为能源转换设计合同

IF 1.4 3区 经济学 Q2 ECONOMICS
Natalia Fabra, Gerard Llobet
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引用次数: 0

摘要

本文考察了现货市场在提供足够的投资激励以支持电力市场零碳投资方面的局限性。相比之下,设计得当的长期合同有可能减轻价格波动,促进投资融资。建立了一个理论模型来分析道德风险和逆向选择条件下的契约设计,强调当企业暴露于价格和数量风险时所产生的权衡。研究结果为核能和可再生能源项目的最佳合同设计提供了信息,并提供了政策建议,以加强投资激励,同时最大限度地减少生产效率低下和过高的租金。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Designing contracts for the energy transition
This paper examines the limitations of spot markets in providing adequate investment incentives to support zero-carbon investments in electricity markets. In contrast, properly designed long-term contracts have the potential to mitigate price volatility and facilitate the funding of the investments. A theoretical model is developed to analyze contract design under conditions of moral hazard and adverse selection, emphasizing the trade-offs that arise when exposing firms to price and quantity risk. The findings inform optimal contract design for nuclear and renewable energy projects, offering policy recommendations to enhance investment incentives while minimizing productive inefficiencies and excessive rents.
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来源期刊
CiteScore
2.50
自引率
6.70%
发文量
48
审稿时长
77 days
期刊介绍: The IJIO is an international venture that aims at full coverage of theoretical and empirical questions in industrial organization. This includes classic questions of strategic behavior and market structure. The journal also seeks to publish articles dealing with technological change, internal organization of firms, regulation, antitrust and productivity analysis. We recognize the need to allow for diversity of perspectives and research styles in industrial organization and we encourage submissions in theoretical work, empirical work, and case studies. The journal will also occasionally publish symposia on topical issues.
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