An axe to grind: Family outsiders and firms doing good

IF 4.6 3区管理学 Q1 BUSINESS

Corporate Governance-An International Review Pub Date : 2023-01-20 DOI:10.1111/corg.12509

Fuxiu Jiang, Ping Jiang, Xiaojia Zheng

{"title":"An axe to grind: Family outsiders and firms doing good","authors":"Fuxiu Jiang, Ping Jiang, Xiaojia Zheng","doi":"10.1111/corg.12509","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"<div>\n \n \n <section>\n \n <h3> Research Question/Issue</h3>\n \n <p>This paper examines the relationship between having nonfamily members (i.e., family outsiders) as board chairs and corporate philanthropy.</p>\n </section>\n \n <section>\n \n <h3> Research Findings/Insights</h3>\n \n <p>In a hand-collected dataset of Chinese family firms, we find that firms invest less in philanthropy when the board chair is a nonfamily member. However, this impact is mitigated when the chair's discretion is restricted, as in highly visible firms or firms controlled by the founding family. The negative relation between nonfamily chairs and corporate philanthropy is also weaker when the interest of chairs is more aligned with that of the controlling family, where chairs are inside-promoted or members of founding team, when board chairs and the families have more goal consistency, when stakeholders have higher demands for corporate social responsibility or investors care less about profitability. Further analysis shows that nonfamily chairs help firms reduce overinvestment in philanthropy, the board chair has a more salient effect than the CEO on philanthropic giving, and the results are not driven by expropriation issues of the controlling family.</p>\n </section>\n \n <section>\n \n <h3> Theoretical/Academic Implications</h3>\n \n <p>Our study highlights the heterogeneity of board chairs in family firms, board chair's significant influence on a firm's social performance, and the agency problem related with the board chair, which are all underexplored topics in prior literature.</p>\n </section>\n \n <section>\n \n <h3> Practitioner/Policy Implications</h3>\n \n <p>Our evidence offers insights to practitioners about the impact of board chairs on corporate philanthropy. Family firms need pay attention to the recruitment of board chairs and hold a comprehensive view of family firm professionalization as a nonfamily board chair might negatively affect firms' stakeholder relationship management but bring benefits by mitigating excess philanthropic activities. Besides, practitioners shall be aware of agency problems originating from board chairs. Incentives or monitoring over chairs might be useful to address potential conflicts of interest.</p>\n </section>\n </div>","PeriodicalId":48209,"journal":{"name":"Corporate Governance-An International Review","volume":"31 6","pages":"921-944"},"PeriodicalIF":4.6000,"publicationDate":"2023-01-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"1","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Corporate Governance-An International Review","FirstCategoryId":"91","ListUrlMain":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/corg.12509","RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q1","JCRName":"BUSINESS","Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 1

Abstract

Research Question/Issue

This paper examines the relationship between having nonfamily members (i.e., family outsiders) as board chairs and corporate philanthropy.

Research Findings/Insights

In a hand-collected dataset of Chinese family firms, we find that firms invest less in philanthropy when the board chair is a nonfamily member. However, this impact is mitigated when the chair's discretion is restricted, as in highly visible firms or firms controlled by the founding family. The negative relation between nonfamily chairs and corporate philanthropy is also weaker when the interest of chairs is more aligned with that of the controlling family, where chairs are inside-promoted or members of founding team, when board chairs and the families have more goal consistency, when stakeholders have higher demands for corporate social responsibility or investors care less about profitability. Further analysis shows that nonfamily chairs help firms reduce overinvestment in philanthropy, the board chair has a more salient effect than the CEO on philanthropic giving, and the results are not driven by expropriation issues of the controlling family.

Theoretical/Academic Implications

Our study highlights the heterogeneity of board chairs in family firms, board chair's significant influence on a firm's social performance, and the agency problem related with the board chair, which are all underexplored topics in prior literature.

Practitioner/Policy Implications

Our evidence offers insights to practitioners about the impact of board chairs on corporate philanthropy. Family firms need pay attention to the recruitment of board chairs and hold a comprehensive view of family firm professionalization as a nonfamily board chair might negatively affect firms' stakeholder relationship management but bring benefits by mitigating excess philanthropic activities. Besides, practitioners shall be aware of agency problems originating from board chairs. Incentives or monitoring over chairs might be useful to address potential conflicts of interest.

查看原文本刊更多论文

一把斧头：家族外部人士和做好事的公司

本文考察了非家族成员(即家族外部成员)担任董事会主席与企业慈善事业之间的关系。研究结果/见解在一份手工收集的中国家族企业数据集中，我们发现，当董事会主席是非家族成员时，企业在慈善事业上的投资会减少。然而，当董事长的自由裁量权受到限制时，这种影响就会减轻，比如在知名度很高的公司或由创始家族控制的公司。当董事长的利益与控股家族更一致、董事长是内部晋升者或创始团队成员、董事会主席与家族的目标更一致、利益相关者对企业社会责任的要求更高或投资者对盈利能力的关注较低时，非家族主席与企业慈善事业的负相关关系也较弱。进一步分析表明，非家族主席有助于企业减少对慈善事业的过度投资，董事会主席对慈善捐赠的影响比首席执行官更显著，并且结果不受控股家族征用问题的驱动。我们的研究突出了家族企业董事会主席的异质性、董事会主席对企业社会绩效的显著影响以及与董事会主席相关的代理问题，这些都是以往文献中未被充分探讨的主题。从业者/政策启示我们的证据为从业者提供了关于董事会主席对企业慈善事业影响的见解。家族企业需要重视董事会主席的招聘，并全面看待家族企业的专业化，因为非家族董事会主席可能会对企业的利益相关者关系管理产生负面影响，但会通过减少过多的慈善活动带来好处。此外，从业者应该意识到董事会主席产生的代理问题。激励或监督主席可能有助于解决潜在的利益冲突。

本文章由计算机程序翻译，如有差异，请以英文原文为准。

求助全文

约1分钟内获得全文求助全文

来源期刊

Corporate Governance-An International Review Multiple-

CiteScore

7.00

自引率

11.30%

发文量

期刊介绍： The mission of Corporate Governance: An International Review is to publish cutting-edge international business research on the phenomena of comparative corporate governance throughout the global economy. Our ultimate goal is a rigorous and relevant global theory of corporate governance. We define corporate governance broadly as the exercise of power over corporate entities so as to increase the value provided to the organization"s various stakeholders, as well as making those stakeholders accountable for acting responsibly with regard to the protection, generation, and distribution of wealth invested in the firm. Because of this broad conceptualization, a wide variety of academic disciplines can contribute to our understanding.