Can Minority Shareholders' Online Voice Restrain Controlling Shareholders' Tunneling?

IF 4.6 3区管理学 Q1 BUSINESS

Corporate Governance-An International Review Pub Date : 2024-11-13 DOI:10.1111/corg.12628

Li Huang, Qianwei Ying, Mengrui Han

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引用次数: 0

Abstract

Research Question/Issue

Using a sample of Chinese listed firms between 2010 and 2020, this study examines the effect of minority shareholders' online voice on controlling shareholders' tunneling.

Research Findings/Insights

We find that minority shareholders' online voice significantly reduces controlling shareholders' tunneling. The effect is more pronounced in firms with higher information asymmetry and weaker investor protection. We further show that minority shareholders' online voice can attract additional attention from other investors and regulators, exerting market and regulator pressure on controlling shareholders. Additional analysis also suggests that the effect of minority shareholders' online voice on controlling shareholders' tunneling increases with the negative tone of the questions and decreases with firms' responsiveness to these questions.

Theoretical/Academic Implications

Past findings of the governance role of minority shareholders mainly focus on their voting rights, but less attention has been paid to their online activism through voice. Our results suggest that minority shareholders' online voice plays an important role in corporate governance by curbing the controlling shareholders' tunneling attempt.

Practitioner/Policy Implications

This study provides an essential implication for the regulators in emerging capital markets that adopting the online interactive platforms for firms and investors helps to enhance the minority shareholders' monitoring role.

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中小股东的网络话语权能否抑制控股股东的挖洞行为？

本研究以2010 - 2020年的中国上市公司为样本，考察了中小股东的网络话语权对控股股东隧道行为的影响。研究发现：中小股东的网络话语权显著降低了控股股东的隧道效应。这种效应在信息不对称程度较高、投资者保护较弱的公司中更为明显。我们进一步表明，中小股东的在线声音可以吸引其他投资者和监管机构的额外关注，从而对控股股东施加市场和监管压力。进一步的分析还表明，小股东的在线声音对控股股东隧道效应的影响随着问题的负面基调而增加，随着公司对这些问题的回应而减少。过去对中小股东治理作用的研究主要集中在其投票权方面，而对其通过网络发声的行动主义关注较少。我们的研究结果表明，中小股东的网络声音通过抑制控股股东的隧道企图在公司治理中发挥重要作用。本研究为新兴资本市场的监管者提供了一个重要的启示，即采用面向公司和投资者的在线互动平台有助于增强中小股东的监督作用。

本文章由计算机程序翻译，如有差异，请以英文原文为准。

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来源期刊

Corporate Governance-An International Review Multiple-

CiteScore

7.00

自引率

11.30%

发文量

期刊介绍： The mission of Corporate Governance: An International Review is to publish cutting-edge international business research on the phenomena of comparative corporate governance throughout the global economy. Our ultimate goal is a rigorous and relevant global theory of corporate governance. We define corporate governance broadly as the exercise of power over corporate entities so as to increase the value provided to the organization"s various stakeholders, as well as making those stakeholders accountable for acting responsibly with regard to the protection, generation, and distribution of wealth invested in the firm. Because of this broad conceptualization, a wide variety of academic disciplines can contribute to our understanding.