The impact of share-pledging purposes on firm performance and innovation

IF 4.6 3区 管理学 Q1 BUSINESS
Xiao Jia, Ellen Jin Jiang, Rui Wang
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引用次数: 0

Abstract

Research question

Share pledging by controlling shareholders can be motivated by business or personal purposes. We investigate whether the firm performance and innovation outputs are different for firms with controlling shareholders pledging shares to support their firm's financing (business-pledging firms) and those pledging shares for increasing personal wealth (individual-pledging firms).

Research findings

Using data from publicly listed Chinese firms, we find that business-pledging firms are associated with higher changes in Tobin's Q and more patent outputs compared with individual-pledging firms. In additional tests, we show that the impact of share-pledging purposes on firm performance and innovative outputs is more pronounced for Chinese non-state-owned enterprises, which have relatively limited access to traditional bank loans.

Theoretical implications

In this study, we bring new empirical evidence to agency theory, especially the “principal–principal” problem. We identify two inherently different purposes in share-pledging cases—business pledging and individual pledging. We show that in business-pledging cases, pledgers' interests become more aligned with outside shareholders, and pledgers have higher incentives to enhance firm value and innovation productivity, relative to individual pledging. This paper adds to the evidence on the bright side of share pledges.

Practitioner implications

This paper sheds light on the recent policy debate regarding the costs and benefits of share pledging and has implications for regulators and investors. Thus, it may be vital for publicly listed firms to disclose the purposes of share pledging.

股权质押目的对公司绩效和创新的影响
研究问题 控股股东质押股份的动机可以是商业目的,也可以是个人目的。我们研究了控股股东为支持公司融资而质押股份的公司(商业质押型公司)和为增加个人财富而质押股份的公司(个人质押型公司)在公司业绩和创新产出方面是否存在差异。 研究结果 利用中国上市公司的数据,我们发现与个人质押企业相比,企业质押企业的托宾 Q 值变化更大,专利产出更多。在额外的测试中,我们发现股权质押对企业绩效和创新产出的影响在中国非国有企业中更为明显,因为这些企业获得传统银行贷款的机会相对有限。 理论意义 在本研究中,我们为代理理论,尤其是 "委托人-委托人 "问题提供了新的经验证据。我们在股权质押案例中发现了两种本质上不同的目的--企业质押和个人质押。我们发现,在企业质押案例中,质押人的利益与外部股东更加一致,相对于个人质押,质押人更有动力提升公司价值和创新生产力。本文补充了有关股权质押光明面的证据。 对从业者的启示 本文揭示了近期有关股权质押成本与收益的政策辩论,对监管者和投资者具有启示意义。因此,上市公司披露股票质押的目的可能至关重要。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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来源期刊
CiteScore
7.00
自引率
11.30%
发文量
79
期刊介绍: The mission of Corporate Governance: An International Review is to publish cutting-edge international business research on the phenomena of comparative corporate governance throughout the global economy. Our ultimate goal is a rigorous and relevant global theory of corporate governance. We define corporate governance broadly as the exercise of power over corporate entities so as to increase the value provided to the organization"s various stakeholders, as well as making those stakeholders accountable for acting responsibly with regard to the protection, generation, and distribution of wealth invested in the firm. Because of this broad conceptualization, a wide variety of academic disciplines can contribute to our understanding.
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