Social capital and stock price crash risk: Evidence from US terrorist attacks

IF 4.6 3区 管理学 Q1 BUSINESS
Hyejin Mun, Seongjae Mun, Hyeong Joon Kim
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引用次数: 0

Abstract

Research Question/Issue

This study examines whether social capital's monitoring role intensifies during post-terrorism periods, as terrorism influences citizens' willingness to change society and increases stakeholder participation. Focusing on firms' stock price crash risk, caused by managers' opportunistic behavior (viz., bad news hoarding), we hypothesize that social capital under terrorism reduces stock price crash risk, as it is expected to play an external monitoring governance role.

Research Findings/Insights

Using US public firms, a county-level social capital index, and terrorist attacks from 1992 to 2014, we find that social capital surrounding corporate headquarters significantly reduces stock price crash risk during post-terrorism periods. The results are robust to propensity score matching and instrumental variable regressions, and a battery of sensitivity tests. Overall, we suggest that stakeholders' willingness (that is intensified by terrorism) to monitor firms' bad news hoarding is channeled through social capital. Furthermore, the monitoring role of social capital under terrorism is significant for firms with poor internal monitoring, more institutional investors, less entrenched managers, CEOs preferring bad news hoarding, and accompanied by improvement of analysts' forecasts, suggesting that the impact of external governance may differ by firms' governance characteristics.

Theoretical/Academic Implications

We contribute to the corporate governance literature by investigating the role of social capital as external governance. While terrorism brings serious damage and economic costs, our study shows that it gives rise to the increased role of social capital, suggesting a novel perspective that terrorism's unexpected socio-psychological outcome, being non-financial social threats, leads to positive corporate behaviors by stimulating stakeholders' willingness to monitor firms. Our study is also consistent with the literature that social capital particularly matters in certain periods, such as traumatic events. Furthermore, the impact of a firm's external monitor differs by its governance characteristics, highlighting the importance of corporate governance.

Practitioner/Policy Implications

We suggest that social capital serves as firms' external monitor by restraining managers' bad news hoarding under certain circumstances, providing implications for policymakers and practitioners. According to our results, traumatic events, such as terrorism, could be viewed as the moderator for the impact of social capital on corporates, emphasizing the need for intensifying social capital (or making it more effective) without tragic incidents. Meanwhile, one might view social capital as the mediator for the increased willingness of individuals to monitor during the post-terrorism period, highlighting the need for sufficient social capital in the local community.

社会资本与股价崩盘风险:来自美国恐怖袭击的证据
研究问题/议题 本研究探讨在后恐怖主义时期,社会资本的监督作用是否会加强,因为恐怖主义会影响公民改变社会的意愿并增加利益相关者的参与。我们以管理者的机会主义行为(即囤积坏消息)导致的公司股价暴跌风险为重点,假设恐怖主义下的社会资本可降低股价暴跌风险,因为它有望发挥外部监督治理作用。 研究结果/见解 利用美国上市公司、县级社会资本指数和 1992 年至 2014 年的恐怖袭击,我们发现公司总部周围的社会资本能显著降低后恐怖袭击时期的股价暴跌风险。这些结果在倾向得分匹配、工具变量回归和一系列敏感性测试中都是稳健的。总之,我们认为利益相关者监督公司囤积坏消息的意愿(恐怖主义加剧了这种意愿)是通过社会资本传递的。此外,对于内部监控不力、机构投资者较多、管理者根基不稳、首席执行官偏好囤积坏消息以及分析师预测改善的公司,社会资本在恐怖主义下的监督作用显著,这表明外部治理的影响可能因公司治理特征的不同而不同。 理论/学术意义 我们通过研究社会资本作为外部治理的作用,为公司治理文献做出了贡献。虽然恐怖主义带来了严重的破坏和经济损失,但我们的研究表明,恐怖主义导致了社会资本作用的增强,提出了一个新的视角,即恐怖主义意外的社会心理结果,即非财务性的社会威胁,通过激发利益相关者监督公司的意愿,导致了积极的公司行为。我们的研究也与文献中的观点一致,即社会资本在创伤性事件等特定时期尤为重要。此外,企业外部监督者的影响因其治理特征而异,这凸显了公司治理的重要性。 实践者/政策启示 我们认为,社会资本在某些情况下可以抑制管理者囤积坏消息,从而起到企业外部监督者的作用,这为政策制定者和实践者提供了启示。根据我们的研究结果,恐怖主义等创伤性事件可被视为社会资本对企业影响的调节因素,这强调了在没有悲剧性事件发生的情况下强化社会资本(或使其更加有效)的必要性。同时,我们也可以将社会资本视为个人在后恐怖主义时期监督意愿增强的中介因素,从而强调当地社区需要足够的社会资本。
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来源期刊
CiteScore
7.00
自引率
11.30%
发文量
79
期刊介绍: The mission of Corporate Governance: An International Review is to publish cutting-edge international business research on the phenomena of comparative corporate governance throughout the global economy. Our ultimate goal is a rigorous and relevant global theory of corporate governance. We define corporate governance broadly as the exercise of power over corporate entities so as to increase the value provided to the organization"s various stakeholders, as well as making those stakeholders accountable for acting responsibly with regard to the protection, generation, and distribution of wealth invested in the firm. Because of this broad conceptualization, a wide variety of academic disciplines can contribute to our understanding.
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