Corporate Governance-An International Review最新文献

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Unification of power and responsibilities for state-owned enterprises: A quasi-natural experiment 国有企业权责统一:一个准自然实验
IF 5.3 3区 管理学
Corporate Governance-An International Review Pub Date : 2023-01-28 DOI: 10.1111/corg.12514
Ning Hu, Shilei Yu, Yanan Cao, Savannah (Yuanyuan) Guo, Yu Wang
{"title":"Unification of power and responsibilities for state-owned enterprises: A quasi-natural experiment","authors":"Ning Hu,&nbsp;Shilei Yu,&nbsp;Yanan Cao,&nbsp;Savannah (Yuanyuan) Guo,&nbsp;Yu Wang","doi":"10.1111/corg.12514","DOIUrl":"10.1111/corg.12514","url":null,"abstract":"<div>\u0000 \u0000 \u0000 <section>\u0000 \u0000 <h3> Research Question/Issue</h3>\u0000 \u0000 <p>Based on Property Rights Theory and Empowerment Theory, this paper uses the establishment of local State-Owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commissions (SASACs) as a quasi-natural experiment to investigate whether and how SASACs improve the efficiency of state-owned enterprises (SOEs).</p>\u0000 </section>\u0000 \u0000 <section>\u0000 \u0000 <h3> Research Findings/Insights</h3>\u0000 \u0000 <p>(1) After the establishment of SASACs, and compared to those not supervised by the SASACs (i.e., the control group), SOEs governed by local SASACs (i.e., the treatment group) have experienced a significant increase in decentralization and empowerment from the government, proxied by corporate pyramid levels. We also find increased pay-performance sensitivity for SOE managers and higher productivity measured by total factor productivity (TFP). (2) SASACs adopt different strategies to manage SOEs in monopolistic and competitive industries. (3) The above effect of the SASACs is more pronounced in SOEs supervised by high-quality governments that effectively protect property rights, enforce fair contracts, apply laws and regulations to everyone, and sufficiently refrain from expropriation.</p>\u0000 </section>\u0000 \u0000 <section>\u0000 \u0000 <h3> Theoretical/Academic Implications</h3>\u0000 \u0000 <p>Using a quasi-natural experiment, this paper expands the existing literature on SOE reform from the perspective of incentive reform at the regulatory level based on Property Rights Theory and Empowerment Theory.</p>\u0000 </section>\u0000 \u0000 <section>\u0000 \u0000 <h3> Practitioner/Policy Implications</h3>\u0000 \u0000 <p>(1) Privatization is not necessarily the only optimal solution for SOE reform. We show that the unification of power and responsibilities can be very effective and is perhaps less costly and more practical than privatization. Thus, our study provides an encouraging solution for SOE reform for other countries. (2) Countries experiencing SOE reform should also work on strengthening their government quality in order to fully maximize the benefit of the reform.</p>\u0000 </section>\u0000 </div>","PeriodicalId":48209,"journal":{"name":"Corporate Governance-An International Review","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":5.3,"publicationDate":"2023-01-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43062298","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 1
How boards manage the tension between cognitive conflict and cohesiveness: Illuminating the four board conflict climates 董事会如何处理认知冲突和凝聚力之间的紧张关系:照亮四种董事会冲突氛围
IF 5.3 3区 管理学
Corporate Governance-An International Review Pub Date : 2023-01-28 DOI: 10.1111/corg.12516
Marilieke Engbers, Svetlana N. Khapova
{"title":"How boards manage the tension between cognitive conflict and cohesiveness: Illuminating the four board conflict climates","authors":"Marilieke Engbers,&nbsp;Svetlana N. Khapova","doi":"10.1111/corg.12516","DOIUrl":"10.1111/corg.12516","url":null,"abstract":"<div>\u0000 \u0000 \u0000 <section>\u0000 \u0000 <h3> Research Question/Issue</h3>\u0000 \u0000 <p>Although both cognitive conflict and cohesiveness are quintessential for a supervisory board to fulfill its monitoring and advisory role, cognitive conflict may equally create tension that negatively affects board cohesiveness and performance. How boards manage this tension between conflict and cohesiveness is the key concern of this paper.</p>\u0000 </section>\u0000 \u0000 <section>\u0000 \u0000 <h3> Research Findings/Insights</h3>\u0000 \u0000 <p>Analysis of the multicase data from 17 Dutch two-tier supervisory boards reveals that how boards manage the tension between conflict and cohesiveness depends on three attributes: (a) board cohesiveness, (b) the board's conflict norms formation and (c) the board's dominant conflict management style. These attributes shape volatile board conflict climates. Four conflict climates are identified: (a) compliance climate, (b) pseudocohesive climate, (c) conflict climate, and (d) agree-to-disagree climate.</p>\u0000 </section>\u0000 \u0000 <section>\u0000 \u0000 <h3> Theoretical/Academic Implications</h3>\u0000 \u0000 <p>Our study makes three contributions. First, it suggests that boards avoid conflict but are nonetheless often not cohesive. Second, it reveals that boards have conflict management styles that include action patterns distinct from those reported in the extant literature since these patterns emerged from exploring what board members think and feel but do not openly say. Third, we develop new insights into how boards implicitly and continuously form conflict norms and propose that boards require explicit, conscious, and shared conflict norms to enact productive conflict management action patterns.</p>\u0000 </section>\u0000 \u0000 <section>\u0000 \u0000 <h3> Practitioner/Policy Implications</h3>\u0000 \u0000 <p>A conceptual model is proposed that facilitates reflection of board decision-making and effectiveness and that maps out actions the boards can take to address the tension between cognitive conflict and cohesiveness.</p>\u0000 </section>\u0000 </div>","PeriodicalId":48209,"journal":{"name":"Corporate Governance-An International Review","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":5.3,"publicationDate":"2023-01-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/corg.12516","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42827921","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
OECD Review of the Corporate Governance of State-Owned Enterprises in Romania 经合组织对罗马尼亚国有企业公司治理的回顾
IF 5.3 3区 管理学
Corporate Governance-An International Review Pub Date : 2023-01-27 DOI: 10.1787/fabf20a8-en
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引用次数: 1
Safeguarding State-Owned Enterprises from Undue Influence 保护国有企业不受不当影响
IF 5.3 3区 管理学
Corporate Governance-An International Review Pub Date : 2023-01-26 DOI: 10.1787/47444e1c-en
{"title":"Safeguarding State-Owned Enterprises from Undue Influence","authors":"","doi":"10.1787/47444e1c-en","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1787/47444e1c-en","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":48209,"journal":{"name":"Corporate Governance-An International Review","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":5.3,"publicationDate":"2023-01-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"80195546","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
When does a female leadership advantage exist? Evidence from SOEs in China 女性领导优势何时存在?来自中国国有企业的证据
IF 5.3 3区 管理学
Corporate Governance-An International Review Pub Date : 2023-01-25 DOI: 10.1111/corg.12510
Hanchen Li, Xiaochuan Tong
{"title":"When does a female leadership advantage exist? Evidence from SOEs in China","authors":"Hanchen Li,&nbsp;Xiaochuan Tong","doi":"10.1111/corg.12510","DOIUrl":"10.1111/corg.12510","url":null,"abstract":"<div>\u0000 \u0000 \u0000 <section>\u0000 \u0000 <h3> Research Question/Issue</h3>\u0000 \u0000 <p>We approach the ongoing debate in the literature on when and why a female leadership advantage exists in the context of China. In particular, we examine whether female CEOs outperform male CEOs in state-owned enterprises (SOEs).</p>\u0000 </section>\u0000 \u0000 <section>\u0000 \u0000 <h3> Research Findings/Insights</h3>\u0000 \u0000 <p>We show that a female leadership advantage exists in SOEs. We find that the female leadership increased performance is attributed to improved profitability, capital structure, and operating efficiency. The magnitude of this gender effect is bigger in central state-owned enterprises (CSOEs) than that in local state-owned enterprises (LSOEs). The results are robust to additional tests that mitigate the sample selection and other endogeneity concerns.</p>\u0000 </section>\u0000 \u0000 <section>\u0000 \u0000 <h3> Theoretical/Academic Implications</h3>\u0000 \u0000 <p>We use the role congruity theory to motivate and develop the hypotheses drawing insights upon the literature in psychology and leadership. Female CEOs are perceived as less congruent with their leadership roles given the gender role stereotypes. Thus, they face more challenges and difficulties than male CEOs. These obstacles take at least two forms which are significant in SOEs: shareholder activism and sex discrimination. Female CEOs have to outperform their male counterparts to alleviate the pressure from shareholder activism and showcase their managerial skills and abilities.</p>\u0000 </section>\u0000 \u0000 <section>\u0000 \u0000 <h3> Practitioner/Policy Implications</h3>\u0000 \u0000 <p>For the state shareholders, the extra scrutiny in selecting female CEOs should be lifted given this outperformance. The evidence is also relevant for CEOs to choose their career paths among different types of firms, for boards of directors on their strategic decisions on CEO hiring, and for policy makers to promote the female leadership advantage.</p>\u0000 </section>\u0000 </div>","PeriodicalId":48209,"journal":{"name":"Corporate Governance-An International Review","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":5.3,"publicationDate":"2023-01-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45044706","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 2
CEO turnover: Cross-country effects CEO更替:跨国效应
IF 5.3 3区 管理学
Corporate Governance-An International Review Pub Date : 2023-01-20 DOI: 10.1111/corg.12506
Natasha Burns, Kristina Minnick, Laura Starks
{"title":"CEO turnover: Cross-country effects","authors":"Natasha Burns,&nbsp;Kristina Minnick,&nbsp;Laura Starks","doi":"10.1111/corg.12506","DOIUrl":"10.1111/corg.12506","url":null,"abstract":"<div>\u0000 \u0000 \u0000 <section>\u0000 \u0000 <h3> Research Question/Issue</h3>\u0000 \u0000 <p>We examine how countries' cultural and legal environment, in addition to firm-level governance mechanisms, affects firms' retention and termination decision of the CEO.</p>\u0000 </section>\u0000 \u0000 <section>\u0000 \u0000 <h3> Research Findings/Insights</h3>\u0000 \u0000 <p>Previous research focuses primarily on the effects of governance structures and incentives on turnover. In this paper, we focus on two additional institutions—cultural and legal. We find that in cultures characterized by higher individualism, competition, and stronger views that hard work leads to success, boards are more likely to replace CEOs in response to poor shareholder performance. Conversely, we find that in more corrupt cultures and cultures more protective of employees, there is lower turnover–performance sensitivity.</p>\u0000 </section>\u0000 \u0000 <section>\u0000 \u0000 <h3> Theoretical/Academic Implications</h3>\u0000 \u0000 <p>Williamson (2000) provided a framework consisting of four levels of institutional influences on economic activity: (1) cultural norms, (2) the legal system, (3) governance structures, and (4) resource allocation and employment. Previous research focuses primarily on the two highest levels; we focus on the two more basic levels, cultural and legal, while controlling for firm-level governance.</p>\u0000 </section>\u0000 \u0000 <section>\u0000 \u0000 <h3> Practitioner/Policy Implications</h3>\u0000 \u0000 <p>Cultural values and legal conditions combine with the firm's governance structure to affect CEO turnover and its sensitivity to firm shareholder performance.</p>\u0000 </section>\u0000 </div>","PeriodicalId":48209,"journal":{"name":"Corporate Governance-An International Review","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":5.3,"publicationDate":"2023-01-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46429636","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 3
Sustainability Policies and Practices for Corporate Governance in Latin America 拉丁美洲公司治理的可持续性政策和实践
IF 5.3 3区 管理学
Corporate Governance-An International Review Pub Date : 2023-01-20 DOI: 10.1787/76df2285-en
{"title":"Sustainability Policies and Practices for Corporate Governance in Latin America","authors":"","doi":"10.1787/76df2285-en","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1787/76df2285-en","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":48209,"journal":{"name":"Corporate Governance-An International Review","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":5.3,"publicationDate":"2023-01-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"91388779","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 1
An axe to grind: Family outsiders and firms doing good 一把斧头:家族外部人士和做好事的公司
IF 5.3 3区 管理学
Corporate Governance-An International Review Pub Date : 2023-01-20 DOI: 10.1111/corg.12509
Fuxiu Jiang, Ping Jiang, Xiaojia Zheng
{"title":"An axe to grind: Family outsiders and firms doing good","authors":"Fuxiu Jiang,&nbsp;Ping Jiang,&nbsp;Xiaojia Zheng","doi":"10.1111/corg.12509","DOIUrl":"10.1111/corg.12509","url":null,"abstract":"<div>\u0000 \u0000 \u0000 <section>\u0000 \u0000 <h3> Research Question/Issue</h3>\u0000 \u0000 <p>This paper examines the relationship between having nonfamily members (i.e., family outsiders) as board chairs and corporate philanthropy.</p>\u0000 </section>\u0000 \u0000 <section>\u0000 \u0000 <h3> Research Findings/Insights</h3>\u0000 \u0000 <p>In a hand-collected dataset of Chinese family firms, we find that firms invest less in philanthropy when the board chair is a nonfamily member. However, this impact is mitigated when the chair's discretion is restricted, as in highly visible firms or firms controlled by the founding family. The negative relation between nonfamily chairs and corporate philanthropy is also weaker when the interest of chairs is more aligned with that of the controlling family, where chairs are inside-promoted or members of founding team, when board chairs and the families have more goal consistency, when stakeholders have higher demands for corporate social responsibility or investors care less about profitability. Further analysis shows that nonfamily chairs help firms reduce overinvestment in philanthropy, the board chair has a more salient effect than the CEO on philanthropic giving, and the results are not driven by expropriation issues of the controlling family.</p>\u0000 </section>\u0000 \u0000 <section>\u0000 \u0000 <h3> Theoretical/Academic Implications</h3>\u0000 \u0000 <p>Our study highlights the heterogeneity of board chairs in family firms, board chair's significant influence on a firm's social performance, and the agency problem related with the board chair, which are all underexplored topics in prior literature.</p>\u0000 </section>\u0000 \u0000 <section>\u0000 \u0000 <h3> Practitioner/Policy Implications</h3>\u0000 \u0000 <p>Our evidence offers insights to practitioners about the impact of board chairs on corporate philanthropy. Family firms need pay attention to the recruitment of board chairs and hold a comprehensive view of family firm professionalization as a nonfamily board chair might negatively affect firms' stakeholder relationship management but bring benefits by mitigating excess philanthropic activities. Besides, practitioners shall be aware of agency problems originating from board chairs. Incentives or monitoring over chairs might be useful to address potential conflicts of interest.</p>\u0000 </section>\u0000 </div>","PeriodicalId":48209,"journal":{"name":"Corporate Governance-An International Review","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":5.3,"publicationDate":"2023-01-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45742289","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 1
CGIR Review Issue 2024 CGIR审查问题2024
IF 5.3 3区 管理学
Corporate Governance-An International Review Pub Date : 2023-01-10 DOI: 10.1111/corg.12499
{"title":"CGIR Review Issue 2024","authors":"","doi":"10.1111/corg.12499","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/corg.12499","url":null,"abstract":"<p>No abstract is available for this article.</p>","PeriodicalId":48209,"journal":{"name":"Corporate Governance-An International Review","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":5.3,"publicationDate":"2023-01-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"50146405","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Corporate Governance and Evolving Corporate Disclosures: Global Challenges and Opportunities for Research and Policy 公司治理与不断发展的公司信息披露:研究与政策的全球挑战与机遇
IF 5.3 3区 管理学
Corporate Governance-An International Review Pub Date : 2023-01-10 DOI: 10.1111/corg.12498
{"title":"Corporate Governance and Evolving Corporate Disclosures: Global Challenges and Opportunities for Research and Policy","authors":"","doi":"10.1111/corg.12498","DOIUrl":"10.1111/corg.12498","url":null,"abstract":"<p>No abstract is available for this article.</p>","PeriodicalId":48209,"journal":{"name":"Corporate Governance-An International Review","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":5.3,"publicationDate":"2023-01-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42219200","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
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