of CEO partisan alignment with the president of the United States 政治喜悦与企业披露：CEO与美国总统党派结盟调查
IF 5.9 1区 管理学
Journal of Accounting & Economics Pub Date : 2023-04-01 DOI: 10.1016/j.jacceco.2022.101552
Mazhar Arikan , Mehmet Kara , Adi Masli , Yaoyi Xi
{"title":"Political euphoria and corporate disclosures: An investigation of CEO partisan alignment with the president of the United States","authors":"Mazhar Arikan ,&nbsp;Mehmet Kara ,&nbsp;Adi Masli ,&nbsp;Yaoyi Xi","doi":"10.1016/j.jacceco.2022.101552","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jacceco.2022.101552","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>We examine how the partisan alignment between chief executive officers (CEOs) and the United States president influences corporate disclosure outcomes. We predict and find evidence that more partisan-aligned CEOs display greater optimism in their corporate disclosures. CEO partisan alignment is positively associated with the likelihood of issuing a management earnings forecast and issuing overly optimistic forecasts. More partisan-aligned CEOs also use a more optimistic tone in the corporate disclosure and exhibit a lower level of accounting conservatism. Our findings suggest that time-varying beliefs of CEOs formed by the political environment can shape corporate disclosures.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":48438,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Accounting & Economics","volume":"75 2","pages":"Article 101552"},"PeriodicalIF":5.9,"publicationDate":"2023-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49826617","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 1
Acknowledgement 确认
IF 5.9 1区 管理学
Journal of Accounting & Economics Pub Date : 2023-04-01 DOI: 10.1016/S0165-4101(23)00021-6
{"title":"Acknowledgement","authors":"","doi":"10.1016/S0165-4101(23)00021-6","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1016/S0165-4101(23)00021-6","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":48438,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Accounting & Economics","volume":"75 2","pages":"Article 101597"},"PeriodicalIF":5.9,"publicationDate":"2023-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49811972","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Assurance level choice, CPA fees, and financial reporting benefits: Inferences from U.S. private firms 保证水平选择、注册会计师费用和财务报告福利：来自美国私营公司的推断
IF 5.9 1区 管理学
Journal of Accounting & Economics Pub Date : 2023-04-01 DOI: 10.1016/j.jacceco.2022.101551
Brad A. Badertscher , Jaewoo Kim , William R. Kinney Jr. , Edward Owens
{"title":"Assurance level choice, CPA fees, and financial reporting benefits: Inferences from U.S. private firms","authors":"Brad A. Badertscher ,&nbsp;Jaewoo Kim ,&nbsp;William R. Kinney Jr. ,&nbsp;Edward Owens","doi":"10.1016/j.jacceco.2022.101551","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jacceco.2022.101551","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>Many U.S. private firms choose either a financial statement compilation or review rather than the higher assurance provided by an audit, yet little is known about these choices. We explore economic aspects of private firm choice of less-than-audit levels of assurance applied to GAAP-based financial statements. We find that CPA fees more than double for each increment in assurance. Commonly used financial reporting quality proxies are higher for both reviews and audits relative to compilations but are statistically indistinguishable on average between reviews and audits. Cost of debt is significantly lower for reviews than for compilations and significantly lower for audits than for reviews. Finally, we find that assurance level choices are associated with bank debt, trade credit, and potential internal information reliability and control concerns.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":48438,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Accounting & Economics","volume":"75 2","pages":"Article 101551"},"PeriodicalIF":5.9,"publicationDate":"2023-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49811978","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 1
A reexamination of investors' reaction to tax shelter news: Evidence from the Luxembourg tax leaks 投资者对避税新闻反应的再审视：来自卢森堡税务泄露的证据
IF 5.9 1区 管理学
Journal of Accounting & Economics Pub Date : 2023-04-01 DOI: 10.1016/j.jacceco.2022.101537
Wayne L. Nesbitt , Edmund Outslay , Anh V. Persson
{"title":"A reexamination of investors' reaction to tax shelter news: Evidence from the Luxembourg tax leaks","authors":"Wayne L. Nesbitt ,&nbsp;Edmund Outslay ,&nbsp;Anh V. Persson","doi":"10.1016/j.jacceco.2022.101537","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jacceco.2022.101537","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>This study examines the stock market reaction to the unprecedented leaks of confidential advance tax rulings between Luxembourg and multinational corporations—also known as the “LuxLeaks.” Contrary to the negative market reaction to tax shelter news documented in prior research, we find that investors responded positively to these leaks. This reaction is concentrated among U.S. firms. Furthermore, we document a positive association between abnormal returns and the reduction in firms' tax uncertainty, consistent with a downward revision in investors' perception of the tax uncertainty associated with the firms' Luxembourg operations. We also investigate other firm characteristics and find that, among U.S. firms, investors' reaction is weaker for those over-invested in tax avoidance. Among non-U.S. firms, the market response is muted by concerns about the quality of governance. In summary, our results suggest that investors' reaction to tax shelter news is conditional on their reassessment of the firms' tax uncertainty.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":48438,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Accounting & Economics","volume":"75 2","pages":"Article 101537"},"PeriodicalIF":5.9,"publicationDate":"2023-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49811979","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
The effect of bond market transparency on bank loan contracting 债券市场透明度对银行贷款契约的影响
IF 5.9 1区 管理学
Journal of Accounting & Economics Pub Date : 2023-04-01 DOI: 10.1016/j.jacceco.2022.101536
Mahfuz Chy, Hoyoun Kyung
{"title":"The effect of bond market transparency on bank loan contracting","authors":"Mahfuz Chy,&nbsp;Hoyoun Kyung","doi":"10.1016/j.jacceco.2022.101536","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jacceco.2022.101536","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>We find that bond issuers receive bank loans with 12% fewer covenants when the secondary corporate bond market becomes more transparent. The treatment effect is more pronounced when bond trades are more informative, when stock prices are less informative, and when the likelihood of future debt-equity agency conflicts is higher. The evidence suggests that bond prices reflect forward-looking information that mitigates banks’ information risk in debt contracting. As such, banks impose fewer contractual restrictions on bond issuers when bond transactions become publicly observable. We find consistent results using a hand-collected dataset of negative covenants. Treatment firms are also less likely to subsequently renegotiate borrowing terms. Finally, we find corroborating evidence from new primary bond issues. Taken together, our findings suggest that public bond market frictions affect private debt contract design.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":48438,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Accounting & Economics","volume":"75 2","pages":"Article 101536"},"PeriodicalIF":5.9,"publicationDate":"2023-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49811982","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Fixed income conference calls 固定收益电话会议
IF 5.9 1区 管理学
Journal of Accounting & Economics Pub Date : 2023-02-01 DOI: 10.1016/j.jacceco.2022.101518
Gus De Franco , Thomas Shohfi , Da Xu , Zhiwei (Vivi) Zhu
{"title":"Fixed income conference calls","authors":"Gus De Franco ,&nbsp;Thomas Shohfi ,&nbsp;Da Xu ,&nbsp;Zhiwei (Vivi) Zhu","doi":"10.1016/j.jacceco.2022.101518","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jacceco.2022.101518","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>We study the determinants and the informational role of firms' fixed income conference calls, a unique form of voluntary disclosure that deviates from the traditional multi-purpose firm disclosures intended for all stakeholders. We find that fixed income calls are more likely to be held by firms that have more debt, lack credit ratings or have publicly traded equity, are foreign, or are experiencing losses. In a content analysis using a sample of public firms, we find that these calls discuss debt-equity conflict events, such as share repurchases, to a greater degree relative to a matched sample of earnings conference calls. Finally, we document that credit markets react to these calls, consistent with the calls providing investors new information. Overall, these results are consistent with fixed income calls meeting the differential informational demands of debt versus equity investors.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":48438,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Accounting & Economics","volume":"75 1","pages":"Article 101518"},"PeriodicalIF":5.9,"publicationDate":"2023-02-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49795210","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 1
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