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Partial secrecy in vertical contracting 垂直合同中的部分保密
IF 1.5 3区 经济学
International Journal of Industrial Organization Pub Date : 2023-09-01 DOI: 10.1016/j.ijindorg.2023.102955
Jihwan Do , Jeanine Miklós-Thal
{"title":"Partial secrecy in vertical contracting","authors":"Jihwan Do ,&nbsp;Jeanine Miklós-Thal","doi":"10.1016/j.ijindorg.2023.102955","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijindorg.2023.102955","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>This paper introduces a notion of partial secrecy in bilateral contracting games between one upstream firm and several competing downstream firms. The supplier’s offer quantities are subject to trembles, and each downstream firm observes a noisy signal about the offer received by its competitor before deciding whether to accept its offer. A downstream firm’s belief about its competitor’s quantity is determined endogenously as a weighted average of the competitor’s expected equilibrium quantity and the signal about the actual quantity that the competitor was offered. The degree of contract secrecy is captured by the weight that this belief puts on the competitor’s expected equilibrium quantity. We find that a higher degree of secrecy implies a more competitive equilibrium outcome, both in a game with simultaneous offers and in a dynamic game with alternating offers similar to the one in Do and Miklós-Thal (2022, “Opportunism in Vertical Contracting: A Dynamic Perspective,” CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP16951).</p></div>","PeriodicalId":48127,"journal":{"name":"International Journal of Industrial Organization","volume":"90 ","pages":"Article 102955"},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2023-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49736117","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Regulating online search in the EU: From the android case to the digital markets act and digital services act 欧盟对在线搜索的监管：从安卓案件到《数字市场法》和《数字服务法》。
IF 1.5 3区 经济学
International Journal of Industrial Organization Pub Date : 2023-09-01 DOI: 10.1016/j.ijindorg.2023.102983
Francesco Decarolis, Muxin Li
{"title":"Regulating online search in the EU: From the android case to the digital markets act and digital services act","authors":"Francesco Decarolis,&nbsp;Muxin Li","doi":"10.1016/j.ijindorg.2023.102983","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.ijindorg.2023.102983","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>This paper offers an analysis of the impacts of public regulations of internet search. Through a theoretical model, we consider three regulations adopted by the EU. The first is the Android choice screen implemented in the European Economic Area in 2020. The other two are the recently adopted Digital Markets Act (DMA) and Digital Services Act (DSA). We find that interventions involving user choice, like the Android choice screen, can be strengthened by other interventions focused on search engine quality and data portability. Since the regulations in the DMA target these multiple dimensions simultaneously, we expect it to deliver the strongest and most effective impacts on the online search market. We also argue that the impacts of the regulations may vary over different time horizons: when first implemented, the DSA may simply direct users to search engines with better privacy protection, but over time it has the potential to change user tastes for privacy and, hence, drive search engines to invest more in privacy protection.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":48127,"journal":{"name":"International Journal of Industrial Organization","volume":"90 ","pages":"Article 102983"},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2023-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44828503","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 1
Pass-through and tax incidence in differentiated product markets 差异化产品市场中的转嫁和税收发生率
IF 1.5 3区 经济学
International Journal of Industrial Organization Pub Date : 2023-09-01 DOI: 10.1016/j.ijindorg.2023.102985
Eugenio J. Miravete , Katja Seim , Jeff Thurk
{"title":"Pass-through and tax incidence in differentiated product markets","authors":"Eugenio J. Miravete ,&nbsp;Katja Seim ,&nbsp;Jeff Thurk","doi":"10.1016/j.ijindorg.2023.102985","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.ijindorg.2023.102985","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>The role of demand curvature in determining firm behavior in symmetric oligopolistic product markets is well-understood. We consider the empirically relevant discrete choice differentiated product demand and point to two forces that drive curvature in logit demand: the impact of outside-good spending on the consumer’s indirect utility and the heterogeneity in this response across consumers. We use the canonical example of the ready-to-eat cereal market (Nevo, 2000) to contrast elasticity and curvature estimates across several workhorse models. We illustrate that the log-concave Multinomial Logit and Nested Logit demands yield significantly biased curvature estimates. In contrast, a Mixed Logit specification generates a wider range of curvatures, including curvatures larger than one. These results are of immediate relevance to the robust assessment of tax incidence and the pass-through of cost savings, such as from a horizontal merger, in differentiated product markets.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":48127,"journal":{"name":"International Journal of Industrial Organization","volume":"90 ","pages":"Article 102985"},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2023-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43165934","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Self-preferencing and foreclosure in digital markets: Theories of harm for abuse cases 数字市场中的自我偏好和丧失抵押品赎回权:滥用案件的伤害理论
IF 1.5 3区 经济学
International Journal of Industrial Organization Pub Date : 2023-09-01 DOI: 10.1016/j.ijindorg.2023.102974
Massimo Motta
{"title":"Self-preferencing and foreclosure in digital markets: Theories of harm for abuse cases","authors":"Massimo Motta","doi":"10.1016/j.ijindorg.2023.102974","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.ijindorg.2023.102974","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>Antitrust agencies all over the world have been investigating large digital platforms for practices which may constitute an abuse of dominance. Here I discuss practices (including ‘self-preferencing’ and denial or degradation of interoperability) which can be interpreted as foreclosure in vertically-related or complementary markets. I discuss, in particular, a few high-profile cases involving Amazon, Apple, Facebook and Google. I focus on possible theories of harm for such cases and show that both original simple models and well-established economic theories (adapted or interpreted) provide a rationale for anti-competitive foreclosure.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":48127,"journal":{"name":"International Journal of Industrial Organization","volume":"90 ","pages":"Article 102974"},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2023-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44754607","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 3
Price and quantity discovery without commitment 没有承诺的价格和数量发现
IF 1.5 3区 经济学
International Journal of Industrial Organization Pub Date : 2023-09-01 DOI: 10.1016/j.ijindorg.2023.102987
Stefan Bergheimer , Estelle Cantillon , Mar Reguant
{"title":"Price and quantity discovery without commitment","authors":"Stefan Bergheimer ,&nbsp;Estelle Cantillon ,&nbsp;Mar Reguant","doi":"10.1016/j.ijindorg.2023.102987","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.ijindorg.2023.102987","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>Wholesale electricity markets solve a complex allocation problem: electricity is not storable, demand is uncertain, and production involves dynamic cost considerations and indivisibilities. The New Zealand wholesale electricity market attempts to solve this complex allocation problem by using an indicative price and quantity discovery mechanism that ends at dispatch. Can such a market mechanism without commitment provide useful information? We document that indicative prices and quantities are increasingly informative of the final prices and quantities and that bid revisions are consistent with information-based updating. We argue that the reason why the predispatch market is informative despite the lack of commitment is that it generates private benefits in terms of improved intertemporal optimization of production plans.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":48127,"journal":{"name":"International Journal of Industrial Organization","volume":"90 ","pages":"Article 102987"},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2023-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42057113","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Algorithmic collusion: Genuine or spurious? 算法合谋:真实还是虚假?
IF 1.5 3区 经济学
International Journal of Industrial Organization Pub Date : 2023-09-01 DOI: 10.1016/j.ijindorg.2023.102973
Emilio Calvano , Giacomo Calzolari , Vincenzo Denicolò , Sergio Pastorello
{"title":"Algorithmic collusion: Genuine or spurious?","authors":"Emilio Calvano ,&nbsp;Giacomo Calzolari ,&nbsp;Vincenzo Denicolò ,&nbsp;Sergio Pastorello","doi":"10.1016/j.ijindorg.2023.102973","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.ijindorg.2023.102973","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>Reinforcement-learning pricing algorithms sometimes converge to supra-competitive prices even in markets where collusion is impossible by design or cannot be an equilibrium outcome. We analyze when such spurious collusion may arise, and when instead the algorithms learn genuinely collusive strategies, focusing on the role of the rate and mode of exploration.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":48127,"journal":{"name":"International Journal of Industrial Organization","volume":"90 ","pages":"Article 102973"},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2023-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48840104","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 1
Buyer power and exclusion: A progress report 买方权力和排除:进度报告
IF 1.5 3区 经济学
International Journal of Industrial Organization Pub Date : 2023-09-01 DOI: 10.1016/j.ijindorg.2023.102969
Claire Chambolle , Clémence Christin , Hugo Molina
{"title":"Buyer power and exclusion: A progress report","authors":"Claire Chambolle ,&nbsp;Clémence Christin ,&nbsp;Hugo Molina","doi":"10.1016/j.ijindorg.2023.102969","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijindorg.2023.102969","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>This article presents recent advances in the analysis of buyer-seller networks, with a particular focus on the role of buyer power on exclusion. We first examine simple vertical structures and highlight that either upstream or downstream firms may have incentives to engage in exclusionary practices to either counteract or leverage buyer power. We then review current work attempting to revisit this issue in “interlocking relationships”. Based on an ongoing research project, we show that the same exclusion mechanisms arise when retail substitution is soft.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":48127,"journal":{"name":"International Journal of Industrial Organization","volume":"90 ","pages":"Article 102969"},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2023-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49720864","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Cournot platform competition with mixed-homing 古诺平台与混居竞争
IF 1.5 3区 经济学
International Journal of Industrial Organization Pub Date : 2023-07-17 DOI: 10.1016/j.ijindorg.2023.103002
Mark J. Tremblay , Takanori Adachi , Susumu Sato
{"title":"Cournot platform competition with mixed-homing","authors":"Mark J. Tremblay ,&nbsp;Takanori Adachi ,&nbsp;Susumu Sato","doi":"10.1016/j.ijindorg.2023.103002","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijindorg.2023.103002","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>Competition in quantity dates back to Cournot (1838) for traditional markets and Katz and Shapiro (1985) for markets with direct network effects. In this paper, we consider Cournot platform competition in two-sided markets with indirect network effects while allowing for single-, multi-, and mixed-homing allocations. We find that the markup and markdown terms that are typically found in monopoly two-sided pricing are distorted toward zero when platform competition intensifies. We also generalize the monopoly platform Lerner indices from Armstrong (2006) and Weyl (2010) to include competition and mixed-homing allocations. Lastly, we show that welfare decreases in the number of platforms for the most commonly considered homing allocations, highlighting how the welfare loss from breaking up a network across smaller platforms can outweigh the welfare benefits from lower aggregate prices in a setting where platforms are homogenous.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":48127,"journal":{"name":"International Journal of Industrial Organization","volume":"91 ","pages":"Article 103002"},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2023-07-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49723138","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Barriers to real-time electricity pricing: Evidence from New Zealand 实时电价的障碍:来自新西兰的证据
IF 1.5 3区 经济学
International Journal of Industrial Organization Pub Date : 2023-07-01 DOI: 10.1016/j.ijindorg.2023.102979
Charles Pébereau , Kevin Remmy
{"title":"Barriers to real-time electricity pricing: Evidence from New Zealand","authors":"Charles Pébereau ,&nbsp;Kevin Remmy","doi":"10.1016/j.ijindorg.2023.102979","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.ijindorg.2023.102979","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>This paper studies the introduction of real-time electricity pricing in the New Zealand residential retail market to understand why its market share remained below 1.25%. We use rich panel data of all retail switches between 2014 and 2018 and an unexpected wholesale price spike to study adoption and attrition. Exploiting the staggered roll-out of real-time pricing in different locations we find that attrition decreases with experience. We also find that prospective adopters are present biased. The combination of these findings explains why adoption stalled and shows that wholesale price spikes pose a serious threat to widespread adoption of real-time pricing.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":48127,"journal":{"name":"International Journal of Industrial Organization","volume":"89 ","pages":"Article 102979"},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2023-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41858100","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Telemedicine competition, pricing, and technology adoption: Evidence from talk therapists 远程医疗的竞争、定价和技术采用:来自谈话治疗师的证据
IF 1.5 3区 经济学
International Journal of Industrial Organization Pub Date : 2023-07-01 DOI: 10.1016/j.ijindorg.2023.102956
Daniel Goetz
{"title":"Telemedicine competition, pricing, and technology adoption: Evidence from talk therapists","authors":"Daniel Goetz","doi":"10.1016/j.ijindorg.2023.102956","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijindorg.2023.102956","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>This paper examines how new telemedicine competitors affected incumbent health care providers during the first waves of COVID-19. Using data from the largest mental health provider search platform in Canada, I show that increased telemedicine competition in a market caused incumbent providers in that market to stop offering income-based discounts to patients. I isolate the causal effect of competition in a difference-in-differences framework, comparing providers before and after a supply shock on the platform that exogenously assigned some markets new telemedicine search results. I find that higher-quality providers are more likely to stop income-based discounts when facing new telemedicine entrants, while lower-quality providers are more likely to exit the platform, which is consistent with telemedicine providers competing for more price-sensitive patients. The results suggest that expanding telemedicine options had a heterogeneous effect on the affordability of care.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":48127,"journal":{"name":"International Journal of Industrial Organization","volume":"89 ","pages":"Article 102956"},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2023-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49717406","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
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