独角兽探索从理论中得出经验预测

IF 5.4 1区管理学 Q1 BUSINESS, FINANCE

Journal of Accounting & Economics Pub Date : 2024-11-01 DOI:10.1016/j.jacceco.2024.101736

Anne Beyer, Junyoung Jeong

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引用次数: 0

摘要

我们讨论了 Feng 等人（2024 年）的论文，该论文研究了委托投资的动态模型。该论文对委托人与代理人之间的最优合约提出了新颖的见解，因为代理人获得了关于投资机会的时机和盈利能力的私人信息。虽然分析提供了有趣的发现，但我们对论文经验预测的有效性表示担忧。我们扩展了利比箱的 "概念 "和 "操作 "层面，增加了 "分析 "层面，为评估和发展理论模型与实证检验之间的联系提供了工具。

本文章由计算机程序翻译，如有差异，请以英文原文为准。

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The unicorn quest: Deriving empirical predictions from theory

We discuss Feng et al. (2024), which studies a dynamic model of delegated investment. The paper provides novel insights into the optimal contract between a principal and an agent who obtains private information about both the timing and profitability of investment opportunities. While the analytical analysis provides interesting findings, we have concerns about the validity of the paper’s empirical predictions. We extend the “conceptual” and “operational” levels of Libby boxes by adding an “analytical” level to offer a tool for assessing and developing the link between theoretical models and empirical tests.

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来源期刊

Journal of Accounting & Economics Multiple-

CiteScore

8.70

自引率

6.80%

发文量

期刊介绍： The Journal of Accounting and Economics encourages the application of economic theory to the explanation of accounting phenomena. It provides a forum for the publication of the highest quality manuscripts which employ economic analyses of accounting problems. A wide range of methodologies and topics are encouraged and covered: * The role of accounting within the firm; * The information content and role of accounting numbers in capital markets; * The role of accounting in financial contracts and in monitoring agency relationships; * The determination of accounting standards; * Government regulation of corporate disclosure and/or the Accounting profession; * The theory of the accounting firm.