Journal of Public Economics最新文献_第10页

Inequality as an externality: Consequences for tax design 作为外部性的不平等：税收设计的后果

IF 9.8 1区经济学

Journal of Public Economics Pub Date : 2024-05-22 DOI: 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2024.105139

Morten Nyborg Støstad , Frank Cowell

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引用次数: 0

Movin’ on up? The impacts of a large-scale housing lottery in Uruguay 向上发展？乌拉圭大规模住房抽签的影响

IF 9.8 1区经济学

Journal of Public Economics Pub Date : 2024-05-21 DOI: 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2024.105138

Vincent Armentano , Craig McIntosh , Felipe Monestier , Rafael Piñeiro-Rodríguez , Fernando Rosenblatt , Guadalupe Tuñón

引用次数: 0

Representative compensation and disability claimant outcomes 有代表性的赔偿和伤残索赔结果

IF 9.8 1区经济学

Journal of Public Economics Pub Date : 2024-05-16 DOI: 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2024.105132

Cody Tuttle , Riley Wilson

{"title":"Representative compensation and disability claimant outcomes","authors":"Cody Tuttle , Riley Wilson","doi":"10.1016/j.jpubeco.2024.105132","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jpubeco.2024.105132","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>Many claimants of Social Security Disability Insurance (SSDI) retain legal representation to help with the approval process. The Social Security Administration imposes strict rules on representative compensation. Representatives are only paid if claimants are awarded disability, and they are paid the lesser of 25 percent of the claimant’s past due benefits or a pre-specified maximum fee ($7,200 since 2022). Because past due benefits are a function of the number of months claimants wait to be awarded, representatives face incentives to delay case resolution until past due benefits push the representative fees past the fee ceiling. We use difference-in-differences to evaluate how these incentives impact SSDI claimant wait times. After the fee ceiling increased in 2002, average wait times increased by 0.85 months among claimants for whom the fee threshold is more binding, implying a 2.6–5.6 month increase for claimants with representatives. This indicates that the structure of representative compensation does matter for case outcomes, and highlights the importance of interactions with auxiliary agents so common in modern social programs.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":48436,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Public Economics","volume":"235 ","pages":"Article 105132"},"PeriodicalIF":9.8,"publicationDate":"2024-05-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140948848","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

The effects of post-Dobbs abortion bans on fertility 后多布斯堕胎禁令对生育的影响

IF 9.8 1区经济学

Journal of Public Economics Pub Date : 2024-05-06 DOI: 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2024.105124

Daniel Dench , Mayra Pineda-Torres , Caitlin Myers

引用次数: 0

Preempting polarization: An experiment on opinion formation 预防两极分化：舆论形成实验

IF 9.8 1区经济学

Journal of Public Economics Pub Date : 2024-05-04 DOI: 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2024.105122

Daniel Kashner , Mateusz Stalinski

{"title":"Preempting polarization: An experiment on opinion formation","authors":"Daniel Kashner , Mateusz Stalinski","doi":"10.1016/j.jpubeco.2024.105122","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jpubeco.2024.105122","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>Blind adoption of opinions put forward by political parties and influential figures can sometimes be harmful. Focusing on cases where the partisan gap on policy support has not yet arisen, we investigate whether its formation can be prevented by encouraging prior active engagement with non-partisan information. To address this question, we recruited N=851 Republicans for a study about net neutrality, an issue largely unfamiliar to the electorate, which refers to equal treatment of all internet traffic. In a pre-registered experiment, we randomly changed the order in which the following two types of information were provided: (i) partisan, underscoring Republicans’ opposition and Democrats’ support, and (ii) non-partisan, where the participants evaluated factual arguments about the pros and cons of the policy. Despite holding total information constant, we find that those who saw the non-partisan block first donated 46% more to a charity advocating for net neutrality (p=0.001). The treatment effect persisted in an obfuscated follow-up study, conducted several weeks after the intervention. However, we do not find an effect on donations when repeating the main study with a sample of Democrats.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":48436,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Public Economics","volume":"234 ","pages":"Article 105122"},"PeriodicalIF":9.8,"publicationDate":"2024-05-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0047272724000586/pdfft?md5=62b730927311e6cccc7e46c5bb4aa87e&pid=1-s2.0-S0047272724000586-main.pdf","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140823837","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Energy efficiency can deliver for climate policy: Evidence from machine learning-based targeting 能源效率可促进气候政策：基于机器学习的目标定位证据

IF 9.8 1区经济学

Journal of Public Economics Pub Date : 2024-04-29 DOI: 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2024.105098

Peter Christensen , Paul Francisco , Erica Myers , Hansen Shao , Mateus Souza

引用次数: 0

The gatekeeper’s dilemma: Political selection or team effort 把关人的两难选择：政治选择还是团队努力

IF 9.8 1区经济学

Journal of Public Economics Pub Date : 2024-04-27 DOI: 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2024.105133

Jon H. Fiva , Federica Izzo , Janne Tukiainen

{"title":"The gatekeeper’s dilemma: Political selection or team effort","authors":"Jon H. Fiva , Federica Izzo , Janne Tukiainen","doi":"10.1016/j.jpubeco.2024.105133","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jpubeco.2024.105133","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>Political parties play a crucial gatekeeping role in elections, including controlling electoral resources, candidate recruitment, and electoral list compositions. In making these strategic choices, parties aim to encourage candidates to invest in the campaign, while also trying to secure advantages for their preferred candidates. We study how parties navigate this trade-off using a specific feature of the Norwegian local electoral system in which parties can give advantaged positions to some candidates in an otherwise open list. Our theory reveals that parties’ ex-ante electoral strength impacts their strategic decisions. Notably, the trade-off is weaker for more popular parties, allowing them to facilitate the election of their preferred candidates without compromising the party’s overall performance. We show empirically that the moral hazard concern is real, and that larger parties are indeed more likely to use their power to make some candidates safe. The advantage of large parties extends further: safeguarding specific candidates enables parties to achieve disproportionately favorable outcomes in post-electoral bargaining. These findings reveal new insights for political representations, policy outcomes, and intra-party dynamics more broadly.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":48436,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Public Economics","volume":"234 ","pages":"Article 105133"},"PeriodicalIF":9.8,"publicationDate":"2024-04-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0047272724000690/pdfft?md5=35f18fae4f11f93622dce841e3451fff&pid=1-s2.0-S0047272724000690-main.pdf","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140806866","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Leveling the playing field: Constraints on multinational profit shifting and the performance of national firms 公平竞争：跨国公司利润转移的制约因素与本国企业的绩效

IF 9.8 1区经济学

Journal of Public Economics Pub Date : 2024-04-23 DOI: 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2024.105116

P. Gauß , M. Kortenhaus , N. Riedel , M. Simmler

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引用次数: 0

Teacher-led innovations to improve education outcomes: Experimental evidence from Brazil 以教师为主导的创新改善教育成果：巴西的实验证据

IF 9.8 1区经济学

Journal of Public Economics Pub Date : 2024-04-23 DOI: 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2024.105123

Caio Piza , Astrid Zwager , Matteo Ruzzante , Rafael Dantas , Andre Loureiro

引用次数: 0

Local minimum wage laws, boundary discontinuity methods, and policy spillovers 地方最低工资法、边界不连续方法和政策溢出效应

IF 9.8 1区经济学

Journal of Public Economics Pub Date : 2024-04-22 DOI: 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2024.105131

Ekaterina Jardim , Mark C. Long , Robert Plotnick , Jacob Vigdor , Emma Wiles

引用次数: 0