Corporate Governance-An International Review最新文献

{"title":"Farewell Editorial","authors":"Konstantinos Stathopoulos, Till Talaulicar","doi":"10.1111/corg.12636","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/corg.12636","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":48209,"journal":{"name":"Corporate Governance-An International Review","volume":"33 1","pages":"3-5"},"PeriodicalIF":4.6,"publicationDate":"2024-12-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143118241","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"The US Individualism–Collectivism and Labor Investment Efficiency","authors":"Rajib Chowdhury,&nbsp;Douglas Cumming,&nbsp;Anjee Gorkhali","doi":"10.1111/corg.12629","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/corg.12629","url":null,"abstract":"<div>\u0000 \u0000 \u0000 <section>\u0000 \u0000 <h3> Research Question/Issue</h3>\u0000 \u0000 <p>We examine whether the variation in the ndividualism–collectivism dimension within the US affects labor investment efficiency.</p>\u0000 </section>\u0000 \u0000 <section>\u0000 \u0000 <h3> Research Findings/Insights</h3>\u0000 \u0000 <p>Using the collectivism index developed by existing literature, we find that firms headquartered in collectivist states are more likely to deviate from the optimal level of hiring. The effect is stronger in firms with high agency problems and information asymmetry. Additional analyses suggest that collectivism induces more inefficiency in firms with larger boards, less independent boards, firms with high R&amp;D intensity, and states that adopt antitakeover laws.</p>\u0000 </section>\u0000 \u0000 <section>\u0000 \u0000 <h3> Theoretical/Academic Implications</h3>\u0000 \u0000 <p>Overall, we find convincing evidence that cultural differences across US states contribute to labor investment decisions.</p>\u0000 </section>\u0000 \u0000 <section>\u0000 \u0000 <h3> Practitioner/Policy Implications</h3>\u0000 \u0000 <p>The study extends the existing literature on the effect of cultural dimensions on labor investment decisions, particularly in the context of the United States. It also extends our understanding of how cultural variations across headquarters states can adversely affect firm hiring and firing decisions.</p>\u0000 </section>\u0000 \u0000 <section>\u0000 \u0000 <h3> Jel Classification</h3>\u0000 \u0000 <p>M14, G30, G34, G40</p>\u0000 </section>\u0000 </div>","PeriodicalId":48209,"journal":{"name":"Corporate Governance-An International Review","volume":"33 4","pages":"873-899"},"PeriodicalIF":4.6,"publicationDate":"2024-12-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/corg.12629","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144598469","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Business Group Affiliation and Board Independence in India: The Effects of Structural and Situated Attention","authors":"Lerong He,&nbsp;Tara Shankar Shaw","doi":"10.1111/corg.12630","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/corg.12630","url":null,"abstract":"&lt;div&gt;\u0000 \u0000 \u0000 &lt;section&gt;\u0000 \u0000 &lt;h3&gt; Research Question/Issue&lt;/h3&gt;\u0000 \u0000 &lt;p&gt;This study examines how business group affiliation shapes firm attention and consequently influences firms' compliance with board independence requirements.&lt;/p&gt;\u0000 &lt;/section&gt;\u0000 \u0000 &lt;section&gt;\u0000 \u0000 &lt;h3&gt; Research Findings/Insights&lt;/h3&gt;\u0000 \u0000 &lt;p&gt;Using a longitudinal sample of Indian listed firms, we find that group-affiliated firms are more likely to comply with board independence requirements than nongroup firms, especially when the affiliated firm is larger or when a greater proportion of firms in the business group has adopted an independent board structure. However, the likelihood of compliance in group-affiliated firms is subject less to the influence of the industry compliance norm. We also document that group-affiliated firms are less sensitive to the influence of the industry task environment than stand-alone firms. Other things being equal, the influences of industry complexity, munificence, and dynamism on compliance are smaller in group affiliates.&lt;/p&gt;\u0000 &lt;/section&gt;\u0000 \u0000 &lt;section&gt;\u0000 \u0000 &lt;h3&gt; Theoretical/Academic Implications&lt;/h3&gt;\u0000 \u0000 &lt;p&gt;Our study contributes to the attention-based view by extending the structural attention argument from organizational structures within firm boundaries to organizational forms across firm boundaries. We argue that the network structure of business groups shapes affiliated firms' attention focus and consequently affects their compliance patterns. We also highlight the joint effects of structural and situated attention on shaping organizational decisions. We reveal that the interplays of business groups' organizational form and industry contexts give rise to distinct compliance patterns between affiliated and unaffiliated firms and among different types of group-affiliated firms. As such, we supplement prior corporate governance literature by stressing the influences of inter-organization networks and industry task environment on board structure.&lt;/p&gt;\u0000 &lt;/section&gt;\u0000 \u0000 &lt;section&gt;\u0000 \u0000 &lt;h3&gt; Practitioner/Policy Implications&lt;/h3&gt;\u0000 \u0000 &lt;p&gt;Our study indicates that inter-organizational networks affect compliance with corporate governance regulations. Thus, the government could utilize inter-organizational relationships and peer influence to encourage compliance. Our study also highlights the impact of industry environments and business group structure on board composition and managers' cognitive limitations that prevent them from attending to all situational cues. Thus, it is essential for managers to allocate their scarce attention to scanning various domains of their firms' external environments and internal circumstances when making strategic and corporate governance decisions.&lt;/p&gt;\u0000 &lt;/secti","PeriodicalId":48209,"journal":{"name":"Corporate Governance-An International Review","volume":"33 4","pages":"900-921"},"PeriodicalIF":4.6,"publicationDate":"2024-11-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144598729","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Can Minority Shareholders' Online Voice Restrain Controlling Shareholders' Tunneling?","authors":"Li Huang,&nbsp;Qianwei Ying,&nbsp;Mengrui Han","doi":"10.1111/corg.12628","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/corg.12628","url":null,"abstract":"<div>\u0000 \u0000 \u0000 <section>\u0000 \u0000 <h3> Research Question/Issue</h3>\u0000 \u0000 <p>Using a sample of Chinese listed firms between 2010 and 2020, this study examines the effect of minority shareholders' online voice on controlling shareholders' tunneling.</p>\u0000 </section>\u0000 \u0000 <section>\u0000 \u0000 <h3> Research Findings/Insights</h3>\u0000 \u0000 <p>We find that minority shareholders' online voice significantly reduces controlling shareholders' tunneling. The effect is more pronounced in firms with higher information asymmetry and weaker investor protection. We further show that minority shareholders' online voice can attract additional attention from other investors and regulators, exerting market and regulator pressure on controlling shareholders. Additional analysis also suggests that the effect of minority shareholders' online voice on controlling shareholders' tunneling increases with the negative tone of the questions and decreases with firms' responsiveness to these questions.</p>\u0000 </section>\u0000 \u0000 <section>\u0000 \u0000 <h3> Theoretical/Academic Implications</h3>\u0000 \u0000 <p>Past findings of the governance role of minority shareholders mainly focus on their voting rights, but less attention has been paid to their online activism through voice. Our results suggest that minority shareholders' online voice plays an important role in corporate governance by curbing the controlling shareholders' tunneling attempt.</p>\u0000 </section>\u0000 \u0000 <section>\u0000 \u0000 <h3> Practitioner/Policy Implications</h3>\u0000 \u0000 <p>This study provides an essential implication for the regulators in emerging capital markets that adopting the online interactive platforms for firms and investors helps to enhance the minority shareholders' monitoring role.</p>\u0000 </section>\u0000 </div>","PeriodicalId":48209,"journal":{"name":"Corporate Governance-An International Review","volume":"33 4","pages":"850-872"},"PeriodicalIF":4.6,"publicationDate":"2024-11-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144598315","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Do CEOs' Industry Tournament Incentives Affect Stock Liquidity?","authors":"Hasibul Chowdhury,&nbsp;Mostafa Monzur Hasan,&nbsp;Hoang Luong,&nbsp;Suichen Xu","doi":"10.1111/corg.12623","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/corg.12623","url":null,"abstract":"<div>\u0000 \u0000 \u0000 <section>\u0000 \u0000 <h3> Research Question/Issue</h3>\u0000 \u0000 <p>We examine the relationship between CEOs' industry tournament incentives (CITI) and stock liquidity in the United States. We also examine if the effect of CITI on stock liquidity varies depending on the information-asymmetry and corporate governance mechanisms.</p>\u0000 </section>\u0000 \u0000 <section>\u0000 \u0000 <h3> Research Findings/Insights</h3>\u0000 \u0000 <p>We find that firms with stronger CITI are associated with greater stock liquidity. Exploiting the enforceability of executive noncompetition agreements across the states in the United States as a quasi-natural experiment, we find that firms headquartered in states that introduce these agreements on average experience lower stock liquidity, suggesting a causal relation. We also find that the effect of CITI on stock liquidity is stronger among firms with severe information-asymmetry problems, but weaker among firms with strong governance mechanisms.</p>\u0000 </section>\u0000 \u0000 <section>\u0000 \u0000 <h3> Theoretical/Academic Implications</h3>\u0000 \u0000 <p>We extend research that examines the impacts of CEO industry tournament incentives on corporate outcomes and strategies. Our paper shows that CEO industry tournament incentives matter for stock liquidity. Our paper contributes to a large literature on the roles of CEO styles and behaviors in shaping corporate policies.</p>\u0000 </section>\u0000 \u0000 <section>\u0000 \u0000 <h3> Practitioner/Policy Implications</h3>\u0000 \u0000 <p>Our findings have several practical implications for investors, policymakers, and financial analysts. For example, our findings can help investors better understand how CEOs' compensation-based incentives impact stock liquidity. Similarly, policymakers can use our findings to design policies that encourage CEOs to act in the best interest of their shareholders and promote market efficiency.</p>\u0000 </section>\u0000 </div>","PeriodicalId":48209,"journal":{"name":"Corporate Governance-An International Review","volume":"33 4","pages":"717-759"},"PeriodicalIF":4.6,"publicationDate":"2024-10-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144598481","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"External Corporate Governance and Corporate Misconduct: A Meta-Analysis","authors":"Max C. Braun,&nbsp;Simone M. Mueller","doi":"10.1111/corg.12627","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/corg.12627","url":null,"abstract":"<div>\u0000 \u0000 \u0000 <section>\u0000 \u0000 <h3> Research Question/Issue</h3>\u0000 \u0000 <p>External governance parties deter corporate misconduct through their monitoring. External monitoring increases the probability of corporate misconduct being detected and sanctioned. Current research on the relationship between external governance and corporate misconduct remains fragmented across these detection and sanction mechanisms of deterrence. This separation of mechanisms leaves us with an incomplete concept of external monitoring and obscures our understanding of what facilitates monitoring by investors, auditors, analysts, and the media.</p>\u0000 </section>\u0000 \u0000 <section>\u0000 \u0000 <h3> Research Findings/Insights</h3>\u0000 \u0000 <p>We integrate the detection and sanction mechanisms of deterrence into a process model of external monitoring. Our meta-analysis of 188 studies from 14 countries covering the period from 1970 to 2019 identifies proximity, credibility, and attention as common underlying factors that facilitate monitoring by external governance parties. Proximity is of particular relevance in deterring corporate misconduct. Ethical relativism weakens external governance parties' role in deterring corporate misconduct.</p>\u0000 </section>\u0000 \u0000 <section>\u0000 \u0000 <h3> Theoretical/Academic Implications</h3>\u0000 \u0000 <p>Parties outside firm boundaries affect public perception of firms, thereby possessing a unique influence on corporate governance. We integrate this form of influence into the concept of external monitoring. Our meta-analytic synthesis suggests a fundamental role for external governance in preventing corporate misconduct and informs on the relevance of societal values for corporate governance and corporate misconduct.</p>\u0000 </section>\u0000 </div>","PeriodicalId":48209,"journal":{"name":"Corporate Governance-An International Review","volume":"33 4","pages":"832-849"},"PeriodicalIF":4.6,"publicationDate":"2024-10-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/corg.12627","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144598610","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Rx for Legal Troubles: CEO Medical Degree and Corporate Litigation","authors":"Omer Unsal","doi":"10.1111/corg.12626","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/corg.12626","url":null,"abstract":"<div>\u0000 \u0000 \u0000 <section>\u0000 \u0000 <h3> Research Question/Issue</h3>\u0000 \u0000 <p>This study examines the relationship between CEOs' medical degrees (MDs) and corporate litigations targeting US pharmaceutical firms.</p>\u0000 </section>\u0000 \u0000 <section>\u0000 \u0000 <h3> Research Findings/Insights</h3>\u0000 \u0000 <p>CEOs with a medical background are significantly more susceptible to securities class actions, while facing fewer patent lawsuits. The results indicate that the lack of management skills among MD CEOs comes at the cost of firm value. After lawsuit announcements, companies led by MD CEOs experience a significantly negative effect on their stock prices. Markets show no tolerance for failures by MD CEOs, as evidenced by the impact of clinical trial disappointments.</p>\u0000 </section>\u0000 \u0000 <section>\u0000 \u0000 <h3> Theoretical/Academic Implications</h3>\u0000 \u0000 <p>The findings contribute to our understanding of the impact of CEOs' medical backgrounds on corporate litigation outcomes. The results suggest that when examining how a CEO's qualifications affect legal issues and the value of a company, we should consider the unique context of having an MD.</p>\u0000 </section>\u0000 \u0000 <section>\u0000 \u0000 <h3> Practitioner/Policy Implications</h3>\u0000 \u0000 <p>Practically, the study implies that firms should carefully consider the balance of managerial and medical expertise in CEO appointments, recognizing the potential legal and financial consequences. Policymakers might see it as beneficial to encourage a mix of different skills among top executives. This could make pharmaceutical companies more resilient in the face of legal issues, which, in turn, helps maintain confidence among investors.</p>\u0000 </section>\u0000 </div>","PeriodicalId":48209,"journal":{"name":"Corporate Governance-An International Review","volume":"33 4","pages":"796-831"},"PeriodicalIF":4.6,"publicationDate":"2024-10-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144598346","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Challenging Institutional Path Dependence Through Field Configuring Events: Exploring the Collective Institutional Entrepreneurship of the Sustainable Stock Exchanges Initiative","authors":"Steve Loren","doi":"10.1111/corg.12622","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/corg.12622","url":null,"abstract":"<div>\u0000 \u0000 \u0000 <section>\u0000 \u0000 <h3> Research Question/Issue</h3>\u0000 \u0000 <p>How can a global social movement, mobilized through a multi-stakeholder initiative, promote the uptake of novel governance practices in distinct national institutional environments?</p>\u0000 </section>\u0000 \u0000 <section>\u0000 \u0000 <h3> Research Findings/Insights</h3>\u0000 \u0000 <p>Using data from all 114 of the world's stock exchanges, covering over 99% of global stock market capitalization as of 2018, I find that exchanges in common-law countries were more likely to become early partners of the Sustainable Stock Exchanges Initiative (SSEI) after its launch in 2012. However, exchanges based in civil-law countries experienced a higher likelihood (i.e., risk) of adoption, as measured by the hazard ratio, particularly during a series of sustained field-configuring events (FCEs) promoted by the SSEI. Over time, this increased hazard ratio indicated a rising likelihood of adoption for civil-law-based exchanges, eventually surpassing that of their common-law counterparts.</p>\u0000 </section>\u0000 \u0000 <section>\u0000 \u0000 <h3> Theoretical/Academic Implications</h3>\u0000 \u0000 <p>While institutional environments' path dependency can facilitate or hinder the adoption of governance practices, collective institutional entrepreneurship (CIE) can moderate this path dependency and reveal new information regarding the structural fit between promoted governance practices and their institutional environments.</p>\u0000 </section>\u0000 \u0000 <section>\u0000 \u0000 <h3> Practitioner/Policy Implications</h3>\u0000 \u0000 <p>The insights provided by this study can help practitioners understand why some practices face resistance in specific institutional environments, while others are more readily accepted. These insights also help practitioners communicate the elements of governance practices that implicitly align with the institutional environments in which they are seeking adoption.</p>\u0000 </section>\u0000 </div>","PeriodicalId":48209,"journal":{"name":"Corporate Governance-An International Review","volume":"33 4","pages":"699-716"},"PeriodicalIF":4.6,"publicationDate":"2024-10-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144598326","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"How Does Shareholding by Passive Institutional Investors Impact the Corporate Governance of European Firms?","authors":"Irina Bevza,&nbsp;Martha O’Hagan Luff","doi":"10.1111/corg.12618","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/corg.12618","url":null,"abstract":"<div>\u0000 \u0000 \u0000 <section>\u0000 \u0000 <h3> Research Question/Issue</h3>\u0000 \u0000 <p>The passive investment (PI) trend, characterized by the increasing inflow of investment funds into PI strategies, has resulted in an increase in the share of corporate ownership held via investments in PI strategies. This paper investigates this trend's consequential impact on European companies' corporate governance (CG).</p>\u0000 </section>\u0000 \u0000 <section>\u0000 \u0000 <h3> Research Findings/Insights</h3>\u0000 \u0000 <p>We find that higher ownership by passive institutional investors (PIIs) is associated with fewer female directors, reduced independence in audit and nomination committees, and higher executive pay, negatively impacting CG. Nevertheless, our findings show that PIIs can increase the probability that a company has a policy regarding the adequate experience of board members and equal treatment of shareholders.</p>\u0000 </section>\u0000 \u0000 <section>\u0000 \u0000 <h3> Theoretical/Academic Implications</h3>\u0000 \u0000 <p>We hypothesize that the level of ownership could be the missing link connecting mixed theories about the impact of ownership by PIIs on the CG of companies they invest in. A curvilinear relationship between the two could allow conflicting theories to coexist in one framework. We find weak evidence for a curvilinear relationship, but this relationship may become more prevalent if PII ownership of European companies increases because of regulatory changes.</p>\u0000 </section>\u0000 \u0000 <section>\u0000 \u0000 <h3> Practitioner/Policy Implications</h3>\u0000 \u0000 <p>Some critics have proposed limiting PII voting rights, but our findings suggest that the effect of PII ownership may become less negative beyond a certain level of ownership and that PIIs may play a positive role in enhancing board experience and shareholder equity policies. Restricting PIIs may not necessarily be beneficial for the CG of companies they invest in.</p>\u0000 </section>\u0000 </div>","PeriodicalId":48209,"journal":{"name":"Corporate Governance-An International Review","volume":"33 4","pages":"604-628"},"PeriodicalIF":4.6,"publicationDate":"2024-10-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/corg.12618","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144598651","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Do CEO Connections to the Chinese Politburo Pay Off and How?","authors":"Marta Alonso,&nbsp;Aditi Gupta,&nbsp;Beatriz Simon-Yarza","doi":"10.1111/corg.12621","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/corg.12621","url":null,"abstract":"<div>\u0000 \u0000 \u0000 <section>\u0000 \u0000 <h3> Research Question/Issue</h3>\u0000 \u0000 <p>This study investigates the effect of connections to the Politburo, the top 25 members of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), on CEO compensation, pay-for-performance sensitivity, and turnover decisions using a comprehensive dataset of 3764 Chinese listed firms from 2007 to 2019.</p>\u0000 </section>\u0000 \u0000 <section>\u0000 \u0000 <h3> Research Findings/Insights</h3>\u0000 \u0000 <p>Our findings reveal that CEOs of privately owned listed firms who have connections to the Politburo via shared educational backgrounds receive significantly higher compensation (up to 20% more). However, such connections do not significantly affect CEO compensation in state-owned enterprises (SOEs). CEOs who have connections to the Politburo also exhibit lower turnover rates, and their compensation is less sensitive to performance outcomes. Our measure of connections excludes reverse causality, as we leverage an exogenous shock—the promotion to the Politburo of an individual with whom the CEO is already connected—to investigate the gain associated with a political connection in the absence of CEO turnover in private firms. This event allows us to observe that CEO pay increases significantly in such cases. We also find that elite connections serve as a mechanism for resource allocation, as politically connected CEOs in private firms benefit from higher subsidies and lower tax rates, and politically connected CEOs in SOEs benefit by being appointed to larger SOEs. Additionally, we find that the positive relationship between CEO pay and elite connections is even stronger when the connection is stronger but is negative when the CEO is a CCP member.</p>\u0000 </section>\u0000 \u0000 <section>\u0000 \u0000 <h3> Theoretical/Academic Implications</h3>\u0000 \u0000 <p>This study enriches the literature on political connections by introducing a novel proxy for elite connections based on past educational ties to members of the political elite. It disentangles the influence of personal educational connections to the political elite from that of a more generic political membership of the CCP, offering a clearer understanding of their distinct impacts.</p>\u0000 </section>\u0000 \u0000 <section>\u0000 \u0000 <h3> Practitioner/Policy Implications</h3>\u0000 \u0000 <p>Our study underscores the necessity of differentiating between private and SOEs in China due to their distinct characteristics and goals. Furthermore, it highlights the critical role of elite political connections in emerging economies such as China in resource allocation, labor market dynamics, and corporate governance.</p>\u0000 </section>\u0000 </div>","PeriodicalId":48209,"journal":{"name":"Corporate Governance-An International Review","volume":"33 4","pages":"680-698"},"PeriodicalIF":4.6,"publicationDate":"2024-10-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/corg.12621","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144598318","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}