Corporate Governance-An International Review最新文献

{"title":"The transaction cost implications from business angel ownership in the Caribbean","authors":"Bruce Hearn,&nbsp;Venancio Tauringana,&nbsp;Collins Ntim","doi":"10.1111/corg.12571","DOIUrl":"10.1111/corg.12571","url":null,"abstract":"<div>\u0000 \u0000 \u0000 <section>\u0000 \u0000 <h3> Research question/issue</h3>\u0000 \u0000 <p>This is a study of the relationship between business angel retained ownership in investee firms across the Caribbean region and their informational asymmetry costs captured in bid-ask spreads.</p>\u0000 </section>\u0000 \u0000 <section>\u0000 \u0000 <h3> Research findings/insights</h3>\u0000 \u0000 <p>We find business angel ownership to be associated with a reduction in transaction costs or bid-ask spreads. However, this is reversed leading to increasing transaction costs following moderation by whether the investee firm has a subsidiary located within an offshore jurisdiction and separately if the investee firm adopts higher levels of Anglo-American shareholder value corporate governance.</p>\u0000 </section>\u0000 \u0000 <section>\u0000 \u0000 <h3> Theoretical/academic implications</h3>\u0000 \u0000 <p>We undertake a novel application of incomplete contracting theory in theorizing the influence of ownership of business angels on the transaction costs of their investee firms. We extend and contribute to theory development through consideration of the presence of investee firm's subsidiary located in offshore financial centers within the firm's corporate network and the degree to which it adopts Anglo-American shareholder value corporate governance. In the former, we argue business angels are more prone to collaborate with firm insiders to the detriment of outside minority investors given the enhanced opacity and shift in incentives. In the latter, we argue the incongruity between business angels, insiders, and outside minority expectations regarding the adoption of shareholder value governance also leads to elevated transaction costs.</p>\u0000 </section>\u0000 \u0000 <section>\u0000 \u0000 <h3> Practitioner/policy implications</h3>\u0000 \u0000 <p>Business angel finance is widely lauded as a potential source of development capital within regional and developing economies with the potential to rejuvenate otherwise moribund entrepreneurial ecosystems and business sectors. Our study yields important findings relevant for practitioners in formulating development policy nurturing the development of indigenous economies through enhanced business angel participation. It also considers the moderating influence of firm's adoption of Anglo-American shareholder value corporate governance and whether the firm has a related party located in an offshore financial center, something of profound importance in regions comprising offshore financial centers.</p>\u0000 </section>\u0000 </div>","PeriodicalId":48209,"journal":{"name":"Corporate Governance-An International Review","volume":"32 5","pages":"786-813"},"PeriodicalIF":4.6,"publicationDate":"2024-01-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/corg.12571","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139580585","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"CGIR Special Issues","authors":"","doi":"10.1111/corg.12574","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/corg.12574","url":null,"abstract":"<p>No abstract is available for this article.</p>","PeriodicalId":48209,"journal":{"name":"Corporate Governance-An International Review","volume":"32 1","pages":"157-158"},"PeriodicalIF":5.3,"publicationDate":"2024-01-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139550472","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Chief Executive Officers With A Cause? CEO Activism And Firms’ Governance, Strategy, And Performance","authors":"","doi":"10.1111/corg.12575","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/corg.12575","url":null,"abstract":"<p>No abstract is available for this article.</p>","PeriodicalId":48209,"journal":{"name":"Corporate Governance-An International Review","volume":"32 1","pages":"159-167"},"PeriodicalIF":5.3,"publicationDate":"2024-01-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139550473","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"CGIR Review Issue 2024","authors":"","doi":"10.1111/corg.12573","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/corg.12573","url":null,"abstract":"<p>No abstract is available for this article.</p>","PeriodicalId":48209,"journal":{"name":"Corporate Governance-An International Review","volume":"32 1","pages":"156"},"PeriodicalIF":5.3,"publicationDate":"2024-01-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139550471","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Board co-option and corporate environmental orientation: New insights from the waste management perspective","authors":"Ammar Ali Gull,&nbsp;Hoa Luong,&nbsp;Muhammad Nadeem","doi":"10.1111/corg.12567","DOIUrl":"10.1111/corg.12567","url":null,"abstract":"<div>\u0000 \u0000 \u0000 <section>\u0000 \u0000 <h3> Research Question/Issue</h3>\u0000 \u0000 <p>We investigate the impact of board co-option on corporate environmental orientation from the perspective of waste management. As waste presents damaging effects on the natural environment, climate change, and human health, businesses assume an ethical responsibility to conduct their operations in a sustainable and responsible manner.</p>\u0000 </section>\u0000 \u0000 <section>\u0000 \u0000 <h3> Research Findings/Insights</h3>\u0000 \u0000 <p>Employing firm-level waste production data, we document a significant negative relationship between board co-option and waste generation, suggesting that co-opted directors help firms reduce their waste—a finding that also carries economic significance. The cross-sectional analyses reveal that the relationship only holds when a CEO does not chair the board and has a shorter tenure. Furthermore, we find that the board co-option–waste management relationship is stronger in environmentally sensitive industries and is mainly driven by the manufacturing firms. We perform a battery of analyses to rule out endogeneity concerns and check for the robustness of our results. The channel test reveals that CEOs of firms with higher waste management face lower performance-induced turnover, particularly when working with co-opted boards. Finally, we also find that co-option-induced waste management initiatives ultimately increase firms' economic value.</p>\u0000 </section>\u0000 \u0000 <section>\u0000 \u0000 <h3> Theoretical/Academic Implications</h3>\u0000 \u0000 <p>We document that co-opted boards may enhance firms' waste management practices by reducing performance-induced CEO turnover. Thus, we make important contributions to the corporate governance and environmentalism strands of the literature by highlighting the bright side of board co-option for waste reduction initiatives.</p>\u0000 </section>\u0000 \u0000 <section>\u0000 \u0000 <h3> Practitioner/Policy Implications</h3>\u0000 \u0000 <p>Our study provides vital policy implications for regulators and top management teams against the background of public outcry and social pressure to mitigate the damage to the environment and calls for ethical business practices.</p>\u0000 </section>\u0000 </div>","PeriodicalId":48209,"journal":{"name":"Corporate Governance-An International Review","volume":"32 5","pages":"758-785"},"PeriodicalIF":4.6,"publicationDate":"2024-01-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/corg.12567","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139501370","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Corporate Governance and Evolving Corporate Disclosures: Global Challenges and Opportunities for Research and Policy","authors":"","doi":"10.1111/corg.12565","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/corg.12565","url":null,"abstract":"<p>No abstract is available for this article.</p>","PeriodicalId":48209,"journal":{"name":"Corporate Governance-An International Review","volume":"31 6","pages":"994-1002"},"PeriodicalIF":5.3,"publicationDate":"2023-11-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"138431848","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Millennial managers","authors":"Ellie Luu,&nbsp;Silvina Rubio","doi":"10.1111/corg.12564","DOIUrl":"10.1111/corg.12564","url":null,"abstract":"<div>\u0000 \u0000 \u0000 <section>\u0000 \u0000 <h3> Research Question/Issue</h3>\u0000 \u0000 <p>This paper investigates whether and how millennial mutual fund managers differ from managers born in other generations in terms of environmental, social, and governance (ESG) orientation in portfolio choices and voting decisions.</p>\u0000 </section>\u0000 \u0000 <section>\u0000 \u0000 <h3> Research Findings/Insights</h3>\u0000 \u0000 <p>We find that millennial mutual fund managers hold portfolios that are more ESG oriented than do managers from other generations, consistent with anecdotal evidence suggesting that millennials are more driven by purpose than profits. Our findings suggest that the observed relationship is stronger when managers have more discretion over portfolio choices, that is, in active funds and funds with lower flow-performance sensitivity. Furthermore, we find that millennial managers respond more strongly to social movements by reallocating assets into more socially conscious firms. We also find that millennial managers are more supportive of environmental proposals when their outcome is contested.</p>\u0000 </section>\u0000 \u0000 <section>\u0000 \u0000 <h3> Theoretical/Academic Implications</h3>\u0000 \u0000 <p>Our paper shows how cultural, political, and economic events, including social movements experienced by people of the same age cohort, shape preferences and beliefs and result in different investment strategies and voting among mutual fund managers. We also show how institutional constraints might limit managers' ability to impose their own preferences when investing or voting their shares.</p>\u0000 </section>\u0000 \u0000 <section>\u0000 \u0000 <h3> Practitioner/Policy Implications</h3>\u0000 \u0000 <p>Millennials are increasingly replacing older generations in managerial roles and investing in the stock market due to wealth transfers from their parents. This study offers insights to policymakers and investors interested in understanding the drivers of ESG investment.</p>\u0000 </section>\u0000 </div>","PeriodicalId":48209,"journal":{"name":"Corporate Governance-An International Review","volume":"32 4","pages":"732-755"},"PeriodicalIF":4.6,"publicationDate":"2023-10-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/corg.12564","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135169238","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"The impact of board gender composition on loan covenant violations","authors":"Md Samsul Alam,&nbsp;Muhammad Atif,&nbsp;Douglas Cumming,&nbsp;Md Shahidul Islam","doi":"10.1111/corg.12561","DOIUrl":"10.1111/corg.12561","url":null,"abstract":"<div>\u0000 \u0000 \u0000 <section>\u0000 \u0000 <h3> Research Question/Issue</h3>\u0000 \u0000 <p>We examine the role of board gender diversity in attenuating loan covenant violations. We also investigate whether the relationship is influenced by female independent directors. Finally, we examine the channels of this relationship.</p>\u0000 </section>\u0000 \u0000 <section>\u0000 \u0000 <h3> Research Findings/Insights</h3>\u0000 \u0000 <p>Drawing on gender socialization and diversity theories, our findings show that firms with gender-diverse boards are less likely to violate loan covenants. We also find that boards with more female directors have a stronger impact on loan covenant violations than those with fewer female directors, consistent with critical mass theory. Our results also suggest that the negative relationship stems from female independent directors rather than from female executive directors. Our channel analyses indicate that the relationship is routed through covenant strictness, the financial performance of firms, and better corporate governance. Our further analysis demonstrates that the relationship is pronounced in female-dominated industries and financially distressed firms, as well as in firms whose directors have greater experience. Our results are robust across a series of sensitivity and endogeneity tests.</p>\u0000 </section>\u0000 \u0000 <section>\u0000 \u0000 <h3> Theoretical/Academic Implications</h3>\u0000 \u0000 <p>We contribute to an emerging strand of literature that examines the link between board gender diversity and loan covenants. We fill a gap in this stream of literature by providing the first empirical evidence that female directors in the boardroom reduce loan covenant violations through their greater integrative bargaining skills during loan deals, improving firm financial performance, and ensuring good corporate governance. Our study also contributes to the growing literature on the differential effects on corporate policies of female directors (independent and executive) and critical mass.</p>\u0000 </section>\u0000 \u0000 <section>\u0000 \u0000 <h3> Practitioner/Policy Implications</h3>\u0000 \u0000 <p>This finding offers significant policy implications for managers, investors, and policymakers. Given the growing frequency of loan covenant violations, the presence of a gender-diverse board should serve as a potent indicator to creditors who have a concern regarding loans. In addition, our study adds to the ongoing debate regarding the business case of board gender diversity.</p>\u0000 </section>\u0000 </div>","PeriodicalId":48209,"journal":{"name":"Corporate Governance-An International Review","volume":"32 4","pages":"703-731"},"PeriodicalIF":4.6,"publicationDate":"2023-10-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/corg.12561","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135366177","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Does certification of corporate governance compliance pay off? Evidence from a unique regulatory setting","authors":"Abdus Sobhan,&nbsp;Sudipta Bose,&nbsp;Muhammad Shahin Miah,&nbsp;Rushdi Md. Rezaur Razzaque","doi":"10.1111/corg.12563","DOIUrl":"10.1111/corg.12563","url":null,"abstract":"<div>\u0000 \u0000 \u0000 <section>\u0000 \u0000 <h3> Research Questions/Issues</h3>\u0000 \u0000 <p>Using insights from agency and signaling theories, we examine the effect on companies' market-based performance of a unique monitoring mechanism of compliance with a corporate governance (CG) code, that is, independent certification of compliance with a CG code and type of certification provider. Furthermore, we examine the impact of two boundary conditions, family company status and company-level information asymmetry, influencing the effect of independent CG compliance certification and type of certification provider on the market-based performance of companies.</p>\u0000 </section>\u0000 \u0000 <section>\u0000 \u0000 <h3> Research Findings/Insights</h3>\u0000 \u0000 <p>Based on 1110 Bangladeshi company-year observations from 2006 to 2017, we firstly find that independent CG compliance certification is positively associated with companies' market-based performance. Secondly, we show that CG compliance certification by a chartered secretarial firm is related to higher market-based performance. Thirdly, we document that family companies attenuate both these associations. Finally, we find that, while company-level information asymmetry reinforces the association between CG compliance certification and market-based performance, it weakens the relationship between certification by a chartered secretarial firm and companies' market-based performance.</p>\u0000 </section>\u0000 \u0000 <section>\u0000 \u0000 <h3> Theoretical/Academic Implications</h3>\u0000 \u0000 <p>Our findings are consistent with the agency and signaling theory that independent certification of CG compliance and this certification by a chartered secretarial firm reduce information asymmetry between managers and external investors by signaling enhanced credibility of reported CG compliance information. However, the roles of CG compliance certification and certification by a chartered secretarial firm to reduce agency conflict and provide credible signals are conditional on two boundary conditions: family company status and company-level information asymmetry.</p>\u0000 </section>\u0000 \u0000 <section>\u0000 \u0000 <h3> Practitioner/Policy Implications</h3>\u0000 \u0000 <p>This study's findings highlight the economic implications of a unique mechanism for monitoring compliance with an adopted CG code. The findings have significant implications for policy makers and regulators in emerging economies.</p>\u0000 </section>\u0000 </div>","PeriodicalId":48209,"journal":{"name":"Corporate Governance-An International Review","volume":"32 4","pages":"670-702"},"PeriodicalIF":4.6,"publicationDate":"2023-10-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/corg.12563","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135570291","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Collusion or governance? Common ownership and corporate risk-taking","authors":"Shouyu Yao,&nbsp;Xinyu Guo,&nbsp;Ahmet Sensoy,&nbsp;John W. Goodell,&nbsp;Feiyang Cheng","doi":"10.1111/corg.12562","DOIUrl":"10.1111/corg.12562","url":null,"abstract":"<div>\u0000 \u0000 \u0000 <section>\u0000 \u0000 <h3> Research Question</h3>\u0000 \u0000 <p>Disputes over the corporate governance impacts of common ownership continue. Differentiating from existing studies, we focus on the Chinese stock market, exploiting the Top 10 Shareholding File, which includes various investors besides institutional investors, to study the impact of common ownership built through blockholders on corporate risk-taking behavior.</p>\u0000 </section>\u0000 \u0000 <section>\u0000 \u0000 <h3> Research Findings</h3>\u0000 \u0000 <p>We find that firms with higher common ownership are less likely to engage in corporate risk-taking, with concomitant decreases in future growth rates. Mechanism analysis shows that blockholders' common ownership exerts its influence through increasing market concentration, with concomitant lessening of market competition. Interestingly, further analyses indicate that, in contrast to blockholders, ownership connectedness built by mutual fund families significantly raises corporate risk-taking along with growth. However, individual investors' common ownership does not show the significant statistical relationship with corporate risk-taking.</p>\u0000 </section>\u0000 \u0000 <section>\u0000 \u0000 <h3> Theoretical Implications</h3>\u0000 \u0000 <p>We add to the debate on common ownership on corporate governance. Consistent with the anti-competition stream of literature, the risk-taking-reduction role we identify for blockholder common ownership supports the theory of anti-competition. Our results highlight the need to consider the heterogeneity of common ownership.</p>\u0000 </section>\u0000 \u0000 <section>\u0000 \u0000 <h3> Policy Implications</h3>\u0000 \u0000 <p>While blockholder common ownership is evidenced to have a negative effect on corporate risk-taking, with, by extension, a negative impact on economic development, our results also suggest that efficient monitoring mitigates these effects. We also document an interesting heterogeneity in investor types. Mutual fund common ownership, in contrast to blockholder common ownership, is associated with higher risk-taking and more robust firm growth. This suggests the positive role of institutions in corporate governance and the necessity of considering the heterogeneity of common ownership.</p>\u0000 </section>\u0000 </div>","PeriodicalId":48209,"journal":{"name":"Corporate Governance-An International Review","volume":"32 4","pages":"645-669"},"PeriodicalIF":4.6,"publicationDate":"2023-10-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135251465","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}