首席执行官薪酬方案的复杂性

IF 0.4 Q4 ECONOMICS
Ana Albuquerque, Mary Ellen Carter, Zhe (Michael) Guo, Luann J. Lynch
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引用次数: 0

摘要

本文探讨了首席执行官薪酬合同的复杂性。我们制定了薪酬复杂性的衡量标准,并提供了随着时间推移复杂性大幅增加的经验证据。我们发现,复杂性不仅源于反映合同效率的因素,也源于薪酬顾问、机构投资者、代理顾问的外部压力,以及试图以同行为基准的尝试,而这些外部因素在最近几年的影响更大。在研究合同复杂性的后果时,我们发现公司未来业绩下降与外部因素对薪酬设计的影响有关。我们进一步发现,当合同的绩效指标关联度较高时,这种关系会得到部分缓解,这与阻碍决策的信息处理成本是一致的。总之,这些发现证实了投资者和媒体对薪酬复杂性的担忧,并为董事会设计首席执行官薪酬方案提供了参考。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Complexity of CEO compensation packages
This paper examines complexity in CEO compensation contracts. We develop a measure of compensation complexity and provide empirical evidence that complexity has increased substantially over time. We document that complexity results not only from factors reflecting efficient contracting, but also from external pressures from compensation consultants, institutional investors, proxy advisors, and attempts to benchmark to peers, with these external factors having greater impact in more recent years. Examining consequences of contract complexity, we find an association with lower future firm performance that is related to the influence of external factors on compensation design. We further find this relation is partially mitigated when a contract's performance metrics are more highly correlated, consistent with information processing costs hampering decision-making. Collectively, these findings confirm concerns raised by investors and the media regarding compensation complexity and can inform boards in their design of CEO pay packages.
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