Corporate Governance-An International Review最新文献

{"title":"Institutional Investors and ESG Preferences","authors":"Florencio Lopez‐de‐Silanes, Joseph A. McCahery, Paul C. Pudschedl","doi":"10.1111/corg.12583","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/corg.12583","url":null,"abstract":"Research Question/IssueWe examine the effect of multiple environmental, social, and governance (ESG) scores on institutional investor ownership of firms and investor portfolio weightings. We are also the first to analyze the three individual components of ESG rankings to estimate the relative preferences of institutional investors.Research Findings/InsightsUsing a unique panel dataset covering US companies and institutional investor portfolios over the 2010–2019 period, we find that while investors are driven to add high‐quality ESG companies to their portfolios, there is a negative relationship with ESG when it comes to taking large ownership stakes. Furthermore, ESG scores are negatively related to the portfolio weightings of institutional investors, which raises concerns of greenwashing. Our analysis of individual ESG scores points to significantly larger effects of G scores in terms of holdings, and G is the only score with no negative impact on portfolio weightings. Finally, in support of systematic stewardship theory, top institutional investors allocate higher proportions of their portfolios to firms with high‐ESG ratings. Our results are robust to the use of a difference‐in‐differences analysis addressing endogeneity concerns.Theoretical/Academic ImplicationsThe findings in this paper offer important policy implications for institutional investors, managers, and policymakers. Given the ongoing debate on ESG scores, this paper shows the importance of examining greenwashing for investors who have a concern regarding the extent to which the valuation of assets might be influenced by unsupported sustainability claims. In addition, our study adds to the debate regarding ESG investing and stewardship theory.","PeriodicalId":48209,"journal":{"name":"Corporate Governance-An International Review","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":5.3,"publicationDate":"2024-04-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140581514","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Women at Multiple Levels of Strategic Leadership: Evidence of Gender Spillovers","authors":"Saneesh Edacherian, Amit Karna, Klaus Uhlenbruck, Sunil Sharma","doi":"10.1111/corg.12584","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/corg.12584","url":null,"abstract":"Manuscript TypeEmpirical.Research Question/IssueWe examine how the combined presence of women in multiple levels of strategic leadership, including gender‐diverse boards, affects firm accounting performance.Research Findings/InsightsOur meta‐analysis of 273 effect sizes across various hypotheses expands research on women in upper echelons by showing that gender‐diverse boards are positively related to gender spillovers, that is, the appointment of female executives. Most importantly, our work demonstrates that gender spillovers mediate the relationship between board gender diversity and firm performance, indicating there are joint effects of women leaders when serving at various levels of the organization simultaneously. We also find that the size of gender‐diverse boards negatively affects gender spillovers to the level of executives.Theoretical/Academic ImplicationsOur research highlights interdependencies between gender diversity at different organizational levels and the distinct contribution of women directors. We draw attention to the role of gender spillovers as a mechanism that helps explain how the appointment of women directors benefits firm performance. Our findings broadly contribute to upper echelons theory.Practitioner/Policy ImplicationsThis study emphasizes that increasing the representation of women on boards can advance the cause of women at other levels of strategic leadership. Furthermore, if women are in multiple levels of strategic leadership at the same time, this can lead to improved firm performance.","PeriodicalId":48209,"journal":{"name":"Corporate Governance-An International Review","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":5.3,"publicationDate":"2024-04-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140581556","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Lead Independent Directors and Internal Information Environment","authors":"Mansoor Afzali, Vasiliki Athanasakou, Siri Terjesen","doi":"10.1111/corg.12582","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/corg.12582","url":null,"abstract":"Research Question/IssueThis study explores the relationship between the presence of a lead independent director (LID) and firms' internal information environment. LIDs are elected independent members of the board who perform key duties for the independent directors and the board, including reviewing and approving board meeting agendas, chairing non‐executive board meetings, and acting as a liaison between the CEO and other independent directors. We hypothesize that LID presence lowers information barriers between the CEO and the rest of the board members, enabling more rapid information acquisition and integration and enhancing the internal information environment of the firm.Research Findings/InsightsUsing a sample of US publicly listed companies from 2001 to 2019, we document that LID presence on the board is positively associated with proxies of internal information quality that reflect better information acquisition and information integration: accuracy and precision of management earnings forecasts, speed of earnings announcement, and absence of material weaknesses in internal controls. These results are robust to alternative model specifications, including entropy balancing, Heckman two‐step correction for self‐selection bias, firm fixed effects, and placebo tests. Further analyses suggest that LIDs with financial expertise and audit committee memberships are more effective in positively influencing internal information quality. We also show that LID presence is positively associated with several proxies of external information quality.Theoretical/Academic ImplicationsWe build on agency theory to argue that LIDs improve internal information quality by reinforcing the information quality benefits of unified leadership while mitigating potential compromises in information quality arising from entrenchment. Similarly, we use arguments emanating from the novel strategic leadership systems theory to posit that a LID appointment facilitates the tasks of the CEO and the board, enhancing the effectiveness of both groups in their respective roles: the CEO in making operating and investment decisions and the board in strengthening oversight while bringing cohesion in their shared role of strategy visioning and implementation.Practitioner/Policy ImplicationsOur findings suggest that there is scope for shareholders to consider LID appointments as an addition to their firms' corporate governance structures to enhance the internal information environment and decision‐making efficiency. Policymakers can also encourage LID appointments on the board when promoting best practices in corporate governance through regulatory guidelines.","PeriodicalId":48209,"journal":{"name":"Corporate Governance-An International Review","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":5.3,"publicationDate":"2024-04-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140581520","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Common Ownership and Goodwill Impairments","authors":"Chunlai Ye, Lin‐Hui Yu","doi":"10.1111/corg.12581","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/corg.12581","url":null,"abstract":"Research Question/IssueAre companies monitored by common owners (i.e., institutional investors that block‐own [owning 5% or more] several companies in a single industry) more likely than other companies to record goodwill impairments when their assets are overstated?Research Findings/InsightsWe find that companies monitored by common owners are more likely than other companies to record goodwill impairments when their assets are overstated. The monitoring effect is stronger for common owners with a stronger incentive to monitor and with more industry knowledge and stronger for the co‐presence of multiple common owners. Our findings are in line with the notion that common owners have an economy of scale in monitoring and internalize the negative externality of delayed recording of goodwill impairment. We also find that common ownership is associated with lower information asymmetry, which in turn increases the timeliness of goodwill impairment.Theoretical/Academic ImplicationsOur research emphasizes the monitoring role of common ownership in recording goodwill impairments. We find support for the mechanisms enabling common owners to be better monitors.Practitioner/Policy ImplicationsThe prevalence of common ownership has prompted regulatory and societal concerns regarding under‐investment in the oversight of the companies. Our findings documenting the association between common ownership and the timely recording of goodwill impairments are relevant to the ongoing debate regarding the potential costs and benefits of common ownership.","PeriodicalId":48209,"journal":{"name":"Corporate Governance-An International Review","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":5.3,"publicationDate":"2024-03-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140581639","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Corruption and Bank Risk-Taking in Dual Banking Systems","authors":"Mushtaq Hussain Khan, Mohammad Bitar, Amine Tarazi, Arshad Hassan, Ahmad Fraz","doi":"10.1111/corg.12579","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/corg.12579","url":null,"abstract":"We investigate whether the risk-taking of Islamic banks is affected differently by corruption compared to conventional banks. We also examine whether the characteristics of the Shari'ah Supervisory Board (SSB) of Islamic banks and the characteristics of the board of directors of conventional banks play an effective role in moderating such an effect.","PeriodicalId":48209,"journal":{"name":"Corporate Governance-An International Review","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":5.3,"publicationDate":"2024-03-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140303026","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Executives' Legal Expertise and Corporate Innovation","authors":"Yunhao Dai, Xinchu Tong, Xiao Jia","doi":"10.1111/corg.12578","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/corg.12578","url":null,"abstract":"This study investigates whether and how executives with legal expertise impact corporate innovation.","PeriodicalId":48209,"journal":{"name":"Corporate Governance-An International Review","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":5.3,"publicationDate":"2024-03-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140302920","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Board gender diversity, firm risk, and the intermediate mechanisms: A meta-analysis","authors":"Sylvia Maxfield, Liu Wang","doi":"10.1111/corg.12572","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/corg.12572","url":null,"abstract":"The primary focus of this meta-analysis is to synthesize previously discordant findings on the relationship between board gender diversity (BGD) and different types of firm risk and to explore potential moderating and mediating mechanisms underlying these relationships.","PeriodicalId":48209,"journal":{"name":"Corporate Governance-An International Review","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":5.3,"publicationDate":"2024-03-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140105265","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"CEO personal experiences and innovation conservatism: Evidence from China","authors":"Bin Dong,&nbsp;Dengli Wang,&nbsp;William Senyu Wang,&nbsp;Min Feng","doi":"10.1111/corg.12577","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/corg.12577","url":null,"abstract":"<div>\u0000 \u0000 \u0000 <section>\u0000 \u0000 <h3> Research question/issue</h3>\u0000 \u0000 <p>This paper studies the relationship between chief executive officers' (CEOs) personal experiences and corporate innovation in China.</p>\u0000 </section>\u0000 \u0000 <section>\u0000 \u0000 <h3> Research findings/insights</h3>\u0000 \u0000 <p>We find that CEOs' famine and military experiences adversely impact firm innovation outcomes. In particular, our channel tests show that CEOs with famine experience adversely affect firm innovation by reducing both R&amp;D expenditures and innovation efficiency, whereas CEOs with military experience hinder innovation mainly by reducing research staff.</p>\u0000 </section>\u0000 \u0000 <section>\u0000 \u0000 <h3> Theoretical/academic implications</h3>\u0000 \u0000 <p>Our results imply that innovation conservatism in some firms may be partly explained by individual CEO's early-life personal experiences. Our study thus has broader implications for the differences in management style across corporate executives who go through different experiences.</p>\u0000 </section>\u0000 \u0000 <section>\u0000 \u0000 <h3> Practitioner/policy implications</h3>\u0000 \u0000 <p>Our findings provide important insights for policy makers, suggesting that they should consider CEOs' early-life exposure to different experiences as important “soft information” when evaluating firms' innovation potential for government subsidies.</p>\u0000 </section>\u0000 </div>","PeriodicalId":48209,"journal":{"name":"Corporate Governance-An International Review","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":4.6,"publicationDate":"2024-02-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/corg.12577","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142152363","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Board gender reforms and voluntary disclosure: International evidence from management earnings forecasts","authors":"Yujie Wang,&nbsp;Muhammad Nadeem,&nbsp;Ihtisham Malik,&nbsp;Ling Xiong","doi":"10.1111/corg.12569","DOIUrl":"10.1111/corg.12569","url":null,"abstract":"<div>\u0000 \u0000 \u0000 <section>\u0000 \u0000 <h3> Research Question/Issue</h3>\u0000 \u0000 <p>This study examines the relationship between boardroom gender diversity reforms (BGDRs) and corporate voluntary disclosure in the form of management earnings forecasts (MEFs) in a sample of 43 countries over the period 2000 to 2020.</p>\u0000 </section>\u0000 \u0000 <section>\u0000 \u0000 <h3> Research Findings/Insights</h3>\u0000 \u0000 <p>Taking advantage of the staggered adoption of the gender diversity reforms that aim to improve women's representation on boards, we find that firms exhibit a greater propensity for and frequency of issuing MEFs. These findings hold for both governance-based and legislation-based reforms but are stronger for the latter. Furthermore, we find stronger results (a) when female directors possess higher financial expertise and serve on board sub-committees, (b) when board activity (meetings and attendance) improved following BGDRs, (c) for firms that had all-male boards before the reforms and where gender diversity increased shortly after the reforms, and (d) for countries with greater legal enforcement and gender equality. Our findings are robust using the stacked difference-in-differences approach and alternative samples, models, and fixed effects. In addition, we find that, after the reforms, there is an increase in the forecast horizon, forecast width, bad news disclosure, accuracy, and the number of disaggregated forecast items.</p>\u0000 </section>\u0000 \u0000 <section>\u0000 \u0000 <h3> Theoretical/Academic Implications</h3>\u0000 \u0000 <p>Our study provides the first international and comprehensive evidence of the positive role of board gender reforms in the corporate information environment and offers vital policy implications.</p>\u0000 </section>\u0000 \u0000 <section>\u0000 \u0000 <h3> Practitioner/Policy Implications</h3>\u0000 \u0000 <p>Our study informs the ongoing debate regarding the effectiveness of and business case for gender diversity reforms. By documenting a causal link between BGDRs and voluntary disclosure, our study provides important implications for policymakers, regulators, investors, and top management teams.</p>\u0000 </section>\u0000 </div>","PeriodicalId":48209,"journal":{"name":"Corporate Governance-An International Review","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":4.6,"publicationDate":"2024-02-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/corg.12569","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139979069","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Long-term value versus short-term profits: When do index funds recall loaned shares for voting?","authors":"Haoyi (Leslie) Luo,&nbsp;Zijin (Vivian) Xu","doi":"10.1111/corg.12576","DOIUrl":"10.1111/corg.12576","url":null,"abstract":"<div>\u0000 \u0000 \u0000 <section>\u0000 \u0000 <h3> Research Question/Issue</h3>\u0000 \u0000 <p>In this paper, we examine the effects of share lending or recall on proxy voting, with a particular focus on the role of index funds.</p>\u0000 </section>\u0000 \u0000 <section>\u0000 \u0000 <h3> Research Findings/Insights</h3>\u0000 \u0000 <p>Our study reveals that higher index ownership in a firm is associated with an increased likelihood of share recall, particularly in the presence of higher institutional ownership, lower past return performance, smaller firm size, and when more shares are held by younger fund families with higher turnover ratios or higher management fees. Using the Russell 1000/2000 Index reconstitution as an exogenous shock, we establish a causal relationship between index ownership and share recall through instrumental variable (IV) analysis. Furthermore, we find a positive correlation between index ownership and share recall for proxy voting proposals related to compensation, director election, and those sponsored by management. In subsequent proxy votes, shareholder-sponsored proposals and environmental, social, and governance (ESG) proposals receive more support in firms with higher index ownership, especially when share recall is more prevalent. Our analysis does not provide evidence to support the conjecture that firms with higher index ownership are more vulnerable to empty voting issues.</p>\u0000 </section>\u0000 \u0000 <section>\u0000 \u0000 <h3> Theoretical/Academic Implications</h3>\u0000 \u0000 <p>Our study enhances the understanding of how index funds recall shares during proxy voting and the impact of index ownership on voting outcomes. The findings support the practice of index funds recalling shares to actively engage in proxy voting, effectively addressing the conflict between short-term profit-seeking through securities lending and long-term governance responsibilities.</p>\u0000 </section>\u0000 \u0000 <section>\u0000 \u0000 <h3> Practitioner/Policy Implications</h3>\u0000 \u0000 <p>We contribute to a better understanding of the role of index funds in corporate governance and shed light on the consequences of securities lending in proxy votes. These findings have important implications for investors, policymakers, and market participants in managing the potential conflicts arising from securities lending activities and promoting effective corporate governance practices.</p>\u0000 </section>\u0000 </div>","PeriodicalId":48209,"journal":{"name":"Corporate Governance-An International Review","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":4.6,"publicationDate":"2024-02-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/corg.12576","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139771484","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}