发布求助
文献互助 智能选刊 最新文献

International Journal of Industrial Organization最新文献

筛选
英文 中文
A model of mobile app and ad platform markets 移动应用程序和广告平台市场模型
IF 1.7 3区 经济学
International Journal of Industrial Organization Pub Date : 2024-11-15 DOI: 10.1016/j.ijindorg.2024.103117
Yusuke Zennyo
{"title":"A model of mobile app and ad platform markets","authors":"Yusuke Zennyo","doi":"10.1016/j.ijindorg.2024.103117","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.ijindorg.2024.103117","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>The mobile application (app) economy comprises two distinct platform markets through which app developers generate revenue: app platform and ad platform markets. When developers monetize their apps by charging users (or through in-app advertising), they must pay commissions to the app platform (or ad platform). Both platform markets are interconnected, as developers choose which market to use for monetization (paid or ad-funded). The model shows that app and ad platforms are substitutes for app developers. Thus, an imbalance between app and ad commissions induces some developers to choose inefficient business models. For example, if the app commission is lower than the ad commission, some ad-friendly developers may choose the paid business model even though they could generate a greater surplus from advertising from a social welfare perspective. This finding highlights the benefits of distinct platforms setting similar commissions. The model is also used to evaluate the impact of a non-price strategy implemented by the app platform to limit the ability of app developers to monetize through advertising. The analysis shows that the app platform can use this non-price strategy to increase its demand at the expense of the ad platform.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48127,"journal":{"name":"International Journal of Industrial Organization","volume":"97 ","pages":"Article 103117"},"PeriodicalIF":1.7,"publicationDate":"2024-11-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142661687","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Post and hold regulation and competitive conduct: Evidence from the U.S. beer industry 事后监管与竞争行为：美国啤酒业的证据
IF 1.7 3区 经济学
International Journal of Industrial Organization Pub Date : 2024-10-30 DOI: 10.1016/j.ijindorg.2024.103116
Philip G. Gayle , Adeel Faheem
{"title":"Post and hold regulation and competitive conduct: Evidence from the U.S. beer industry","authors":"Philip G. Gayle ,&nbsp;Adeel Faheem","doi":"10.1016/j.ijindorg.2024.103116","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.ijindorg.2024.103116","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>The literature argues that Post and Hold (pH) laws facilitate tacit collusive price-setting behavior among suppliers of alcoholic beverages. Yet there is no explicit empirical test of this claim. We specify and estimate a structural model designed to identify the extent to which pH laws induce tacit collusive price-setting behavior among beer suppliers. Our estimates reveal evidence of pH law-induced collusive behavior that causes higher prices and lower consumption. Furthermore, we find that an alcohol content tax as a replacement for pH regulation yields the highest surplus to consumers compared to a sales tax or the pH regulation.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48127,"journal":{"name":"International Journal of Industrial Organization","volume":"97 ","pages":"Article 103116"},"PeriodicalIF":1.7,"publicationDate":"2024-10-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142578205","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
VAT pass-through and competition: Evidence from the Greek islands 增值税转嫁与竞争：希腊岛屿的证据
IF 1.7 3区 经济学
International Journal of Industrial Organization Pub Date : 2024-10-21 DOI: 10.1016/j.ijindorg.2024.103110
Lydia Dimitrakopoulou , Christos Genakos , Themistoklis Kampouris , Stella Papadokonstantaki
{"title":"VAT pass-through and competition: Evidence from the Greek islands","authors":"Lydia Dimitrakopoulou ,&nbsp;Christos Genakos ,&nbsp;Themistoklis Kampouris ,&nbsp;Stella Papadokonstantaki","doi":"10.1016/j.ijindorg.2024.103110","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.ijindorg.2024.103110","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>We examine how competition affects VAT pass-through in isolated oligopolistic markets as defined by the Greek islands. Using daily gasoline prices and a difference-in-differences methodology, we investigate how changes in VAT rates are passed through to consumers in islands with different market structure. We show that pass-through increases with competition, going from 50% in monopoly to around 80% in more competitive markets, but remains incomplete. We also discover a rapid rate of adjustment for VAT changes, as well as a positive relationship between competition and the rate of price adjustment. Finally, we document higher pass-through for products with more inelastic demand.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48127,"journal":{"name":"International Journal of Industrial Organization","volume":"97 ","pages":"Article 103110"},"PeriodicalIF":1.7,"publicationDate":"2024-10-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142560615","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Why do some new products fail? Evidence from the entry and exit of Vanilla Coke 为什么有些新产品会失败？香草可乐进入和退出市场的证据
IF 1.7 3区 经济学
International Journal of Industrial Organization Pub Date : 2024-10-15 DOI: 10.1016/j.ijindorg.2024.103112
Robert Clark, Yiran Gong
{"title":"Why do some new products fail? Evidence from the entry and exit of Vanilla Coke","authors":"Robert Clark,&nbsp;Yiran Gong","doi":"10.1016/j.ijindorg.2024.103112","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.ijindorg.2024.103112","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>We study a new brand (Coca-Cola's Vanilla Coke) that was discontinued after its introduction, to investigate reasons for its failure and why it was ever introduced in the first place. We estimate demand and supply and simulate a scenario in which it was not introduced. We estimate profit gains and show they may have been insufficient to cover fixed costs. We analyze the importance of variables for explaining its failure, investigating the levels of each required to cover fixed costs. We then explain how Coca-Cola may have incorrectly forecast the levels of these variables by focusing on their pre-introduction values.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48127,"journal":{"name":"International Journal of Industrial Organization","volume":"97 ","pages":"Article 103112"},"PeriodicalIF":1.7,"publicationDate":"2024-10-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142534915","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
The effects of removing gender-based price discrimination on movie demand: Estimates using smartphone location data 消除基于性别的价格歧视对电影需求的影响：利用智能手机位置数据进行估算
IF 1.7 3区 经济学
International Journal of Industrial Organization Pub Date : 2024-10-15 DOI: 10.1016/j.ijindorg.2024.103113
Yaxi Jiang
{"title":"The effects of removing gender-based price discrimination on movie demand: Estimates using smartphone location data","authors":"Yaxi Jiang","doi":"10.1016/j.ijindorg.2024.103113","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.ijindorg.2024.103113","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>Since 2021, an increasing number of movie complex firms in Japan have eliminated long-standing gender-based price discrimination by replacing discounts for only women with discounts for all customers. This study examines the impact of this discount change on movie demand. Using theater-level visit data by gender and a difference-in-differences strategy, I find increased movie demand for both males and females, indicating inter-gender interdependence of movie demand. A profit analysis shows that the average movie theater profit remains at the same level as that before the discount adjustment. Lastly, combining the difference-in-differences estimates with a random utility model reveals that joint movie consumption enhances paired customers' movie-watching utility.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48127,"journal":{"name":"International Journal of Industrial Organization","volume":"97 ","pages":"Article 103113"},"PeriodicalIF":1.7,"publicationDate":"2024-10-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142442290","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Bargaining on price on behalf of price-insensitive downstream consumers 代表对价格不敏感的下游消费者进行价格谈判
IF 1.7 3区 经济学
International Journal of Industrial Organization Pub Date : 2024-09-24 DOI: 10.1016/j.ijindorg.2024.103107
Guy Arie , Paul L.E. Grieco , Shiran Rachmilevitch
{"title":"Bargaining on price on behalf of price-insensitive downstream consumers","authors":"Guy Arie ,&nbsp;Paul L.E. Grieco ,&nbsp;Shiran Rachmilevitch","doi":"10.1016/j.ijindorg.2024.103107","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.ijindorg.2024.103107","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>There are settings in which prices are negotiated by procurement agents and final consumption decisions are made by end users who are indifferent to negotiated prices. For example, a patient seeking medical treatment is indifferent to the treatment's cost if it is covered by his insurance program. We study bargaining for per-unit prices between suppliers and an intermediary who represents price-insensitive consumers. Under the commonly used simultaneous bargaining framework we show that, if suppliers have sufficiently high bargaining power, the resulting prices will exceed the value of the good (or service) being delivered. This overpricing is solved if simultaneous negotiations are replaced by sequential ones. The theoretical problem with sequential negotiations is that they necessitate treating the suppliers asymmetrically, even if they are symmetric; the empirical problem with sequential negotiations is that the negotiations-order is unobservable. We propose a multi-period model that resolves these issues: overpricing is prevented and all suppliers are treated the same. In this model, the result about sequential negotiations is utilized in order to produce (asymmetric) off-path threats. These threats sustain symmetric on-path play.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48127,"journal":{"name":"International Journal of Industrial Organization","volume":"97 ","pages":"Article 103107"},"PeriodicalIF":1.7,"publicationDate":"2024-09-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142326819","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Redesigning automated market power mitigation in electricity markets 重新设计电力市场中的自动市场力量缓解措施
IF 1.7 3区 经济学
International Journal of Industrial Organization Pub Date : 2024-09-23 DOI: 10.1016/j.ijindorg.2024.103108
Jacqueline Adelowo , Moritz Bohland
{"title":"Redesigning automated market power mitigation in electricity markets","authors":"Jacqueline Adelowo ,&nbsp;Moritz Bohland","doi":"10.1016/j.ijindorg.2024.103108","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.ijindorg.2024.103108","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>Electricity markets are prone to the abuse of market power. Several U.S. markets employ algorithms to monitor and mitigate market power abuse in real-time. The performance of automated mitigation procedures is contingent on precise estimates of firms' marginal production costs. Currently, marginal cost is inferred from the past offers of a plant. We present new estimation approaches and compare them to the currently applied benchmark method. We test the performance of all approaches on auction data from the Iberian power market. The results show that our novel approaches outperform the benchmark approach significantly, reducing the mean (median) absolute estimation error from 11.53 (6.08) €/MWh in the benchmark to 4.03 (2.64) €/MWh for our preferred approach. This approach also performs best in our subsequent simulation of mitigation procedures. Here we find large welfare transfers from supplier to buyer surplus as well as a robust overall welfare gain, stemming from both productive and allocative efficiency gains. Our research contributes to accurate monitoring of market power and improved automated mitigation. Although we focus on power markets, our findings are applicable to monitoring of renewable energy tenders or market power surveillance in rail and air traffic.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48127,"journal":{"name":"International Journal of Industrial Organization","volume":"97 ","pages":"Article 103108"},"PeriodicalIF":1.7,"publicationDate":"2024-09-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142319890","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Who versus when: Designing decision processes in organizations 谁与何时：设计组织中的决策过程
IF 1.7 3区 经济学
International Journal of Industrial Organization Pub Date : 2024-09-23 DOI: 10.1016/j.ijindorg.2024.103111
Roi Orzach
{"title":"Who versus when: Designing decision processes in organizations","authors":"Roi Orzach","doi":"10.1016/j.ijindorg.2024.103111","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.ijindorg.2024.103111","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>This paper analyzes concurrent versus sequential decision-making in a model where two units first communicate and then make decisions, attempting to both adapt to their local conditions and coordinate with their partner. Sequential decision-making improves overall information sharing compared to concurrent decision-making. However, first movers also have an incentive to over-adapt to their state, knowing second movers will conform to their decision. A surplus-maximizing headquarters prefers sequential decision-making to concurrent if and only if (i) the two units' local conditions have sufficiently different volatilities and (ii) their need to coordinate is sufficiently asymmetric or low. Finally, sequential decision-making is shown to be optimal even when allowing for additional governance structures involving the reallocation of decision rights across the units and the headquarters and is shown to render some commonly-analyzed forms of decentralization sub-optimal.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48127,"journal":{"name":"International Journal of Industrial Organization","volume":"97 ","pages":"Article 103111"},"PeriodicalIF":1.7,"publicationDate":"2024-09-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142315428","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
The impact of cartel dissolution on prices: Evidence from the air cargo cartel 卡特尔解体对价格的影响：航空货运卡特尔的证据
IF 1.7 3区 经济学
International Journal of Industrial Organization Pub Date : 2024-09-19 DOI: 10.1016/j.ijindorg.2024.103109
Douglas C. Turner
{"title":"The impact of cartel dissolution on prices: Evidence from the air cargo cartel","authors":"Douglas C. Turner","doi":"10.1016/j.ijindorg.2024.103109","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.ijindorg.2024.103109","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>I analyze pricing behavior before and after the detection of an air cargo cartel using a novel, hand-collected dataset. I find that prices did not decline after the cartel's detection. Additionally, pricing patterns are consistent with post-cartel tacit collusion. My findings suggest that airlines' cartel activity (specifically, the development of a methodology for determining the collusive price) laid a foundation for future tacit collusion. As a result, airlines profited from cartel activity, and shippers paid elevated prices, long after the cartel's dissolution.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48127,"journal":{"name":"International Journal of Industrial Organization","volume":"97 ","pages":"Article 103109"},"PeriodicalIF":1.7,"publicationDate":"2024-09-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142310695","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Market power, randomization and regulation 市场支配力、随机化和监管
IF 1.7 3区 经济学
International Journal of Industrial Organization Pub Date : 2024-09-01 DOI: 10.1016/j.ijindorg.2024.103081
{"title":"Market power, randomization and regulation","authors":"","doi":"10.1016/j.ijindorg.2024.103081","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.ijindorg.2024.103081","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>This paper provides an introduction to and overview of the mechanism design approach to textbook monopoly and monopsony pricing problems. Specifically, assuming that agents are privately informed about their values and costs, it shows that the optimal selling and procurement mechanisms quite generally involve rationing, provided the underlying mechanism design problem does not satisfy the regularity assumption of <span><span>Myerson (1981)</span></span>. Rationing takes the form of underpricing in the case of a monopoly seller and of involuntary unemployment and efficiency wages in the case of a monopsony employer. The paper illustrates these phenomena, as well as the effects of price ceilings and minimum wages, with a leading example that permits closed-form solutions. It also explains why resale tends to undermine the firm's benefits from rationing without eliminating them and discusses emerging issues for the theory of regulation.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":48127,"journal":{"name":"International Journal of Industrial Organization","volume":"96 ","pages":"Article 103081"},"PeriodicalIF":1.7,"publicationDate":"2024-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0167718724000365/pdfft?md5=cdf3e6883c7b012e4c8aa2ac6e4390c1&pid=1-s2.0-S0167718724000365-main.pdf","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141525577","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
下一页 尾页
0
×
引用
GB/T 7714-2015
复制
MLA
复制
APA
复制
导出至
BibTeX EndNote RefMan NoteFirst NoteExpress
×
提示
您的信息不完整，为了账户安全，请先补充。
现在去补充
×
提示
您因"违规操作"
具体请查看互助需知
我知道了
×
提示
现在去查看 取消
×
提示
确定
请完成安全验证×
相关产品
×
本文献相关产品
联系我们：info@booksci.cn Book学术提供免费学术资源搜索服务，方便国内外学者检索中英文文献。致力于提供最便捷和优质的服务体验。 Copyright © 2023 布克学术 All rights reserved.
京ICP备2023020795号-1
ghs 京公网安备 11010802042870号
Book学术文献互助
Book学术文献互助群
群 号：481959085
Book学术官方微信