{"title":"Health risk and the value of life","authors":"Daniel Bauer , Darius Lakdawalla , Julian Reif","doi":"10.1016/j.jpubeco.2025.105346","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jpubeco.2025.105346","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>We extend the conventional life-cycle framework for valuing health and longevity improvements to a stochastic setting with multiple health states and apply it to data on mortality, quality of life, labor earnings, and medical spending for adults with different comorbidities. We find that sick adults are willing to pay nearly twice as much per quality-adjusted life-year (QALY) to reduce mortality risk as healthy adults, and that reducing the risk of serious illness is valued similarly to reducing the risk of mild illness. Our results provide a rational explanation for why people oppose a single threshold value for rationing care and why they invest less in prevention than in treatment.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48436,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Public Economics","volume":"245 ","pages":"Article 105346"},"PeriodicalIF":4.8,"publicationDate":"2025-04-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143761082","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Policy-advising competition and endogenous lobbies","authors":"Manuel Foerster , Daniel Habermacher","doi":"10.1016/j.jpubeco.2025.105354","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jpubeco.2025.105354","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>We investigate Bertrand competition between experts in a policy-advising market. A policy-maker can either hire one of the experts or take the policy decision himself. The experts differ in policy competence and preferences and may either charge a fee or offer lobbying contributions. In equilibrium, the hired expert charges a fee if she has high policy competence and policy preferences are roughly aligned. Otherwise, the expert pays contributions—and thus acts as a <em>lobbyist</em> instead of as an <em>advisor</em>. Comparative statics show that more intense competition may even cause an expert previously hired at a positive price to engage in <em>lobbying</em>. Finally, we apply the model to competition between experts with different motives, reflecting the current debate about the role of professional consultants in advising governments. We show that the presence of able consultants may decrease social welfare if the policy issue is narrow and mainly concerns the policy-maker’s own voters. Our results give rise to alternative explanations for the empirical puzzle of why there is so little money in politics.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48436,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Public Economics","volume":"245 ","pages":"Article 105354"},"PeriodicalIF":4.8,"publicationDate":"2025-03-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143705586","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Gaurav Khanna , Margaret J. Lay , Stephanie Lee , Benjamin Thompson
{"title":"Female labor supply and rural pension eligibility in Brazil","authors":"Gaurav Khanna , Margaret J. Lay , Stephanie Lee , Benjamin Thompson","doi":"10.1016/j.jpubeco.2025.105352","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jpubeco.2025.105352","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>In 1991, Brazil expanded its rural retirement pension to cover millions of previously uncovered women, conditional on work requirements. We use a difference-in-differences approach to show that this expansion drastically increased married women’s employment by nine percentage points, or 26 percent. This increase in labor force participation occurred among women who were immediately age-eligible, and among younger cohorts that would be eligible in the future. These results illuminate the capacity of workers to respond to financial incentives for labor participation, and the extent to which younger workers might be forward-looking as they respond to retirement incentives.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48436,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Public Economics","volume":"245 ","pages":"Article 105352"},"PeriodicalIF":4.8,"publicationDate":"2025-03-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143705585","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"An older college professor like me","authors":"Duha T. Altindag , Samuel Cole , Elif S. Filiz","doi":"10.1016/j.jpubeco.2025.105355","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jpubeco.2025.105355","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>Past research shows that students’ educational outcomes improve when their race matches their teachers’ and they are significantly younger than their teachers. This study examines whether these racial congruence effects apply to students who are older than their instructors. Using administrative data from a university with a significant population of non-traditional-aged students and focusing on required classes to eliminate strategic instructor choice possibility, we find that race matches are associated with improved grades for younger students but not for those of similar age or older relative to their professors. While the dataset predominantly features White student–teacher pairs, additional analyses yield similar patterns for minorities with some limitations for statistical power. The most potent effects are observed for non-traditional-aged Black students. Our findings suggest that the benefits of race-matched instructors for younger students may be driven by the role model channel, wherein older professors positively influence younger students’ academic performance through mentoring and motivation.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48436,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Public Economics","volume":"244 ","pages":"Article 105355"},"PeriodicalIF":4.8,"publicationDate":"2025-03-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143682288","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Declining earnings inequality, rising income inequality: What explains discordant inequality trends in the United States?","authors":"Zachary Parolin , Lukas Lehner , Nathan Wilmers","doi":"10.1016/j.jpubeco.2025.105337","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jpubeco.2025.105337","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>From 2010 to 2019, personal earnings inequality declined in the United States (U.S.) for the first time in decades, yet household income inequality continued to increase. Discordance between the inequality trends reached its highest rate in recent history. We introduce a framework to decompose differences in inequality trends. We find that 46% of post-2010 discordance in inequality trends is due to changing household composition, namely a larger share of young workers living with their parents and combining low (but increasing) personal earnings with high household incomes. The remaining discordance stems from increases in private income among higher-earning households and declining redistributive effects of government transfers. Declines in personal earnings inequality do not imply declines in household income inequality.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48436,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Public Economics","volume":"244 ","pages":"Article 105337"},"PeriodicalIF":4.8,"publicationDate":"2025-03-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143682287","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Tax Avoidance through corporate accounting: Insights for corporate tax bases","authors":"Eric Heiser , Michael Love , Jacob Mortenson","doi":"10.1016/j.jpubeco.2025.105336","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jpubeco.2025.105336","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>How do firms respond when a tax reform changes the relative costs of inputs? We exploit a reform in Texas that broadened the corporate tax base and created a 1% tax wedge favoring both cost of goods sold (COGS) and worker compensation over other types of expenses. We find no discernible real change in inputs, and little avoidance response into worker compensation, but find a large avoidance response reclassifying costs into COGS (a 4% base reduction, with elasticity -5). Our results highlight the importance of enforceable boundaries when designing broader corporate tax bases.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48436,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Public Economics","volume":"244 ","pages":"Article 105336"},"PeriodicalIF":4.8,"publicationDate":"2025-03-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143619854","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"What do bequests in married couples with a surviving spouse tell us about bequest motives?","authors":"Sean Fahle","doi":"10.1016/j.jpubeco.2025.105333","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jpubeco.2025.105333","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>This paper studies the bequests that arise in married couples after the death of the first spouse. It provides the first systematic examination of these bequests using representative data from the United States on the actual (not intended or expected) bequests made to each of the couple’s children. I find that these bequests are divided among children very similarly to the bequests left by single individuals, which have been the near-exclusive focus of the literature. In both cases, I observe strong support for theories of bequests based on exchange and evolutionary psychology and no evidence for altruistic or dynastic models. Also novel to this paper, I document that different types of assets—residences, estates, and life insurance—exhibit different bequest patterns. While estates are typically equally divided, parents often divide life insurance and especially housing assets unequally, often leaving these assets to caregiving children. Selective disinheritance of certain children, particularly stepchildren, is common.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48436,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Public Economics","volume":"244 ","pages":"Article 105333"},"PeriodicalIF":4.8,"publicationDate":"2025-03-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143600460","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Wei Huang , Mi Luo , Yueping Song , Yiping Wang , Hantao Wu
{"title":"Poverty spillovers in human capital Formation: Evidence from randomized class assignments in China","authors":"Wei Huang , Mi Luo , Yueping Song , Yiping Wang , Hantao Wu","doi":"10.1016/j.jpubeco.2025.105334","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jpubeco.2025.105334","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>This paper investigates the spillover effects of peer poverty on student outcomes using data from a nationally representative, randomly assigned sample of junior high school classes in China. We find that higher classroom poverty rates significantly reduce students’ academic performance, non-cognitive skills, and the likelihood of high school and college enrollment. These effects are particularly pronounced among students from lower-income families, while the presence of wealthier peers provides yields little benefit. Mechanisms driving these outcomes include diminished student motivation, poorer classroom climates, reduced parental involvement, and lower teacher attention. Our findings provide new evidence on the impact of peer socio-economic status on student achievement and long-term educational trajectories.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48436,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Public Economics","volume":"244 ","pages":"Article 105334"},"PeriodicalIF":4.8,"publicationDate":"2025-03-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143563522","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Rubbing shoulders: Class segregation in daily activities","authors":"Maxim Massenkoff , Nathan Wilmers","doi":"10.1016/j.jpubeco.2025.105335","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jpubeco.2025.105335","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>We use location data to study cross-class encounters. Low-income and especially high-income individuals are socially isolated: they are more likely than other income groups to encounter people from their own class. Counterfactual exercises suggest this is explained largely by residential segregation and firms. Among firms, casual restaurants make the largest positive contribution to cross-class encounters through both scale and their diversity of visitors. Dollar stores and libraries isolate visitors. Our local measure of encounters is strongly associated with cross-class Facebook friendships, which have been previously shown to correlate with intergenerational mobility.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48436,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Public Economics","volume":"244 ","pages":"Article 105335"},"PeriodicalIF":4.8,"publicationDate":"2025-03-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143548846","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Target-based GDP manipulation: Evidence from China","authors":"Binlei Gong , Yuhui Shen , Shuai Chen","doi":"10.1016/j.jpubeco.2025.105349","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jpubeco.2025.105349","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>GDP manipulation is a prevalent form of hidden action, often arising from the principal-agent problem. Utilizing Bunching Estimation within an innovative ratio form approach, this study identifies and quantifies target-based GDP manipulation. Our empirical analysis offers evidence of such manipulation at the prefectural level in China to meet predetermined targets. However, China’s target-based GDP manipulation is diminishing over time. Furthermore, the findings suggest that reducing the weight of economic performance in local government assessments and adopting the soft target-setting restrictions have served as effective strategies to significantly mitigate China’s GDP manipulation in recent years.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48436,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Public Economics","volume":"244 ","pages":"Article 105349"},"PeriodicalIF":4.8,"publicationDate":"2025-03-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143563521","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}