{"title":"Market dynamics and investment in the electricity sector","authors":"Joseph A. Cullen , Stanley S. Reynolds","doi":"10.1016/j.ijindorg.2023.102954","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.ijindorg.2023.102954","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>A transition to a low carbon future will include a medium-to-long run period in which intermittent renewables co-exist with conventional fossil fuel electricity generators. Fossil fuel generators have frequent startups and shut-downs during the transition. A dynamic competition model is developed that allows for costly cycling of conventional generators. We analyze long run effects of renewable subsidies and carbon prices in the Electric Reliability Council of Texas system using the dynamic model. Accounting for costly generator cycling leads to large changes in equilibrium outcomes and changes policy predictions. The dynamic model predicts higher subsidies or carbon taxes are required to achieve CO2 reduction targets compared to a static model without costly generator cycling. The dynamic model predicts the cost of CO2 reduction is 40 - 80% greater than the static model prediction. The dynamic model predicts a much larger gap between CO2 reduction costs for carbon taxes and renewable subsidies; $303 million/year, compared to a static model prediction of $209 million/year.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":48127,"journal":{"name":"International Journal of Industrial Organization","volume":"89 ","pages":"Article 102954"},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2023-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43627338","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Ryan Mansley , Nathan H. Miller , Gloria Sheu , Matthew C. Weinberg
{"title":"A price leadership model for merger analysis","authors":"Ryan Mansley , Nathan H. Miller , Gloria Sheu , Matthew C. Weinberg","doi":"10.1016/j.ijindorg.2023.102975","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.ijindorg.2023.102975","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>We provide a methodology to simulate the coordinated effects of a proposed merger using data commonly available to antitrust authorities. The model follows the price leadership structure in Miller, Sheu, and Weinberg (2021) in an environment with logit or nested logit demand. The model calibration leverages profit margin data to separately identify the extent of coordinated pricing from marginal costs. Using this framework, we demonstrate how mergers can shift incentive compatibility constraints and thereby lead to adverse competitive effects. The incentive compatibility constraints also affect the extent to which cost efficiencies and divestitures mitigate competitive harms.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":48127,"journal":{"name":"International Journal of Industrial Organization","volume":"89 ","pages":"Article 102975"},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2023-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47468047","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Flagging cartel participants with deep learning based on convolutional neural networks","authors":"Martin Huber , David Imhof","doi":"10.1016/j.ijindorg.2023.102946","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.ijindorg.2023.102946","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>Adding to the literature on the data-driven detection of bid-rigging cartels, we propose a novel approach based on deep learning (a subfield of artificial intelligence) that flags cartel participants based on their pairwise bidding interactions with other firms. More concisely, we combine a so-called convolutional neural network for image recognition with graphs that in a pairwise manner plot the normalized bids of some reference firm against the normalized bids of any other firms participating in the same tenders as the reference firm. Based on Japanese and Swiss procurement data, we construct such graphs for both collusive and competitive episodes (i.e when a bid-rigging cartel is or is not active) and we use a subset of graphs to train the neural network such that it learns distinguishing collusive from competitive bidding patterns. With the remaining graphs, we test the neural network’s out-of-sample performance in correctly classifying collusive and competitive bidding interactions. We obtain a very decent average accuracy of around 95% or slightly higher when either applying the method within Japanese, Swiss, or mixed data (in which Swiss and Japanese graphs are pooled). When using data from one country for training to test the trained model’s performance in the other country (i.e. transnationally), predictive performance decreases (likely due to institutional differences in procurement procedures across countries), but often remains satisfactorily high. All in all, the generally quite high accuracy of the convolutional neural network despite being trained in a rather small sample of a few 100 graphs points to a large potential of deep learning approaches for flagging and fighting bid-rigging cartels.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":48127,"journal":{"name":"International Journal of Industrial Organization","volume":"89 ","pages":"Article 102946"},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2023-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46742738","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Mergers of Complements: On the Absence of Consumer Benefits","authors":"Alessandro S. Kadner-Graziano","doi":"10.1016/j.ijindorg.2023.102935","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.ijindorg.2023.102935","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>Mergers of complements are widely thought to decrease prices and thereby benefit consumers. Benefits materialise when the merging parties are monopolists but not when they face perfect competition. What about all cases between those competitive extremes? I model a vertically related industry where every supplier may face competition. I show that, for general demand functions, pre-merger margins can reveal whether a merger would decrease prices. Then I develop a simple, practicable merger test and identify when the standard prediction of merger benefits is inconsistent with observable facts. Instead of yielding benefits, profitable mergers of complements can cause unambiguous consumer harm.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":48127,"journal":{"name":"International Journal of Industrial Organization","volume":"89 ","pages":"Article 102935"},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2023-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48419184","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Jinjing Luo , GianCarlo Moschini , Edward D. Perry
{"title":"Switching costs in the US seed industry: Technology adoption and welfare impacts","authors":"Jinjing Luo , GianCarlo Moschini , Edward D. Perry","doi":"10.1016/j.ijindorg.2023.102977","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.ijindorg.2023.102977","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>We evaluate the role of brand and technology switching costs in the US soybean seed industry using a unique dataset of actual seed purchases by about 28,000 farmers from 1996 to 2016. Using a random coefficients logit model of demand, we estimate brand and technology switching costs, characterize the distributions of buyers’ willingness to pay for seed brands and the glyphosate tolerance (GT) trait, and assess the implications of brand and technology switching costs for farmers’ welfare, technology adoption, firm profits, and firm market shares. We find that farmers are willing to pay large premiums for brand labels, and even larger premiums for the GT trait, although there is considerable heterogeneity in these values. Switching costs play an important role in the soybean seed industry. Eliminating these costs would significantly increase buyers’ welfare, reduce seed prices and firm profits, decrease adoption of the GT trait, and impact industry consolidation by expanding smaller firms’ market shares.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":48127,"journal":{"name":"International Journal of Industrial Organization","volume":"89 ","pages":"Article 102977"},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2023-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44569750","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Strategic behaviour by wind generators: An empirical investigation","authors":"Mario Intini , Michael Waterson","doi":"10.1016/j.ijindorg.2023.102947","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.ijindorg.2023.102947","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>Renewable generation of electricity is a vital step in reducing dependence on fossil fuels, and wind generation is particularly important in countries such as Britain. A large part of the windfarms are in Scotland but links with England are relatively limited and subject to exogenous failure of an interconnector. As a consequence, for a significant portion of time the system operator imposes constraints on wind generation in Scotland. We investigate the resulting effects on a majority subset of these windfarms operating under a scheme called Renewables Obligation, which involves a subsidy on top of market price. One feature of this scheme is that windfarms each declare a price at which they are willing to be constrained; these prices are used in the selection of windfarms to constrain when necessary. Thus, windfarms are sometimes paid not to produce. We investigate the strategic consequences of this, given that the prices set by windfarms to turn off in practice exceed the opportunity cost, finding significant evidence consistent with windfarm strategic behaviour. Specifically, we observe that in making their final physical declarations of output, the sample windfarms overestimate their final physical notifications of generation, the more so when other circumstances suggest constraints will be required. Following our findings we propose two potential policies to reduce both the extent of over-prediction and the payments made to windfarms to curtail output.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":48127,"journal":{"name":"International Journal of Industrial Organization","volume":"89 ","pages":"Article 102947"},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2023-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49201319","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Consequences of model choice in predicting horizontal merger effects","authors":"Matthew T. Panhans , Charles Taragin","doi":"10.1016/j.ijindorg.2023.102986","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.ijindorg.2023.102986","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>How practitioners model competition influences the predicted effects of a merger. We show how a Bertrand price setting and a second score auction model can be nested within a general bargaining framework. Through numerical simulations, we then show how the predicted merger effects vary with model choice, and that two commonly used strategies for obtaining demand parameters can yield markedly different outcomes across the models. Finally, we show how model and calibration strategy choices affect the magnitude of predicted harm in the 2012 Bazaarvoice/PowerReviews merger.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":48127,"journal":{"name":"International Journal of Industrial Organization","volume":"89 ","pages":"Article 102986"},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2023-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49247415","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Overlapping ownership and product innovation","authors":"Rune Stenbacka, Geert Van Moer","doi":"10.1016/j.ijindorg.2023.102980","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijindorg.2023.102980","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>We characterize the effect of overlapping ownership (OO) on investments in drastic product innovation. The success probability of innovation increases with investment. We analyse two opposing forces: (1) OO induces firms to internalize that success on their own behalf erodes the rivals’ business, reducing investments; (2) OO softens competition in the product market, enhancing investments. Our analysis reveals that the competition-softening effect, by stimulating investments, can induce OO to benefit consumers, in particular when the R&D projects are complex. We also show that an incumbent technology raises the threshold required for OO to stimulate investments in innovation.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":48127,"journal":{"name":"International Journal of Industrial Organization","volume":"89 ","pages":"Article 102980"},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2023-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49717326","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Patent hold-out and licensing frictions: Evidence from litigation of standard essential patents","authors":"Brian J. Love , Christian Helmers","doi":"10.1016/j.ijindorg.2023.102978","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.ijindorg.2023.102978","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>The theory of patent “hold-out” posits that frictions in the market for licensing standard-essential patents (SEPs) provide incentives for prospective licensees to opportunistically delay taking licenses with the goal of avoiding or reducing royalty payments. We construct measures of pre- and in-litigation hold-out from information disclosed in U.S. cases filed 2010–2019. Relying on both SEP and a matched control set of non-SEP disputes, we explore whether frictions in the market for licensing are associated with hold-out. We find some evidence of an association between hold-out and both SEP portfolio size and enforcement uncertainty; however, we find no evidence associating pre- or in-litigation hold-out with the international breadth of SEP rights.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":48127,"journal":{"name":"International Journal of Industrial Organization","volume":"89 ","pages":"Article 102978"},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2023-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47413559","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Private labels in marketplaces","authors":"Radostina Shopova","doi":"10.1016/j.ijindorg.2023.102949","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijindorg.2023.102949","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>Regulators are concerned that by introducing their own private labels, dominant online marketplace operators distort competition in their own favor. This paper addresses this concern by studying how online marketplaces differ from classic retailers with a wholesale arrangement. In online marketplaces individual sellers set their own consumer prices, while the marketplace operator collects fees from their sales. I show that when introducing a private label, the marketplace operator does not have an incentive to distort competition and foreclose the outside seller. On the contrary, when introducing a private label, there is an incentive to decrease the fee charged to the outside seller and to vertically differentiate its own product in order to protect the seller’s channel. However, relative to the wholesale model of classic retailers, online marketplace operators offer a lower quality with higher consumer prices, leading to less improvement in consumer surplus and potentially less harm to the outside seller.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":48127,"journal":{"name":"International Journal of Industrial Organization","volume":"89 ","pages":"Article 102949"},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2023-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49717488","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}