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The long-run costs of highly competitive exams for government jobs 竞争激烈的政府职位考试的长期成本
IF 5.1 1区 经济学
Journal of Development Economics Pub Date : 2024-06-17 DOI: 10.1016/j.jdeveco.2024.103331
Kunal Mangal
{"title":"The long-run costs of highly competitive exams for government jobs","authors":"Kunal Mangal","doi":"10.1016/j.jdeveco.2024.103331","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jdeveco.2024.103331","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>Public sector recruitment exams can be highly competitive. Does this competition encourage candidates to develop generalizable skills, or do investments in exam preparation burden candidates who fail to get selected? I address this question by studying the impact of a partial public sector hiring freeze in the state of Tamil Nadu, India on male college graduates. The hiring freeze eliminated 86% of the usual vacancies. This increased the applicant-to-vacancy ratio for the remaining posts. Cohorts that were exposed to the hiring freeze delayed full-time employment, most likely in order to invest more time in exam preparation. A decade after the hiring freeze ended, the affected cohorts demonstrate a lower earning capacity, have delayed household formation, and appear more likely to remain unemployed. Together, these results suggest that highly competitive exams encourage candidates to make investments that are ultimately unproductive.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":48418,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Development Economics","volume":"171 ","pages":"Article 103331"},"PeriodicalIF":5.1,"publicationDate":"2024-06-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141595016","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Spatial inefficiencies in Africa’s trade network 非洲贸易网络的空间效率低下问题
IF 5.1 1区 经济学
Journal of Development Economics Pub Date : 2024-06-13 DOI: 10.1016/j.jdeveco.2024.103319
Tilman Graff
{"title":"Spatial inefficiencies in Africa’s trade network","authors":"Tilman Graff","doi":"10.1016/j.jdeveco.2024.103319","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jdeveco.2024.103319","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>I assess the efficiency of transport networks for every country in Africa. Using spatial data from various sources, I simulate trade flows over more than 70,000 links covering the entire continent. I maximise over the space of networks and find the optimal road system for every African state. My simulations predict that Africa would gain 1.3% of total welfare from reorganising its national road systems, and 0.8% from optimally expanding it by a tenth. I then construct a dataset of local network inefficiency and find that colonial infrastructure projects significantly skew trade networks towards a sub-optimal equilibrium today. I find suggestive evidence that regional favouritism played a role sustaining these imbalances.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":48418,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Development Economics","volume":"171 ","pages":"Article 103319"},"PeriodicalIF":5.1,"publicationDate":"2024-06-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141434381","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
How important are matching frictions in the labor market? Experimental & non-experimental evidence from a large Indian firm 劳动力市场中的匹配摩擦有多重要？来自一家印度大型企业的实验和非实验证据
IF 5.1 1区 经济学
Journal of Development Economics Pub Date : 2024-06-12 DOI: 10.1016/j.jdeveco.2024.103330
Abhijit V. Banerjee , Gaurav Chiplunkar
{"title":"How important are matching frictions in the labor market? Experimental & non-experimental evidence from a large Indian firm","authors":"Abhijit V. Banerjee ,&nbsp;Gaurav Chiplunkar","doi":"10.1016/j.jdeveco.2024.103330","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jdeveco.2024.103330","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>This paper provides evidence of matching frictions in the Indian labor market. Using several methods to elicit genuine preferences of job-seekers over jobs, we show that: (a) there is substantial variation in job-seekers preferences over the same jobs; and (b) placement officers, responsible for placing job-seekers in jobs, have poor knowledge of it. Providing placement offers with this information improves matching of job-seekers to interviews, even after taking into account redistribution of jobs across job-seekers. Treated job-seekers get more preferred jobs and retain them in the short run (three months), but not in the longer run (six months).</p></div>","PeriodicalId":48418,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Development Economics","volume":"171 ","pages":"Article 103330"},"PeriodicalIF":5.1,"publicationDate":"2024-06-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141391513","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
In-group competition for incentives 组内竞争激励
IF 5 1区 经济学
Journal of Development Economics Pub Date : 2024-06-07 DOI: 10.1016/j.jdeveco.2024.103320
Michael Olabisi , Mywish Maredia , Jiawen Liu , Toyin Ajibade , Hakeem Ajeigbe
{"title":"In-group competition for incentives","authors":"Michael Olabisi ,&nbsp;Mywish Maredia ,&nbsp;Jiawen Liu ,&nbsp;Toyin Ajibade ,&nbsp;Hakeem Ajeigbe","doi":"10.1016/j.jdeveco.2024.103320","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jdeveco.2024.103320","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>How can one motivate field staff to meet activity goals on time? Can introducing competition within groups motivate workers to meet goals faster than simply setting targets for workers? We conducted an experiment that assigned temporary field workers for a mobile app registration project into two treatment groups: field workers pursuing individual goals versus competing for a shared group-goal. We measure whether field workers reached their goal, the time to reach the goal, and the number of registered users per field worker. Our model suggests that field workers complete tasks more quickly with in-group competitive targets compared to individual targets. In line with this prediction, we observed that in-group competition led to an increased number of registrations and faster target achievement. Although the effects do not significantly vary by gender, the competition treatment proved more effective for employed individuals, those with less experience, and those with higher ability.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":48418,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Development Economics","volume":"171 ","pages":"Article 103320"},"PeriodicalIF":5.0,"publicationDate":"2024-06-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141413805","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Altruism in governance: Insights from randomized training for Pakistan's junior ministers 治理中的利他主义：巴基斯坦初级部长随机培训的启示
IF 5 1区 经济学
Journal of Development Economics Pub Date : 2024-05-31 DOI: 10.1016/j.jdeveco.2024.103317
Sultan Mehmood , Shaheen Naseer , Daniel L. Chen
{"title":"Altruism in governance: Insights from randomized training for Pakistan's junior ministers","authors":"Sultan Mehmood ,&nbsp;Shaheen Naseer ,&nbsp;Daniel L. Chen","doi":"10.1016/j.jdeveco.2024.103317","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jdeveco.2024.103317","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>Randomizing different schools of thought in training altruism finds that training junior deputy ministers in the utility of empathy renders at least a 0.4 standard deviation increase in altruism. Treated ministers increased their perspective-taking: blood donations doubled, but only when blood banks requested their exact blood type. Perspective-taking in strategic dilemmas improved. Field measures such as orphanage visits and volunteering in impoverished schools also increased, as did their test scores in teamwork assessments in policy scenarios. Overall, our results underscore that the utility of empathy can be a parsimonious foundation for the formation of prosociality, even impacting the behavior of adults in the field.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":48418,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Development Economics","volume":"170 ","pages":"Article 103317"},"PeriodicalIF":5.0,"publicationDate":"2024-05-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141286031","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Passing the message: Peer outreach about COVID-19 precautions in Zambia 传递信息：在赞比亚开展有关 COVID-19 预防措施的同伴宣传活动
IF 5 1区 经济学
Journal of Development Economics Pub Date : 2024-05-31 DOI: 10.1016/j.jdeveco.2024.103318
Alfredo Burlando , Pradeep Chintagunta , Jessica Goldberg , Melissa Graboyes , Peter Hangoma , Dean Karlan , Mario Macis , Silvia Prina
{"title":"Passing the message: Peer outreach about COVID-19 precautions in Zambia","authors":"Alfredo Burlando ,&nbsp;Pradeep Chintagunta ,&nbsp;Jessica Goldberg ,&nbsp;Melissa Graboyes ,&nbsp;Peter Hangoma ,&nbsp;Dean Karlan ,&nbsp;Mario Macis ,&nbsp;Silvia Prina","doi":"10.1016/j.jdeveco.2024.103318","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jdeveco.2024.103318","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>During public health emergencies, spreading accurate information and increasing adherence to recommended behaviors is critical for communal welfare. However, uncertainty, mistrust, and misinformation can slow the adoption of best practices. Preexisting social networks can amplify and endorse information from authorities, and technology makes peer-to-peer messaging scalable and fast. Using text messages and small cash incentives, we test a peer-based information campaign to encourage adherence to recommended COVID-19-related health behaviors in Zambia. None of the treatments affected health behavior among primary study participants or their peers. The suggestion to pass messages to peers increases dissemination, but financial incentives do not have any additional impact.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":48418,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Development Economics","volume":"171 ","pages":"Article 103318"},"PeriodicalIF":5.0,"publicationDate":"2024-05-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141294513","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Evidence on designing sanitation interventions 设计卫生设施干预措施的证据
IF 5.1 1区 经济学
Journal of Development Economics Pub Date : 2024-05-29 DOI: 10.1016/j.jdeveco.2024.103316
Britta Augsburg , Andrew Foster , Terence Johnson , Molly Lipscomb
{"title":"Evidence on designing sanitation interventions","authors":"Britta Augsburg ,&nbsp;Andrew Foster ,&nbsp;Terence Johnson ,&nbsp;Molly Lipscomb","doi":"10.1016/j.jdeveco.2024.103316","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jdeveco.2024.103316","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>Sanitation is a public good, the responsibility for which is shared between households and the government. Interventions in the sector, therefore, must be designed with an eye toward reducing crowd out. We discuss the new findings on sanitation provision from the 12 papers in this special issue in the context of a simple model of household choice of levels of sanitation investment in the face of joint responsibility between the government and households over sanitation. The model provides micro-foundations for understanding when we should be particularly concerned about the potential for crowd-out together with intuition for the implications of the choice of intervention design between information, in-kind transfers, cash transfers, and subsidies. We use the framework of the model to discuss the findings of the papers in this special issue.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":48418,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Development Economics","volume":"171 ","pages":"Article 103316"},"PeriodicalIF":5.1,"publicationDate":"2024-05-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0304387824000658/pdfft?md5=9d56502e824d550aa2bbdd7aaa5f80e8&pid=1-s2.0-S0304387824000658-main.pdf","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141484369","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Punishing mayors who fail the test: How do voters respond to information about educational outcomes? 惩罚考试不及格的市长：选民如何回应有关教育成果的信息？
IF 5 1区 经济学
Journal of Development Economics Pub Date : 2024-05-29 DOI: 10.1016/j.jdeveco.2024.103315
Loreto Cox , Sylvia Eyzaguirre , Francisco A. Gallego , Maximiliano García
{"title":"Punishing mayors who fail the test: How do voters respond to information about educational outcomes?","authors":"Loreto Cox ,&nbsp;Sylvia Eyzaguirre ,&nbsp;Francisco A. Gallego ,&nbsp;Maximiliano García","doi":"10.1016/j.jdeveco.2024.103315","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jdeveco.2024.103315","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>This paper explores the electoral effects of providing information on the educational outcomes of municipal schools when the mayor is running for reelection. We designed and implemented an experiment in Chile whereby we sent 128,033 letters to voters in 400 randomly selected polling stations prior to the 2016 municipal elections. The letters included information on past test scores for local public schools (levels and changes), and either average or maximum outcomes for comparable municipalities. Our findings do not reveal a relevant average impact of the letters, but when they contain poor educational outcomes, voter turnout decreases, translating almost one to one in decreases in votes for the incumbent mayor. Voters respond to educational results in levels and to letters that have average results as a benchmark. The results are especially strong when poor educational outcomes come as bad news to voters. We also find spillover effects in the municipal council election. Overall, our findings suggest that voters hold politicians accountable when faced to certain (but not all) types of information on their performance. JEL Codes: D72, H75, I25.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":48418,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Development Economics","volume":"171 ","pages":"Article 103315"},"PeriodicalIF":5.0,"publicationDate":"2024-05-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141302708","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Big hits in export growth 出口大幅增长
IF 5 1区 经济学
Journal of Development Economics Pub Date : 2024-05-23 DOI: 10.1016/j.jdeveco.2024.103310
Melise Jaud , Olivier Cadot , Anne-Célia Disdier , Akiko Suwa-Eisenmann
{"title":"Big hits in export growth","authors":"Melise Jaud ,&nbsp;Olivier Cadot ,&nbsp;Anne-Célia Disdier ,&nbsp;Akiko Suwa-Eisenmann","doi":"10.1016/j.jdeveco.2024.103310","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jdeveco.2024.103310","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>This paper identifies export accelerations at the country pair-product level that are large enough to drive aggregate export growth in the medium run. In a sample of 100 countries, these export “big hits” are rare, less than 2 percent of all export spells, yet account for over two-thirds of export growth in a given country. The paper then explores their microfoundations using matched customs-census firm-level data for France. We find that typically, two firms are sufficient to generate a big hit and these firms’ access to external financing is key to their ability to drive export success. Moreover, big hits spread within firms across destinations and products. Our results offer new evidence on the granularity of export growth by linking micro-level entrepreneurial decisions with country-level export outcomes.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":48418,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Development Economics","volume":"170 ","pages":"Article 103310"},"PeriodicalIF":5.0,"publicationDate":"2024-05-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141142110","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Types of communications technology and civil conflict 通信技术类型与国内冲突
IF 5 1区 经济学
Journal of Development Economics Pub Date : 2024-05-21 DOI: 10.1016/j.jdeveco.2024.103312
Tushar Bharati , Michael Jetter , Muhammad Nauman Malik
{"title":"Types of communications technology and civil conflict","authors":"Tushar Bharati ,&nbsp;Michael Jetter ,&nbsp;Muhammad Nauman Malik","doi":"10.1016/j.jdeveco.2024.103312","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jdeveco.2024.103312","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>Why do different types of information and communications technologies (ICTs) differentially relate to civil conflict incidence? We distinguish one-way (radio; television) from two-way ICTs (phone; internet; social media), contrasting technologies enabling one-directional broadcasting against technologies facilitating dialogue. The former predominantly allow rulers to misinform rebels about attainable rents, which, according to our theoretical framework, consequentially reduces conflict potential. However, two-way ICTs primarily help rebels overcome communication and coordination problems, which ultimately increases conflict potential. Strong political institutions are predicted to weaken these relationships but should remain unable to overturn their signs. Empirically, we observe consistent patterns in <span><math><mrow><mo>(</mo><mi>i</mi><mo>)</mo></mrow></math></span> country-level panel analyses of civil conflict and <span><math><mrow><mo>(</mo><mi>i</mi><mi>i</mi><mo>)</mo></mrow></math></span> individual-level survey responses eliciting anti-government attitudes. Radio and television availability and usage consistently emerge as negative predictors of conflict incidence and anti-government attitudes — but less so under strong political institutions. Opposite results materialize for mobile phone, internet, and social media availability and usage.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":48418,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Development Economics","volume":"170 ","pages":"Article 103312"},"PeriodicalIF":5.0,"publicationDate":"2024-05-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0304387824000610/pdfft?md5=e30291d4d74c20d6a09596f1fa0a0b69&pid=1-s2.0-S0304387824000610-main.pdf","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141132571","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
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