Relative performance evaluation, sabotage and collusion

IF 5.4 1区管理学 Q1 BUSINESS, FINANCE

Journal of Accounting & Economics Pub Date : 2023-11-01 DOI:10.1016/j.jacceco.2023.101608

Matthew J. Bloomfield , Catarina Marvão , Giancarlo Spagnolo

引用次数: 0

Abstract

We examine whether the potential for costly sabotage is a deterrent to firms' use of relative performance evaluation (“RPE”) in CEO pay plans. We exploit illegal cartel membership as a source of variation in the potential for costly sabotage and document that firms are more likely to use RPE if they are currently cartel members. Moreover, firms frequently drop RPE from their CEOs’ pay plans immediately after their cartels are detected, dissolved and punished. We further provide suggestive evidence that the potential for costly sabotage explains these patterns; cartel membership severs the empirical association between RPE and competitive aggression.

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相对绩效评估、蓄意破坏和串通

我们研究了潜在的代价高昂的破坏是否会阻碍公司在CEO薪酬计划中使用相对绩效评估(“RPE”)。我们利用非法的卡特尔成员身份作为潜在的昂贵破坏的变化来源，并证明如果公司目前是卡特尔成员，则更有可能使用RPE。此外，在卡特尔被发现、解散并受到惩罚后，企业经常立即将RPE从ceo薪酬计划中剔除。我们进一步提供了暗示性的证据，表明潜在的代价高昂的破坏可以解释这些模式;卡特尔成员资格切断了RPE与竞争侵略之间的实证联系。

本文章由计算机程序翻译，如有差异，请以英文原文为准。

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来源期刊

Journal of Accounting & Economics Multiple-

CiteScore

8.70

自引率

6.80%

发文量

期刊介绍： The Journal of Accounting and Economics encourages the application of economic theory to the explanation of accounting phenomena. It provides a forum for the publication of the highest quality manuscripts which employ economic analyses of accounting problems. A wide range of methodologies and topics are encouraged and covered: * The role of accounting within the firm; * The information content and role of accounting numbers in capital markets; * The role of accounting in financial contracts and in monitoring agency relationships; * The determination of accounting standards; * Government regulation of corporate disclosure and/or the Accounting profession; * The theory of the accounting firm.