发布求助
文献互助 智能选刊 最新文献

International Journal of Industrial Organization最新文献

筛选
英文 中文
Bargaining on price on behalf of price-insensitive downstream consumers 代表对价格不敏感的下游消费者进行价格谈判
IF 1.7 3区 经济学
International Journal of Industrial Organization Pub Date : 2024-09-24 DOI: 10.1016/j.ijindorg.2024.103107
{"title":"Bargaining on price on behalf of price-insensitive downstream consumers","authors":"","doi":"10.1016/j.ijindorg.2024.103107","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.ijindorg.2024.103107","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>There are settings in which prices are negotiated by procurement agents and final consumption decisions are made by end users who are indifferent to negotiated prices. For example, a patient seeking medical treatment is indifferent to the treatment's cost if it is covered by his insurance program. We study bargaining for per-unit prices between suppliers and an intermediary who represents price-insensitive consumers. Under the commonly used simultaneous bargaining framework we show that, if suppliers have sufficiently high bargaining power, the resulting prices will exceed the value of the good (or service) being delivered. This overpricing is solved if simultaneous negotiations are replaced by sequential ones. The theoretical problem with sequential negotiations is that they necessitate treating the suppliers asymmetrically, even if they are symmetric; the empirical problem with sequential negotiations is that the negotiations-order is unobservable. We propose a multi-period model that resolves these issues: overpricing is prevented and all suppliers are treated the same. In this model, the result about sequential negotiations is utilized in order to produce (asymmetric) off-path threats. These threats sustain symmetric on-path play.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48127,"journal":{"name":"International Journal of Industrial Organization","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.7,"publicationDate":"2024-09-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142326819","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Redesigning automated market power mitigation in electricity markets 重新设计电力市场中的自动市场力量缓解措施
IF 1.7 3区 经济学
International Journal of Industrial Organization Pub Date : 2024-09-23 DOI: 10.1016/j.ijindorg.2024.103108
{"title":"Redesigning automated market power mitigation in electricity markets","authors":"","doi":"10.1016/j.ijindorg.2024.103108","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.ijindorg.2024.103108","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>Electricity markets are prone to the abuse of market power. Several U.S. markets employ algorithms to monitor and mitigate market power abuse in real-time. The performance of automated mitigation procedures is contingent on precise estimates of firms' marginal production costs. Currently, marginal cost is inferred from the past offers of a plant. We present new estimation approaches and compare them to the currently applied benchmark method. We test the performance of all approaches on auction data from the Iberian power market. The results show that our novel approaches outperform the benchmark approach significantly, reducing the mean (median) absolute estimation error from 11.53 (6.08) €/MWh in the benchmark to 4.03 (2.64) €/MWh for our preferred approach. This approach also performs best in our subsequent simulation of mitigation procedures. Here we find large welfare transfers from supplier to buyer surplus as well as a robust overall welfare gain, stemming from both productive and allocative efficiency gains. Our research contributes to accurate monitoring of market power and improved automated mitigation. Although we focus on power markets, our findings are applicable to monitoring of renewable energy tenders or market power surveillance in rail and air traffic.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48127,"journal":{"name":"International Journal of Industrial Organization","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.7,"publicationDate":"2024-09-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142319890","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Who versus when: Designing decision processes in organizations 谁与何时：设计组织中的决策过程
IF 1.7 3区 经济学
International Journal of Industrial Organization Pub Date : 2024-09-23 DOI: 10.1016/j.ijindorg.2024.103111
{"title":"Who versus when: Designing decision processes in organizations","authors":"","doi":"10.1016/j.ijindorg.2024.103111","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.ijindorg.2024.103111","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>This paper analyzes concurrent versus sequential decision-making in a model where two units first communicate and then make decisions, attempting to both adapt to their local conditions and coordinate with their partner. Sequential decision-making improves overall information sharing compared to concurrent decision-making. However, first movers also have an incentive to over-adapt to their state, knowing second movers will conform to their decision. A surplus-maximizing headquarters prefers sequential decision-making to concurrent if and only if (i) the two units' local conditions have sufficiently different volatilities and (ii) their need to coordinate is sufficiently asymmetric or low. Finally, sequential decision-making is shown to be optimal even when allowing for additional governance structures involving the reallocation of decision rights across the units and the headquarters and is shown to render some commonly-analyzed forms of decentralization sub-optimal.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48127,"journal":{"name":"International Journal of Industrial Organization","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.7,"publicationDate":"2024-09-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142315428","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
The impact of cartel dissolution on prices: Evidence from the air cargo cartel 卡特尔解体对价格的影响：航空货运卡特尔的证据
IF 1.7 3区 经济学
International Journal of Industrial Organization Pub Date : 2024-09-19 DOI: 10.1016/j.ijindorg.2024.103109
{"title":"The impact of cartel dissolution on prices: Evidence from the air cargo cartel","authors":"","doi":"10.1016/j.ijindorg.2024.103109","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.ijindorg.2024.103109","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>I analyze pricing behavior before and after the detection of an air cargo cartel using a novel, hand-collected dataset. I find that prices did not decline after the cartel's detection. Additionally, pricing patterns are consistent with post-cartel tacit collusion. My findings suggest that airlines' cartel activity (specifically, the development of a methodology for determining the collusive price) laid a foundation for future tacit collusion. As a result, airlines profited from cartel activity, and shippers paid elevated prices, long after the cartel's dissolution.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48127,"journal":{"name":"International Journal of Industrial Organization","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.7,"publicationDate":"2024-09-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142310695","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Ownership frictions in a procurement market: Evidence from London buses 采购市场中的所有权摩擦：伦敦公交车的证据
IF 1.7 3区 经济学
International Journal of Industrial Organization Pub Date : 2024-09-01 DOI: 10.1016/j.ijindorg.2024.103080
{"title":"Ownership frictions in a procurement market: Evidence from London buses","authors":"","doi":"10.1016/j.ijindorg.2024.103080","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.ijindorg.2024.103080","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>This paper investigates the efficiency impact of garage ownership frictions in the procurement of public bus transportation services in London. In this market, operators are less competitive for routes far from their garages, leading to local monopoly rents. Empty bus travel between garages and routes (<em>dead miles</em>) is found to account for about 13 percent of driving time in this market. Consequentially, sizeable effects of dead mile minutes on bids and procurement costs are estimated. Taking the urban context and the demand side as given, and treating this market as a typical network industry, counterfactual simulations evaluate the effect of unbundling the ownership of bus garages from the operation of the bus routes. Letting a central dispatcher allocate buses to garages would reduce total dead miles by 14 percent, with corresponding reductions of operating costs and of polluting exhaust emissions.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":48127,"journal":{"name":"International Journal of Industrial Organization","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.7,"publicationDate":"2024-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0167718724000353/pdfft?md5=399f1b60eb0bf594dc38ff5e5b8961d3&pid=1-s2.0-S0167718724000353-main.pdf","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141547904","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Market power, randomization and regulation 市场支配力、随机化和监管
IF 1.7 3区 经济学
International Journal of Industrial Organization Pub Date : 2024-09-01 DOI: 10.1016/j.ijindorg.2024.103081
{"title":"Market power, randomization and regulation","authors":"","doi":"10.1016/j.ijindorg.2024.103081","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.ijindorg.2024.103081","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>This paper provides an introduction to and overview of the mechanism design approach to textbook monopoly and monopsony pricing problems. Specifically, assuming that agents are privately informed about their values and costs, it shows that the optimal selling and procurement mechanisms quite generally involve rationing, provided the underlying mechanism design problem does not satisfy the regularity assumption of <span><span>Myerson (1981)</span></span>. Rationing takes the form of underpricing in the case of a monopoly seller and of involuntary unemployment and efficiency wages in the case of a monopsony employer. The paper illustrates these phenomena, as well as the effects of price ceilings and minimum wages, with a leading example that permits closed-form solutions. It also explains why resale tends to undermine the firm's benefits from rationing without eliminating them and discusses emerging issues for the theory of regulation.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":48127,"journal":{"name":"International Journal of Industrial Organization","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.7,"publicationDate":"2024-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0167718724000365/pdfft?md5=cdf3e6883c7b012e4c8aa2ac6e4390c1&pid=1-s2.0-S0167718724000365-main.pdf","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141525577","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Drivers of public procurement prices: Evidence from pharmaceutical markets 公共采购价格的驱动因素：医药市场的证据
IF 1.7 3区 经济学
International Journal of Industrial Organization Pub Date : 2024-09-01 DOI: 10.1016/j.ijindorg.2024.103086
{"title":"Drivers of public procurement prices: Evidence from pharmaceutical markets","authors":"","doi":"10.1016/j.ijindorg.2024.103086","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.ijindorg.2024.103086","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>This paper examines the determinants of public procurement prices using comprehensive data on pharmaceutical purchases by the public sector in Chile. We first document sizable price differences between buyers for the same product and quantity purchased: the difference between the average prices paid by buyers at the 90<em>th</em> and 10<em>th</em> percentiles of the distribution is 16 percent. Our main results are related to the importance of market structure in explaining the dispersion in procurement prices. We find that market structure explains three times more dispersion than buyer effects. Moreover, we leverage exogenous variation in market structure due to patent expirations to estimate that the entry of an additional seller decreases average procurement prices by 11.7 percent, which is 72 percent of the price differences implied by the gap between the 90<em>th</em> and 10<em>th</em> percentiles of estimated buyer effects. These results suggest that supply-side factors are relevant determinants of public procurement prices and that their quantitative importance may exceed that of demand-side factors previously emphasized in the literature.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":48127,"journal":{"name":"International Journal of Industrial Organization","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.7,"publicationDate":"2024-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0167718724000419/pdfft?md5=5d6e83dee49023509a505affcf4a6c2e&pid=1-s2.0-S0167718724000419-main.pdf","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141713078","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
The effects of short-term rental regulation: Insights from Chicago 短期租赁监管的效果：芝加哥的启示
IF 1.7 3区 经济学
International Journal of Industrial Organization Pub Date : 2024-09-01 DOI: 10.1016/j.ijindorg.2024.103087
{"title":"The effects of short-term rental regulation: Insights from Chicago","authors":"","doi":"10.1016/j.ijindorg.2024.103087","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.ijindorg.2024.103087","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>We provide an in-depth study of short-term rental (STR) regulation in Chicago. While many municipalities choose between outright bans or laissez-faire strategies concerning STR activities, Chicago pioneered a middle-ground ordinance, enabling the market to exist with limitations and registrations, and imposing a new tax. We show that compared to three control cities, the number of active Airbnb listings in Chicago declined 16.4% in the two years after the ordinance, but this effect is only significant after the city began receiving detailed data feeds from STR platforms. We further demonstrate (i) localized reductions in burglaries near buildings that prohibit STR listings as part of a new capability of the ordinance, (ii) Airbnb revenues declined more in zip codes with above-median hotel revenues, and (iii) Chicago's middle ground approach generated different and nuanced effects on different STR stakeholders, including the city itself in terms of its STR tax revenues.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":48127,"journal":{"name":"International Journal of Industrial Organization","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.7,"publicationDate":"2024-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141872489","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Competition with exclusive contracts in vertically related markets: An equilibrium non-existence result 纵向相关市场中的排他性合同竞争：均衡不存在的结果
IF 1.7 3区 经济学
International Journal of Industrial Organization Pub Date : 2024-09-01 DOI: 10.1016/j.ijindorg.2024.103097
{"title":"Competition with exclusive contracts in vertically related markets: An equilibrium non-existence result","authors":"","doi":"10.1016/j.ijindorg.2024.103097","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.ijindorg.2024.103097","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>I study a model in which two upstream firms compete to supply a homogeneous input to two downstream firms selling differentiated products. Upstream firms offer exclusive, discriminatory, public, two-part tariff contracts to the downstream firms. I show that, under very general conditions, this game does not have a pure-strategy subgame-perfect equilibrium. The intuition is that variable parts in such an equilibrium would have to be pairwise-stable; however, with pairwise-stable variable parts, downstream competitive externalities are not internalized, implying that upstream firms can profitably deviate. I contrast this non-existence result with earlier papers that found equilibria in related models.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":48127,"journal":{"name":"International Journal of Industrial Organization","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.7,"publicationDate":"2024-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0167718724000523/pdfft?md5=623ed3a84a6ad876a9e31a624e6ab972&pid=1-s2.0-S0167718724000523-main.pdf","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142180065","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
On the design of price caps as sanctions 关于设计作为制裁手段的价格上限
IF 1.7 3区 经济学
International Journal of Industrial Organization Pub Date : 2024-08-30 DOI: 10.1016/j.ijindorg.2024.103099
{"title":"On the design of price caps as sanctions","authors":"","doi":"10.1016/j.ijindorg.2024.103099","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.ijindorg.2024.103099","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>A ceiling has been imposed on the price at which Russian producers can sell oil. The price cap is intended to reduce Russian government tax revenue without increasing the world price of oil excessively. We show that such price caps can have counterintuitive effects. A price cap can induce sanctioned producers to increase their output, thereby increasing their revenue. This increased output can also reduce the world price of the homogeneous product supplied by sanctioned and non-sanctioned producers. The welfare-maximizing price cap, which is often well below the unrestricted world price, can increase welfare substantially.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":48127,"journal":{"name":"International Journal of Industrial Organization","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.7,"publicationDate":"2024-08-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142128826","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
下一页 尾页
0
×
引用
GB/T 7714-2015
复制
MLA
复制
APA
复制
导出至
BibTeX EndNote RefMan NoteFirst NoteExpress
×
提示
您的信息不完整，为了账户安全，请先补充。
现在去补充
×
提示
您因"违规操作"
具体请查看互助需知
我知道了
×
提示
现在去查看 取消
×
提示
确定
请完成安全验证×
相关产品
×
本文献相关产品
联系我们：info@booksci.cn Book学术提供免费学术资源搜索服务，方便国内外学者检索中英文文献。致力于提供最便捷和优质的服务体验。 Copyright © 2023 布克学术 All rights reserved.
京ICP备2023020795号-1
ghs 京公网安备 11010802042870号
Book学术文献互助
Book学术文献互助群
群 号：481959085
Book学术官方微信