行业状况不佳是收购的外部约束机制

IF 4.6 3区管理学 Q1 BUSINESS

Corporate Governance-An International Review Pub Date : 2024-07-26 DOI:10.1111/corg.12601

Jana P. Fidrmuc, Tereza Tykvová

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引用次数: 0

摘要

研究问题/议题许多兼并破坏了股东价值，因为管理者为了追求私人利益而浪费了公司资源。本文认为，收购方行业状况不佳是一种新的外部约束机制，可以缓解收购中的代理问题。研究结果/见解通过文本分析，我们根据收购方同行的 10-K 报表建立了一种新的行业状况衡量标准。理论/学术意义我们的研究结果表明，较差的行业状况会对经理人施加约束，而经理人则倾向于专注于为收购方股东创造价值的交易。

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Poor Industry Conditions as an External Disciplining Mechanism in Takeovers

Research Question/IssueMany mergers destroy shareholder value because managers waste corporate resources to pursue private benefits. This paper considers poor conditions in the acquirer industry as a novel external disciplining mechanism that mitigates agency problems in takeovers.Research Findings/InsightsUsing textual analysis, we build a new measure of industry conditions based on acquirer peers' 10‐K statements. We link this measure to acquirer announcement abnormal returns and find that more negative industry conditions are associated with higher abnormal returns.Theoretical/Academic ImplicationsOur results suggest that poor industry conditions impose discipline on managers who then tend to focus on deals that create value for acquirer shareholders.Practitioner/Policy ImplicationsShareholders can rely on better alignment of interests with their managers during poorer industry conditions.

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来源期刊

Corporate Governance-An International Review Multiple-

CiteScore

7.00

自引率

11.30%

发文量

期刊介绍： The mission of Corporate Governance: An International Review is to publish cutting-edge international business research on the phenomena of comparative corporate governance throughout the global economy. Our ultimate goal is a rigorous and relevant global theory of corporate governance. We define corporate governance broadly as the exercise of power over corporate entities so as to increase the value provided to the organization"s various stakeholders, as well as making those stakeholders accountable for acting responsibly with regard to the protection, generation, and distribution of wealth invested in the firm. Because of this broad conceptualization, a wide variety of academic disciplines can contribute to our understanding.