Journal of Accounting & Economics最新文献_第3页

Standing on the shoulders of giants: Financial reporting comparability and knowledge accumulation 站在巨人的肩膀上：财务报告可比性与知识积累

IF 5.4 1区管理学

Journal of Accounting & Economics Pub Date : 2024-08-01 DOI: 10.1016/j.jacceco.2024.101685

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引用次数: 0

Community membership and reciprocity in lending: Evidence from informal markets 社区成员资格与借贷互惠：非正规市场的证据

IF 5.4 1区管理学

Journal of Accounting & Economics Pub Date : 2024-08-01 DOI: 10.1016/j.jacceco.2024.101697

引用次数: 0

EDITORIAL DATA 编辑日期

IF 5.4 1区管理学

Journal of Accounting & Economics Pub Date : 2024-08-01 DOI: 10.1016/j.jacceco.2024.101712

引用次数: 0

Mandatory financial information disclosure and credit ratings 强制性财务信息披露和信用评级

IF 5.4 1区管理学

Journal of Accounting & Economics Pub Date : 2024-08-01 DOI: 10.1016/j.jacceco.2024.101676

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引用次数: 0

Distinguishing between recurring and nonrecurring components of earnings using unobserved components modeling 利用非观测变量模型区分收益的经常性和非经常性组成部分

IF 5.4 1区管理学

Journal of Accounting & Economics Pub Date : 2024-08-01 DOI: 10.1016/j.jacceco.2024.101687

引用次数: 0

Litigation risk and strategic M&A valuations 诉讼风险与战略性并购估值

IF 5.4 1区管理学

Journal of Accounting & Economics Pub Date : 2024-08-01 DOI: 10.1016/j.jacceco.2024.101671

引用次数: 0

Employee responses to CEO activism 员工对首席执行官行动主义的反应

IF 5.4 1区管理学

Journal of Accounting & Economics Pub Date : 2024-08-01 DOI: 10.1016/j.jacceco.2024.101701

引用次数: 0

Public environmental enforcement and private lender monitoring: Evidence from environmental covenants 公共环境执法和私人贷方监督：环境契约的证据

IF 5.9 1区管理学

Journal of Accounting & Economics Pub Date : 2024-04-01 DOI: 10.1016/j.jacceco.2023.101621

Stacey Choy , Shushu Jiang , Scott Liao , Emma Wang

{"title":"Public environmental enforcement and private lender monitoring: Evidence from environmental covenants","authors":"Stacey Choy , Shushu Jiang , Scott Liao , Emma Wang","doi":"10.1016/j.jacceco.2023.101621","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jacceco.2023.101621","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>This paper examines whether and how public environmental enforcement affects private lenders’ monitoring efforts and the effectiveness of such monitoring. We capture lender monitoring using environmental covenants in loan agreements. Consistent with the prediction that stringent public environmental enforcement increases lenders’ monitoring incentives, we find that in the presence of higher environmental regulatory enforcement intensity, lenders are more likely to use environmental covenants when lending to polluting borrowers and when the loans are secured by real property collateral. Moreover, consistent with the prediction that stringent public environmental enforcement facilitates lender monitoring, we find that environmental covenants are more effective in reducing borrowers’ toxic chemical releases when environmental regulatory enforcement is stronger. Taken together, our findings corroborate the importance of public environmental enforcement in inducing lenders’ monitoring efforts, as well as the joint role of public enforcement and private lender monitoring in curbing corporate pollution.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":48438,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Accounting & Economics","volume":"77 2","pages":"Article 101621"},"PeriodicalIF":5.9,"publicationDate":"2024-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135509300","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Capital-market effects of tipper-tippee insider trading law: Evidence from the Newman ruling 内幕交易法对资本市场的影响：来自纽曼案裁决的证据

IF 5.9 1区管理学

Journal of Accounting & Economics Pub Date : 2024-04-01 DOI: 10.1016/j.jacceco.2023.101639

Andrew T. Pierce

引用次数: 0

Accounting conservatism and managerial information acquisition 会计保守主义与管理信息获取

IF 5.9 1区管理学

Journal of Accounting & Economics Pub Date : 2024-04-01 DOI: 10.1016/j.jacceco.2023.101630

Christian Laux , Volker Laux

引用次数: 0