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Cheap Exclusion in Markets with Multiple Complements 多重互补市场中的廉价排斥
IF 1.5 3区 经济学
International Journal of Industrial Organization Pub Date : 2023-07-01 DOI: 10.1016/j.ijindorg.2023.102982
Daniel P. O’Brien, Mark Israel, Erica Benton
{"title":"Cheap Exclusion in Markets with Multiple Complements","authors":"Daniel P. O’Brien,&nbsp;Mark Israel,&nbsp;Erica Benton","doi":"10.1016/j.ijindorg.2023.102982","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijindorg.2023.102982","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>We extend the theory of exclusive dealing in first-mover environments to settings where the incumbent seller’s product is used with multiple complements in a distribution chain and the incumbent can sign exclusive dealing contracts with more than one of them. The model is motivated by the market for biosimilar pharmaceuticals, where incumbent sellers that face a threat of entry can sign exclusionary contracts with both providers and insurance carriers prior to entry. We show that when the incumbent’s complementors are vertically related, it can be profitable for the incumbent to sign exclusive contracts with <em>indirect buyers</em>, who operate downstream from the direct buyers of the product. Under linear pricing, such exclusion is profitable if the pass-through rate is sufficiently low, and under nonlinear pricing and symmetric Nash bargaining, it is profitable for all pass-through rates. Complementors face a more severe coordination problem than independent buyers that can make anticompetitive exclusion more likely and especially cheap.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":48127,"journal":{"name":"International Journal of Industrial Organization","volume":"89 ","pages":"Article 102982"},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2023-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49735190","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
When can auctions maximize post-auction welfare? 什么时候拍卖能使拍卖后的福利最大化?
IF 1.5 3区 经济学
International Journal of Industrial Organization Pub Date : 2023-07-01 DOI: 10.1016/j.ijindorg.2023.102972
Bernhard Kasberger
{"title":"When can auctions maximize post-auction welfare?","authors":"Bernhard Kasberger","doi":"10.1016/j.ijindorg.2023.102972","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijindorg.2023.102972","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>I study auctions in which firms bid for licenses that reduce their marginal costs in a post-auction downstream market. When there are three or more firms, I show that the Vickrey–Clarke–Groves (VCG) auction maximizes consumer surplus in dominant strategies if and only if it maximizes producer surplus in dominant strategies. With two firms, the effect on consumer surplus is ambiguous. When the VCG auction does not maximize consumer surplus, I show that consumer surplus can be maximized by adding caps, i.e., restricting the number of licenses a bidder can win. This might lower producer surplus.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":48127,"journal":{"name":"International Journal of Industrial Organization","volume":"89 ","pages":"Article 102972"},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2023-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49761873","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Impact of roaming regulation on revenues and prices of mobile operators in the EU 漫游法规对欧盟移动运营商收入和价格的影响
IF 1.5 3区 经济学
International Journal of Industrial Organization Pub Date : 2023-07-01 DOI: 10.1016/j.ijindorg.2023.102927
Ángela Muñoz-Acevedo , Lukasz Grzybowski
{"title":"Impact of roaming regulation on revenues and prices of mobile operators in the EU","authors":"Ángela Muñoz-Acevedo ,&nbsp;Lukasz Grzybowski","doi":"10.1016/j.ijindorg.2023.102927","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijindorg.2023.102927","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>We use a difference-in-differences approach to assess the impact of the EU roaming regulation on mobile operators’ average revenues per user (ARPU) and the retail prices of mobile services. Our results suggest that due to the regulation the ARPU of EU mobile operators decreased since 2007 on average by 9.1%. When considering purchasing power parities, the decline of ARPU is estimated on average at 5.8%, but in this case we cannot reject that there was no decrease at all. We also find that the impact of the regulation on ARPU depends on traffic imbalances, which may be related to tourism flows, and has a stronger negative impact on operators from countries with a surplus in tourism traffic. There is however no difference in the impact of the regulation on cross-country and national operators. Moreover, our results suggest that the Roam Like at Home (RLAH) regulation implemented in June 2017 had no impact on the tariffs of national mobile plans.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":48127,"journal":{"name":"International Journal of Industrial Organization","volume":"89 ","pages":"Article 102927"},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2023-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49717182","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Platform competition with free entry of sellers 平台竞争，卖家免费入场
IF 1.5 3区 经济学
International Journal of Industrial Organization Pub Date : 2023-07-01 DOI: 10.1016/j.ijindorg.2022.102903
Federico Etro
{"title":"Platform competition with free entry of sellers","authors":"Federico Etro","doi":"10.1016/j.ijindorg.2022.102903","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijindorg.2022.102903","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>We study platforms setting access prices and commissions on revenues of sellers engaged in monopolistic competition with free entry, such as the app providers on the app stores of Apple and Android devices. The link between prices on different sides induces the platforms to redistribute all the commission revenues through lower access prices and to set the optimal commission rates from the point of view of consumers, taking into account the pass-through on the prices of sellers, the elasticities of demand and surplus for their services and the elasticity of entry with respect to profitability. We discuss the role of heterogeneous sellers, substitutability between sellers’s products and limitations of the basic alignment of interest due to direct channels for sellers and consumer myopia.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":48127,"journal":{"name":"International Journal of Industrial Organization","volume":"89 ","pages":"Article 102903"},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2023-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49717487","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Product innovation with vertical differentiation: Is a monopolist's incentive weaker? 纵向差异化下的产品创新:垄断者的激励是否较弱?
IF 1.5 3区 经济学
International Journal of Industrial Organization Pub Date : 2023-07-01 DOI: 10.1016/j.ijindorg.2023.102951
Serge Moresi , Marius Schwartz
{"title":"Product innovation with vertical differentiation: Is a monopolist's incentive weaker?","authors":"Serge Moresi ,&nbsp;Marius Schwartz","doi":"10.1016/j.ijindorg.2023.102951","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.ijindorg.2023.102951","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>This paper compares the incentives for product innovation across different market structures when the new product is vertically differentiated and of <em>lower qualit</em>y, a common case empirically. We show that innovation incentive rankings across market structures can differ substantially when the new product is of lower rather than higher quality. In particular, the incentive to add the new product can be greater for a monopolist over the old product than for a firm that would face any degree of competition from the old product. This incentive ranking cannot occur when, instead, the new product is of higher quality as has been analyzed in previous work. Moreover, in that case, the incentive ranking is the same whether the market is covered or not covered, whereas in our setting the ranking can differ. With the market covered, our setting provides another environment where the monopolist can have the greatest incentive to innovate, as previously shown when the new product is <em>horizontally differentiated.</em><span> Together, both settings show that Arrow's famous result—a secure monopolist gains less from a nondrastic process innovation than would a competitive firm—does not always extend to nondrastic product innovations. However, in all the cases analyzed here, consumer welfare (though not total welfare) is always lower under monopoly, even when only the monopolist would add the new product.</span></p></div>","PeriodicalId":48127,"journal":{"name":"International Journal of Industrial Organization","volume":"89 ","pages":"Article 102951"},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2023-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42270407","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
The home bias in procurement. Cross-border procurement of medical supplies during the Covid-19 pandemic. 采购中的本土偏见。Covid-19大流行期间跨境采购医疗用品。
IF 1.5 3区 经济学
International Journal of Industrial Organization Pub Date : 2023-07-01 DOI: 10.1016/j.ijindorg.2023.102976
Philip Hanspach
{"title":"The home bias in procurement. Cross-border procurement of medical supplies during the Covid-19 pandemic.","authors":"Philip Hanspach","doi":"10.1016/j.ijindorg.2023.102976","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.ijindorg.2023.102976","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>Public procurement markets are often national despite a general agreement against national preferencing. I exploit shocks occurring during the Covid-19 pandemic to two important factors, <em>crisis urgency</em>, measured through local infection rates, and increased <em>buyer discretion</em>, to study home bias in public procurement. Two causal difference-in-difference analyses on novel data for medical supplies in Europe show that home bias is not inevitable. An increase in local infection rates by one standard deviation locally increases the share of cross-border procurement by 19.3 percentage points over a baseline of 1.5 percent. Also, deregulation that allowed for buyer discretion caused cross-border procurement to increase by more than 35 percentage points. A simple theoretical model systematizes these findings.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":48127,"journal":{"name":"International Journal of Industrial Organization","volume":"89 ","pages":"Article 102976"},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2023-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC10287179/pdf/","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"9716107","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 1
Reprint of: Platform competition in the tablet PC market: The effect of application quality 转载自:平板电脑市场的平台竞争:应用质量的影响
IF 1.5 3区 经济学
International Journal of Industrial Organization Pub Date : 2023-07-01 DOI: 10.1016/j.ijindorg.2023.102989
Thanh Doan , Fabio M. Manenti , Franco Mariuzzo
{"title":"Reprint of: Platform competition in the tablet PC market: The effect of application quality","authors":"Thanh Doan ,&nbsp;Fabio M. Manenti ,&nbsp;Franco Mariuzzo","doi":"10.1016/j.ijindorg.2023.102989","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijindorg.2023.102989","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>The tablet PC market is dominated by two platforms: iOS and Android. In this paper, we combine tablet-level data with data on the quality of the top 1000 mobile applications from these platforms and estimate a structural demand model. We exploit variations over three periods and five European countries to find whether the application quality affects tablet demand. We then run two counterfactuals. The first counterfactual suggests that an improvement in application quality benefits the tablet producers on that platform with a more pronounced effect on the demand for Android-based tablets. The second counterfactual discusses the policy of leveling the app quality of the two stores. It shows that such a policy favors the tablet producers adopting the lowest quality app store (Google) and stimulates the adoption of tablet PCs. This generates consumer surplus in tablet demand.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":48127,"journal":{"name":"International Journal of Industrial Organization","volume":"89 ","pages":"Article 102989"},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2023-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49717486","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
How Do Top Acquirers Compare in Technology Mergers? New Evidence from an S&P Taxonomy 技术并购的主要收购者如何比较?来自标准普尔分类的新证据
IF 1.5 3区 经济学
International Journal of Industrial Organization Pub Date : 2023-07-01 DOI: 10.1016/j.ijindorg.2022.102891
Ginger Zhe Jin , Mario Leccese , Liad Wagman
{"title":"How Do Top Acquirers Compare in Technology Mergers? New Evidence from an S&P Taxonomy","authors":"Ginger Zhe Jin ,&nbsp;Mario Leccese ,&nbsp;Liad Wagman","doi":"10.1016/j.ijindorg.2022.102891","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijindorg.2022.102891","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>Some argue that large platforms, such as Alphabet/Google, Amazon, Apple, Facebook and Microsoft (or GAFAM), are unusual in their number, pace and concentration of technology mergers, with the potential to harm market competition. Using a unique taxonomy developed by S&amp;P Global Market Intelligence, we conduct a descriptive study of GAFAM’s M&amp;A activities, comparing them to those of other top acquirers from 2010 to 2020. We find: (i) GAFAM completed more tech acquisitions per firm than other groups of top acquirers, and acquired younger and more consumer-facing firms on average. (ii) The top 25 private equity firms outpaced GAFAM in tech acquisitions per firm since 2018. (iii) GAFAM acquisitions are less concentrated across tech categories than other top acquirer groups, due, in part, to an “acquire-adjacent-and-then-expand” strategy. (iv) Over time, more and more GAFAM and other top acquirers acquire in the same categories. (v) No evidence suggesting that a GAFAM acquisition in a category, compared to similar categories without GAFAM acquisitions, is correlated with a slowdown in the number of new acquirers acquiring in that category. Overall, we find that technology acquisitions do not shield GAFAM from potential competition that may arise from other GAFAM members or other firms that acquire in the same categories.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":48127,"journal":{"name":"International Journal of Industrial Organization","volume":"89 ","pages":"Article 102891"},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2023-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49735653","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Outsourcing horizontally differentiated tasks under asymmetric information 信息不对称下的横向差异化任务外包
IF 1.5 3区 经济学
International Journal of Industrial Organization Pub Date : 2023-07-01 DOI: 10.1016/j.ijindorg.2023.102971
Christophe Bernard, Sébastien Mitraille
{"title":"Outsourcing horizontally differentiated tasks under asymmetric information","authors":"Christophe Bernard,&nbsp;Sébastien Mitraille","doi":"10.1016/j.ijindorg.2023.102971","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.ijindorg.2023.102971","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>We explore how asymmetric information affects task assignment between a manufacturer and its supplier when tasks are horizontally differentiated, and when the comparative advantage in terms of marginal costs differs during the production process. We show that the manufacturer <em>over-outsources</em> to a generalist supplier and <em>under-outsources</em> to a specialist supplier depending on its level of efficiency. The presence of countervailing incentives drives these results. When the manufacturer’s internal costs are sufficiently low, it can externalize some of its best tasks and internalize its worst tasks. These two distortions simultaneously affect the contract offered to the generalist supplier.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":48127,"journal":{"name":"International Journal of Industrial Organization","volume":"89 ","pages":"Article 102971"},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2023-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47717125","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Market dynamics and investment in the electricity sector 电力行业的市场动态和投资
IF 1.5 3区 经济学
International Journal of Industrial Organization Pub Date : 2023-07-01 DOI: 10.1016/j.ijindorg.2023.102954
Joseph A. Cullen , Stanley S. Reynolds
{"title":"Market dynamics and investment in the electricity sector","authors":"Joseph A. Cullen ,&nbsp;Stanley S. Reynolds","doi":"10.1016/j.ijindorg.2023.102954","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.ijindorg.2023.102954","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>A transition to a low carbon future will include a medium-to-long run period in which intermittent renewables co-exist with conventional fossil fuel electricity generators. Fossil fuel generators have frequent startups and shut-downs during the transition. A dynamic competition model is developed that allows for costly cycling of conventional generators. We analyze long run effects of renewable subsidies and carbon prices in the Electric Reliability Council of Texas system using the dynamic model. Accounting for costly generator cycling leads to large changes in equilibrium outcomes and changes policy predictions. The dynamic model predicts higher subsidies or carbon taxes are required to achieve CO2 reduction targets compared to a static model without costly generator cycling. The dynamic model predicts the cost of CO2 reduction is 40 - 80% greater than the static model prediction. The dynamic model predicts a much larger gap between CO2 reduction costs for carbon taxes and renewable subsidies; $303 million/year, compared to a static model prediction of $209 million/year.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":48127,"journal":{"name":"International Journal of Industrial Organization","volume":"89 ","pages":"Article 102954"},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2023-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43627338","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 12
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