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Public environmental enforcement and private lender monitoring: Evidence from environmental covenants 公共环境执法和私人贷方监督：环境契约的证据
IF 5.9 1区 管理学
Journal of Accounting & Economics Pub Date : 2024-04-01 DOI: 10.1016/j.jacceco.2023.101621
Stacey Choy , Shushu Jiang , Scott Liao , Emma Wang
{"title":"Public environmental enforcement and private lender monitoring: Evidence from environmental covenants","authors":"Stacey Choy ,&nbsp;Shushu Jiang ,&nbsp;Scott Liao ,&nbsp;Emma Wang","doi":"10.1016/j.jacceco.2023.101621","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jacceco.2023.101621","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>This paper examines whether and how public environmental enforcement affects private lenders’ monitoring efforts and the effectiveness of such monitoring. We capture lender monitoring using environmental covenants in loan agreements. Consistent with the prediction that stringent public environmental enforcement increases lenders’ monitoring incentives, we find that in the presence of higher environmental regulatory enforcement intensity, lenders are more likely to use environmental covenants when lending to polluting borrowers and when the loans are secured by real property collateral. Moreover, consistent with the prediction that stringent public environmental enforcement facilitates lender monitoring, we find that environmental covenants are more effective in reducing borrowers’ toxic chemical releases when environmental regulatory enforcement is stronger. Taken together, our findings corroborate the importance of public environmental enforcement in inducing lenders’ monitoring efforts, as well as the joint role of public enforcement and private lender monitoring in curbing corporate pollution.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":48438,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Accounting & Economics","volume":"77 2","pages":"Article 101621"},"PeriodicalIF":5.9,"publicationDate":"2024-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135509300","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Capital-market effects of tipper-tippee insider trading law: Evidence from the Newman ruling 内幕交易法对资本市场的影响：来自纽曼案裁决的证据
IF 5.9 1区 管理学
Journal of Accounting & Economics Pub Date : 2024-04-01 DOI: 10.1016/j.jacceco.2023.101639
Andrew T. Pierce
{"title":"Capital-market effects of tipper-tippee insider trading law: Evidence from the Newman ruling","authors":"Andrew T. Pierce","doi":"10.1016/j.jacceco.2023.101639","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jacceco.2023.101639","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>This study examines the capital-market effects of tipper-tippee insider trading laws. To do so, I exploit the unexpected decision issued by the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in U.S. v. Newman 773 F.3d 438, which reduced legal jeopardy for Second Circuit-based market participants prior to being overturned. Consistent with Newman constraining insider trading enforcement, I find strong evidence of plausible insider trading in the Second Circuit following the ruling. I also document a substantial reduction in general trading activity in Second Circuit stocks, as well as an increase in daily quoted spreads and the price impact of trading. These findings are consistent with unchecked insider trading increasing transaction costs and crowding-out investors. In total, my results show that tipper-tippee insider trading restrictions play an important role in bolstering market integrity, and that market participants can to some degree counteract insider trading when public regulation is constrained.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":48438,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Accounting & Economics","volume":"77 2","pages":"Article 101639"},"PeriodicalIF":5.9,"publicationDate":"2024-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"78105605","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Accounting conservatism and managerial information acquisition 会计保守主义与管理信息获取
IF 5.9 1区 管理学
Journal of Accounting & Economics Pub Date : 2024-04-01 DOI: 10.1016/j.jacceco.2023.101630
Christian Laux , Volker Laux
{"title":"Accounting conservatism and managerial information acquisition","authors":"Christian Laux ,&nbsp;Volker Laux","doi":"10.1016/j.jacceco.2023.101630","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jacceco.2023.101630","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>We study the interaction between optimal financial reporting rules and managers' incentives to gather additional information about firm performance. Accounting-based covenants transfer control rights to lenders, allowing them to take corrective actions. After the accounting report is released, the manager can exert effort to uncover whether the report is a false alarm or unduly optimistic. The manager's incentive to gather information stems from optimal incentive contracts and private benefits of control that she loses when the project is liquidated. We derive conditions under which managerial information acquisition renders conservative reporting optimal for shareholders and show that these conditions relax when the manager derives greater private benefits from the project or the cost of information acquisition declines. Our model provides novel explanations for existing empirical findings and offers new predictions with respect to covenant waivers, debt contract renegotiations, and the frequency of corrective actions.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":48438,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Accounting & Economics","volume":"77 2","pages":"Article 101630"},"PeriodicalIF":5.9,"publicationDate":"2024-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"134951695","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Learning from peers: Evidence from disclosure of consumer complaints 向同行学习：披露消费者投诉的证据
IF 5.9 1区 管理学
Journal of Accounting & Economics Pub Date : 2024-04-01 DOI: 10.1016/j.jacceco.2023.101620
Yiwei Dou , Mingyi Hung , Guoman She , Lynn Linghuan Wang
{"title":"Learning from peers: Evidence from disclosure of consumer complaints","authors":"Yiwei Dou ,&nbsp;Mingyi Hung ,&nbsp;Guoman She ,&nbsp;Lynn Linghuan Wang","doi":"10.1016/j.jacceco.2023.101620","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jacceco.2023.101620","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>In 2013, the U.S. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau released a database of consumer complaints filed against banks under its supervision (“CFPB banks”). We find that after the disclosure, rival banks exhibit a greater increase in mortgage approval rates in markets with more intensive mortgage complaints about CFPB banks. The effect is weaker when rivals have more expertise in the local market, are less concerned about credit risk due to mortgage sales, and locate in areas with more alternative information about the CFPB banks. The effect is concentrated in severe complaints and complaints related to loan underwriting practices. In addition to approving more loans, rivals also open more branches and are more likely to post a job opening in these markets. The findings suggest that these banks learn from the nonfinancial disclosures about operational deficiencies of peers (i.e., CFPB banks) in local markets, which alleviates their adverse selection concern about expanding.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":48438,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Accounting & Economics","volume":"77 2","pages":"Article 101620"},"PeriodicalIF":5.9,"publicationDate":"2024-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"79738386","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
The SEC's September spike: Regulatory inconsistency within the fiscal year 美国证券交易委员会（SEC）9 月份的秒杀活动：财政年度内的监管不一致
IF 5.9 1区 管理学
Journal of Accounting & Economics Pub Date : 2024-04-01 DOI: 10.1016/j.jacceco.2023.101636
Dain C. Donelson , Matthew Kubic , Sara Toynbee
{"title":"The SEC's September spike: Regulatory inconsistency within the fiscal year","authors":"Dain C. Donelson ,&nbsp;Matthew Kubic ,&nbsp;Sara Toynbee","doi":"10.1016/j.jacceco.2023.101636","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jacceco.2023.101636","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>We examine whether performance reporting leads to inconsistent enforcement at the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). In a sample of over 13,000 SEC enforcement actions, we show that SEC staff respond to performance-reporting pressures and file more enforcement actions in September, the final month of the SEC's fiscal year, than in any other month. The increase in case volume in September is not fully explained by staff filing more procedural cases or accelerating case filings. Instead, SEC staff pursue less complex cases and agree to more lenient financial and non-financial sanctions to increase case volume in September. We attempt to rule out alternative explanations for our results, including natural SEC workflow and resource constraints. Overall, our findings suggest that performance reporting creates agency conflicts that lead to regulatory inconsistency within the fiscal year.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":48438,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Accounting & Economics","volume":"77 2","pages":"Article 101636"},"PeriodicalIF":5.9,"publicationDate":"2024-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"84854703","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Editorial data 编辑数据
IF 5.9 1区 管理学
Journal of Accounting & Economics Pub Date : 2024-04-01 DOI: 10.1016/j.jacceco.2024.101695
Elizabeth Blankespoor, John E. Core, Ed deHaan, Wayne Guay, Michelle Hanlon, Mark Lang, Nemit Shroff, Joanna Wu
{"title":"Editorial data","authors":"Elizabeth Blankespoor,&nbsp;John E. Core,&nbsp;Ed deHaan,&nbsp;Wayne Guay,&nbsp;Michelle Hanlon,&nbsp;Mark Lang,&nbsp;Nemit Shroff,&nbsp;Joanna Wu","doi":"10.1016/j.jacceco.2024.101695","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jacceco.2024.101695","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":48438,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Accounting & Economics","volume":"77 2","pages":"Article 101695"},"PeriodicalIF":5.9,"publicationDate":"2024-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140550829","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Firm-level political risk and credit markets 公司层面的政治风险和信贷市场
IF 5.9 1区 管理学
Journal of Accounting & Economics Pub Date : 2024-04-01 DOI: 10.1016/j.jacceco.2023.101642
Mahmoud Gad , Valeri Nikolaev , Ahmed Tahoun , Laurence van Lent
{"title":"Firm-level political risk and credit markets","authors":"Mahmoud Gad ,&nbsp;Valeri Nikolaev ,&nbsp;Ahmed Tahoun ,&nbsp;Laurence van Lent","doi":"10.1016/j.jacceco.2023.101642","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jacceco.2023.101642","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>We take advantage of a new composite measure of political risk (Hassan et al., 2019) to study the effects of firm-level political risk on private debt markets. First, we use panel data tests and exploit the redrawing of US congressional districts to uncover plausibly exogenous variation in firm-level political risk. We show that borrowers’ political risk is linked to interest rates set by lenders. Second, we test for the transmission of political risk from lenders to borrowers. We predict and find that lender-level political risk propagates to borrowers through lending relationships. Our analysis allows for endogenous matching between lenders and borrowers and indicates the presence of network effects in diffusing political risk throughout the economy. Finally, we introduce new text-based methods to analyze the distinct sources of political risk to lenders and borrowers and provide textual evidence of the transmission of political risk from lenders to borrowers.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":48438,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Accounting & Economics","volume":"77 2","pages":"Article 101642"},"PeriodicalIF":5.9,"publicationDate":"2024-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135248201","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Data visualization in 10-K filings 10-K 文件中的数据可视化
IF 5.9 1区 管理学
Journal of Accounting & Economics Pub Date : 2024-04-01 DOI: 10.1016/j.jacceco.2023.101631
Theodore E. Christensen , Karson E. Fronk , Joshua A. Lee , Karen K. Nelson
{"title":"Data visualization in 10-K filings","authors":"Theodore E. Christensen ,&nbsp;Karson E. Fronk ,&nbsp;Joshua A. Lee ,&nbsp;Karen K. Nelson","doi":"10.1016/j.jacceco.2023.101631","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jacceco.2023.101631","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>The Securities and Exchange Commission encourages the presentation of information or data in graphical form to improve users' ability to understand financial disclosures. We find a dramatic increase in the disclosure of both qualitative and quantitative infographics in 10-K filings over time and substantial cross-sectional variation in firms' choices regarding image types, data content, and the placement of infographics within 10-Ks. We provide evidence on factors associated with firms’ use of infographics and explore the persistence with which they are disclosed over time. Finally, we investigate the relation between the use of infographics and uncertainty in capital markets.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":48438,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Accounting & Economics","volume":"77 2","pages":"Article 101631"},"PeriodicalIF":5.9,"publicationDate":"2024-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"136184562","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Auditor industry range and audit quality 审核员的行业范围和审核质量*
IF 5.9 1区 管理学
Journal of Accounting & Economics Pub Date : 2024-04-01 DOI: 10.1016/j.jacceco.2023.101669
Simon Dekeyser , Xianjie He , Tusheng Xiao , Luo Zuo
{"title":"Auditor industry range and audit quality","authors":"Simon Dekeyser ,&nbsp;Xianjie He ,&nbsp;Tusheng Xiao ,&nbsp;Luo Zuo","doi":"10.1016/j.jacceco.2023.101669","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jacceco.2023.101669","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>We develop the concept of auditor industry range as the extent to which an auditor has experiences in auditing clients from different industries, and we link this construct to auditor performance, drawing on prior research in psychology and cognitive science. We find that auditors with a wide range of industry experiences are more likely to require audit adjustments than auditors with a narrow range. We conduct an extensive set of analyses to mitigate the concern that our results are driven by endogenous matching between auditors and clients. The positive relation between auditor industry range and audit adjustments exists regardless of whether the industries covered by an auditor's portfolio exhibit strong or weak economic co-movement, and the relation is stronger for more complex clients, in more uncertain environments, and for auditors with more years of audit experience. Overall, our findings suggest that an auditor's diverse experiences in different industries can enhance audit quality.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":48438,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Accounting & Economics","volume":"77 2","pages":"Article 101669"},"PeriodicalIF":5.9,"publicationDate":"2024-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"138438939","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Acknowledgement 鸣谢
IF 5.9 1区 管理学
Journal of Accounting & Economics Pub Date : 2024-04-01 DOI: 10.1016/j.jacceco.2024.101696
{"title":"Acknowledgement","authors":"","doi":"10.1016/j.jacceco.2024.101696","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jacceco.2024.101696","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":48438,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Accounting & Economics","volume":"77 2","pages":"Article 101696"},"PeriodicalIF":5.9,"publicationDate":"2024-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0165410124000260/pdfft?md5=fad40d42458575f05721fa45ac5a7eb1&pid=1-s2.0-S0165410124000260-main.pdf","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140551646","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
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