{"title":"Assessing the objective function of the SEC against financial misconduct: A structural approach","authors":"Chuan Chen , Yanrong Jia , Xiumin Martin , Bernardo Silveira","doi":"10.1016/j.jacceco.2025.101794","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jacceco.2025.101794","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>We examine the objective function of the SEC against financial misconduct by estimating a structural model of the interactions between the SEC and a regulated firm. The SEC considers social costs, enforcement costs, and firms' compliance costs when making enforcement decisions. Identification exploits SOX as a shock to enforcement intensity. Four insights emerge from counterfactual analyses. First, marginal social costs have a greater impact on the SEC's perceived welfare than marginal enforcement costs. Second, the SEC's current enforcement mitigates earnings management to a level close to the first-best scenario. Third, a “hawkish” regulator, who perceives high social costs of financial misconduct, would impose excessive costs on society. Lastly, removing regulatory discretion would result in higher penalties and lower welfare, with little effect on earnings management.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48438,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Accounting & Economics","volume":"80 1","pages":"Article 101794"},"PeriodicalIF":6.8,"publicationDate":"2025-08-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143877893","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Bok Baik , Alex G. Kim , David S. Kim , Sangwon Yoon
{"title":"Vocal delivery quality in earnings conference calls","authors":"Bok Baik , Alex G. Kim , David S. Kim , Sangwon Yoon","doi":"10.1016/j.jacceco.2024.101763","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jacceco.2024.101763","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>We study the economic consequences of managers’ vocal delivery quality during earnings conference calls. We introduce a novel measure, vocal delivery quality, that captures the acoustic comprehensibility of audio information for an average listener. Our measure relies on a deep-learning algorithm applied to a large sample of earnings call audio files. Consistent with predictions from the psychology and accounting literatures, we find evidence that the quality of managers’ vocal delivery deteriorates when they deliver negative news, such as a decrease in earnings or negative narrative information, and positive but transitory earnings news. We show that the stock market reacts in real time to managers’ vocal delivery quality. We also document that the vocal delivery quality has an effect on information intermediaries<span> such as analysts and the media. Overall, our findings underscore the role of vocal dimensions in corporate oral disclosures.</span></div></div>","PeriodicalId":48438,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Accounting & Economics","volume":"80 1","pages":"Article 101763"},"PeriodicalIF":6.8,"publicationDate":"2025-08-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142929393","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Mirko S. Heinle , Chongho Kim , Daniel J. Taylor , Frank S. Zhou
{"title":"Signaling long-term information using short-term forecasts","authors":"Mirko S. Heinle , Chongho Kim , Daniel J. Taylor , Frank S. Zhou","doi":"10.1016/j.jacceco.2025.101768","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jacceco.2025.101768","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>This paper shows theoretically and empirically that the decision to disclose a short-term earnings forecast can reveal managers’ private information about long-term performance. Consistent with the predictions of our model, we find that the decision to disclose a short-term earnings forecast predicts long-term performance for up to three years. The relation strengthens when current period performance is poor, when managers have longer horizons, and when competitive threats are lower. Endogenizing the proprietary costs of disclosure, our analysis suggests that––despite the short horizon––the decision to provide an earnings forecast contains significant information about long-term performance and thus can entail proprietary costs.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48438,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Accounting & Economics","volume":"80 1","pages":"Article 101768"},"PeriodicalIF":6.8,"publicationDate":"2025-08-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143477812","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The asset pricing and real implications of relationship intensity disclosure","authors":"Xu Jiang , Jordi Mondria , Liyan Yang","doi":"10.1016/j.jacceco.2025.101770","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jacceco.2025.101770","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>Investors in financial markets are often uncertain about the relationship intensity between firms and have to rely on firms’ disclosure of such relationship intensity. We analytically study the asset pricing implications of this relationship intensity uncertainty and how such uncertainty affects firms’ incentives to form and disclose their relationship intensities (i.e., the real implications). We find that while such disclosure has a positive price impact by increasing the expected cash flow, it also has a negative impact by reducing the diversification benefit of investing in multiple firms that have more correlated cash flows. The price impact upon relationship intensity disclosure is therefore not monotone: it increases with the expected benefit of relationship and decreases with the risk of the underlying relationship. Our analysis implies that mandatory disclosure of firm relationship intensities may both destroy relationship development and reduce investor welfare, i.e., has adverse real consequences.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48438,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Accounting & Economics","volume":"80 1","pages":"Article 101770"},"PeriodicalIF":6.8,"publicationDate":"2025-08-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143532986","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Tax enforcement and R&D credits","authors":"Mary Cowx","doi":"10.1016/j.jacceco.2025.101784","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jacceco.2025.101784","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>Tax enforcement deters noncompliance, increasing tax revenue, but may also discourage taxpayer investment in activities that policymakers aim to incentivize through tax credits and deductions. This paper investigates this investment-revenue trade-off through the lens of the research and development (R&D) tax credit, a federal tax incentive that is highly scrutinized by the Internal Revenue Service (IRS). My results suggest that expectations about IRS corporate tax scrutiny are negatively associated with both R&D tax credits and R&D investment, on average. I estimate each $1 of aggregate enforcement spending is associated with a reduction in R&D tax credits of $2.64. In terms of elasticities, a 1 % increase in my estimate of IRS corporate tax scrutiny is associated with a decline in R&D tax credits and R&D investment of 0.4 % and 0.2 %, respectively. A survey of 116 managers further supports that the risk of IRS scrutiny affects both R&D tax credit take-up and R&D investment decisions. Moreover, both the survey responses and archival evidence underscore the importance of internal information quality in claiming R&D tax credits, suggesting tax policy simplification as a means to address enforcement-related declines in R&D investment.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48438,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Accounting & Economics","volume":"80 1","pages":"Article 101784"},"PeriodicalIF":6.8,"publicationDate":"2025-08-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143824978","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Preference dynamics and risk-taking incentives","authors":"Xiao Cen , Nan Li , Chao Tang , Juanting Wang","doi":"10.1016/j.jacceco.2024.101739","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jacceco.2024.101739","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>This study explores the relationship between executive compensation and the preference dynamics of managers and shareholders. Our analysis centers on the theoretical prediction that changes in firms' asset value can differentially affect the risk-taking preferences of the two groups, potentially influencing the optimal compensation policy. Utilizing local real estate price changes to identify variations in firms’ asset value, we find that a decrease in asset value leads to more risk-taking incentives in compensation, and this effect is more pronounced in firms that are more likely to be influenced by the hypothesized mechanisms. In the second empirical setting, we provide corroborating evidence using a natural experiment involving disaster-induced negative shocks to the firm fundamentals. Collectively, our findings suggest that the design of compensation contracts facilitates incentive alignment by incorporating the dynamic preferences of the contracting parties.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48438,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Accounting & Economics","volume":"79 2","pages":"Article 101739"},"PeriodicalIF":5.4,"publicationDate":"2025-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143820356","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Fotis Delis , Manthos D. Delis , Luc Laeven , Steven Ongena
{"title":"Global evidence on profit shifting within firms and across time","authors":"Fotis Delis , Manthos D. Delis , Luc Laeven , Steven Ongena","doi":"10.1016/j.jacceco.2024.101744","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jacceco.2024.101744","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>We provide estimates of profit shifting for over 2 million firm-year observations in 100 countries over the period 2009–2020. Employing nonparametric estimation techniques within a mainstay model of profit shifting, we examine how the profits of both parent and subsidiary firms within a multinational group respond to marginal changes in the composite tax indicator. The key advantage of this approach is that it yields firm-year estimates of profit shifting. Multinational firms engage in extensive profit shifting by maintaining affiliates in low-tax countries and zero-tax havens. Multinational groups with an ultimate tax-haven owner exhibit the largest profit response to tax incentives. Our new database opens important avenues for analyzing the sources and effects of profit shifting.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48438,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Accounting & Economics","volume":"79 2","pages":"Article 101744"},"PeriodicalIF":5.4,"publicationDate":"2025-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142670431","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Contract contingencies and uncertainty: Evidence from product market contracts","authors":"Kai Wai Hui , Jun Oh , Guoman She , P. Eric Yeung","doi":"10.1016/j.jacceco.2024.101743","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jacceco.2024.101743","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>We study contingencies written in firms' material product market contracts, focusing on the theoretical prediction of uncertainty as an important determinant. We identify contract contingencies from firms’ public regulatory filings and examine the effects of general business uncertainty and specific innovation-related uncertainty. To enhance causal inference, we utilize two major business shocks (i.e., the 2008 Financial Crisis and the COVID pandemic) and the diffusion of 29 disruptive innovation shocks (Bloom et al., 2021). We also explore the effects of re-negotiation costs and writing costs. Overall, our empirical results are consistent with predictions from dynamic models of incomplete contracting.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48438,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Accounting & Economics","volume":"79 2","pages":"Article 101743"},"PeriodicalIF":5.4,"publicationDate":"2025-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142670433","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Antonio De Vito , Lisa Hillmann , Martin Jacob , Robert Vossebürger
{"title":"Do personal income taxes affect corporate tax-motivated profit shifting?","authors":"Antonio De Vito , Lisa Hillmann , Martin Jacob , Robert Vossebürger","doi":"10.1016/j.jacceco.2024.101758","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jacceco.2024.101758","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>This paper examines the role of personal income taxes on multinationals' corporate tax-induced profit shifting. As mandated in most OECD countries, firms need economic substance in low corporate-tax countries to justify profit shifting to these countries. Because high personal income taxes raise labor costs and thus the cost of providing economic substance, we predict that personal income taxes mute profit shifting. Using data from 26 European countries, we find that personal income taxes substantially reduce profit shifting to low corporate-tax jurisdictions, particularly when parent countries impose strict substance requirements. We also find that firms use employees to justify economic substance and that the effect of the personal income tax is related to its incidence falling partly on firms. Our results show important interactions between personal and corporate income taxes that reduce multinationals’ profit-shifting activities when substance requirements are implemented as in the European Union or many OECD countries.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48438,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Accounting & Economics","volume":"79 2","pages":"Article 101758"},"PeriodicalIF":5.4,"publicationDate":"2025-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143820361","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}