Corporate Governance-An International Review最新文献

{"title":"The Innovation-Promoting Role of Governmental Stock Market Stabilization Funds","authors":"Xingquan Yang,&nbsp;Zheng Yang","doi":"10.1111/corg.70024","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/corg.70024","url":null,"abstract":"<div>\u0000 \u0000 \u0000 <section>\u0000 \u0000 <h3> Research Question/Issue</h3>\u0000 \u0000 <p>This study exploits China's 2015 introduction of stock market stabilization funds (SMSFs) as a quasi-natural experiment and uses panel data on Chinese A-share–listed companies from 2010 to 2018 to assess the causal effect of SMSFs on corporate innovation through a difference-in-differences (DID) framework.</p>\u0000 </section>\u0000 \u0000 <section>\u0000 \u0000 <h3> Research Findings/Insights</h3>\u0000 \u0000 <p>We find that China's SMSFs significantly enhance corporate innovation. Mechanism analyses indicate that SMSFs promote corporate innovation through the corporate governance effect (curbing managerial self-interest and controlling shareholder tunneling) and the risk shock mitigation effect (reducing stock price crash risk). Furthermore, we find that the positive effect of SMSFs on corporate innovation is stronger when a firm is held by multiple SMSFs or when SMSFs increase their stock holdings. This effect is also more pronounced for state-owned firms or firms receiving greater analyst attention. Finally, we find that China's SMSFs more effectively promote corporate innovation in regions with higher marketization levels and better government quality.</p>\u0000 </section>\u0000 \u0000 <section>\u0000 \u0000 <h3> Theoretical/Academic Implications</h3>\u0000 \u0000 <p>First, we broaden the existing research on the relationship between government intervention and corporate innovation by providing new empirical evidence to clarify the debate on this relationship from the perspective of causal identification. Second, we link the literature on SMSFs and corporate innovation to enrich the understanding of the economic consequences of SMSFs, expand the existing research on institutional investors, and offer new perspectives for exploring the factors influencing corporate innovation.</p>\u0000 </section>\u0000 \u0000 <section>\u0000 \u0000 <h3> Practitioner/Policy Implications</h3>\u0000 \u0000 <p>Our findings confirm the positive role of government intervention in promoting corporate innovation and demonstrate that moderate, well-designed, and long-term-oriented government intervention in capital markets can yield beneficial outcomes. Our study provides valuable implications for the operation of SMSFs in other East Asian economies and for the healthy and sustainable development of capital markets in emerging economies.</p>\u0000 </section>\u0000 </div>","PeriodicalId":48209,"journal":{"name":"Corporate Governance-An International Review","volume":"34 2","pages":"445-467"},"PeriodicalIF":5.5,"publicationDate":"2026-03-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"147563812","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Does Organizational Power Allocation Respond to Technological Shift in the Digital Age? Empirical Evidence From Chinese Listed Firms","authors":"Danyang Chen,&nbsp;Lili Jiu,&nbsp;Yuanyuan Liu","doi":"10.1111/corg.70026","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/corg.70026","url":null,"abstract":"<div>\u0000 \u0000 \u0000 <section>\u0000 \u0000 <h3> Research Question/Issue</h3>\u0000 \u0000 <p>This study examines how organizational structures adapt to digital technologies in the digital age. Many nontechnology firms are undergoing transformations driven by data-driven digital technologies. However, their existing structures often fail to accommodate these changes, thus prompting a need for strategic adaptation to integrate these technologies into business operations. Specifically, we propose that digitalization facilitates decentralized power in governance structures.</p>\u0000 </section>\u0000 \u0000 <section>\u0000 \u0000 <h3> Research Findings/Insights</h3>\u0000 \u0000 <p>To better capture how digitalization influences governance structure, we focus on the adoption of digital technologies and apply multiple measures of digitalization to examine its impact on the empowerment of subsidiaries by parent firms. Using public data from China's listed companies between 2009 and 2020, we find that firms with higher levels of digitalization tend to decentralize decision-making authority to their subsidiaries. Moderation tests indicate that this effect is more pronounced for companies with greater business diversification and those operating in environments of higher uncertainty, highlighting the role of digital technologies in managing task uncertainty and governance costs. Further analysis suggests that this shift in power allocation significantly enhances firm productivity.</p>\u0000 </section>\u0000 \u0000 <section>\u0000 \u0000 <h3> Theoretical/Academic Implications</h3>\u0000 \u0000 <p>This study contributes to the growing literature on corporate digitalization by shifting the focus from antecedents and production efficiency to proactive adaptation strategies. By exploring changes in internal power structures and their financial consequences, we offer insights into how digital technologies can drive competitive advantage within firms. Additionally, we contribute to organizational structure theory by positing that digital technologies act as an external contingency for nontech firms, requiring structural decentralization to align with technological shifts.</p>\u0000 </section>\u0000 \u0000 <section>\u0000 \u0000 <h3> Practitioner/Policy Implications</h3>\u0000 \u0000 <p>Our findings have implications for both professional managers and shareholders. For nontech firms seeking to enhance operational efficiency through digitalization, they should consider optimizing internal power structures in response to technological shifts, which can improve firm performance.</p>\u0000 </section>\u0000 </div>","PeriodicalId":48209,"journal":{"name":"Corporate Governance-An International Review","volume":"34 2","pages":"486-508"},"PeriodicalIF":5.5,"publicationDate":"2026-03-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"147566013","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Talk or Fight? Activist Board Entry and Its Impact on Firm Strategic Change","authors":"Eugene See,&nbsp;Bruce Skaggs","doi":"10.1111/corg.70028","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/corg.70028","url":null,"abstract":"<div>\u0000 \u0000 \u0000 <section>\u0000 \u0000 <h3> Research Question/Issue</h3>\u0000 \u0000 <p>This study examines how the method of activist director board entry—via private settlements or proxy battles—influences their impact on firm strategic change, highlighting the moderating influence of prior activist experience on these entry methods.</p>\u0000 </section>\u0000 \u0000 <section>\u0000 \u0000 <h3> Research Findings/Insights</h3>\u0000 \u0000 <p>We find that activist directors appointed via proxy battles lead to less firm strategic change than activist directors appointed through private settlements. Further, we find that under private settlement conditions, activist directors without prior activist experience lead to more strategic change than those with prior activist experience. Under proxy battle conditions, however, we find no significant difference in strategic change between activist directors with and without prior activist experience.</p>\u0000 </section>\u0000 \u0000 <section>\u0000 \u0000 <h3> Theoretical/Academic Implications</h3>\u0000 \u0000 <p>Adopting a behavioral perspective, we propose that the situational context of activist board entry shapes how incumbent directors perceive activist appointees through alignment and legitimacy—perceptions that, in turn, influence their receptivity to activist-driven strategic change. Our findings highlight how these contextual dynamics affect firm strategic change and underscore conditions under which prior activist experience moderates such effects.</p>\u0000 </section>\u0000 \u0000 <section>\u0000 \u0000 <h3> Practitioner/Policy Implications</h3>\u0000 \u0000 <p>For activist shareholders, our findings suggest that settlement-based director appointments result in more strategic change than contested elections. Moreover, nominating directors without prior activist experience may reduce resistance and foster smoother integration within the boardroom under cooperative settlement conditions. These insights can inform campaign strategy, director selection, and engagement protocols during activist negotiations.</p>\u0000 </section>\u0000 </div>","PeriodicalId":48209,"journal":{"name":"Corporate Governance-An International Review","volume":"34 2","pages":"520-539"},"PeriodicalIF":5.5,"publicationDate":"2026-03-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/corg.70028","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"147567547","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Retail Investor Governance and M&A Performance","authors":"Chun Liu,&nbsp;Qidan Liu,&nbsp;Liang Sun,&nbsp;Guojian Zheng","doi":"10.1111/corg.70013","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/corg.70013","url":null,"abstract":"<div>\u0000 \u0000 \u0000 <section>\u0000 \u0000 <h3> Research Question/Issue</h3>\u0000 \u0000 <p>For a long time, retail investors have been deemed ineffective governors because of rational apathy. This study examines a central theoretical question: Absent any enhancements of their governance capability, is it sufficient to exogenously raise their exit costs—thereby increasing their willingness to voice—to activate retail investors' monitoring function and improve major corporate decisions (e.g., M&amp;A)?</p>\u0000 </section>\u0000 \u0000 <section>\u0000 \u0000 <h3> Research Findings/Insights</h3>\u0000 \u0000 <p>Exploiting a 2012 dividend tax reform in China targeted solely at individual investors as a quasi-natural experiment, we find that this policy—by strengthening retail investors' willingness to govern through a lock-in effect—significantly improves the M&amp;A performance of affected firms. Mechanism tests indicate that the improvement stems from retail investors, once exit is impeded, more actively constraining managerial agency behavior.</p>\u0000 </section>\u0000 \u0000 <section>\u0000 \u0000 <h3> Theoretical/Academic Implications</h3>\u0000 \u0000 <p>Our core theoretical contribution is to advance a new paradigm of cost-driven governance, which offers a constraint-based pathway—distinct from traditional empowerment approaches—to activate the governance role of retail investors. We provide evidence that rational apathy is not an inherent attribute of retail investors but an endogenous choice under a specific cost structure, which can be steered and reshaped through institutional design.</p>\u0000 </section>\u0000 \u0000 <section>\u0000 \u0000 <h3> Practitioner/Policy Implications</h3>\u0000 \u0000 <p>This study offers regulators a new policy perspective: Beyond direct empowerment, regulators can adjust investors' exit–voice cost trade-off through carefully crafted institutional designs (e.g., differentiated tax regimes). This reveals that taxation can serve as a potentially cost-effective corporate governance tool to mobilize the vast retail investor base to play a more constructive role in corporate governance.</p>\u0000 </section>\u0000 </div>","PeriodicalId":48209,"journal":{"name":"Corporate Governance-An International Review","volume":"34 1","pages":"252-273"},"PeriodicalIF":5.5,"publicationDate":"2025-12-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145931001","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"The Coexistence of Multiple Large Shareholders and Greenwashing in Environmental, Social, and Governance Disclosures: Evidence From China","authors":"Hao Ding","doi":"10.1111/corg.70014","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/corg.70014","url":null,"abstract":"<div>\u0000 \u0000 \u0000 <section>\u0000 \u0000 <h3> Research Question/Issue</h3>\u0000 \u0000 <p>ESG greenwashing carries significant risks and negative consequences. From a shareholding structure perspective, this paper tries to test the relationship between the coexistence of multiple large shareholders and ESG greenwashing.</p>\u0000 </section>\u0000 \u0000 <section>\u0000 \u0000 <h3> Research Findings/Insights</h3>\u0000 \u0000 <p>We find that multiple large shareholders are associated with ESG greenwashing. On the one hand, multiple large shareholders can lead to the short-termism of firms' management, which boosts ESG greenwashing. On the other hand, multiple large shareholders cause the increased agency problems of firms, which also leads to ESG greenwashing. Furthermore, we find that the promoting effect is more apparent among nonhighly polluting firms and firms that are not audited by Big 4 accounting firms.</p>\u0000 </section>\u0000 \u0000 <section>\u0000 \u0000 <h3> Theoretical/Academic Implications</h3>\u0000 \u0000 <p>At the level of firms' equity structure, this paper enriches the study of the antecedents and influences of ESG greenwashing. That is, the coexistence of multiple large shareholders of a firm may boost ESG greenwashing. Besides, there are different voices in the academic community about the multiple large shareholders, and this paper expands the shareholder studies in corporate governance theory.</p>\u0000 </section>\u0000 \u0000 <section>\u0000 \u0000 <h3> Practitioner/Policy Implications</h3>\u0000 \u0000 <p>This paper proposes that the introduction of multiple large shareholders may produce side effects of ESG governance, and collusion among shareholders to greenwash needs to be guarded against. Therefore, the related authorities may need to set up a more stringent ESG audit process.</p>\u0000 </section>\u0000 </div>","PeriodicalId":48209,"journal":{"name":"Corporate Governance-An International Review","volume":"34 1","pages":"274-286"},"PeriodicalIF":5.5,"publicationDate":"2025-12-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145931002","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Large Owner Expropriation Threat and Stock Option Pay's Effect on Firm Risk-Taking Behaviors in Weak Institutions","authors":"Cuili Qian,&nbsp;Lipeng (Gary) Ge,&nbsp;Xuesong Geng,&nbsp;Jiatao (J. T.) Li,&nbsp;Maria Hasenhuttl","doi":"10.1111/corg.70012","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/corg.70012","url":null,"abstract":"<div>\u0000 \u0000 \u0000 <section>\u0000 \u0000 <h3> Research Question/Issue</h3>\u0000 \u0000 <p>This study investigates the impact of managerial stock option pay on firm risk-taking behaviors in a weak institutional context, a critical question that has been overlooked by the literature. Specifically, we build on the comparative corporate governance perspective that emphasizes the implications of large shareholders' expropriation threat in weak institutions to develop predictions about their impact on the stock option's incentive alignment effect. We further explore the boundary conditions of such a relationship.</p>\u0000 </section>\u0000 \u0000 <section>\u0000 \u0000 <h3> Research Findings/Insights</h3>\u0000 \u0000 <p>Based on a sample of Chinese listed firms between 2006 and 2016, we find that a high level of large shareholders' expropriation threat weakens the effect of stock option value on firm risk-taking. We also find that such an adverse impact of large shareholders on the effect of stock option value is mitigated by the institutional factors that strengthen the protection of the interests of minority shareholders.</p>\u0000 </section>\u0000 \u0000 <section>\u0000 \u0000 <h3> Theoretical Implications</h3>\u0000 \u0000 <p>Our results underscore the importance of integrating the potential expropriation risk due to large shareholders and the institutional contexts into understanding the effectiveness of incentive-alignment governance practices such as stock option pay in the context with weak institutions (e.g., China).</p>\u0000 </section>\u0000 \u0000 <section>\u0000 \u0000 <h3> Practitioner/Policy Implications</h3>\u0000 \u0000 <p>Our findings offer insights for policy makers to better design the regulatory and institutional frameworks to increase the effectiveness of corporate governance practices. It also shows that firms in the context of weak institutions need to be more cognizant when adopting certain corporate governance practices (i.e., stock option pay for the incentive-alignment purpose).</p>\u0000 </section>\u0000 </div>","PeriodicalId":48209,"journal":{"name":"Corporate Governance-An International Review","volume":"34 1","pages":"233-251"},"PeriodicalIF":5.5,"publicationDate":"2025-12-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/corg.70012","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145930833","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"CEO Social Capital, Board Connectedness, and Anchor Investors: A Study of Initial Public Offerings","authors":"Rwan El-Khatib,&nbsp;Abdulkadir Mohamed,&nbsp;Brahim Saadouni","doi":"10.1111/corg.70011","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/corg.70011","url":null,"abstract":"<div>\u0000 \u0000 \u0000 <section>\u0000 \u0000 <h3> Research Question/Issue</h3>\u0000 \u0000 <p>This study investigates the role of CEO social capital, director networks, and anchor investor participation in influencing the short- and long-term performance outcomes of initial public offerings (IPOs) in the Hong Kong stock market.</p>\u0000 </section>\u0000 \u0000 <section>\u0000 \u0000 <h3> Research Findings/Insights</h3>\u0000 \u0000 <p>Studying a sample of 1155 IPOs listed in Hong Kong from 2004 to 2019, we find that highly connected CEOs and boards significantly enhance short-term IPO performance as measured by demand multiples. We find that anchor investors' participations strengthen the positive performance of the IPO firms. We show that the positive effects of CEO and board networks are beyond the short-term outcomes and significantly contribute to enhanced operating performance, higher market-adjusted returns, and higher survival rates post listing. These results are robust to endogeneity concerns and shed further light on the value of social capital and anchor investors' participation for IPO firms.</p>\u0000 </section>\u0000 \u0000 <section>\u0000 \u0000 <h3> Theoretical/Academic Implications</h3>\u0000 \u0000 <p>This study advances corporate governance research by highlighting the critical role of social capital in IPO success, particularly for a well-regulated market outside the United States and Europe. It extends the literature on board and executive networks by demonstrating their complementary relationship with institutional investors, such as anchor investors, in enhancing both short- and long-term IPO outcomes.</p>\u0000 </section>\u0000 \u0000 <section>\u0000 \u0000 <h3> Practitioner/Policy Implications</h3>\u0000 \u0000 <p>The findings underscore the importance of leveraging CEO and board networks alongside unique institutional (i.e., anchor) investors to boost IPO success. Policymakers and stock exchange regulators can draw on these insights to design regulatory frameworks that foster stakeholder collaboration, reduce information asymmetry, and promote better governance practices in IPO markets.</p>\u0000 </section>\u0000 </div>","PeriodicalId":48209,"journal":{"name":"Corporate Governance-An International Review","volume":"34 1","pages":"208-232"},"PeriodicalIF":5.5,"publicationDate":"2025-12-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145930863","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Legitimacy at a Premium: When Do Firms Hire Comparatively Better (Lesser) Qualified Female Directors?","authors":"Punit Arora,&nbsp;Patricia Gabaldon,&nbsp;Cynthia E. Clark,&nbsp;Priya Nagaraj","doi":"10.1111/corg.70010","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/corg.70010","url":null,"abstract":"&lt;div&gt;\u0000 \u0000 \u0000 &lt;section&gt;\u0000 \u0000 &lt;h3&gt; Research Question&lt;/h3&gt;\u0000 \u0000 &lt;p&gt;This study explores the role of (mis)alignment between institutional and behavioral forces in determining compliance (or deviance) with changing institutional norms on inclusion on corporate boards. Specifically, we examine the effect of (1) the type of quota design, (2) the distance to the quota target, and (3) the attainment discrepancy on a firm's compliance behavior regarding director appointments.&lt;/p&gt;\u0000 &lt;/section&gt;\u0000 \u0000 &lt;section&gt;\u0000 \u0000 &lt;h3&gt; Research Insights&lt;/h3&gt;\u0000 \u0000 &lt;p&gt;Using a sample of 33,036 observations for 6022 firms from 25 countries for the period of 2006–2019 with dynamic panel regression methodology, we find that firms operating under mandatory quotas and firms at a longer distance to the quota target generally hire lesser qualified female directors, whereas those with positive attainment discrepancy (i.e., firms with actual performance above their aspirations) hire more qualified female directors in certain institutional contexts. More importantly, we find robust evidence for joint effects among these factors. Our post hoc analysis also indicates a strong direct and indirect effect of female CEOs. Overall, these findings indicate that firms actively navigate the intersection of institutional mandates and internal performance dynamics when determining how to respond to gender diversity initiatives.&lt;/p&gt;\u0000 &lt;/section&gt;\u0000 \u0000 &lt;section&gt;\u0000 \u0000 &lt;h3&gt; Theoretical/Academic Implications&lt;/h3&gt;\u0000 \u0000 &lt;p&gt;Our results show that firms use complex decision heuristics in deciding how to comply with institutional demands encompassing factors such as the severity of institutional compulsions, risk tolerance, firm performance, and self-interest. In unraveling when institutional norms may be perceived as opportunities, or, conversely, threats, we unpack when firms are likely to comply with both the letter and the spirit of regulatory initiatives. These results reveal important boundary conditions for institutional theory predictions.&lt;/p&gt;\u0000 &lt;/section&gt;\u0000 \u0000 &lt;section&gt;\u0000 \u0000 &lt;h3&gt; Practitioner/Policy Implications&lt;/h3&gt;\u0000 \u0000 &lt;p&gt;As we find no overall difference in the qualifications of existing male directors and newly appointed female directors, our results challenge the persistent conversations regarding the supply-side constraints for qualified female directors, that is, the perception that there is a limited pool of females who are board-ready. However, we do observe the need for policymakers and practitioners to take a more holistic view in instituting and monitoring new norms, including by paying attention to director qualifications rather than just the number of seats allocated to meet quota targets. This is important given firms' proclivity to respon","PeriodicalId":48209,"journal":{"name":"Corporate Governance-An International Review","volume":"34 1","pages":"180-207"},"PeriodicalIF":5.5,"publicationDate":"2025-11-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145931020","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Board Faultlines and Resource Allocation: Effects on Women's Professional Development","authors":"Alana Vandebeek,&nbsp;Kristof Struyfs","doi":"10.1111/corg.70009","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/corg.70009","url":null,"abstract":"&lt;p&gt;Board composition has received considerable attention in recent years within corporate governance literature (e.g., Au et al. &lt;span&gt;2023&lt;/span&gt;; Ginglinger and Raskopf &lt;span&gt;2023&lt;/span&gt;; Joecks et al. &lt;span&gt;2023&lt;/span&gt;; Mateos de Cabo et al. &lt;span&gt;2024&lt;/span&gt;; Schoonjans et al. &lt;span&gt;2023&lt;/span&gt;; Tilbury and Sealy &lt;span&gt;2023&lt;/span&gt;; Yao &lt;span&gt;2023&lt;/span&gt;). Prior research has linked board composition in terms of the presence of women to various outcomes, including corporate financial performance (Joecks et al. &lt;span&gt;2023&lt;/span&gt;), firm's strategic choices (Askarzadeh et al. &lt;span&gt;2022&lt;/span&gt;), CEO turnover (Kim et al. &lt;span&gt;2020&lt;/span&gt;), firm risk (Maxfield and Wang &lt;span&gt;2023&lt;/span&gt;), or innovation (Cumming and Leung &lt;span&gt;2021&lt;/span&gt;), but it has paid less attention to how internal board dynamics associated with composition can shape decision-making processes. While corporate governance research recognizes the board's critical role in resource allocation, it has yet to fully explore how the compositional dynamics of the board as a whole influence these decisions. This study addresses this gap by applying both faultline and subgroup theory to examine how board composition shapes organizational resource allocation decisions.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;The concept of faultlines captures the interplay of multiple diversity characteristics within a group's composition and highlights how these attributes can shape group processes and outcomes through subgroup dynamics (Lau and Murnighan &lt;span&gt;1998&lt;/span&gt;, &lt;span&gt;2005&lt;/span&gt;). Group faultlines are defined as hypothetical dividing lines that separate a group into relatively homogeneous subgroups based on multiple diversity characteristics (Lau and Murnighan &lt;span&gt;1998&lt;/span&gt;). Faultlines strengthen when more attributes align along the same dimensions. For example, consider a board that consists of two men in their 60s and two women in their 40s. In this board, a strong faultline based on gender and age is present, dividing the board into two homogeneous subgroups of the same size. The initial theoretical framework explaining faultlines was grounded in social identity and social categorization theory (Ashforth and Mael &lt;span&gt;1989&lt;/span&gt;; Hogg and Terry &lt;span&gt;2000&lt;/span&gt;; Lau and Murnighan &lt;span&gt;1998&lt;/span&gt;; Tajfel and Turner &lt;span&gt;2004&lt;/span&gt;). These theories suggest that individuals naturally classify themselves and others into social categories and tend to identify more strongly with those they perceive as similar, which can intensify subgroup divisions when multiple attributes align. Later, Carton and Cummings (&lt;span&gt;2012&lt;/span&gt;) expanded the faultline model with subgroup theory, proposing that different faultline types (separation-based, disparity-based, or variety-based) lead to distinct subgroups (identity-based, resource-based, knowledge-based), each influencing team outcomes differently.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;In this study, we argue that disparity-based faultlines play a crucial role in resource allocation decisions. Disparity-base","PeriodicalId":48209,"journal":{"name":"Corporate Governance-An International Review","volume":"34 1","pages":"163-179"},"PeriodicalIF":5.5,"publicationDate":"2025-11-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/corg.70009","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145930941","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"The Myths of Blockchain Governance","authors":"Daniel Ferreira","doi":"10.1111/corg.70008","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/corg.70008","url":null,"abstract":"<div>\u0000 \u0000 \u0000 <section>\u0000 \u0000 <h3> Research Question/Issue</h3>\u0000 \u0000 <p>Blockchain technology promises to revolutionize governance through strong commitments, trustlessness, and transparency. This paper examines how these promises have failed to materialize in practice.</p>\u0000 </section>\u0000 \u0000 <section>\u0000 \u0000 <h3> Research Findings/Insights</h3>\u0000 \u0000 <p>Drawing on case evidence from major blockchains, including Bitcoin and Ethereum, I argue that blockchains have evolved into technocracies where developers, foundations, and companies exercise disproportionate control. Rather than being exceptional, blockchain governance suffers from the same coordination problems, collective action failures, and centralization tendencies that plague traditional governance systems.</p>\u0000 </section>\u0000 \u0000 <section>\u0000 \u0000 <h3> Theoretical/Academic Implications</h3>\u0000 \u0000 <p>The paper concludes that while blockchains offer valuable experiments in governance design, their alleged advantages over traditional institutions remain largely mythical.</p>\u0000 </section>\u0000 \u0000 <section>\u0000 \u0000 <h3> Practitioner/Policy Implications</h3>\u0000 \u0000 <p>Blockchain organizations should acknowledge their reliance on off-chain coordination and informal authority. Investors must understand that blockchain governance depends on trusting technical elites, while regulators should recognize that decentralization claims often mask concentrated power structures requiring traditional oversight.</p>\u0000 </section>\u0000 </div>","PeriodicalId":48209,"journal":{"name":"Corporate Governance-An International Review","volume":"34 1","pages":"154-162"},"PeriodicalIF":5.5,"publicationDate":"2025-10-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/corg.70008","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145931188","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}