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Does transparency about banks’ lending costs lower firms’ borrowing costs? Evidence from India 银行贷款成本的透明度会降低企业的借贷成本吗？印度的证据
IF 5.4 1区 管理学
Journal of Accounting & Economics Pub Date : 2025-04-01 DOI: 10.1016/j.jacceco.2024.101737
Prasanna Tantri , Nitin Vishen
{"title":"Does transparency about banks’ lending costs lower firms’ borrowing costs? Evidence from India","authors":"Prasanna Tantri ,&nbsp;Nitin Vishen","doi":"10.1016/j.jacceco.2024.101737","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jacceco.2024.101737","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>We study the impact of transparency about banks’ costs on loan interest rates. The Indian Central Bank required banks to disclose a cost-based benchmark interest rate instead of the prime rate. The banks could price loans using any spread to the cost-based benchmark. We find that this change, which made banks’ cost structures more transparent, lowers the interest rates charged and leads to increases in debtor firms’ total borrowings and investments. We hypothesize that increased cost transparency reveals relationship rents to competitor banks and makes it difficult for incumbent banks to maintain high relationship rents because of increased threat of entry.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48438,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Accounting & Economics","volume":"79 2","pages":"Article 101737"},"PeriodicalIF":5.4,"publicationDate":"2025-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142101879","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Generalist managers and firm innovation worldwide: The role of innovation-specific institutions 全球通才经理人与企业创新：创新机构的角色
IF 5.4 1区 管理学
Journal of Accounting & Economics Pub Date : 2025-04-01 DOI: 10.1016/j.jacceco.2024.101755
Yue Rio Wu , Sterling Huang , Albert Tsang , Kun Tracy Wang
{"title":"Generalist managers and firm innovation worldwide: The role of innovation-specific institutions","authors":"Yue Rio Wu ,&nbsp;Sterling Huang ,&nbsp;Albert Tsang ,&nbsp;Kun Tracy Wang","doi":"10.1016/j.jacceco.2024.101755","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jacceco.2024.101755","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>We examine how generalist CEOs influence innovation outcomes across 25 countries from 2001 to 2019. We assemble a novel, extended dataset of generalist CEOs and find that generalist CEOs positively affect innovation, particularly in countries with abundant innovation resources. This finding aligns with the notion that generalist CEOs leverage their broad knowledge and cross-industry experience to integrate resources across institutional environments, thereby fostering innovation activities. However, in countries with stricter patent systems, the increased need for specialized knowledge and resources limits the value that generalist CEOs can contribute, leading to decreased innovation activities. Our research highlights how institutional environments shape the efficacy of CEO human capital in driving innovation, thus offering insights for the design of innovation policies that maximize leadership potential across different institutional contexts.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48438,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Accounting & Economics","volume":"79 2","pages":"Article 101755"},"PeriodicalIF":5.4,"publicationDate":"2025-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142758707","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
New accounting standards and the performance of quantitative investors 新会计准则与量化投资者的表现
IF 5.4 1区 管理学
Journal of Accounting & Economics Pub Date : 2025-04-01 DOI: 10.1016/j.jacceco.2024.101740
Travis Dyer , Nicholas Guest , Elisha Yu
{"title":"New accounting standards and the performance of quantitative investors","authors":"Travis Dyer ,&nbsp;Nicholas Guest ,&nbsp;Elisha Yu","doi":"10.1016/j.jacceco.2024.101740","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jacceco.2024.101740","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>We examine quantitative investors’ ability to navigate a common and occasionally material change to the financial data generating process: new accounting standards. Returns of quantitative mutual funds temporarily decrease relative to funds that rely more heavily on human discretion following the implementation of a few standards that significantly change key financial statement variables; however, other standards do not appear to have a differential effect. Our result is stronger for quantitative funds using more accounting terminology in their prospectuses and using value strategies, which leverage accounting signals. Excess portfolio turnover following the implementation of accounting standards appears to be a driving factor of the quant underperformance. Additional evidence connects the fund-level results to the specific stocks that were affected by the accounting standards. Overall, our results suggest quant funds are generally proficient at adapting to accounting changes, although material changes occasionally put them at a temporary disadvantage relative to discretionary investors.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48438,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Accounting & Economics","volume":"79 2","pages":"Article 101740"},"PeriodicalIF":5.4,"publicationDate":"2025-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142231925","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Comply-or-explain regulation and investor protection
IF 5.4 1区 管理学
Journal of Accounting & Economics Pub Date : 2025-04-01 DOI: 10.1016/j.jacceco.2025.101765
Thomas Bourveau , Xingchao Gao , Rongchen Li , Frank S. Zhou
{"title":"Comply-or-explain regulation and investor protection","authors":"Thomas Bourveau ,&nbsp;Xingchao Gao ,&nbsp;Rongchen Li ,&nbsp;Frank S. Zhou","doi":"10.1016/j.jacceco.2025.101765","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jacceco.2025.101765","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>We investigate a 2012 comply-or-explain regulation implemented by China’s Shanghai Stock Exchange. The regulation requires eligible firms to pay 30% of their current-year profits as cash dividends or explain the reasons why they do not meet this requirement through a public conference call. Using firms listed on the Shenzhen Stock Exchange as a control group, our difference-in-differences estimates suggest that firms subject to the regulation decreased tunneling, irrespective of whether they complied by paying or disclosing. Further analyses suggest that the reduction in tunneling is partially attributed to enhanced regulatory monitoring over explaining firms and the constraint on excess cash of paying firms. These findings offer novel policy insights into how a flexible comply-or-explain form of regulation can mitigate agency costs between controlling and minority shareholders in a weak institutional environment.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48438,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Accounting & Economics","volume":"79 2","pages":"Article 101765"},"PeriodicalIF":5.4,"publicationDate":"2025-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143820364","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Board risk oversight and environmental and social performance 董事会风险监督以及环境和社会绩效
IF 5.4 1区 管理学
Journal of Accounting & Economics Pub Date : 2025-04-01 DOI: 10.1016/j.jacceco.2024.101754
Hami Amiraslani , Carolyn Deller , Christopher D. Ittner , Thomas Keusch
{"title":"Board risk oversight and environmental and social performance","authors":"Hami Amiraslani ,&nbsp;Carolyn Deller ,&nbsp;Christopher D. Ittner ,&nbsp;Thomas Keusch","doi":"10.1016/j.jacceco.2024.101754","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jacceco.2024.101754","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>We examine the relation between board risk oversight and environmental and social (E&amp;S) performance. Our study is motivated by heightened awareness of E&amp;S risks and growing calls for their inclusion in the purview of board risk oversight. Using a novel proprietary dataset on board risk oversight for an international sample, we find that firms with more extensive board risk oversight are more likely to institute E&amp;S compensation, set environmental (but <em>not</em> social) targets, adopt policies that address E&amp;S risks and opportunities, and issue an E&amp;S report. Our exploratory evidence also shows that more extensive board risk oversight is associated with <em>better</em> environmental outcomes, specifically lower monetized environmental costs, but <em>worse</em> social outcomes, namely lower monetized employee benefits and a higher likelihood of social risk incidents. Our results suggest that risk oversight is analogous to a constrained optimization problem whereby risk exposures are prioritized and receive different degrees of oversight consideration by the board.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48438,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Accounting & Economics","volume":"79 2","pages":"Article 101754"},"PeriodicalIF":5.4,"publicationDate":"2025-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143820359","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
The value of lending to bellwether firms by institutional investors 机构投资者向风向标企业提供贷款的价值
IF 5.4 1区 管理学
Journal of Accounting & Economics Pub Date : 2025-04-01 DOI: 10.1016/j.jacceco.2024.101735
Wayne R. Landsman , F. Dimas Peña-Romera , Jianxin (Donny) Zhao
{"title":"The value of lending to bellwether firms by institutional investors","authors":"Wayne R. Landsman ,&nbsp;F. Dimas Peña-Romera ,&nbsp;Jianxin (Donny) Zhao","doi":"10.1016/j.jacceco.2024.101735","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jacceco.2024.101735","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>We predict that institutional investors in loan syndicates charge bellwether firms lower loan spreads as compensation for having access to private information that can help identify trading opportunities in other firms' public market securities. Consistent with this prediction, when lending to bellwether firms, institutional investors charge a loan premium that is between 17 and 25 bps lower relative to non-bellwether firms, and earn annualized excess returns of 1.5–2.2% from trading in other firms' securities. Findings from cross-sectional analyses reveal that the reduction in loan spread is larger when the value of private information from bellwether firms is higher. Additionally, institutional lenders' excess returns are lower when lending to more transparent bellwether borrowers and when they pay a lower price—as reflected in loan spreads—in exchange for the private information, supporting the notion that the value of private information relates to institutional investors’ trading performance.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48438,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Accounting & Economics","volume":"79 2","pages":"Article 101735"},"PeriodicalIF":5.4,"publicationDate":"2025-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141910699","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
The role of accounting information in an era of fake news 假新闻时代会计信息的作用
IF 5.4 1区 管理学
Journal of Accounting & Economics Pub Date : 2025-04-01 DOI: 10.1016/j.jacceco.2024.101764
Betty Liu , Austin Moss
{"title":"The role of accounting information in an era of fake news","authors":"Betty Liu ,&nbsp;Austin Moss","doi":"10.1016/j.jacceco.2024.101764","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jacceco.2024.101764","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>We offer empirical evidence on the role of accounting information in shaping the incentives to produce fake news. We document that fake news authors strategically (1) publish their articles near earnings announcements, leveraging the widespread market attention these events attract, and (2) within the near-announcement window, avoid publishing post-announcement when investors are less susceptible to fake news due to the disclosure of accounting information. In extending our analyses to the broader accounting information environment, we find that fake news authors are less likely to target firms with more robust accounting information and elicit lower market reactions when doing so. These results highlight both ex-ante and ex-post roles that accounting information plays in safeguarding firms from financial disinformation.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48438,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Accounting & Economics","volume":"79 2","pages":"Article 101764"},"PeriodicalIF":5.4,"publicationDate":"2025-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143820363","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Editorial Data 编辑数据
IF 5.4 1区 管理学
Journal of Accounting & Economics Pub Date : 2025-04-01 DOI: 10.1016/j.jacceco.2025.101785
{"title":"Editorial Data","authors":"","doi":"10.1016/j.jacceco.2025.101785","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jacceco.2025.101785","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":48438,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Accounting & Economics","volume":"79 2","pages":"Article 101785"},"PeriodicalIF":5.4,"publicationDate":"2025-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143820355","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Creditor protection and government procurement contracting 债权人保护和政府采购合同
IF 5.4 1区 管理学
Journal of Accounting & Economics Pub Date : 2025-04-01 DOI: 10.1016/j.jacceco.2024.101742
Xiao Liu , Zhiming Ma , Lufei Ruan
{"title":"Creditor protection and government procurement contracting","authors":"Xiao Liu ,&nbsp;Zhiming Ma ,&nbsp;Lufei Ruan","doi":"10.1016/j.jacceco.2024.101742","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jacceco.2024.101742","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>This paper examines the effect of creditor protection on the choice of government procurement contract types. We use the staggered adoption of anti-recharacterization laws (ARLs) as a quasi-natural experiment to investigate the research question. ARLs strengthen creditors’ rights to repossess collateral in bankruptcy and thus enhance creditor protection. Using a dataset of U.S. government contracts, we find a significant shift from the use of fixed-price contracts to cost-plus contracts after the adoption of ARLs. The effect is more pronounced for firms with higher default risk and stronger firm-government ties. We also find that the government is more likely to switch away or reduce the contract value for contractors affected by ARLs. Overall, our findings point to an important relation between debt contracts and government contracts.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48438,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Accounting & Economics","volume":"79 2","pages":"Article 101742"},"PeriodicalIF":5.4,"publicationDate":"2025-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143820358","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
The future performance implications of Non-GAAP firms’ investments 非公认会计准则公司投资对未来业绩的影响
IF 5.4 1区 管理学
Journal of Accounting & Economics Pub Date : 2025-04-01 DOI: 10.1016/j.jacceco.2024.101760
Minkwan Ahn , Theodore E. Christensen , Ryan G. Johnson , Melissa F. Lewis-Western
{"title":"The future performance implications of Non-GAAP firms’ investments","authors":"Minkwan Ahn ,&nbsp;Theodore E. Christensen ,&nbsp;Ryan G. Johnson ,&nbsp;Melissa F. Lewis-Western","doi":"10.1016/j.jacceco.2024.101760","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jacceco.2024.101760","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>We investigate whether consistent non-GAAP reporting is associated with investment efficiency. Prior research finds a positive association between non-GAAP reporting and investment levels, concluding that it represents overinvestment. We corroborate this positive association, but additional tests are not consistent with the conclusion of inefficient overinvestment. Specifically, we explore the relation between investment and future cash flows as a proxy for the realization of investments in positive net present value projects. We find that the investments of firms that consistently report non-GAAP metrics are associated with similar or higher future cash flows than the investments of firms reporting only GAAP earnings, which is consistent with efficient investment. We observe similar associations in multiple specifications, performance horizons, and outcome variables, including future returns and earnings. Given the prevalence of non-GAAP reporting and the SEC's ongoing concern with the consequences of non-GAAP disclosure, our analyses offer timely evidence relevant to this important discussion.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48438,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Accounting & Economics","volume":"79 2","pages":"Article 101760"},"PeriodicalIF":5.4,"publicationDate":"2025-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142874777","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
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