Cognitive Science最新文献

{"title":"Can Language Models Trained on Written Monologue Learn to Predict Spoken Dialogue?","authors":"Muhammad Umair,&nbsp;Julia B. Mertens,&nbsp;Lena Warnke,&nbsp;Jan P. de Ruiter","doi":"10.1111/cogs.70013","DOIUrl":"10.1111/cogs.70013","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Transformer-based Large Language Models (LLMs) have recently increased in popularity, in part due to their impressive performance on a number of language tasks. While LLMs can produce human-like writing, the extent to which these models can learn to predict <i>spoken</i> language in natural interaction remains unclear. This is a nontrivial question, as spoken and written language differ in syntax, pragmatics, and norms that interlocutors follow. Previous work suggests that while LLMs may develop an understanding of linguistic rules based on statistical regularities, they fail to acquire the knowledge required for language use. This implies that LLMs may not learn the normative structure underlying interactive spoken language, but may instead only model superficial regularities in speech. In this paper, we aim to evaluate LLMs as models of spoken dialogue. Specifically, we investigate whether LLMs can learn that the <i>identity</i> of a speaker in spoken dialogue influences what is likely to be said. To answer this question, we first fine-tuned two variants of a specific LLM (GPT-2) on transcripts of natural spoken dialogue in English. Then, we used these models to compute surprisal values for two-turn sequences with the same first-turn but different second-turn speakers and compared the output to human behavioral data. While the predictability of words in all fine-tuned models was influenced by speaker identity information, the models did not replicate humans' use of this information. Our findings suggest that although LLMs may learn to generate text conforming to normative linguistic structure, they do not (yet) faithfully replicate human behavior in natural conversation.</p>","PeriodicalId":48349,"journal":{"name":"Cognitive Science","volume":"48 11","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.3,"publicationDate":"2024-11-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142717401","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Dissociable Contributions of Goal-Relevant Evidence and Goal-Irrelevant Familiarity to Individual and Developmental Differences in Conflict Recognition","authors":"Alexander Weigard,&nbsp;Takakuni Suzuki,&nbsp;Lena J. Skalaban,&nbsp;May Conley,&nbsp;Alexandra O. Cohen,&nbsp;Hugh Garavan,&nbsp;Mary M. Heitzeg,&nbsp;B. J. Casey,&nbsp;Chandra Sripada,&nbsp;Andrew Heathcote","doi":"10.1111/cogs.70019","DOIUrl":"10.1111/cogs.70019","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Recent studies using the diffusion decision model find that performance across many cognitive control tasks can be largely attributed to a task-general efficiency of evidence accumulation (EEA) factor that reflects individuals’ ability to selectively gather evidence relevant to task goals. However, estimates of EEA from an n-back “conflict recognition” paradigm in the Adolescent Brain Cognitive Development^SM (ABCD) Study, a large, diverse sample of youth, appear to contradict these findings. EEA estimates from “lure” trials—which present stimuli that are familiar (i.e., presented previously) but do not meet formal criteria for being a target—show inconsistent relations with EEA estimates from other trials and display atypical v-shaped bivariate distributions, suggesting many individuals are responding based largely on stimulus familiarity rather than goal-relevant stimulus features. We present a new formal model of evidence integration in conflict recognition tasks that distinguishes individuals’ EEA for goal-relevant evidence from their use of goal-irrelevant familiarity. We then investigate developmental, cognitive, and clinical correlates of these novel parameters. Parameters for EEA and goal-irrelevant familiarity-based processing showed strong correlations across levels of n-back load, suggesting they are task-general dimensions that influence individuals’ performance regardless of working memory demands. Only EEA showed large, robust developmental differences in the ABCD sample and an independent age-diverse sample. EEA also exhibited higher test-retest reliability and uniquely meaningful associations with clinically relevant dimensions. These findings establish a principled modeling framework for characterizing conflict recognition mechanisms and have several broader implications for research on individual and developmental differences in cognitive control.</p>","PeriodicalId":48349,"journal":{"name":"Cognitive Science","volume":"48 11","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.3,"publicationDate":"2024-11-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/cogs.70019","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142717412","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Semantic Content in Face Representation: Essential for Proficient Recognition of Unfamiliar Faces by Good Recognizers","authors":"Tong Jiang,&nbsp;Guomei Zhou","doi":"10.1111/cogs.70020","DOIUrl":"10.1111/cogs.70020","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Face recognition is adapted to achieve goals of social interactions, which rely on further processing of the semantic information of faces, beyond visual computations. Here, we explored the semantic content of face representation apart from visual component, and tested their relations to face recognition performance. Specifically, we propose that enhanced visual or semantic coding could underlie the advantage of familiar over unfamiliar faces recognition, as well as the superior recognition of skilled face recognizers. We asked participants to freely describe familiar/unfamiliar faces using words or phrases, and converted these descriptions into semantic vectors. Face semantics were transformed into quantifiable face vectors by aggregating these word/phrase vectors. We also extracted visual features from a deep convolutional neural network and obtained the visual representation of familiar/unfamiliar faces. Semantic and visual representations were used to predict perceptual representation generated from a behavior rating task separately in different groups (bad/good face recognizers in familiar-face/unfamiliar-face conditions). Comparisons revealed that although long-term memory facilitated visual feature extraction for familiar faces compared to unfamiliar faces, good recognizers compensated for this disparity by incorporating more semantic information for unfamiliar faces, a strategy not observed in bad recognizers. This study highlights the significance of semantics in recognizing unfamiliar faces.</p>","PeriodicalId":48349,"journal":{"name":"Cognitive Science","volume":"48 11","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.3,"publicationDate":"2024-11-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142717428","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Beyond the Positivity Bias: The Processing and Integration of Self-Relevant Feedback Is Driven by Its Alignment With Pre-Existing Self-Views","authors":"Josué García-Arch,&nbsp;Solenn Friedrich,&nbsp;Xiongbo Wu,&nbsp;David Cucurell,&nbsp;Lluís Fuentemilla","doi":"10.1111/cogs.70017","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/cogs.70017","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Our self-concept is constantly faced with self-relevant information. Prevailing research suggests that information's valence plays a central role in shaping our self-views. However, the need for stability within the self-concept structure and the inherent alignment of positive feedback with the pre-existing self-views of healthy individuals might mask valence and congruence effects. In this study (<i>N</i> = 30, undergraduates), we orthogonalized feedback valence and self-congruence effects to examine the behavioral and electrophysiological signatures of self-relevant feedback processing and self-concept updating. We found that participants had a preference for integrating self-congruent and dismissing self-incongruent feedback, regardless of its valence. Consistently, electroencephalography results revealed that feedback congruence, but not feedback valence, is rapidly detected during early processing stages. Our findings diverge from the accepted notion that self-concept updating is based on the selective incorporation of positive information. These findings offer novel insights into self-concept dynamics, with implications for the understanding of psychopathological conditions.</p>","PeriodicalId":48349,"journal":{"name":"Cognitive Science","volume":"48 11","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.3,"publicationDate":"2024-11-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/cogs.70017","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142666025","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Lay Theories of Moral Progress","authors":"Casey Lewry,&nbsp;Sana Asifriyaz,&nbsp;Tania Lombrozo","doi":"10.1111/cogs.70018","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/cogs.70018","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Many consider the world to be morally better today than it was in the past and expect moral improvement to continue. How do people explain what drives this change? In this paper, we identify two ways people might think about how moral progress occurs: that it is driven by human action (i.e., if people did not actively work to make the world better, moral progress would not occur) or that it is driven by an unspecified mechanism (i.e., that our world is destined to morally improve, but without specifying a role for human action). In Study 1 (<i>N</i> = 147), we find that those who more strongly believe that the mechanism of moral progress is human action are more likely to believe their own intervention is warranted to correct a moral setback. In Study 2 (<i>N</i> = 145), we find that this translates to intended action: those who more strongly believe moral progress is driven by human action report that they would donate more money to correct a moral setback. In Study 3 (<i>N</i> = 297), participants generate their own explanations for why moral progress occurs. We find that participants’ donation intentions are predicted by whether their explanations state that human action drives moral progress. Together, these studies suggest that beliefs about the mechanisms of moral progress have important implications for engaging in social action.</p>","PeriodicalId":48349,"journal":{"name":"Cognitive Science","volume":"48 11","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.3,"publicationDate":"2024-11-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/cogs.70018","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142665101","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Adults and Children Engage in Subtle and Fine-Grained Action Interpretation and Evaluation in Moral Dilemmas","authors":"Isa Blomberg,&nbsp;Britta Schünemann,&nbsp;Marina Proft,&nbsp;Hannes Rakoczy","doi":"10.1111/cogs.70012","DOIUrl":"10.1111/cogs.70012","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Understanding the actions of others is fundamental for human social life. It builds on a grasp of the subjective intentionality behind behavior: one action comprises different things simultaneously (e.g., moving their arm, turning on the light) but which of these constitute intentional actions, in contrast to merely foreseen side-effects (e.g., increasing the electricity bill), depends on the description under which the agent represents the acts. She may be acting intentionally only under the description “turning on the light,” but did not turn on the light in order to increase the electricity bill. In preregistered studies (<i>N</i> = 620), we asked how adults and children engage in such complex subjective action interpretation and evaluation in moral dilemmas. To capture the deep structure of subjects' representations of the intentional structures of actions, we derived “act trees” from their response patterns to questions about the acts. Results suggest that people systematically distinguish between intended main and merely foreseen side-effects in their moral and intentionality judgments, even when main and side-effects were closely related and the latter were harmful. Additional experimental conditions suggest that, when given ambiguous information, the majority of subjects assume that agents act with beneficial main intentions. This “good intention prior” was so strong that participants attributed good intentions even when the harmful action was no longer necessary to resolve the dilemma (Study 2). These methods provide promising new ways to investigate in more subtle and fine-grained ways how reasoners parse, interpret, and evaluate complex actions.</p>","PeriodicalId":48349,"journal":{"name":"Cognitive Science","volume":"48 11","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.3,"publicationDate":"2024-11-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/cogs.70012","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142630538","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Folk Intuitions About Free Will and Moral Responsibility: Evaluating the Combined Effects of Misunderstandings About Determinism and Motivated Cognition","authors":"Kiichi Inarimori,&nbsp;Yusuke Haruki,&nbsp;Kengo Miyazono","doi":"10.1111/cogs.70014","DOIUrl":"10.1111/cogs.70014","url":null,"abstract":"<p>In this study, we conducted large-scale experiments with novel descriptions of determinism. Our goal was to investigate the effects of desires for punishment and comprehension errors on people's intuitions about free will and moral responsibility in deterministic scenarios. Previous research has acknowledged the influence of these factors, but their total effect has not been revealed. Using a large-scale survey of Japanese participants, we found that the failure to understand causal determination (intrusion) has limited effects relative to other factors and that the conflation of determinism and epiphenomenalism (bypassing) has a significant influence, even when controlling for other variables. This leads to the increased prevalence of incompatibilist responses. Furthermore, our results demonstrated a close association between the attribution of free will/responsibility and retributive desire. While further research is needed to establish the causal relationship between these factors, this association is consistent with Cory Clark and colleagues’ study that increased desire contributes to increased compatibilist responses and their claim that a definitive intuition about free will may be elusive.</p>","PeriodicalId":48349,"journal":{"name":"Cognitive Science","volume":"48 11","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.3,"publicationDate":"2024-11-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142607080","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"How Likely Is it that I Would Act the Same Way: Modeling Moral Judgment During Uncertainty","authors":"Paul C. Bogdan,&nbsp;Sanda Dolcos,&nbsp;Florin Dolcos","doi":"10.1111/cogs.70010","DOIUrl":"10.1111/cogs.70010","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Moral rules come with exceptions, and moral judgments come with uncertainty. For instance, stealing is wrong and generally punished. Yet, it could be the case that the thief is stealing food for their family. Such information about the thief's context could flip admonishment to praise. To varying degrees, this type of uncertainty regarding the context of another person's behavior is ever-present in moral judgment. Hence, we propose a model of how people evaluate others’ behavior: We argue that individuals principally judge the righteousness of another person's behavior by assessing the likelihood that they would act the same way if they were in the person's shoes. That is, if you see another person steal, you will consider the contexts where you too would steal and assess the likelihood that any of these contexts are true, given the available information. This idea can be formalized as a Bayesian model that treats moral judgment as probabilistic reasoning. We tested this model across four studies (<i>N</i> = 601) involving either fictional moral vignettes or economic games. The studies yielded converging evidence showing that the proposed model better predicts moral judgment under uncertainty than traditional theories that emphasize social norms or perceived harm/utility. Overall, the present studies support a new model of moral judgment with the potential to unite research on social judgment, decision-making, and probabilistic reasoning. Beyond this specific model, the present studies also more generally speak to how individuals parse uncertainty by integrating across different possibilities.</p>","PeriodicalId":48349,"journal":{"name":"Cognitive Science","volume":"48 11","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.3,"publicationDate":"2024-11-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/cogs.70010","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142607082","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Does Momentary Outcome-Based Reflection Shape Bioethical Views? A Pre-Post Intervention Design","authors":"Carme Isern-Mas,&nbsp;Piotr Bystranowski,&nbsp;John Rueda,&nbsp;Ivar R. Hannikainen","doi":"10.1111/cogs.70009","DOIUrl":"10.1111/cogs.70009","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Many bioliberals endorse broadly consequentialist frameworks in normative ethics, implying that a progressive stance on matters of bioethical controversy could stem from outcome-based reasoning. This raises an intriguing empirical prediction: encouraging outcome-based reflection could yield a shift toward bioliberal views among nonexperts as well. To evaluate this hypothesis, we identified empirical premises that underlie moral disagreements on seven divisive issues (e.g., vaccines, abortion, or genetically modified organisms). In exploratory and confirmatory experiments, we assessed whether people spontaneously engage in outcome-based reasoning by asking how their moral views change after momentarily reflecting on the underlying empirical questions. Our findings indicate that momentary reflection had no overall treatment effect on the central tendency or the dispersion in moral attitudes when compared to prereflection measures collected 1 week prior. Autoregressive models provided evidence that participants engaged in consequentialist moral reasoning, but this self-guided reflection produced neither moral “progress” (shifts in the distributions’ central tendency) nor moral “consensus” (reductions in their dispersion). These results imply that flexibility in people's search for empirical answers may limit the potential for outcome-based reflection to foster moral consensus.</p>","PeriodicalId":48349,"journal":{"name":"Cognitive Science","volume":"48 11","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.3,"publicationDate":"2024-11-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/cogs.70009","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142607079","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Correction to “Evaluation of an Algorithmic-Level Left-Corner Parsing Account of Surprisal Effects”","authors":"","doi":"10.1111/cogs.70016","DOIUrl":"10.1111/cogs.70016","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Schuler, W. &amp; Yue, S. (2024), Evaluation of an Algorithmic-Level Left-Corner Parsing Account of Surprisal Effects. <i>Cognitive Science</i>, 48(10), e13500. https://doi.org/10.1111/cogs.13500.</p><p>In the above referenced article, author Shisen Yue's name was misspelled as Shizen Yue. This has now been corrected in the original article.</p>","PeriodicalId":48349,"journal":{"name":"Cognitive Science","volume":"48 11","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.3,"publicationDate":"2024-11-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/cogs.70016","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142607077","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}