{"title":"The promises and pitfalls of mandated ownership transparency: A discussion of Amberger, Wilde, and Wu (2025)","authors":"Thomas Rauter","doi":"10.1016/j.jacceco.2025.101814","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jacceco.2025.101814","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>Amberger, Wilde, and Wu (2025, AWW) examine the impact of EU beneficial ownership transparency (BOT) regulation on cross-border investment. They find that BOT is associated with reductions in investments from non-EU financial havens into the EU and that BOT unintentionally discourages legitimate investments without deterring illicit actors. My discussion evaluates AWW's evidence, positions the paper within the existing literature, and discusses its contributions. I particularly focus on challenges in measuring illicit activities and the impact of voluntary FDI data reporting by EU countries. I also assess how privacy concerns and recent legal decisions have shaped the evolving landscape of beneficial ownership mandates and how they may affect the public scrutiny mechanism going forward. To contextualize the paper's findings, I provide new survey evidence on private firms' disclosure practices and interview-based insights into the practical use of BOT registries. I conclude with suggestions for future research.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48438,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Accounting & Economics","volume":"80 2","pages":"Article 101814"},"PeriodicalIF":6.8,"publicationDate":"2025-11-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144621771","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Firms’ real and reporting response to taxation: A discussion","authors":"Jennifer Blouin","doi":"10.1016/j.jacceco.2025.101836","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jacceco.2025.101836","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>This discussion reflects my thoughts on Lester and Olbert's (2025) review of the tax literature. I address the notion of “real” effects in tax work and the reliance by Lester and Olbert (2025) on the Hall and Jorgenson (1967) neoclassical framework. I intend to complement the review by discussing some of the competitive advantages of accounting researchers working in taxation. I close by emphasizing some areas where accountants can potentially be the most impactful on tax research and listing some of my hopes for the future of this work.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48438,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Accounting & Economics","volume":"80 2","pages":"Article 101836"},"PeriodicalIF":6.8,"publicationDate":"2025-11-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145411993","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Oliver Binz , Katherine Schipper , Kevin R. Standridge
{"title":"Estimating profitability decomposition frameworks via machine learning: Implications for earnings forecasting and financial statement analysis","authors":"Oliver Binz , Katherine Schipper , Kevin R. Standridge","doi":"10.1016/j.jacceco.2025.101805","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jacceco.2025.101805","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>We find that nonlinear estimation of profitability decomposition frameworks yields more accurate out-of-sample profitability forecasts than forecasts from both a random walk and linear estimation. The improvements derive from nonlinear estimation and synergies between nonlinear estimation and profitability decomposition frameworks. We analyze three essential financial statement analysis design choices to provide insights for the practice of fundamental analysis and find robust evidence that higher levels of profitability decomposition, focusing on core items, and using up to three years of historical information improve forecast accuracy. We find that our forecasts predict returns and profitability changes before and after controlling for analyst forecasts and common asset pricing factors.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48438,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Accounting & Economics","volume":"80 2","pages":"Article 101805"},"PeriodicalIF":6.8,"publicationDate":"2025-11-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144337782","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Jie Chen , Xunhua Su , Xuan Tian , Bin Xu , Luo Zuo
{"title":"Do major corporate customers deter supplier misconduct?","authors":"Jie Chen , Xunhua Su , Xuan Tian , Bin Xu , Luo Zuo","doi":"10.1016/j.jacceco.2025.101801","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jacceco.2025.101801","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>We examine whether major corporate customers can deter misconduct among their suppliers. Our findings indicate that firms with concentrated customer bases are less likely to commit misconduct and face lower penalties in equilibrium. We also observe a significant decline in supplier misconduct following the establishment of a major customer relationship. Furthermore, the deterrent effect of major customers is more pronounced when customer pressure to reduce supplier misconduct risk is higher. Additional analyses suggest that major customers exercise their exit option to penalize suppliers after acute violations. Overall, our results suggest that major customers play a crucial role in deterring supplier misconduct.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48438,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Accounting & Economics","volume":"80 2","pages":"Article 101801"},"PeriodicalIF":6.8,"publicationDate":"2025-11-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144133753","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Reflections on the founding of The Journal of Accounting and Economics","authors":"Jerold L. Zimmerman","doi":"10.1016/j.jacceco.2024.101762","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jacceco.2024.101762","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":48438,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Accounting & Economics","volume":"80 2","pages":"Article 101762"},"PeriodicalIF":6.8,"publicationDate":"2025-11-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142874776","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Real effects of lagged guidance from prudential regulators on CECL","authors":"Riddha Basu , Sugata Roychowdhury , Kirti Sinha","doi":"10.1016/j.jacceco.2025.101808","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jacceco.2025.101808","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>We examine the impact of lagged guidance from prudential regulators on new accounting standards in the context of the Current Expected Credit Loss (CECL) standard. We refer to the period following CECL's 2016 pronouncement but prior to the 2018 guidance from prudential banking regulators on the standard as the lagged guidance (<em>LG)</em> period. We find that during the <em>LG</em><span> period, banks reduce loan amounts and increase loan spreads for affected loans (Term Loan As, or TLAs) relative to unaffected loans (Term Loan Bs, or TLBs). Following the 2018 regulatory guidelines, however, banks increase loan amounts and reduce loan spreads on TLAs relative to TLBs. The stricter TLA terms during the </span><em>LG</em><span><span> period coincide with decreased investments by corporate borrowers dependent exclusively on TLAs, especially those that borrow frequently and are financially constrained. The results indicate that delayed guidance from industry regulators on CECL had </span>spillover effects in the economy.</span></div></div>","PeriodicalId":48438,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Accounting & Economics","volume":"80 2","pages":"Article 101808"},"PeriodicalIF":6.8,"publicationDate":"2025-11-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144621831","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Trading of emission allowances and reporting incentives","authors":"Donald N'Gatta , Gaizka Ormazabal , Robert Raney","doi":"10.1016/j.jacceco.2025.101804","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jacceco.2025.101804","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>This paper examines the role of reporting incentives on the trading of emission allowances. Our tests are based on a wide international sample of firms and data from the European Union Emission Trading System (EU ETS), which is the most liquid and developed in the world. We find evidence consistent with the notion that excess allowances combined with historical cost accounting for emission rights provide firms the opportunity to obtain a reporting benefit from selling emission allowances. We observe more frequent selling of allowances when the transactions are likely to boost earnings to avoid accounting losses. The documented trading activity increases in the ETS market towards the end of the year and is associated with selling imbalance and effects on carbon pricing, which in turn affect firms’ emission abatement incentives. Our results have implications for the debate on the institutional design of carbon markets and on the need to define an accounting standard for emission allowances.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48438,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Accounting & Economics","volume":"80 2","pages":"Article 101804"},"PeriodicalIF":6.8,"publicationDate":"2025-11-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144304680","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Complexities in utilizing the patent pilot program as shock to judicial efficiency felt by firms","authors":"Melissa F. Wasserman","doi":"10.1016/j.jacceco.2025.101812","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jacceco.2025.101812","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>The paper by Kim, Shi, and Verdi (2025) examines how judicial efficiency—as defined by the court’s ability to resolve patent cases quickly and in a manner that is mutually agreeable to both parties in the lawsuit—affects the incentives of corporations to innovate. The authors utilize the Patent Pilot Program (PPP), which routed patent cases to PPP-designated judges in select districts to facilitate efficient rulings, as a shock to judicial efficiency. The authors find that firms headquartered in counties subject to the PPP increase patent-based innovation by 6.1 %–6.9 %, relative to firms in counties not under the program. However, there are aspects of patent litigation that complicate the ability to neatly divide firms into treated (those who feel the effects of increased judicial efficiency associated with PPP districts) and non-treated (those that do not). The difficulty in identifying treated and untreated firms confounds the ability to interpret the increase in patent-based innovation incentives for firms headquartered in PPP judicial districts.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48438,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Accounting & Economics","volume":"80 2","pages":"Article 101812"},"PeriodicalIF":6.8,"publicationDate":"2025-11-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144664741","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Partisan regulatory actions: Evidence from the SEC","authors":"Vivek Pandey, Xingyu Shen, Joanna Shuang Wu","doi":"10.1016/j.jacceco.2025.101777","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jacceco.2025.101777","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>We study the influence of political partisanship in SEC investigations and AAER enforcement actions against financial misconduct. We find that the SEC is more likely to launch an investigation against a firm that is misaligned with the agency’s political ideology than other firms. The likelihood of an AAER appears unaffected by political misalignment, but once named in an AAER, a misaligned firm faces harsher penalties than other firms. We find evidence that collectively points to potential misallocation of scarce enforcement resources due to partisanship: conditional on investigation, misaligned firms are less likely to receive an enforcement action, and conditional on misreporting, non-misaligned firms are less likely to be investigated.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48438,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Accounting & Economics","volume":"80 1","pages":"Article 101777"},"PeriodicalIF":6.8,"publicationDate":"2025-08-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143477811","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}