Hami Amiraslani , Carolyn Deller , Christopher D. Ittner , Thomas Keusch
{"title":"董事会风险监督以及环境和社会绩效","authors":"Hami Amiraslani , Carolyn Deller , Christopher D. Ittner , Thomas Keusch","doi":"10.1016/j.jacceco.2024.101754","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>We examine the relation between board risk oversight and environmental and social (E&S) performance. Our study is motivated by heightened awareness of E&S risks and growing calls for their inclusion in the purview of board risk oversight. Using a novel proprietary dataset on board risk oversight for an international sample, we find that firms with more extensive board risk oversight are more likely to institute E&S compensation, set environmental (but <em>not</em> social) targets, adopt policies that address E&S risks and opportunities, and issue an E&S report. Our exploratory evidence also shows that more extensive board risk oversight is associated with <em>better</em> environmental outcomes, specifically lower monetized environmental costs, but <em>worse</em> social outcomes, namely lower monetized employee benefits and a higher likelihood of social risk incidents. Our results suggest that risk oversight is analogous to a constrained optimization problem whereby risk exposures are prioritized and receive different degrees of oversight consideration by the board.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48438,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Accounting & Economics","volume":"79 2","pages":"Article 101754"},"PeriodicalIF":5.4000,"publicationDate":"2025-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Board risk oversight and environmental and social performance\",\"authors\":\"Hami Amiraslani , Carolyn Deller , Christopher D. Ittner , Thomas Keusch\",\"doi\":\"10.1016/j.jacceco.2024.101754\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"<div><div>We examine the relation between board risk oversight and environmental and social (E&S) performance. Our study is motivated by heightened awareness of E&S risks and growing calls for their inclusion in the purview of board risk oversight. Using a novel proprietary dataset on board risk oversight for an international sample, we find that firms with more extensive board risk oversight are more likely to institute E&S compensation, set environmental (but <em>not</em> social) targets, adopt policies that address E&S risks and opportunities, and issue an E&S report. Our exploratory evidence also shows that more extensive board risk oversight is associated with <em>better</em> environmental outcomes, specifically lower monetized environmental costs, but <em>worse</em> social outcomes, namely lower monetized employee benefits and a higher likelihood of social risk incidents. Our results suggest that risk oversight is analogous to a constrained optimization problem whereby risk exposures are prioritized and receive different degrees of oversight consideration by the board.</div></div>\",\"PeriodicalId\":48438,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Journal of Accounting & Economics\",\"volume\":\"79 2\",\"pages\":\"Article 101754\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":5.4000,\"publicationDate\":\"2025-04-01\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Journal of Accounting & Economics\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"91\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0165410124000843\",\"RegionNum\":1,\"RegionCategory\":\"管理学\",\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"Q1\",\"JCRName\":\"BUSINESS, FINANCE\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Journal of Accounting & Economics","FirstCategoryId":"91","ListUrlMain":"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0165410124000843","RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q1","JCRName":"BUSINESS, FINANCE","Score":null,"Total":0}
Board risk oversight and environmental and social performance
We examine the relation between board risk oversight and environmental and social (E&S) performance. Our study is motivated by heightened awareness of E&S risks and growing calls for their inclusion in the purview of board risk oversight. Using a novel proprietary dataset on board risk oversight for an international sample, we find that firms with more extensive board risk oversight are more likely to institute E&S compensation, set environmental (but not social) targets, adopt policies that address E&S risks and opportunities, and issue an E&S report. Our exploratory evidence also shows that more extensive board risk oversight is associated with better environmental outcomes, specifically lower monetized environmental costs, but worse social outcomes, namely lower monetized employee benefits and a higher likelihood of social risk incidents. Our results suggest that risk oversight is analogous to a constrained optimization problem whereby risk exposures are prioritized and receive different degrees of oversight consideration by the board.
期刊介绍:
The Journal of Accounting and Economics encourages the application of economic theory to the explanation of accounting phenomena. It provides a forum for the publication of the highest quality manuscripts which employ economic analyses of accounting problems. A wide range of methodologies and topics are encouraged and covered: * The role of accounting within the firm; * The information content and role of accounting numbers in capital markets; * The role of accounting in financial contracts and in monitoring agency relationships; * The determination of accounting standards; * Government regulation of corporate disclosure and/or the Accounting profession; * The theory of the accounting firm.