遵守或解释法规和投资者保护

IF 5.4 1区管理学 Q1 BUSINESS, FINANCE

Journal of Accounting & Economics Pub Date : 2025-04-01 DOI:10.1016/j.jacceco.2025.101765

Thomas Bourveau , Xingchao Gao , Rongchen Li , Frank S. Zhou

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引用次数: 0

摘要

我们调查了中国上海证券交易所2012年实施的“不合规即解释”规定。该法规要求符合条件的公司将其当年利润的30%作为现金股息支付，或者通过公开电话会议解释他们不符合这一要求的原因。以在深圳证券交易所上市的公司作为对照组，我们的差异估计表明，受监管的公司减少了隧道行为，无论他们是否通过支付或披露来遵守监管。进一步的分析表明，隧道行为的减少部分归因于对解释公司的监管监督和对支付公司过剩现金的约束。这些发现为在薄弱的制度环境下，灵活的“服从或解释”监管形式如何降低控股股东和小股东之间的代理成本提供了新的政策见解。

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Comply-or-explain regulation and investor protection

We investigate a 2012 comply-or-explain regulation implemented by China’s Shanghai Stock Exchange. The regulation requires eligible firms to pay 30% of their current-year profits as cash dividends or explain the reasons why they do not meet this requirement through a public conference call. Using firms listed on the Shenzhen Stock Exchange as a control group, our difference-in-differences estimates suggest that firms subject to the regulation decreased tunneling, irrespective of whether they complied by paying or disclosing. Further analyses suggest that the reduction in tunneling is partially attributed to enhanced regulatory monitoring over explaining firms and the constraint on excess cash of paying firms. These findings offer novel policy insights into how a flexible comply-or-explain form of regulation can mitigate agency costs between controlling and minority shareholders in a weak institutional environment.

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来源期刊

Journal of Accounting & Economics Multiple-

CiteScore

8.70

自引率

6.80%

发文量

期刊介绍： The Journal of Accounting and Economics encourages the application of economic theory to the explanation of accounting phenomena. It provides a forum for the publication of the highest quality manuscripts which employ economic analyses of accounting problems. A wide range of methodologies and topics are encouraged and covered: * The role of accounting within the firm; * The information content and role of accounting numbers in capital markets; * The role of accounting in financial contracts and in monitoring agency relationships; * The determination of accounting standards; * Government regulation of corporate disclosure and/or the Accounting profession; * The theory of the accounting firm.