数字市场中的自我偏好和丧失抵押品赎回权:滥用案件的伤害理论

IF 1.7 3区经济学 Q2 ECONOMICS

International Journal of Industrial Organization Pub Date : 2023-09-01 DOI:10.1016/j.ijindorg.2023.102974

Massimo Motta

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引用次数: 3

摘要

世界各地的反垄断机构一直在调查大型数字平台可能构成滥用主导地位的行为。在这里，我讨论了一些实践(包括“自我偏好”和互操作性的否定或退化)，这些实践可以解释为垂直相关或互补市场中的丧失抵押品赎回权。我特别讨论了几个引人注目的案例，涉及亚马逊、苹果、Facebook和谷歌。我将重点放在这些案例可能的伤害理论上，并表明原始的简单模型和成熟的经济理论(改编或解释)都为反竞争性止赎提供了基本原理。

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Self-preferencing and foreclosure in digital markets: Theories of harm for abuse cases

Antitrust agencies all over the world have been investigating large digital platforms for practices which may constitute an abuse of dominance. Here I discuss practices (including ‘self-preferencing’ and denial or degradation of interoperability) which can be interpreted as foreclosure in vertically-related or complementary markets. I discuss, in particular, a few high-profile cases involving Amazon, Apple, Facebook and Google. I focus on possible theories of harm for such cases and show that both original simple models and well-established economic theories (adapted or interpreted) provide a rationale for anti-competitive foreclosure.

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来源期刊

International Journal of Industrial Organization ECONOMICS-

CiteScore

2.50

自引率

6.70%

发文量

审稿时长

77 days

期刊介绍： The IJIO is an international venture that aims at full coverage of theoretical and empirical questions in industrial organization. This includes classic questions of strategic behavior and market structure. The journal also seeks to publish articles dealing with technological change, internal organization of firms, regulation, antitrust and productivity analysis. We recognize the need to allow for diversity of perspectives and research styles in industrial organization and we encourage submissions in theoretical work, empirical work, and case studies. The journal will also occasionally publish symposia on topical issues.