内部干扰:考察临时CEO继任与高管离职的关系

IF 5.5 3区 管理学 Q1 BUSINESS
Robert Langan, Nicolas Deuschel
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引用次数: 0

摘要

虽然关于临时CEO继任的研究有所增加,但关于临时CEO任命对公司的内部影响,特别是对现任高管的影响,人们的认识仍然有限。本研究旨在了解临时CEO任命是否以及如何与高管更替相关,重点关注董事会在临时继任过程中的作用和参与。与直接CEO继任相比,临时CEO继任与更高的高管流动率有关。如果前任首席执行官被解雇,或者临时首席执行官兼任董事会主席,这种人员流动就会进一步扩大。我们还发现,当前任CEO被解雇时,与临时CEO继任相关的高管流动率与随后较差的公司绩效相关。本研究填补了临时CEO继任文献中的一个重要空白,重点关注临时CEO任命的内部影响,特别是现任高管可能受到的影响以及这可能如何影响公司绩效。它调和了这样一种观点,即临时ceo可能参与有限的决策,而董事会则利用过渡时期来规划公司的未来。从业者/政策影响本文强调了临时CEO继任所造成的潜在干扰,并就这些干扰如何影响高管和公司绩效提供了一些见解。此外,本文还为利益相关者提供了有关临时CEO任命的细微治理决策的指南。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。

Internal Disruption: Examining the Relationship Between Interim CEO Successions and Executive Turnover

Internal Disruption: Examining the Relationship Between Interim CEO Successions and Executive Turnover

Research Question/Issue

Although research on interim CEO successions has increased, there remains limited knowledge about what internal repercussions interim CEO appointments have on firms, notably on incumbent executives. This study seeks to understand whether and how interim CEO appointments are related to executive turnover, focusing on the role and involvement of the board in the interim succession process.

Research Findings/Insights

Interim CEO successions are related to higher executive turnover compared to direct CEO successions. This turnover is further augmented either when the preceding CEO was fired or when the interim CEO is also the board chair. We also find that, when the preceding CEO was fired, the executive turnover related to interim CEO successions is related to poorer subsequent firm performance.

Theoretical/Academic Implications

This research fills an important gap in the interim CEO succession literature, focusing on the internal repercussions of interim CEO appointments, particularly how incumbent executives may be affected and how this may influence firm performance. It reconciles the view that interim CEOs may engage in limited decision-making, whereas the board uses the interim period to plan for the firm's future.

Practitioner/Policy Implications

This paper highlights the potential disruptions caused by interim CEO successions and offers some insights into how these may affect executives and firm performance. Moreover, this paper acts as a guide for stakeholders on the nuanced governance decisions around interim CEO appointments.

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来源期刊
CiteScore
7.00
自引率
11.30%
发文量
79
期刊介绍: The mission of Corporate Governance: An International Review is to publish cutting-edge international business research on the phenomena of comparative corporate governance throughout the global economy. Our ultimate goal is a rigorous and relevant global theory of corporate governance. We define corporate governance broadly as the exercise of power over corporate entities so as to increase the value provided to the organization"s various stakeholders, as well as making those stakeholders accountable for acting responsibly with regard to the protection, generation, and distribution of wealth invested in the firm. Because of this broad conceptualization, a wide variety of academic disciplines can contribute to our understanding.
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