不需要财务报表

IF 5.4 1区 管理学 Q1 BUSINESS, FINANCE
Michael Minnis , Andrew G. Sutherland , Felix W. Vetter
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引用次数: 0

摘要

利用涵盖 300 万份商业借款人财务报表的数据集,我们记录了过去二十年来银行在贷款中使用经证明的财务报表(AFS)的大幅、近乎单调的下降。两种市场力量有助于解释这一趋势。首先,技术进步为贷款人提供了越来越多的借款人信息来源,可以替代经证明的财务报表。其次,银行与非银行贷款机构的竞争日益激烈,而非银行贷款机构在筛选和监控方面对美国金融服务的依赖程度较低。我们的研究结果说明了技术的采用和信贷市场结构的变化是如何使全额融资服务在筛选和监控方面的效率低于其他信息来源的。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Financial statements not required
Using a dataset covering 3 million commercial borrower financial statements, we document a substantial, nearly monotonic decline in banks’ use of attested financial statements (AFS) in lending over the past two decades. Two market forces help explain this trend. First, technological advances provide lenders with access to a growing array of borrower information sources that can substitute for AFS. Second, banks are increasingly competing with nonbank lenders that rely less on AFS in screening and monitoring. Our results illustrate how technology adoption and changes in credit market structure can render AFS less efficient than alternative information sources for screening and monitoring.
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来源期刊
CiteScore
8.70
自引率
6.80%
发文量
68
期刊介绍: The Journal of Accounting and Economics encourages the application of economic theory to the explanation of accounting phenomena. It provides a forum for the publication of the highest quality manuscripts which employ economic analyses of accounting problems. A wide range of methodologies and topics are encouraged and covered: * The role of accounting within the firm; * The information content and role of accounting numbers in capital markets; * The role of accounting in financial contracts and in monitoring agency relationships; * The determination of accounting standards; * Government regulation of corporate disclosure and/or the Accounting profession; * The theory of the accounting firm.
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