International Journal of Industrial Organization最新文献_第10页

How Do Top Acquirers Compare in Technology Mergers? New Evidence from an S&P Taxonomy 技术并购的主要收购者如何比较?来自标准普尔分类的新证据

IF 1.5 3区经济学

International Journal of Industrial Organization Pub Date : 2023-07-01 DOI: 10.1016/j.ijindorg.2022.102891

Ginger Zhe Jin , Mario Leccese , Liad Wagman

{"title":"How Do Top Acquirers Compare in Technology Mergers? New Evidence from an S&P Taxonomy","authors":"Ginger Zhe Jin , Mario Leccese , Liad Wagman","doi":"10.1016/j.ijindorg.2022.102891","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijindorg.2022.102891","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>Some argue that large platforms, such as Alphabet/Google, Amazon, Apple, Facebook and Microsoft (or GAFAM), are unusual in their number, pace and concentration of technology mergers, with the potential to harm market competition. Using a unique taxonomy developed by S&P Global Market Intelligence, we conduct a descriptive study of GAFAM’s M&A activities, comparing them to those of other top acquirers from 2010 to 2020. We find: (i) GAFAM completed more tech acquisitions per firm than other groups of top acquirers, and acquired younger and more consumer-facing firms on average. (ii) The top 25 private equity firms outpaced GAFAM in tech acquisitions per firm since 2018. (iii) GAFAM acquisitions are less concentrated across tech categories than other top acquirer groups, due, in part, to an “acquire-adjacent-and-then-expand” strategy. (iv) Over time, more and more GAFAM and other top acquirers acquire in the same categories. (v) No evidence suggesting that a GAFAM acquisition in a category, compared to similar categories without GAFAM acquisitions, is correlated with a slowdown in the number of new acquirers acquiring in that category. Overall, we find that technology acquisitions do not shield GAFAM from potential competition that may arise from other GAFAM members or other firms that acquire in the same categories.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":48127,"journal":{"name":"International Journal of Industrial Organization","volume":"89 ","pages":"Article 102891"},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2023-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49735653","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Outsourcing horizontally differentiated tasks under asymmetric information 信息不对称下的横向差异化任务外包

IF 1.5 3区经济学

International Journal of Industrial Organization Pub Date : 2023-07-01 DOI: 10.1016/j.ijindorg.2023.102971

Christophe Bernard, Sébastien Mitraille

引用次数: 0

Market dynamics and investment in the electricity sector 电力行业的市场动态和投资

IF 1.5 3区经济学

International Journal of Industrial Organization Pub Date : 2023-07-01 DOI: 10.1016/j.ijindorg.2023.102954

Joseph A. Cullen , Stanley S. Reynolds

引用次数: 12

A price leadership model for merger analysis 并购分析的价格领导模型

IF 1.5 3区经济学

International Journal of Industrial Organization Pub Date : 2023-07-01 DOI: 10.1016/j.ijindorg.2023.102975

Ryan Mansley , Nathan H. Miller , Gloria Sheu , Matthew C. Weinberg

引用次数: 0

Flagging cartel participants with deep learning based on convolutional neural networks 基于卷积神经网络的深度学习标记卡特尔参与者

IF 1.5 3区经济学

International Journal of Industrial Organization Pub Date : 2023-07-01 DOI: 10.1016/j.ijindorg.2023.102946

Martin Huber , David Imhof

{"title":"Flagging cartel participants with deep learning based on convolutional neural networks","authors":"Martin Huber , David Imhof","doi":"10.1016/j.ijindorg.2023.102946","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.ijindorg.2023.102946","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>Adding to the literature on the data-driven detection of bid-rigging cartels, we propose a novel approach based on deep learning (a subfield of artificial intelligence) that flags cartel participants based on their pairwise bidding interactions with other firms. More concisely, we combine a so-called convolutional neural network for image recognition with graphs that in a pairwise manner plot the normalized bids of some reference firm against the normalized bids of any other firms participating in the same tenders as the reference firm. Based on Japanese and Swiss procurement data, we construct such graphs for both collusive and competitive episodes (i.e when a bid-rigging cartel is or is not active) and we use a subset of graphs to train the neural network such that it learns distinguishing collusive from competitive bidding patterns. With the remaining graphs, we test the neural network’s out-of-sample performance in correctly classifying collusive and competitive bidding interactions. We obtain a very decent average accuracy of around 95% or slightly higher when either applying the method within Japanese, Swiss, or mixed data (in which Swiss and Japanese graphs are pooled). When using data from one country for training to test the trained model’s performance in the other country (i.e. transnationally), predictive performance decreases (likely due to institutional differences in procurement procedures across countries), but often remains satisfactorily high. All in all, the generally quite high accuracy of the convolutional neural network despite being trained in a rather small sample of a few 100 graphs points to a large potential of deep learning approaches for flagging and fighting bid-rigging cartels.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":48127,"journal":{"name":"International Journal of Industrial Organization","volume":"89 ","pages":"Article 102946"},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2023-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46742738","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Mergers of Complements: On the Absence of Consumer Benefits 互补企业合并:消费者利益缺失论

IF 1.5 3区经济学

International Journal of Industrial Organization Pub Date : 2023-07-01 DOI: 10.1016/j.ijindorg.2023.102935

Alessandro S. Kadner-Graziano

引用次数: 1

Switching costs in the US seed industry: Technology adoption and welfare impacts 美国种子行业的转换成本：技术采用和福利影响†

IF 1.5 3区经济学

International Journal of Industrial Organization Pub Date : 2023-07-01 DOI: 10.1016/j.ijindorg.2023.102977

Jinjing Luo , GianCarlo Moschini , Edward D. Perry

引用次数: 0

Strategic behaviour by wind generators: An empirical investigation 风力发电机的战略行为：一项实证调查

IF 1.5 3区经济学

International Journal of Industrial Organization Pub Date : 2023-07-01 DOI: 10.1016/j.ijindorg.2023.102947

Mario Intini , Michael Waterson

{"title":"Strategic behaviour by wind generators: An empirical investigation","authors":"Mario Intini , Michael Waterson","doi":"10.1016/j.ijindorg.2023.102947","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.ijindorg.2023.102947","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>Renewable generation of electricity is a vital step in reducing dependence on fossil fuels, and wind generation is particularly important in countries such as Britain. A large part of the windfarms are in Scotland but links with England are relatively limited and subject to exogenous failure of an interconnector. As a consequence, for a significant portion of time the system operator imposes constraints on wind generation in Scotland. We investigate the resulting effects on a majority subset of these windfarms operating under a scheme called Renewables Obligation, which involves a subsidy on top of market price. One feature of this scheme is that windfarms each declare a price at which they are willing to be constrained; these prices are used in the selection of windfarms to constrain when necessary. Thus, windfarms are sometimes paid not to produce. We investigate the strategic consequences of this, given that the prices set by windfarms to turn off in practice exceed the opportunity cost, finding significant evidence consistent with windfarm strategic behaviour. Specifically, we observe that in making their final physical declarations of output, the sample windfarms overestimate their final physical notifications of generation, the more so when other circumstances suggest constraints will be required. Following our findings we propose two potential policies to reduce both the extent of over-prediction and the payments made to windfarms to curtail output.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":48127,"journal":{"name":"International Journal of Industrial Organization","volume":"89 ","pages":"Article 102947"},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2023-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49201319","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Consequences of model choice in predicting horizontal merger effects 模型选择在预测横向合并效应中的影响

IF 1.5 3区经济学

International Journal of Industrial Organization Pub Date : 2023-07-01 DOI: 10.1016/j.ijindorg.2023.102986

Matthew T. Panhans , Charles Taragin

引用次数: 2

Overlapping ownership and product innovation 重叠所有权和产品创新

IF 1.5 3区经济学

International Journal of Industrial Organization Pub Date : 2023-07-01 DOI: 10.1016/j.ijindorg.2023.102980

Rune Stenbacka, Geert Van Moer

引用次数: 0