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Acknowledgement 确认
IF 5.4 1区 管理学
Journal of Accounting & Economics Pub Date : 2025-04-01 DOI: 10.1016/j.jacceco.2025.101786
{"title":"Acknowledgement","authors":"","doi":"10.1016/j.jacceco.2025.101786","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jacceco.2025.101786","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":48438,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Accounting & Economics","volume":"79 2","pages":"Article 101786"},"PeriodicalIF":5.4,"publicationDate":"2025-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143820365","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Tax havens and reputational costs 避税天堂和声誉成本
IF 5.4 1区 管理学
Journal of Accounting & Economics Pub Date : 2025-04-01 DOI: 10.1016/j.jacceco.2024.101761
Adrienne DePaul , Frank Murphy , Mary E. Vernon
{"title":"Tax havens and reputational costs","authors":"Adrienne DePaul ,&nbsp;Frank Murphy ,&nbsp;Mary E. Vernon","doi":"10.1016/j.jacceco.2024.101761","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jacceco.2024.101761","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>In 2017, the European Commission (EC) published a list of non-cooperative tax havens. We study whether country-level tourism and foreign direct investment (FDI) change as a result of this list. Consistent with a reputational cost of the EC's “name and shame” campaign, there is a modest reduction in EU tourism among listed countries compared to unlisted ones. This relative reduction is concentrated among tourists from countries that view cheating on taxes as less justifiable. In contrast, listed countries experience a general increase in FDI following the list, a benefit potentially offsetting the costs of reduced tourism.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48438,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Accounting & Economics","volume":"79 2","pages":"Article 101761"},"PeriodicalIF":5.4,"publicationDate":"2025-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142874774","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Sell-by-plan mandate and opportunistic insider selling: Evidence from China 按计划出售授权和机会主义的内幕抛售：来自中国的证据
IF 5.4 1区 管理学
Journal of Accounting & Economics Pub Date : 2025-04-01 DOI: 10.1016/j.jacceco.2024.101757
Pengfei Ye , Qingsheng Zeng , Cheng Zhang
{"title":"Sell-by-plan mandate and opportunistic insider selling: Evidence from China","authors":"Pengfei Ye ,&nbsp;Qingsheng Zeng ,&nbsp;Cheng Zhang","doi":"10.1016/j.jacceco.2024.101757","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jacceco.2024.101757","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>We examine whether requiring insiders to sell their stock shares based on pre-disclosed plans can mitigate opportunistic insider selling activities and, more importantly, to what extent insiders can circumvent this regulation. Using China's mandate enacted in 2017 as the setting, we demonstrate that a sell-by-plan mandate can reduce opportunistic selling activities. However, insiders can circumvent this mandate by strategically initiating their plans before bad news. We find that this gaming practice is widespread in China. It is concentrated in firms with weak governance but largely absent in firms with strong governance<strong>.</strong> We also find that China's stock market cannot discern whether a plan is opportunistically motivated upon its announcement. Overall, this paper highlights a new form of opportunism in insider trading—opportunistic planning—and proposes a method to identify such plans. Our results also suggest that government regulation, without strong governance, could be ineffective in curbing corporate executives' opportunistic behaviors.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48438,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Accounting & Economics","volume":"79 2","pages":"Article 101757"},"PeriodicalIF":5.4,"publicationDate":"2025-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143820360","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
FOMC news and segmented markets 联邦公开市场委员会新闻和细分市场
IF 5.4 1区 管理学
Journal of Accounting & Economics Pub Date : 2025-04-01 DOI: 10.1016/j.jacceco.2025.101767
Benjamin Golez , Peter Kelly , Ben Matthies
{"title":"FOMC news and segmented markets","authors":"Benjamin Golez ,&nbsp;Peter Kelly ,&nbsp;Ben Matthies","doi":"10.1016/j.jacceco.2025.101767","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jacceco.2025.101767","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>A growing body of evidence suggests that Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) announcements can affect private sector beliefs about near-term macroeconomic conditions. We measure the impact of central bank policy on index option trader beliefs about near-term economic conditions using the return of short-term dividend strips around each FOMC announcement (we term this short-term dividend strip return, “SDR”). Consistent with the idea that these announcements contain valuable information about macroeconomic conditions, we find that <em>SDR</em> predicts both future firm-level earnings and firm-level earnings announcement returns. Furthermore, using analyst earnings forecasts, we provide evidence of belief underreaction to FOMC announcements. We discuss how investor specialization and segmented markets can generate our empirical results.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48438,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Accounting & Economics","volume":"79 2","pages":"Article 101767"},"PeriodicalIF":5.4,"publicationDate":"2025-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143049704","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Sell-side analysts’ assessment of ESG risk 卖方分析师对ESG风险的评估
IF 5.4 1区 管理学
Journal of Accounting & Economics Pub Date : 2025-04-01 DOI: 10.1016/j.jacceco.2024.101759
Min Park , Aaron Yoon , Tzachi Zach
{"title":"Sell-side analysts’ assessment of ESG risk","authors":"Min Park ,&nbsp;Aaron Yoon ,&nbsp;Tzachi Zach","doi":"10.1016/j.jacceco.2024.101759","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jacceco.2024.101759","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>We assess whether and how financial analysts incorporate information about downside ESG risk. Using a unique dataset on firm-day level negative ESG incidents, we find that analysts’ outputs (i.e., stock recommendations, EPS forecasts, and target prices) are associated with negative future ESG risk events, especially those that are financially material. Further investigation suggests that analysts incorporate ESG risk not only through adjusting future cash flow expectations (i.e. the “numerator”), but also through adjusting discount rates (i.e., the “denominator”). Overall, our results highlight the ability of financial analysts to synthesize and integrate ESG risk into their research.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48438,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Accounting & Economics","volume":"79 2","pages":"Article 101759"},"PeriodicalIF":5.4,"publicationDate":"2025-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143820362","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Does transparency about banks’ lending costs lower firms’ borrowing costs? Evidence from India 银行贷款成本的透明度会降低企业的借贷成本吗？印度的证据
IF 5.4 1区 管理学
Journal of Accounting & Economics Pub Date : 2025-04-01 DOI: 10.1016/j.jacceco.2024.101737
Prasanna Tantri , Nitin Vishen
{"title":"Does transparency about banks’ lending costs lower firms’ borrowing costs? Evidence from India","authors":"Prasanna Tantri ,&nbsp;Nitin Vishen","doi":"10.1016/j.jacceco.2024.101737","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jacceco.2024.101737","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>We study the impact of transparency about banks’ costs on loan interest rates. The Indian Central Bank required banks to disclose a cost-based benchmark interest rate instead of the prime rate. The banks could price loans using any spread to the cost-based benchmark. We find that this change, which made banks’ cost structures more transparent, lowers the interest rates charged and leads to increases in debtor firms’ total borrowings and investments. We hypothesize that increased cost transparency reveals relationship rents to competitor banks and makes it difficult for incumbent banks to maintain high relationship rents because of increased threat of entry.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48438,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Accounting & Economics","volume":"79 2","pages":"Article 101737"},"PeriodicalIF":5.4,"publicationDate":"2025-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142101879","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Client restatement announcement, audit office human capital investment, and audit quality improvements 客户重述公告，审计署人力资本投资，审计质量改进
IF 5.4 1区 管理学
Journal of Accounting & Economics Pub Date : 2025-04-01 DOI: 10.1016/j.jacceco.2024.101741
Daniel Aobdia , Xuejiao Liu , Ke Na , Hong Wu
{"title":"Client restatement announcement, audit office human capital investment, and audit quality improvements","authors":"Daniel Aobdia ,&nbsp;Xuejiao Liu ,&nbsp;Ke Na ,&nbsp;Hong Wu","doi":"10.1016/j.jacceco.2024.101741","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jacceco.2024.101741","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>This paper examines audit offices’ human capital investment in response to client restatement announcements and the resulting effects on audit quality and audit office client base. We find that audit offices attempt to acquire human capital and talent by posting more audit-related job positions just after a client announces a restatement. The increase in job postings follows restatements with more negative announcement returns and restatements of annual financial statements, and is concentrated among more senior and experienced positions. Importantly, the increased job postings are not driven by replacement hiring due to individual auditor departures and reflect more auditors joining the office. These human capital investments reduce future client misstatements and losses in client portfolios, indicating improvements in actual and perceived audit quality. Audit offices are also more likely to replace audit managing partners and prevent the signing partners of the misstated financial statements from signing new audit reports after restatement announcements.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48438,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Accounting & Economics","volume":"79 2","pages":"Article 101741"},"PeriodicalIF":5.4,"publicationDate":"2025-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143820357","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Generalist managers and firm innovation worldwide: The role of innovation-specific institutions 全球通才经理人与企业创新：创新机构的角色
IF 5.4 1区 管理学
Journal of Accounting & Economics Pub Date : 2025-04-01 DOI: 10.1016/j.jacceco.2024.101755
Yue Rio Wu , Sterling Huang , Albert Tsang , Kun Tracy Wang
{"title":"Generalist managers and firm innovation worldwide: The role of innovation-specific institutions","authors":"Yue Rio Wu ,&nbsp;Sterling Huang ,&nbsp;Albert Tsang ,&nbsp;Kun Tracy Wang","doi":"10.1016/j.jacceco.2024.101755","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jacceco.2024.101755","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>We examine how generalist CEOs influence innovation outcomes across 25 countries from 2001 to 2019. We assemble a novel, extended dataset of generalist CEOs and find that generalist CEOs positively affect innovation, particularly in countries with abundant innovation resources. This finding aligns with the notion that generalist CEOs leverage their broad knowledge and cross-industry experience to integrate resources across institutional environments, thereby fostering innovation activities. However, in countries with stricter patent systems, the increased need for specialized knowledge and resources limits the value that generalist CEOs can contribute, leading to decreased innovation activities. Our research highlights how institutional environments shape the efficacy of CEO human capital in driving innovation, thus offering insights for the design of innovation policies that maximize leadership potential across different institutional contexts.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48438,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Accounting & Economics","volume":"79 2","pages":"Article 101755"},"PeriodicalIF":5.4,"publicationDate":"2025-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142758707","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
New accounting standards and the performance of quantitative investors 新会计准则与量化投资者的表现
IF 5.4 1区 管理学
Journal of Accounting & Economics Pub Date : 2025-04-01 DOI: 10.1016/j.jacceco.2024.101740
Travis Dyer , Nicholas Guest , Elisha Yu
{"title":"New accounting standards and the performance of quantitative investors","authors":"Travis Dyer ,&nbsp;Nicholas Guest ,&nbsp;Elisha Yu","doi":"10.1016/j.jacceco.2024.101740","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jacceco.2024.101740","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>We examine quantitative investors’ ability to navigate a common and occasionally material change to the financial data generating process: new accounting standards. Returns of quantitative mutual funds temporarily decrease relative to funds that rely more heavily on human discretion following the implementation of a few standards that significantly change key financial statement variables; however, other standards do not appear to have a differential effect. Our result is stronger for quantitative funds using more accounting terminology in their prospectuses and using value strategies, which leverage accounting signals. Excess portfolio turnover following the implementation of accounting standards appears to be a driving factor of the quant underperformance. Additional evidence connects the fund-level results to the specific stocks that were affected by the accounting standards. Overall, our results suggest quant funds are generally proficient at adapting to accounting changes, although material changes occasionally put them at a temporary disadvantage relative to discretionary investors.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48438,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Accounting & Economics","volume":"79 2","pages":"Article 101740"},"PeriodicalIF":5.4,"publicationDate":"2025-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142231925","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Board risk oversight and environmental and social performance 董事会风险监督以及环境和社会绩效
IF 5.4 1区 管理学
Journal of Accounting & Economics Pub Date : 2025-04-01 DOI: 10.1016/j.jacceco.2024.101754
Hami Amiraslani , Carolyn Deller , Christopher D. Ittner , Thomas Keusch
{"title":"Board risk oversight and environmental and social performance","authors":"Hami Amiraslani ,&nbsp;Carolyn Deller ,&nbsp;Christopher D. Ittner ,&nbsp;Thomas Keusch","doi":"10.1016/j.jacceco.2024.101754","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jacceco.2024.101754","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>We examine the relation between board risk oversight and environmental and social (E&amp;S) performance. Our study is motivated by heightened awareness of E&amp;S risks and growing calls for their inclusion in the purview of board risk oversight. Using a novel proprietary dataset on board risk oversight for an international sample, we find that firms with more extensive board risk oversight are more likely to institute E&amp;S compensation, set environmental (but <em>not</em> social) targets, adopt policies that address E&amp;S risks and opportunities, and issue an E&amp;S report. Our exploratory evidence also shows that more extensive board risk oversight is associated with <em>better</em> environmental outcomes, specifically lower monetized environmental costs, but <em>worse</em> social outcomes, namely lower monetized employee benefits and a higher likelihood of social risk incidents. Our results suggest that risk oversight is analogous to a constrained optimization problem whereby risk exposures are prioritized and receive different degrees of oversight consideration by the board.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48438,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Accounting & Economics","volume":"79 2","pages":"Article 101754"},"PeriodicalIF":5.4,"publicationDate":"2025-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143820359","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
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