International Studies Quarterly最新文献_第2页

Outsourcing Empire: International Monetary Power in the Age of Offshore Finance 外包帝国：离岸金融时代的国际货币权力

IF 2.6 1区社会学

International Studies Quarterly Pub Date : 2024-10-07 DOI: 10.1093/isq/sqae123

Andrea Binder

{"title":"Outsourcing Empire: International Monetary Power in the Age of Offshore Finance","authors":"Andrea Binder","doi":"10.1093/isq/sqae123","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/isq/sqae123","url":null,"abstract":"Offshore finance allows foreign banks to create US dollars under the laws of an offshore jurisdiction. How and why does this affect international monetary power? Conceptually, I argue that offshore finance bifurcates across borders the shared power of the state and banks to create money, combining the US dollar with mostly English law. Empirically, I demonstrate that more US dollars are created offshore outside US jurisdiction than onshore within it. Offshore finance increases liquidity, at higher risk, and leads to a cross-border entanglement of issuing country, offshore financial centers, borrowers, and global banks. In short, offshore finance changes the power inherent in money. Consequently, international monetary power has become the ability to get access to offshore dollars in combination with the capacity to determine international liquidity and to set, select, or circumvent the related rules. It is constrained by the hierarchically organized social credit relations that money consists of. The international monetary power of the United States has become an instance of indirect rule with global banks having been delegated the prerogative of US dollar creation. As is common with indirect rule, it entails a difficult balancing act between geographical reach and centralization of power.","PeriodicalId":48313,"journal":{"name":"International Studies Quarterly","volume":"23 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.6,"publicationDate":"2024-10-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142383720","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Learning to Fight Together: UN Peacekeeping Coalitions and Civilian Protection 学会共同战斗：联合国维和联盟与平民保护

IF 2.6 1区社会学

International Studies Quarterly Pub Date : 2024-08-27 DOI: 10.1093/isq/sqae118

Michael A Morgan, Daniel S Morey

引用次数: 0

Resilience and Domination: Resonances of Racial Slavery in Refugee Exclusion 复原与统治：难民排斥中的种族奴役共鸣

IF 2.6 1区社会学

International Studies Quarterly Pub Date : 2024-08-16 DOI: 10.1093/isq/sqae116

Luke Glanville

引用次数: 0

Calendar versus Analysis Time: Reanalyzing the Relationship between Humanitarian Aid and Civil Conflict Duration 日历与分析时间：重新分析人道主义援助与国内冲突持续时间之间的关系

IF 2.6 1区社会学

International Studies Quarterly Pub Date : 2024-08-15 DOI: 10.1093/isq/sqae106

Shawna K Metzger

引用次数: 0

The Limits of Enforcement in Global Financial Governance: Blacklisting in FATF as Rational Myth 全球金融治理中执法的局限性：作为合理神话的金融行动特别工作组黑名单制度

IF 2.6 1区社会学

International Studies Quarterly Pub Date : 2024-08-12 DOI: 10.1093/isq/sqae115

Devin Case-Ruchala, Mark Nance

{"title":"The Limits of Enforcement in Global Financial Governance: Blacklisting in FATF as Rational Myth","authors":"Devin Case-Ruchala, Mark Nance","doi":"10.1093/isq/sqae115","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/isq/sqae115","url":null,"abstract":"How might international institutions matter? To consider this central question of International Relations, we analyze a most-likely case for the importance of materially driven enforcement: the Financial Action Task Force’s (FATF) use of blacklisting in the global regime targeting money laundering and terrorism financing. Scholars and practitioners often argue that fear of financial harm caused by FATF’s lists explains the near-global commitment to FATF’s standards, even if compliance lags. We search for statistical evidence of this impact across four different measures of financial flows and find that listing is not correlated with financial harm. To explain these null results, we examine bank decision-making and find that the lists’ impact is likely diminished by two overlooked factors: the existence of multiple, competing lists and banks’ access to more fine-grained, client-specific information provided by third-party companies. We interpret this contradiction—a commitment to compliance generated in part by a fear of enforcement, despite a lack of evidence for enforcement’s impact—as a “rational myth.” The results challenge a common understanding of a major global governance regime, confirm ideas about the limited ability of states or International Organizations to control governance outcomes, and advance a new research agenda on the impact of bank decision-making on global governance.","PeriodicalId":48313,"journal":{"name":"International Studies Quarterly","volume":"48 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.6,"publicationDate":"2024-08-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141974308","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Transnational Repression: International Cooperation in Silencing Dissent 跨国镇压：压制异议的国际合作

IF 2.6 1区社会学

International Studies Quarterly Pub Date : 2024-08-07 DOI: 10.1093/isq/sqae108

Rebecca Cordell, Kashmiri Medhi

{"title":"Transnational Repression: International Cooperation in Silencing Dissent","authors":"Rebecca Cordell, Kashmiri Medhi","doi":"10.1093/isq/sqae108","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/isq/sqae108","url":null,"abstract":"Why do some states assist other countries to reach across national borders and repress their diaspora, while others do not? Transnational repression involves host countries (including democracies) working closely with origin states (typically autocracies) to transfer their citizens living abroad into their custody and silence dissent. We expect international cooperation on transnational repression to rely on a host country’s domestic rule of law (opportunity to repress) and economic ties with the origin country (leverage to cooperate). To measure international cooperation on transnational repression, we present new data containing 608 direct physical cases of transnational repression from 2014 to 2020 involving 160 unique country dyads (79 host countries and 31 origin countries). We test our hypotheses using a dataset of 33,615 directed dyad-years that accounts for refugee flows between pairs of countries and find empirical support for our theoretical argument. Autocracies are better able to elicit cooperation on human rights violations from states that have shared economic interests and a weak rule of law. Our findings provide one of the first quantitative accounts of foreign complicity in extraterritorial repression and have policy implications for civil society activists that seek to prevent governments from committing future human rights abuses against foreign nationals living abroad.","PeriodicalId":48313,"journal":{"name":"International Studies Quarterly","volume":"111 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.6,"publicationDate":"2024-08-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141904496","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Do Foreign Military Deployments Provide Assurance? Unpacking the Micro-Mechanisms of Burden Sharing in Alliances 外国军事部署能提供保障吗？解读联盟中分担负担的微观机制

IF 2.6 1区社会学

International Studies Quarterly Pub Date : 2024-08-02 DOI: 10.1093/isq/sqae107

Alexander Sorg, Julian Wucherpfennig

{"title":"Do Foreign Military Deployments Provide Assurance? Unpacking the Micro-Mechanisms of Burden Sharing in Alliances","authors":"Alexander Sorg, Julian Wucherpfennig","doi":"10.1093/isq/sqae107","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/isq/sqae107","url":null,"abstract":"How do US foreign military deployments impact the defense policies of host states? Dominant scholarship holds that these deployments play a pivotal role in assuring allies that their security is guaranteed, which in turn leads host countries to neglect their national defense contributions. In this research note, we examine the micro-foundations of this conventional wisdom, investigating how nuclear and conventional troop deployments impact attitudes toward defense policies in (potential) host states. We highlight that the presumed linkage between assurance and free-riding critically implies that foreign military deployments must positively affect perceptions of security among host nations. We test this core logic, alongside some alternative pathways, at the micro level through two survey experiments that randomize hypothetical withdrawals (Germany) and deployments (Czech Republic). Although we find some evidence that foreign military deployments can decrease citizens’ subjective need for defense, the survey experiments also reveal that citizens hardly feel protected by these deployments. Thus, our results cast doubt on the core logic underlying the theory of free-riding in alliances.","PeriodicalId":48313,"journal":{"name":"International Studies Quarterly","volume":"75 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.6,"publicationDate":"2024-08-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141880164","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Network Context and the Effectiveness of International Agreements 网络环境与国际协定的效力

IF 2.6 1区社会学

International Studies Quarterly Pub Date : 2024-07-11 DOI: 10.1093/isq/sqae099

Brandon J Kinne

引用次数: 0

Border Barriers and Illicit Trade Flows 边境壁垒与非法贸易流动

IF 2.6 1区社会学

International Studies Quarterly Pub Date : 2024-07-03 DOI: 10.1093/isq/sqae094

David B Carter, Bailee Donahue, Rob Williams

引用次数: 0

Reputations and Change in International Relations 国际关系中的声誉与变革

IF 2.6 1区社会学

International Studies Quarterly Pub Date : 2024-07-03 DOI: 10.1093/isq/sqae097

Ekrem T Baser

{"title":"Reputations and Change in International Relations","authors":"Ekrem T Baser","doi":"10.1093/isq/sqae097","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/isq/sqae097","url":null,"abstract":"Reputations for resolve are critical in international relations for deterring adversaries and reassuring partners. However, a state’s resolve is unobservable and can change unbeknownst to its audience. How does the possibility of unobserved change impact reputation dynamics? I provide a theory of long-run reputations with changing resolve via a formal model covering conflict and cooperation domains. In the model, the possibility that current reputations are based on outdated information makes the audience extend the benefit of the doubt to states with poor reputations. This leads to states building or spending their reputations depending on their current reputations. Importantly, when damaged reputations can be rebuilt, states with better reputations face stronger temptations to spend them. Thus, reputations constrain states with poor reputations the most. Further, because demonstrations of resolve improve reputations, which, in turn, reduce incentives for future demonstrations of resolve, there is a cyclical rhythm to conflict and cooperation. A major implication is that a state’s behavior changes with its reputation even if its resolve is unchanged and the stakes are identical. Reputational enforcement works, but the price is occasional breaches of trust. These results also settle a few long-standing controversies in the IR-reputation literature.","PeriodicalId":48313,"journal":{"name":"International Studies Quarterly","volume":"37 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.6,"publicationDate":"2024-07-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141521367","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0