{"title":"Tournament-style political competition and local protectionism: Theory and evidence from China","authors":"Hanming Fang , Ming Li , Zenan Wu","doi":"10.1016/j.jpubeco.2025.105421","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jpubeco.2025.105421","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>We argue that interjurisdictional competition in a regionally decentralized authoritarian regime distorts local politicians’ incentives in resource allocation among firms from their own city and a competing city. We develop a tournament model of project selection that captures the driving forces of local protectionism. The model robustly predicts that the joint presence of regional spillover and the incentive for political competition leads to biased resource allocations against the competing regions. Combining unique data sets, we test our model predictions in the context of government procurement allocation and firms’ equity investment across Chinese cities. We find that, first, when local politicians are in more intensive political competition, they allocate fewer government procurement contracts to firms in the competing city; second, local firms, especially local state-owned enterprises (SOEs), internalize the local politicians’ career concerns and invest less in the competing cities. Our paper provides a political economy explanation for inefficient local protectionism in an autocracy incentivized by tournament-style political competition.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48436,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Public Economics","volume":"248 ","pages":"Article 105421"},"PeriodicalIF":4.8,"publicationDate":"2025-06-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144222940","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The sectoral origins of heterogeneous spending multipliers","authors":"Hafedh Bouakez , Omar Rachedi , Emiliano Santoro","doi":"10.1016/j.jpubeco.2025.105404","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jpubeco.2025.105404","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>The aggregate spending multiplier crucially depends on the sectoral origin of government purchases. To establish this result, we characterize analytically the response of aggregate output to sector-specific government spending shocks in a tractable production-network economy, showing how it maps into various characteristics of the shocked sector. The response is larger when government spending originates in sectors with a relatively small contribution to private final demand, low markup, high labor intensity, and in those located downstream in the supply chain. We confirm these predictions and evaluate their quantitative relevance within a calibrated multi-sector model of the U.S. economy that embeds several dimensions of sectoral heterogeneity. Leveraging this model, we illustrate how differences in the sectoral composition of purchases across U.S. government levels lead to large variation in the spending multiplier. The latter ranges from 0.47 for federal defense spending, which is relatively concentrated in upstream capital-intensive manufacturing, to 0.82 for state and local spending, which is mainly oriented towards downstream labor-intensive services. Finally, we exploit heterogeneity in the sectoral composition of military spending across U.S. states to provide empirical evidence supporting our theoretical predictions.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48436,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Public Economics","volume":"248 ","pages":"Article 105404"},"PeriodicalIF":4.8,"publicationDate":"2025-06-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144212310","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Does the prospect of upward mobility undermine support for redistribution?","authors":"Don A. Moore, Rene Choudhari , Aileen Wu","doi":"10.1016/j.jpubeco.2025.105418","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jpubeco.2025.105418","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>Despite substantial economic inequality in the United States, many Americans who would benefit from redistributive economic policies vote against them. This opposition could be justified by an exaggerated belief in the prospects of upward mobility. That is, people may oppose higher taxes on the largest incomes and estates because they overestimate the degree to which they would be subject to them. This research employs an experimental approach to studying Americans’ beliefs about their own prosperity and correlates these beliefs with support for redistribution. The results are not consistent with the theory that overconfidence about future prosperity impairs Americans’ support for redistribution. Instead, people report ideological stances tolerant of economic inequality and opposing redistribution, largely independent of their private economic interests.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48436,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Public Economics","volume":"248 ","pages":"Article 105418"},"PeriodicalIF":4.8,"publicationDate":"2025-06-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144222864","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Aline Bütikofer , René Karadakic , Alexander Willén
{"title":"Parenthood and the gender gap in commuting","authors":"Aline Bütikofer , René Karadakic , Alexander Willén","doi":"10.1016/j.jpubeco.2025.105371","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jpubeco.2025.105371","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>Childbirth raises the opportunity cost of commuting and makes it difficult for both parents to work far away from home. Using detailed Norwegian employer–employee matched register data, we show that the commuting behavior of men and women diverges immediately after childbirth and that those differences persist for at least a decade. This divergence in commuting behavior exposes mothers to more concentrated and suburban labor markets with fewer job opportunities and lower establishment quality. These findings uncover a key mechanism underlying the child penalty documented in prior work and have important implications for the design of policies seeking to address the remaining gender wage gap.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48436,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Public Economics","volume":"248 ","pages":"Article 105371"},"PeriodicalIF":4.8,"publicationDate":"2025-06-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144204459","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The dynamic fiscal costs of outsourcing health insurance - evidence from Medicaid","authors":"Timothy J. Layton , Eran Politzer","doi":"10.1016/j.jpubeco.2025.105417","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jpubeco.2025.105417","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>We study the dynamics of fiscal costs following the outsourcing of Medicaid provision to private health insurers by states. We focus on beneficiaries with disabilities who account for a third of Medicaid’s spending. Using a national administrative database, we identify county-level private plan enrollment mandates and exploit them as an instrument for individuals’ transition to managed care plans. These transitions, while initially slightly reducing fiscal costs, lead to a continuous increase in Medicaid’s costs over subsequent years. Counties subject to mandates experience a 9.8 % higher cost 4 years post-mandate compared to those without mandates. “Actuarially sound\" endogenous payment rates, that are based on past costs in the market, may serve as a mechanism underlying the rising spending.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48436,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Public Economics","volume":"247 ","pages":"Article 105417"},"PeriodicalIF":4.8,"publicationDate":"2025-06-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144196341","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The migrant penalty in Latin America: Experimental evidence from job recruiters","authors":"Raissa Fabregas , Wladimir Zanoni","doi":"10.1016/j.jpubeco.2025.105393","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jpubeco.2025.105393","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>We conduct an experiment with human resources recruiters in Ecuador to investigate the extent to which Venezuelan migrants are penalized in the formal labor market, despite being from a population that shares cultural, historical, and linguistic characteristics with natives and has, on average, higher levels of education. Recruiters were tasked with evaluating pairs of candidate profiles for different jobs, proposing salaries for each, and making hiring recommendations. Candidate profiles were comparable in observable characteristics, with one candidate in each pair randomly designated as a Venezuelan migrant. We find robust evidence of a migrant penalty across all outcomes. Recruiters’ demographic characteristics, work experience, reasoning ability, and personality traits do not predict a preference for natives. Instead, there is suggestive evidence that the penalty is larger in jobs requiring greater local knowledge or public-facing interaction.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48436,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Public Economics","volume":"247 ","pages":"Article 105393"},"PeriodicalIF":4.8,"publicationDate":"2025-05-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144167362","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The value of group purchasing: Evidence from the U.S. hospital industry","authors":"Haizhen Lin , Yanhao Wang","doi":"10.1016/j.jpubeco.2025.105380","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jpubeco.2025.105380","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>Group purchasing organizations, or GPOs, are pervasive in many settings, but the actual value of GPOs remains a constant topic of debate. We offer one of the first studies examining the effect of GPOs on supply expenses in the U.S. hospital setting. Our two-way fixed effects model reveals that a one-standard-deviation increase in GPO scale (a GPO’s market share weighted by its member hospitals’ bed capacity) reduces an average hospital’s supply expenses by 2.7%, translating into a per-discharge savings of $48 and an annual savings of about $0.72 million. Our event study, which exploits a merger event between two of the largest GPOs, has produced qualitatively similar results. Meanwhile, we find no evidence that GPOs reduce supply expenses at the cost of the quality of care, nor by means of selective patient admission. Instead, we find that some of the cost savings are passed along to consumers in terms of lowered hospital prices, although only in highly competitive hospital markets. Our results contribute directly to policy debates over the value of GPOs and, more broadly, to the literature on countervailing buyer power and purchasing intermediaries.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48436,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Public Economics","volume":"247 ","pages":"Article 105380"},"PeriodicalIF":4.8,"publicationDate":"2025-05-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144167740","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Marketing authorization and strategic patenting: Evidence from pharmaceuticals","authors":"Dennis Byrski , Lucy Xiaolu Wang","doi":"10.1016/j.jpubeco.2025.105415","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jpubeco.2025.105415","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>Patents can incentivize innovation, but pharmaceutical firms often extend market exclusivity by patenting minor modifications to existing drugs, raising concerns about low-novelty patents that add little therapeutic value. This study examines how patenting behavior changes after marketing authorization, a regulatory milestone that makes clinical trial data public and thereby creates “prior art” that limits future patent claims. Using a novel European patent–drug dataset and event study methods, we exploit plausibly exogenous variation in the time from patent priority filing to marketing authorization. We find a significant decline in strategic patenting after authorization, particularly in secondary patents and those covering the same disease areas. In contrast, follow-on product patents and patents for new disease areas remain stable, suggesting that authorization selectively curbs low-novelty filings. Both originators and other firms respond similarly, though at different speeds. The absence of similar responses after earlier milestones indicates increased difficulty in obtaining or enforcing low-value patents as the likely mechanism. Robustness checks – including alternative difference-in-differences estimators, constant exclusivity samples, and analyses accounting for non-European market incentives, firm characteristics, and instrumental variable approaches – support our conclusions. Our findings show how regulatory data transparency can indirectly improve patent quality.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48436,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Public Economics","volume":"247 ","pages":"Article 105415"},"PeriodicalIF":4.8,"publicationDate":"2025-05-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144167361","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Thomas Luke Spreen , Ziyuan Wang , Lang (Kate) Yang
{"title":"Industrial automation and local public goods","authors":"Thomas Luke Spreen , Ziyuan Wang , Lang (Kate) Yang","doi":"10.1016/j.jpubeco.2025.105394","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jpubeco.2025.105394","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>Recent research shows industrial automation raises labor productivity but also depresses employment and wages in exposed industries and regions. This paper examines the impact of automation on U.S. state and local governments. We find that state and local governments with greater exposure to automation experience significant declines in per capita revenues and expenditures. The spending reduction is concentrated in K-12 education and is driven primarily by a decrease in state support. Automation exposure is also associated with a decline in student test scores. These findings suggest that industrial automation impairs state and local financing of public education and student outcomes.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48436,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Public Economics","volume":"247 ","pages":"Article 105394"},"PeriodicalIF":4.8,"publicationDate":"2025-05-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144134983","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Fallen women: Recessions and the supply of sex work","authors":"Grant Goehring","doi":"10.1016/j.jpubeco.2025.105405","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jpubeco.2025.105405","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>This paper studies how recessions impact the supply of sex work. I consider a historical recession that affected British cotton textile production, an industry that employed a significant number of women and was geographically localized. To measure the size of the market for sex, I digitized new data on the locations of establishments where sex work occurred across Britain. The recession led to 12 more establishments per 100,000 people in exposed counties, an increase of approximately 20 %. Informal establishments, such as pubs, accounted for three-fourths of the increase while brothels accounted for approximately 25 %. I provide suggestive evidence that an outward shift in supply contributed to the increase.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48436,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Public Economics","volume":"247 ","pages":"Article 105405"},"PeriodicalIF":4.8,"publicationDate":"2025-05-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144123792","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}