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Accounting conservatism and relational contracting 会计稳健性与关系契约
IF 5.9 1区 管理学
Journal of Accounting & Economics Pub Date : 2023-08-01 DOI: 10.1016/j.jacceco.2022.101571
Jonathan Glover , Hao Xue
{"title":"Accounting conservatism and relational contracting","authors":"Jonathan Glover ,&nbsp;Hao Xue","doi":"10.1016/j.jacceco.2022.101571","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jacceco.2022.101571","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>This paper develops a positive role for accounting conservatism in fostering relational contracts between two agents in a two-period model of moral hazard. Building on Kreps (1996), the principal in our model designs a conservative measurement system and optimal contracts to create multiple equilibria that foster a team-based corporate culture. Accruals introduced by conservatism increase each agent's stake in the future of the relationship when it matters most—when it is going badly. This makes staying in the relationship worthwhile for the agents, even if they plan to play a low payoff equilibrium in the second period to punish first-period free-riding. In turn, this allows the principal to use lower-powered (and less costly) team incentives in the first period of the relationship. In contrast, deferred compensation increases each agent's stake in the future of the relationship when it is going well, making it less efficient in fostering relationships.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":48438,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Accounting & Economics","volume":"76 1","pages":"Article 101571"},"PeriodicalIF":5.9,"publicationDate":"2023-08-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49848132","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 2
Not just for investors: The role of earnings announcements in guiding job seekers 不仅仅针对投资者：盈利公告在引导求职者方面的作用
IF 5.9 1区 管理学
Journal of Accounting & Economics Pub Date : 2023-08-01 DOI: 10.1016/j.jacceco.2023.101588
Bong-Geun Choi , Jung Ho Choi , Sara Malik
{"title":"Not just for investors: The role of earnings announcements in guiding job seekers","authors":"Bong-Geun Choi ,&nbsp;Jung Ho Choi ,&nbsp;Sara Malik","doi":"10.1016/j.jacceco.2023.101588","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jacceco.2023.101588","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>We study the information content of earnings announcements and its relevance for job search using detailed search data from half a million anonymous job seekers. We find evidence consistent with job seekers initiating job-search activity in response to a prospective employer's earnings announcements. Job seekers search more intensely for employers with media coverage and earnings growth, consistent with the attention and information roles of earnings announcements. We find corroborating evidence about the usefulness of earnings announcements' financial information content to job seekers: (1) a survey experiment indicates that job seekers are more willing to apply to firms when provided with evidence of positive performance; (2) job seekers search for financial information during applications and interviews; and (3) financial information is predictive of future job prospects, including job openings and career growth. Overall, our paper suggests that earnings announcements—among other sources—prompt and guide job seekers' search activities.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":48438,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Accounting & Economics","volume":"76 1","pages":"Article 101588"},"PeriodicalIF":5.9,"publicationDate":"2023-08-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49808950","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 5
Public firm disclosures and the market for innovation 上市公司披露与创新市场
IF 5.9 1区 管理学
Journal of Accounting & Economics Pub Date : 2023-08-01 DOI: 10.1016/j.jacceco.2023.101577
Jinhwan Kim , Kristen Valentine
{"title":"Public firm disclosures and the market for innovation","authors":"Jinhwan Kim ,&nbsp;Kristen Valentine","doi":"10.1016/j.jacceco.2023.101577","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jacceco.2023.101577","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>We examine the spillover effect of public firm disclosures on the patent trading market. The patent market is rife with information frictions, yet can potentially facilitate the reallocation of innovation to the most productive users. We find that going from the 25th percentile to the 75th percentile in public firm presence – our proxy for public firm disclosures – is linked to a 9.4% increase in other related parties' future patent sales. The positive link between public firm presence is stronger where information asymmetry is greatest and where information uncertainty prevails relative to transactions less likely to suffer from information frictions. Tests exploiting cross-sectional variation and public firms' EDGAR implementation corroborate the resolution of information frictions as a mechanism. Additional tests reveal financial statement disclosure as an important information source facilitating patent sales. Our results speak to an important and underexplored externality of public firm disclosures – its contribution to the patent market.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":48438,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Accounting & Economics","volume":"76 1","pages":"Article 101577"},"PeriodicalIF":5.9,"publicationDate":"2023-08-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49808947","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 3
Compensation regulation in banking: Executive director behavior and bank performance after the EU bonus cap 银行业薪酬监管：欧盟奖金上限后执行董事行为与银行业绩
IF 5.9 1区 管理学
Journal of Accounting & Economics Pub Date : 2023-08-01 DOI: 10.1016/j.jacceco.2022.101576
Stefano Colonnello , Michael Koetter , Konstantin Wagner
{"title":"Compensation regulation in banking: Executive director behavior and bank performance after the EU bonus cap","authors":"Stefano Colonnello ,&nbsp;Michael Koetter ,&nbsp;Konstantin Wagner","doi":"10.1016/j.jacceco.2022.101576","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jacceco.2022.101576","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>The regulation that caps executives’ variable compensation, as part of the Capital Requirements Directive IV of 2013, likely affected executive turnover, compensation design, and risk-taking in EU banking. The current study identifies significantly higher average turnover rates but also finds that they are driven by CEOs at poorly performing banks. Banks indemnified their executives by off-setting the bonus cap with higher fixed compensation. Although our evidence is only suggestive, we do not find any reduction in risk-taking at the bank level, one purported aim of the regulation.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":48438,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Accounting & Economics","volume":"76 1","pages":"Article 101576"},"PeriodicalIF":5.9,"publicationDate":"2023-08-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49808945","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Retail bond investors and credit ratings 零售债券投资者和信用评级
IF 5.9 1区 管理学
Journal of Accounting & Economics Pub Date : 2023-08-01 DOI: 10.1016/j.jacceco.2023.101587
Ed deHaan , Jiacui Li , Edward M. Watts
{"title":"Retail bond investors and credit ratings","authors":"Ed deHaan ,&nbsp;Jiacui Li ,&nbsp;Edward M. Watts","doi":"10.1016/j.jacceco.2023.101587","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jacceco.2023.101587","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>Using comprehensive data on U.S. corporate bond trades since 2002, we find evidence that retail bond investors overrely on untimely credit ratings to their financial detriment. Specifically, they appear to select bonds by first screening on a credit rating and then sorting by yield, buying the highest-yielding bonds within each rating level. Because yields lead credit rating changes, selecting on yield-within-rating means that retail investors systematically trade in the opposite direction of changing fundamentals, buy in advance of credit downgrades and defaults, and materially underperform a diversified portfolio. Our study provides new evidence of ill-informed retail trading in a market that is thought to be relatively sophisticated, corroborates regulators’ concerns about investor overreliance on credit ratings, and contributes to the academic literature on the roles and consequences of credit ratings in debt markets.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":48438,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Accounting & Economics","volume":"76 1","pages":"Article 101587"},"PeriodicalIF":5.9,"publicationDate":"2023-08-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49808951","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
EDITORIAL DATA 编辑数据
IF 5.9 1区 管理学
Journal of Accounting & Economics Pub Date : 2023-08-01 DOI: 10.1016/S0165-4101(23)00052-6
{"title":"EDITORIAL DATA","authors":"","doi":"10.1016/S0165-4101(23)00052-6","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1016/S0165-4101(23)00052-6","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":48438,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Accounting & Economics","volume":"76 1","pages":"Article 101628"},"PeriodicalIF":5.9,"publicationDate":"2023-08-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49848130","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Financial reporting and disclosure practices in China 中国的财务报告和披露实践
IF 5.9 1区 管理学
Journal of Accounting & Economics Pub Date : 2023-08-01 DOI: 10.1016/j.jacceco.2023.101598
Hai Lu , Jee-Eun Shin , Mingyue Zhang
{"title":"Financial reporting and disclosure practices in China","authors":"Hai Lu ,&nbsp;Jee-Eun Shin ,&nbsp;Mingyue Zhang","doi":"10.1016/j.jacceco.2023.101598","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jacceco.2023.101598","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>We study financial reporting and disclosure practices in China using survey methods similar to prior studies of U.S. firms (i.e., Graham et al., 2005; Dichev et al., 2013). Comparing earnings features, motives to manage and smooth earnings, and voluntary disclosure practices between the two countries, we reveal three major differences. First, Chinese firms exhibit a stronger preference for predictive, relative to verifiable, attributes of earnings that can signal stable firm performance to their stakeholders. Second, smooth earnings are desired by various stakeholders and can be achieved through coordination among connected stakeholders, which is conceptually different from earnings management. Third, Chinese firms consider public disclosure as less relevant in the reduction of the cost of capital. In addition, Chinese firms do not have a bias towards conservative reporting. We explain and reconcile these differences as resulting from some unique institutional features of China. Our study provides novel field evidence that contributes to, expands, and directly corroborates existing empirical studies.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":48438,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Accounting & Economics","volume":"76 1","pages":"Article 101598"},"PeriodicalIF":5.9,"publicationDate":"2023-08-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49850872","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 1
Explaining accruals quality over time 解释应计项目随时间变化的质量
IF 5.9 1区 管理学
Journal of Accounting & Economics Pub Date : 2023-08-01 DOI: 10.1016/j.jacceco.2022.101575
Theodore E. Christensen , Jenna D'Adduzio , Karen K. Nelson
{"title":"Explaining accruals quality over time","authors":"Theodore E. Christensen ,&nbsp;Jenna D'Adduzio ,&nbsp;Karen K. Nelson","doi":"10.1016/j.jacceco.2022.101575","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jacceco.2022.101575","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>We provide evidence that accruals quality in the U.S. has generally improved since 2000, following a decade of decline during the 1990s. Our results indicate that both the initial decline in accruals quality and the subsequent reversal can be explained by an inverse relation with operating cash flow volatility. Moreover, even though patterns of cash flow volatility and accruals quality vary in different regions of the world and relative to the U.S., we find evidence of an inverse relation between accruals quality and cash flow volatility globally. We corroborate our main results in a battery of additional tests, which also indicate that our results are not attributable to other explanations. Overall, our evidence challenges conventional wisdom and suggests that concerns about a sustained decline in accruals quality over time are unwarranted.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":48438,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Accounting & Economics","volume":"76 1","pages":"Article 101575"},"PeriodicalIF":5.9,"publicationDate":"2023-08-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49808948","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 1
The wisdom of crowds and the market's response to earnings news: Evidence using the geographic dispersion of investors 人群的智慧和市场对盈利消息的反应：利用投资者地理分布的证据
IF 5.9 1区 管理学
Journal of Accounting & Economics Pub Date : 2023-04-01 DOI: 10.1016/j.jacceco.2022.101567
Jason V. Chen
{"title":"The wisdom of crowds and the market's response to earnings news: Evidence using the geographic dispersion of investors","authors":"Jason V. Chen","doi":"10.1016/j.jacceco.2022.101567","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jacceco.2022.101567","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>The wisdom of crowds suggests that groups with more diversely informed individuals reach more informed decisions because their members are collectively more knowledgeable. I study this idea in the context of the market's response to earnings announcements by examining how information diversity across investors affects the efficiency of the price response to earnings news. I measure investors' information diversity based on their geographic dispersion, which I estimate using the locations of the requests for firms' filings to EDGAR. Greater geographic dispersion is associated with greater trading during the announcement period; this supports the use of geographic dispersion as a measure of information diversity. Consistent with my predictions, the price response to a firm's earnings news is more efficient when the firm's investors have greater information diversity. In further analysis, I find that the initial heightened trading for firms with more diversely informed investors subsides quickly after the announcement period.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":48438,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Accounting & Economics","volume":"75 2","pages":"Article 101567"},"PeriodicalIF":5.9,"publicationDate":"2023-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49811975","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
How does shareholder governance affect the cost of borrowing? Evidence from the passage of anti-takeover provisions 股东治理如何影响借贷成本？反收购条款通过的证据
IF 5.9 1区 管理学
Journal of Accounting & Economics Pub Date : 2023-04-01 DOI: 10.1016/j.jacceco.2022.101569
Yukun Liu , Xi Wu
{"title":"How does shareholder governance affect the cost of borrowing? Evidence from the passage of anti-takeover provisions","authors":"Yukun Liu ,&nbsp;Xi Wu","doi":"10.1016/j.jacceco.2022.101569","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jacceco.2022.101569","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p><span>This paper examines the effect of shareholder governance on firms' cost of borrowing using the voting outcomes of shareholder-sponsored anti-takeover governance proposals. Implementing a regression discontinuity design centered around the proposals' passing thresholds, we show that firms' public debt prices fall significantly upon the proposals' passage, and that banks demand higher </span>interest rates and more general covenants on new loans issued to those firms. We find that these effects are more pronounced for riskier firms where shareholder-debtholder conflicts are more severe. Moreover, firms with passed shareholder-sponsored proposals become more volatile, reflecting an increase in their risk-shifting incentives. Collectively, our findings suggest that shareholder governance exacerbates shareholder-debtholder conflicts and raises firms’ cost of borrowing.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":48438,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Accounting & Economics","volume":"75 2","pages":"Article 101569"},"PeriodicalIF":5.9,"publicationDate":"2023-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49811973","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
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