机构投资者向风向标企业提供贷款的价值

IF 5.4 1区管理学 Q1 BUSINESS, FINANCE

Journal of Accounting & Economics Pub Date : 2025-04-01 DOI:10.1016/j.jacceco.2024.101735

Wayne R. Landsman , F. Dimas Peña-Romera , Jianxin (Donny) Zhao

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引用次数: 0

摘要

我们预测，贷款银团中的机构投资者会向风向标企业收取较低的贷款利差，作为对其获取私人信息的补偿，这些信息有助于识别其他企业公开市场证券的交易机会。与这一预测相一致的是，在向钟点企业贷款时，机构投资者收取的贷款溢价比非钟点企业低 17-25 个基点，并从其他企业的证券交易中获得 1.5-2.2% 的年化超额回报。横截面分析结果显示，当来自风向标企业的私人信息价值较高时，贷款利差的降幅更大。此外，当机构贷款人贷款给透明度更高的风向标借款人时，以及当他们支付较低的价格--如贷款利差所反映的那样--以换取私人信息时，他们的超额收益较低，这支持了私人信息的价值与机构投资者的交易表现有关这一观点。

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The value of lending to bellwether firms by institutional investors

We predict that institutional investors in loan syndicates charge bellwether firms lower loan spreads as compensation for having access to private information that can help identify trading opportunities in other firms' public market securities. Consistent with this prediction, when lending to bellwether firms, institutional investors charge a loan premium that is between 17 and 25 bps lower relative to non-bellwether firms, and earn annualized excess returns of 1.5–2.2% from trading in other firms' securities. Findings from cross-sectional analyses reveal that the reduction in loan spread is larger when the value of private information from bellwether firms is higher. Additionally, institutional lenders' excess returns are lower when lending to more transparent bellwether borrowers and when they pay a lower price—as reflected in loan spreads—in exchange for the private information, supporting the notion that the value of private information relates to institutional investors’ trading performance.

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来源期刊

Journal of Accounting & Economics Multiple-

CiteScore

8.70

自引率

6.80%

发文量

期刊介绍： The Journal of Accounting and Economics encourages the application of economic theory to the explanation of accounting phenomena. It provides a forum for the publication of the highest quality manuscripts which employ economic analyses of accounting problems. A wide range of methodologies and topics are encouraged and covered: * The role of accounting within the firm; * The information content and role of accounting numbers in capital markets; * The role of accounting in financial contracts and in monitoring agency relationships; * The determination of accounting standards; * Government regulation of corporate disclosure and/or the Accounting profession; * The theory of the accounting firm.