International Journal of Industrial Organization最新文献

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Flagging cartel participants with deep learning based on convolutional neural networks 基于卷积神经网络的深度学习标记卡特尔参与者
IF 1.5 3区 经济学
International Journal of Industrial Organization Pub Date : 2023-07-01 DOI: 10.1016/j.ijindorg.2023.102946
Martin Huber , David Imhof
{"title":"Flagging cartel participants with deep learning based on convolutional neural networks","authors":"Martin Huber ,&nbsp;David Imhof","doi":"10.1016/j.ijindorg.2023.102946","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.ijindorg.2023.102946","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>Adding to the literature on the data-driven detection of bid-rigging cartels, we propose a novel approach based on deep learning (a subfield of artificial intelligence) that flags cartel participants based on their pairwise bidding interactions with other firms. More concisely, we combine a so-called convolutional neural network for image recognition with graphs that in a pairwise manner plot the normalized bids of some reference firm against the normalized bids of any other firms participating in the same tenders as the reference firm. Based on Japanese and Swiss procurement data, we construct such graphs for both collusive and competitive episodes (i.e when a bid-rigging cartel is or is not active) and we use a subset of graphs to train the neural network such that it learns distinguishing collusive from competitive bidding patterns. With the remaining graphs, we test the neural network’s out-of-sample performance in correctly classifying collusive and competitive bidding interactions. We obtain a very decent average accuracy of around 95% or slightly higher when either applying the method within Japanese, Swiss, or mixed data (in which Swiss and Japanese graphs are pooled). When using data from one country for training to test the trained model’s performance in the other country (i.e. transnationally), predictive performance decreases (likely due to institutional differences in procurement procedures across countries), but often remains satisfactorily high. All in all, the generally quite high accuracy of the convolutional neural network despite being trained in a rather small sample of a few 100 graphs points to a large potential of deep learning approaches for flagging and fighting bid-rigging cartels.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":48127,"journal":{"name":"International Journal of Industrial Organization","volume":"89 ","pages":"Article 102946"},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2023-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46742738","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Mergers of Complements: On the Absence of Consumer Benefits 互补企业合并:消费者利益缺失论
IF 1.5 3区 经济学
International Journal of Industrial Organization Pub Date : 2023-07-01 DOI: 10.1016/j.ijindorg.2023.102935
Alessandro S. Kadner-Graziano
{"title":"Mergers of Complements: On the Absence of Consumer Benefits","authors":"Alessandro S. Kadner-Graziano","doi":"10.1016/j.ijindorg.2023.102935","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.ijindorg.2023.102935","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>Mergers of complements are widely thought to decrease prices and thereby benefit consumers. Benefits materialise when the merging parties are monopolists but not when they face perfect competition. What about all cases between those competitive extremes? I model a vertically related industry where every supplier may face competition. I show that, for general demand functions, pre-merger margins can reveal whether a merger would decrease prices. Then I develop a simple, practicable merger test and identify when the standard prediction of merger benefits is inconsistent with observable facts. Instead of yielding benefits, profitable mergers of complements can cause unambiguous consumer harm.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":48127,"journal":{"name":"International Journal of Industrial Organization","volume":"89 ","pages":"Article 102935"},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2023-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48419184","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 1
Switching costs in the US seed industry: Technology adoption and welfare impacts 美国种子行业的转换成本:技术采用和福利影响†
IF 1.5 3区 经济学
International Journal of Industrial Organization Pub Date : 2023-07-01 DOI: 10.1016/j.ijindorg.2023.102977
Jinjing Luo , GianCarlo Moschini , Edward D. Perry
{"title":"Switching costs in the US seed industry: Technology adoption and welfare impacts","authors":"Jinjing Luo ,&nbsp;GianCarlo Moschini ,&nbsp;Edward D. Perry","doi":"10.1016/j.ijindorg.2023.102977","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.ijindorg.2023.102977","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>We evaluate the role of brand and technology switching costs in the US soybean seed industry using a unique dataset of actual seed purchases by about 28,000 farmers from 1996 to 2016. Using a random coefficients logit model of demand, we estimate brand and technology switching costs, characterize the distributions of buyers’ willingness to pay for seed brands and the glyphosate tolerance (GT) trait, and assess the implications of brand and technology switching costs for farmers’ welfare, technology adoption, firm profits, and firm market shares. We find that farmers are willing to pay large premiums for brand labels, and even larger premiums for the GT trait, although there is considerable heterogeneity in these values. Switching costs play an important role in the soybean seed industry. Eliminating these costs would significantly increase buyers’ welfare, reduce seed prices and firm profits, decrease adoption of the GT trait, and impact industry consolidation by expanding smaller firms’ market shares.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":48127,"journal":{"name":"International Journal of Industrial Organization","volume":"89 ","pages":"Article 102977"},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2023-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44569750","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Strategic behaviour by wind generators: An empirical investigation 风力发电机的战略行为:一项实证调查
IF 1.5 3区 经济学
International Journal of Industrial Organization Pub Date : 2023-07-01 DOI: 10.1016/j.ijindorg.2023.102947
Mario Intini , Michael Waterson
{"title":"Strategic behaviour by wind generators: An empirical investigation","authors":"Mario Intini ,&nbsp;Michael Waterson","doi":"10.1016/j.ijindorg.2023.102947","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.ijindorg.2023.102947","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>Renewable generation of electricity is a vital step in reducing dependence on fossil fuels, and wind generation is particularly important in countries such as Britain. A large part of the windfarms are in Scotland but links with England are relatively limited and subject to exogenous failure of an interconnector. As a consequence, for a significant portion of time the system operator imposes constraints on wind generation in Scotland. We investigate the resulting effects on a majority subset of these windfarms operating under a scheme called Renewables Obligation, which involves a subsidy on top of market price. One feature of this scheme is that windfarms each declare a price at which they are willing to be constrained; these prices are used in the selection of windfarms to constrain when necessary. Thus, windfarms are sometimes paid not to produce. We investigate the strategic consequences of this, given that the prices set by windfarms to turn off in practice exceed the opportunity cost, finding significant evidence consistent with windfarm strategic behaviour. Specifically, we observe that in making their final physical declarations of output, the sample windfarms overestimate their final physical notifications of generation, the more so when other circumstances suggest constraints will be required. Following our findings we propose two potential policies to reduce both the extent of over-prediction and the payments made to windfarms to curtail output.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":48127,"journal":{"name":"International Journal of Industrial Organization","volume":"89 ","pages":"Article 102947"},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2023-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49201319","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Consequences of model choice in predicting horizontal merger effects 模型选择在预测横向合并效应中的影响
IF 1.5 3区 经济学
International Journal of Industrial Organization Pub Date : 2023-07-01 DOI: 10.1016/j.ijindorg.2023.102986
Matthew T. Panhans , Charles Taragin
{"title":"Consequences of model choice in predicting horizontal merger effects","authors":"Matthew T. Panhans ,&nbsp;Charles Taragin","doi":"10.1016/j.ijindorg.2023.102986","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.ijindorg.2023.102986","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>How practitioners model competition influences the predicted effects of a merger. We show how a Bertrand price setting and a second score auction model can be nested within a general bargaining framework. Through numerical simulations, we then show how the predicted merger effects vary with model choice, and that two commonly used strategies for obtaining demand parameters can yield markedly different outcomes across the models. Finally, we show how model and calibration strategy choices affect the magnitude of predicted harm in the 2012 Bazaarvoice/PowerReviews merger.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":48127,"journal":{"name":"International Journal of Industrial Organization","volume":"89 ","pages":"Article 102986"},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2023-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49247415","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 2
Overlapping ownership and product innovation 重叠所有权和产品创新
IF 1.5 3区 经济学
International Journal of Industrial Organization Pub Date : 2023-07-01 DOI: 10.1016/j.ijindorg.2023.102980
Rune Stenbacka, Geert Van Moer
{"title":"Overlapping ownership and product innovation","authors":"Rune Stenbacka,&nbsp;Geert Van Moer","doi":"10.1016/j.ijindorg.2023.102980","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijindorg.2023.102980","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>We characterize the effect of overlapping ownership (OO) on investments in drastic product innovation. The success probability of innovation increases with investment. We analyse two opposing forces: (1) OO induces firms to internalize that success on their own behalf erodes the rivals’ business, reducing investments; (2) OO softens competition in the product market, enhancing investments. Our analysis reveals that the competition-softening effect, by stimulating investments, can induce OO to benefit consumers, in particular when the R&amp;D projects are complex. We also show that an incumbent technology raises the threshold required for OO to stimulate investments in innovation.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":48127,"journal":{"name":"International Journal of Industrial Organization","volume":"89 ","pages":"Article 102980"},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2023-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49717326","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Patent hold-out and licensing frictions: Evidence from litigation of standard essential patents 专利持有与许可摩擦:来自标准必要专利诉讼的证据
IF 1.5 3区 经济学
International Journal of Industrial Organization Pub Date : 2023-07-01 DOI: 10.1016/j.ijindorg.2023.102978
Brian J. Love , Christian Helmers
{"title":"Patent hold-out and licensing frictions: Evidence from litigation of standard essential patents","authors":"Brian J. Love ,&nbsp;Christian Helmers","doi":"10.1016/j.ijindorg.2023.102978","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.ijindorg.2023.102978","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>The theory of patent “hold-out” posits that frictions in the market for licensing standard-essential patents (SEPs) provide incentives for prospective licensees to opportunistically delay taking licenses with the goal of avoiding or reducing royalty payments. We construct measures of pre- and in-litigation hold-out from information disclosed in U.S. cases filed 2010–2019. Relying on both SEP and a matched control set of non-SEP disputes, we explore whether frictions in the market for licensing are associated with hold-out. We find some evidence of an association between hold-out and both SEP portfolio size and enforcement uncertainty; however, we find no evidence associating pre- or in-litigation hold-out with the international breadth of SEP rights.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":48127,"journal":{"name":"International Journal of Industrial Organization","volume":"89 ","pages":"Article 102978"},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2023-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47413559","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Private labels in marketplaces 市场上的自有品牌
IF 1.5 3区 经济学
International Journal of Industrial Organization Pub Date : 2023-07-01 DOI: 10.1016/j.ijindorg.2023.102949
Radostina Shopova
{"title":"Private labels in marketplaces","authors":"Radostina Shopova","doi":"10.1016/j.ijindorg.2023.102949","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijindorg.2023.102949","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>Regulators are concerned that by introducing their own private labels, dominant online marketplace operators distort competition in their own favor. This paper addresses this concern by studying how online marketplaces differ from classic retailers with a wholesale arrangement. In online marketplaces individual sellers set their own consumer prices, while the marketplace operator collects fees from their sales. I show that when introducing a private label, the marketplace operator does not have an incentive to distort competition and foreclose the outside seller. On the contrary, when introducing a private label, there is an incentive to decrease the fee charged to the outside seller and to vertically differentiate its own product in order to protect the seller’s channel. However, relative to the wholesale model of classic retailers, online marketplace operators offer a lower quality with higher consumer prices, leading to less improvement in consumer surplus and potentially less harm to the outside seller.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":48127,"journal":{"name":"International Journal of Industrial Organization","volume":"89 ","pages":"Article 102949"},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2023-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49717488","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Cartel birth and death dynamics: Empirical evidence 贩毒集团的生死动态:经验证据
IF 1.5 3区 经济学
International Journal of Industrial Organization Pub Date : 2023-07-01 DOI: 10.1016/j.ijindorg.2023.102932
Tove Forsbacka , Chloé Le Coq , Catarina Marvão
{"title":"Cartel birth and death dynamics: Empirical evidence","authors":"Tove Forsbacka ,&nbsp;Chloé Le Coq ,&nbsp;Catarina Marvão","doi":"10.1016/j.ijindorg.2023.102932","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijindorg.2023.102932","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>This paper examines how a gradual tightening of antitrust enforcement impacts cartels’ births and deaths. To avoid the inherent sample selection bias in prosecuted cartel studies, we use a unique dataset of Swedish legal cartels registered between 1946 and 1993. We compare estimates from a count model (considering only registered cartels) and a Hidden Markov Model (allowing for potentially unregistered cartels) to identify observed and hidden cartel dynamics. The count model suggests that strengthening antitrust enforcement has a deterrent effect, but the Hidden Markov Model suggests otherwise. Despite stricter competition laws and a credible threat of cartel prohibition, cartels continue to form, but do so undercover. Additionally, our results suggest that the strengthening of competition law has little impact on destabilizing existing cartels.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":48127,"journal":{"name":"International Journal of Industrial Organization","volume":"89 ","pages":"Article 102932"},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2023-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49734615","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Rising markups, common ownership, and technological capacities 不断上涨的加价、共同所有权和技术能力
IF 1.5 3区 经济学
International Journal of Industrial Organization Pub Date : 2023-07-01 DOI: 10.1016/j.ijindorg.2022.102900
Alexandra J. Gibbon, Jan Philip Schain
{"title":"Rising markups, common ownership, and technological capacities","authors":"Alexandra J. Gibbon,&nbsp;Jan Philip Schain","doi":"10.1016/j.ijindorg.2022.102900","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijindorg.2022.102900","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>This paper analyses the impact of common ownership on markups and innovation and adds to the discussion of the recently observed patterns of a long term rise in market power. Using a panel of European manufacturing firms from 2005 to 2016, we structurally infer markups and construct a measure of common ownership. We use a propensity score reweighting estimator to eliminate biases due to observational characteristics and find an increase of firm markups ranging up to 3.3% on average in industries with high technological spillovers after the first exposure to common ownership. For companies directly held by common institutional investors, we also measure a positive effect on citation-weighted patents of up to 9.6% in high-spillover industries on average. Both findings are consistent with recent theoretical findings in López and Vives (2019).</p></div>","PeriodicalId":48127,"journal":{"name":"International Journal of Industrial Organization","volume":"89 ","pages":"Article 102900"},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2023-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49717183","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
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